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Preface 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, it must be confessed that I was 
quite overwhelmed by the horrific events, by the loss of life, and by the 
sheer visual impact and magnitude of the attacks against the World Trade 
Centre and Pentagon. Overwhelmed but at the same time eager, not in any 
morbid sense, to learn more about terrorism. September 11 also created 
significant media and public interest. Having entered academia a year 
earlier, after some years in private practice, and as the only international 
lawyer at the University of Canterbury, I responded by writing on the 
subject. Soon enough, that research and writing led to this thesis. 
As a full-time lecturer at the University of Canterbury, a part-time 
Barrister of the High Court of New Zealand, and a part-time PhD 
candidate, the progress and methodology in the writing of this thesis has 
been somewhat haphazard at times. The first two years of research were 
perhaps not typical of postgraduate research. That period of time was 
characterised by three types of activity: the collation of materials, from 
treaties to articles and cases; the writing of papers and articles on particular 
issues involved within the thesis topic; and the presentation of papers or 
other oral discussions and debate, including the giving of evidence to the 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the Counter-Terrorism 
Bill 2002. 
In July 2004 I was fortunate enough to take up a research fellowship at 
the Centre for International and Public Law at the Australian National 
University, working with those involved in the Australian Research 
Council funded project on Terrorism and the Non-State Actor. With that 
work, this period was an opportunity to almost entirely dedicate time to the 
writing of the thesis proper. That period saw the further development of a 
number of ideas and the writing of four significant chapters and the near 
completion of a fifth chapter. Since returning to New Zealand from the 
fellowship in early December 2004, the preponderance of my time was 
again devoted to the writing and completion of the thesis. Thus it might be 
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said that a little over two years of research was sporadic and characterised 
by the research and consideration of isolated issues, while the balance of 
time consisted of a much more concentrated period of writing and review. 
When first embarking upon this research, I was warned by colleagues 
that this would be akin to running a marathon, and it certainly has felt so at 
times. However, although the run has been a solo one, there are many I am 
grateful to for their roadside support. To my mother, for her unfailing 
faith, encouragement and pride. To my supervisors, Professor Chris Joyner 
at the Department of Government, Georgetown University, Washington 
DC, and Professors John Burrows and Scott Davidson at the School of 
Law, University of Canterbury, New Zealand. Professor Burrows' quiet, 
thoughtful, honest and generous oversight has meant a great deal to me, as 
did the generous input of Professor Davidson. I must likewise thank my 
colleagues, particularly those of the International Law Group at the 
University of Canterbury and the Centre for International and Public Law 
at the Australian National University, especially Dr Neil Boister, Professor 
Andrew Byrnes, John Caldwell, Associated Professor Pene Matthew, and 
Barbara von Tigerstrom. 
Alex Conte 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Since the tragic events of September 11, 200l, the phenomenon of 
terrorism and the idea of a war against terrorism have been much 
publicised. A considerable number of issues arise when considering 
terrorism, particularly having regard to post-September 11 events. 
Primarily, those issues can be classified in three groups. First is the subject 
of the physical response to September 11, borne out through the 
intervention in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom and the 
generic "war against terror" - what might be looked at as matters 
concerning the use of force between States. Second are those issues 
involved in the prosecution, arrest and extradition of the perpetrators of 
terrorist acts - matters concerning international and transnational criminal 
law. Finally, and partly linked with the second set of issues, is the question 
of how to suppress and deal with terrorist acts - counter-terrorism. 
The initial proposal for this thesis was to consider responses to 
terrorism by New Zealand and the United Nations post September 11. This 
thesis was to look at aspects of all three groupings of issues involved in the 
subject of terrorism. The final product is much different to that envisaged 
in March 2002. In order to properly contain the thesis subject, the topic 
has ever narrowed. Now, rather than considering the three groupings of 
issues, it is concerned with a particular aspect of the third set of issues 
(counter-terrorism). Specifically, the thesis examines New Zealand's 
counter-terrorism obligations and the interface between those and its 
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international human rights obligations (including the domestic instruments 
through which those obligations have been implemented). 
Thesis Overview 
By looking at the international framework on counter-terrorism, it will be 
shown that counter-terrorism is considered to be a pressing objective in a 
free and democratic society - terrorism being something that negatively 
impacts on various rights and freedoms (the right to life being the most 
fundamental). Equally, however, both the international and domestic 
human rights frameworks take the position that the pursuit of such 
objectives must be undertaken in a proportionate and rational manner. 
Interesting issues arise in the particular analysis of apparent conflicts 
between New Zealand's counter-terrorist and human rights legislation. 
The overall thesis question is a simple one: do the legislative means by 
which New Zealand has implemented its international counter-terrorism 
obligations comply with New Zealand's domestic human rights legislation 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights? 
The thesis is divided into two parts: 
Part I: Counter-Terrorism, Human Rights and New Zealand 
The first part of the thesis aims to lay a solid foundation for a more detailed 
examination of the interface between counter-terrorism and human rights 
by looking at extant international obligations and domestic law. 
Chapter Two reviews the relevant international law sources of 
obligation pertaining to international terrorism. Some time is spent on the 
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question of the definition of terrorism, simply to introduce the notion that 
this is a term which creates difficulties (of relevance to Part II of the thesis 
when considering the terrorist designation process). Other than that, 
however, this is not a matter that requires resolution within the thesis, since 
New Zealand (like all States) has been required to adopt its own definition 
of the term, due to the lack of a defining clause within relevant conventions 
and United Nations resolutions. The chapter introduces the general nature 
of the twelve counter-terrorist treaties and the move to adopt a 
comprehensive convention. Resolutions of both the General Assembly and 
Security Council, as actual and potential sources of obligation, are also 
considered. 
The next chapter, Chapter Three, reasonably mechanical in nature, 
looks at the twelve international conventions, various international 
resolutions and seven items of domestic legislation. The principal aim of 
the chapter is to identify the means by which New Zealand has 
implemented its international anti-terrorism obligations. In doing so, 
consideration is given to the nature of the international obligations and the 
consequent required means of incorporation. A chronological examination 
of each item of incorporating legislation is then undertaken, in an attempt 
to achieve three objectives. The first is to provide an overview of the 
nature and operation of the legislation. The second is to undertake an 
assessment of whether the legislation fully implements the relevant 
international obligations. Finally, consideration is given to what provisions 
of the legislation may have a potential impact on civil and political rights. 
The latter undertaking does not distinguish between primary and secondary 
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legislation, nor between policy, practice or discretion. It simply seeks to 
identify provisions that might impact upon a right or freedom (albeit that 
the impact may be subsequently "protected" by section 4 of the Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, or justified under section 5 of that Act). Those more 
detailed considerations are matters to be dealt with in later chapters, within 
Part II of the thesis. 
Chapter Four, the final within Part I of the thesis, considers New 
Zealand's human rights framework, including international obligations, 
pertaining to civil and political rights. It does so with the aim of 
establishing a sound platform for subsequent issues to be discussed within 
the second part of the thesis. The chapter considers, in brief terms, why the 
issue of human rights is raised in the context of counter-terrorism. It looks 
at both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. In doing so, the intention is to 
consider (in general, abstract, terms) how these two instruments apply to 
any examination of domestic law - considering the general review 
mechanisms of the ICCPR treaty-monitoring body and the manner in 
which New Zealand courts apply the NZBORA through the operative 
provisions of that Act. Of particular significance to this thesis, the chapter 
considers the question of how both instruments deal with the limitation of 
rights. 
Part II: The Inteiface between Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights 
Having looked at extant obligations and law, and identified potential areas 
of concern, Part II of the thesis undertakes a detailed examination of the 
interface between human rights and counter-terrorism. 
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Chapter Five establishes the principles by which this second part of the 
thesis is to examine particular provisions of New Zealand's counter-
terrorist law and the interface of it with human rights. Acknowledging the 
obvious point that terrorism is an important objective to pursue, some 
consideration is given to resolutions of the United Nations on the subject 
which, cumulatively, recognise that terrorism has an adverse impact upon 
various aspects of international relations, the internal workings of a State 
and upon human rights. The question is then asked, is compliance with 
human rights necessaJY when combating terrorism, concluding that 
compliance is required and that various international bodies have 
recognised this point. The crux of the chapter, and of this thesis, is then 
reached. Considering that both the maintenance of human rights and the 
combating of terrorism are important objectives, how are those objectives 
to be accommodated in free and democratic societies? In the case of New 
Zealand, how is its counter-terrorist legislation to be measured against the 
human rights protections under the and the NZBORA? This 
examination will bring to bear important and interesting issues: the 
interface between terrorism and emergency measures; the question of 
whether there is any such thing as 'non-derogable' or 'absolute' rights; 
how one is to measure the importance of the objective of counter-terrorism; 
how one is to assess whether any limitation upon rights effected by 
statutory counter-terrorist provisions is proportional; and the consequences 
of finding legislative provisions 'valid' under one human rights instrument 
but not the other. 
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Again focussing on a reasonably broad constitutional issue, Chapter Six 
considers the making of regulations under the United Nations Act 1946 and 
the potential for such regulations to limit rights in the pursuit of security 
issues. Although the making of regulations in response to Security Council 
Resolutions 1373 (concerning terrorism) is not found to cause any concern, 
it is discovered that the regulation-making power under the United Nations 
Act has the potential to abrogate rights. The balance between security and 
human rights is assessed, with recommendations for reform considered. 
Chapter Seven is the first chapter to consider specific provisions of 
New Zealand's counter-terrorism legislation. It examines the process by 
which New Zealand can designate persons as 'terrorist' or 'associated' 
entities under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. Commencing with an 
expository overview of the designation process under the Act, the chapter 
identifies aspects of the process that raise concerns about the enjoyment of 
natural justice rights, in particular the disclosure of information and the 
giving of reasons for decisions. The chapter briefly traces the sources and 
content of the relevant aspects of the right to natural justice. Significantly, 
it then examines whether the tensions between the designation process and 
the right to natural justice are compatible with the ICCPR and the 
NZBORA. Concluding that the interface between the designation process 
and natural justice is not justifiable at intemationallaw, nor 'in principle' at 
domestic law, consideration is given to what reforms might render the 
process compatible with human rights through the implementation of 
proportionate limiting measures. 
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Chapter Eight considers two democratic and civil "freedoms"; the 
freedoms of expression and association. Concerning the freedom of 
expression, the ability of the Prime Minister to issue 'media gags' during 
times of an international terrorist emergency is examined. Brief 
consideration is given to the question of whether the freedom of expression 
includes freedom of the press. In the subsequent examination of the 
compatibility of the statutory provisions with the ICCPR and NZBORA, 
the question of the justiciability of such decisions is addressed, concluding 
that judicial review is available to determine whether media gags have been 
properly issued. That conclusion will be shown to significantly impact 
upon determining whether the limitations upon the freedom of the press are 
justifiable under the International Covenant and the Bill of Rights. Chapter 
8 then considers the various restrictions upon the freedom of association 
imposed under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, which: prohibit the 
provision or collection of funds to or for a designated entity, or the 
proVISIon of property or financial services to such entities; make it an 
offence to recruit another person into an organisation or group, knowing 
that the organisation or group is either a terrorist entity or participates in 
"terrorist acts", or to participate in such an organisation or group; or, 
finally, criminalise the harbouring or concealing of a person, where it is 
known (or ought to be known) that the person has carried out, or intends to 
commit, a terrorist act. 
The final chapter III which provisions of New Zealand's counter-
terrorist legislation are examined is Chapter Nine. The chapter is 
concerned with four of the seven items of New Zealand's counter-terrorist 
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legislation: the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, the International Terrorism 
(Emergency Powers Act 1987), the Maritime Crimes Act 1999, and the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. Those enactments contain provisions 
(potentially) impacting upon the privilege against self-incrimination, the 
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, atTest and detention rights, 
and the freedom from interference with one's privacy. Chapter Nine 
examines each of those rights and freedoms in turn, applying the 
methodology identified under Chapter Five of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
New Zealand's 
International Counter-Terrorist Obligations 
International terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, the origin of the 
word terrorism dates back to the French Revolution of 1788 as the label 
used by the establishment to describe the conduct of revolutionaries. 1 
Likewise, terrorism has been a subject of concern with the United Nations 
since the 1960s, following a series of aircraft hijackings.2 Terrorism has, 
some would argue, entered a new phase since September 11 of 2001: an 
age where trans-national activity has intensified and been made easier, and 
where technology and the media can be taken advantage of by terrorist 
entities to further the impact of terrorist conduct and the delivery of 
messages or fear-inducing images.3 
The responses and initiatives of the international community since 
September 11, in what has come to be known as the "war on terror", have 
taken many varied forms. 4 The subject of concern within this thesis, and 
this chapter in particular, is an assessment of New Zealand's obligations 
under the international legal framework for counter-terrorism. This 
involves consideration of the various international treaties, norms of 
1 French Ambassador to Fiji, His Excellency "Terrorism: The New 
International Challenge", presentation at the public workshop, How Should Fiji 
Respond to the Threat of Terrorism?, hosted by the Citizens' Constitutional 
Forum and the Fiji Human Rights Commission, 17 July 2004, Suva, Fiji. 
2 Discussed below at 2.2 International Conventions on Counter-Terrorism. 
3 Berg, above n 1. 
4 Including, for example, the military intervention in Afghanistan under Operation 
Enduring Freedom, national security policies of pre-emptive strikes against States 
harbouring terrorists, initiatives towards strengthening measures towards 
disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
interdiction operations on the high seas. 
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customary international law and resolutions of the United Nations on the 
subject. By establishing the scope and content of this legal framework, and 
New Zealand's international obligations thereto, this thesis can then go on 
to consider the question of domestic implementation5 and its interface with 
human rights.6 
2.1 International Terrorism 
The starting point in looking at the international law on terrorism is to 
acknowledge the problems with defining terrorism. The United Nations 
Terrorism Prevention Branch? describes terrorism as a unique form of 
crime. Terrorist acts, it says, often contain elements of warfare, politics 
and propaganda.8 It continues, stating that "[fjor security reasons and due 
to lack of popular support, terrorist organisations are usually small, making 
detection and infiltration difficult. Although the goals of terrorists are 
sometimes shared by wider constituencies, their methods are generally 
abhorred" . 
One of the major obstacles facing the fight against terrorism is the 
inability of the international community to achieve consensus on a global 
definition of terrorism. The Executive Director of the International Policy 
5 See Chapter Three, concerning counter-terrorism laws under New Zealand Acts 
of Parliament, and Chapter Six, concerning interim implementation of obligations 
by regulations made pursuant to the United Nations Act 1946. 
6 See Part II of the thesis, Chapter Five in particular. 
7 The Terrorism Suppression Branch is part of the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, which was established in 1997 (then with the name of the United 
Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention) as a special programme of 
the United Nations General Assembly as part of its programme of action against 
crime and towards drug control - see United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 51/64 of 12 December 1996, AlRES/51/64, and 92/92 of 12 December 
1997, A/RES/52/92. 
8 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "UN Action Against Terrorism", 
URL <www.odccp.org/terrorism.html> at 19/06/02. 
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Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Boaz Ganor, has emphasised the point, 
saying that UN Security Council resolutions can only have an effective 
impact once all States agree upon what types of acts constitute terrorist 
acts.9 Despite this, there is still no definition of the term to which all States 
subscribe. 
Generally speaking, the twelve international treaties on counter-
terrorism 10 deal with specific forms of terrorist conduct and are thereby 
precise in nature and not of general application. Furthermore, they are not 
a solution in themselves, since treaties are only binding upon States parties 
to treaties. l1 Nor does the United Nations Charter contain a definition of 
the term. Likewise, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
does not include terrorism as one of the international crimes within the 
Court's jurisdiction. 12 The Court has within its jurisdiction the "most 
serious international crimes", according to its preamble. It was proposed, 
within the draft Statute, to include terrorism within the Court's jurisdiction, 
but the failure of States to upon a definition of the term resulted in 
the crime being removed from the scope of the Court's jurisdiction and 
subject matter of the constitutive treaty. 13 
9 Ganor B, "Security Council Resolution 1269: What it Leaves Out", 25 October 
1999, web site of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, URL 
<www.ict.org.iI/articles!articledet.cfm?articleid=93> at 01/06/02. 
10 Discussed in more detail below at 2.2 International Conventions on Counter-
Terrorism 
II By application of the legal principle paeta tertii nee noeent nee prosunt (treaties 
are not binding upon States unless their consent to be bound has been signified) 
as reflected within article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 
January 1980). 
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 
1998,2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002). 
13 There are arguments, however, that telTorist acts fall within the jurisdiction of 
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Perhaps most surprising is the fact that Security Council Resolution 
1373, which imposes various obligations concerning counter-terrorism 
upon member States of the United Nations, does not define the term. 14 
2.1.1 Attempts to Define Terrorism 
Attempts to define the term have been made since before the establishment 
of the United Nations. The Draft League of Nations Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism was to provide that terrorism 
comprised: 15 
All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to 
create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of 
persons or the general public. 
This Draft Convention never came into force as not enough States ratified 
it, due to dissent over the definition. 16 
There have been suggestions that terrorism be defined as the peacetime 
equivalent of war crimes. In a report to the United Nations Office on 
Dmgs and Crime (UNODC), Schmidt proposed taking the already agreed 
upon definition of war crimes (comprising deliberate attacks on civilians, 
the Court as constituting crimes against humanity, as crimes under article 7 of the 
Rome Statute. 
14 Having said this, the lack of definition was most likely due to the fact (as will 
be seen through subsequent discussions) that there is a lack of consensus on just 
what amounts to terrorism. In a desire to issue a forceful, and at the same time 
early, resolution in the wake of September 11 it is likely that the Council saw use 
of the term, without definition, as the only viable option in the short term. The 
problem with this approach is that it has left the question of defining the term with 
individual member States, leading to inconsistent definitions and, arguably, a 
weak rather than forceful resolution. 
15 As recorded by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime on its website, 
"Definitions of Terrorism", URL <www.odccp.orglterrorism_definitions.html> at 
19/06/02. 
16 Geneva Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 1937 
(Draft). See discussion on this point within the website of the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, "Definitions of Terrorism", URL 
<www.odccp.orglterrorism_definitions.html> at 19/06/02. See also Andreu-
Guzman, Terrorism and Human Rights, (lnteruational Commission of Jurists, 
2002), 185. 
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hostage taking and the killing of prisoners) and extending it to peacetime. 17 
Terrorism would then have simply be defined as the "peacetime 
equivalents of war crimes". It does not appear, however, that this has 
gained any popular acceptance. Schmidt's earlier and more complex 
definition of terrorism is, on the other hand, cited by UNODC as 
representing "academic consensus,,:18 
An anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by a 
(semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, 
criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination -
the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate 
human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of 
opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a 
target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and 
violence-based communication processes between terrorist 
(organisation), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to 
manipulate the main target (audience(s», turning it into a target of 
terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on what 
the intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. 
Although limited in its relevance to members of the European Union, the 
crime of terrorism has been defined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Union as: 19 
Any offence committed by individuals or groups resorting to violence 
or threatening to use violence against a country, its institutions, its 
population in general or specific individuals which, being motivated by 
separatist aspirations, extremist ideological conceptions, fanaticism or 
irrational and subjective factors, is intended to create a climate of 
terrors among official authorities, certain individuals or groups in 
society, or the general public. 
17 This definition was put to the United Nations Crime Branch by Schmidt in 
1992: ibid. 
18 Ibid. This definition comes from an earlier text: Schmidt AP and Jongman AI 
et al., Political Terrorism (Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 1988),5. 
19 Recommendation 1426 (1999) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European 
Union, European Democracies Facing up to Terrorism, 23 September 1999, para 
5. See also the much more precise definition within article 3(1) of the European 
Council Common Position of 27 December 2001. 
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What might be observed is that there are three common threads throughout 
this, and various other, definitions of "terrorism": firstly, that the physical 
targets of a terrorist act are not the intended targets (the target against 
whom a message is being sent, usually a Government or International 
Organisation); next, that the purpose of the threat or violence is to 
intimidate and create a situation of fear or terror (hence the term terrorism) 
or to persuade or dissuade the primary target to do or abstain from doing 
something; and, finally, that this is done to advance an ideological, 
political, or religious cause. 
It should be signalled at this stage that article 2(1)(b) of the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
contains a description of prohibited conduct that might also be useful. 20 
Ultimately, though, this is a description of a specific offence and applies 
only to States parties to that Convention?l 
2.1.2 Why a Lack of Consensus? 
The sticking point, it seems, is not so much with the technical wording of 
what physical conduct amounts to a terrorist act. The problem appears to 
lie with the purpose of the conduct. For instance, does a bombing carried 
out by a rebel group, which is directed towards the destabilisation of fascist 
authorities (the Pol Pot Regime, for example), amount to a terrorist act or 
an act of "freedom fighters"? The point to make is that this is not just a 
20 Opened for signature 10 January 2000, 2179 UNTS 232 (entered into force 10 
April 1992). 
21 Discussed below at 2.2.2 Utility of the International Conventions. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 15 
Chapter 2: New Zealand's lntemational Counter-Terrorist Obligations 
cliche.22 To give two very striking examples, the United States keeps a list 
of the most wanted terrorists.23 That list featured, at one time, Yassir 
Arafat and Nelson Mandela - both of whom were subsequently awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize: clearly evidence that this is a highly political and 
controversial issue. An observation made by a journalist on this point 
encapsulates the issue very nicely:24 
Terrorists are those who use violence against the side that is using the 
word. 
A number of States argue that a subjective analysis and definition of such 
conduct (by examining the purpose of the conduct) should therefore be 
made. It is interesting to note, in that regard, that early resolutions of the 
General Assembly addressing the issue of terrorism contained express 
affirmations of the principle of self-determination. In the very first 
resolution of the United Nations on the subject of terrorism, the General 
Assembly expressed deep concern over terrorism, urged States to solve the 
problem by addressing the underlying issues leading to terrorist conduct 
and then stated:25 
Reaffinns the inalienable right to self-determination and independence 
of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien 
domination and upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular 
the struggle of national liberation movements, in accordance with the 
22 Indeed, this has been the subject of much debate. See, for example, Ganor B, 
"Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?", 
online publications of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 
URL <http://www.ict.org.il/artic1es/define.htm> at 7 January 2005. 
23 This is maintained by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
may be accessed online at URL <www.fbi.gov/mostwantlterrorists/ 
fugiti ves.htm>. 
24 The Observer, 30 September 2001, quote contained within Submissions of the 
Indonesian Human Rights Committee to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee on the Terrorism <Bombings and Finance> Suppression Bill, 
TERRO/88, Parliamentary Library, Wellington. 
25 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 
1972, AlRES/27/3034, para 3. 
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purposes and principles of the Charter and the relevant resolutions of 
the organs of the United Nations; 
A number of subsequent General Assembly resolutions echoed this 
affirmation, adding that such liberation movements should also be 
conducted in accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States?6 
Although these resolutions urge compliance with these principles, the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that Arab States such as 
Libya, Syria and Iran have all campaigned for a definition that excludes 
acts of "freedom fighters" from the international definition of terrorism by 
employing the argument that a justified goal may be pursued by any 
available means.27 
While it must be acknowledged that these positions are firmly held by a 
small number of States, it should also be pointed out that the majority of 
States adhere to an objective definition of terrorism (one which does not 
take into account the motives of the conduct). In 1994, the UN General 
Assembly adopted the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International 
26 This further qualification was firsts added by United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 38/130 of 19 December 1983, AlRES/38/130, preambular para 6, and 
reiterated within United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 40/61 of 9 
December 1985, AlRES/40/61, preambular para 8; 421159 of 7 December 1987, 
AlRES/42/159, preambular para 12; 44/29 of 4 December 1989, AlRES/44/29, 
preambular para 17; and 46/51 of 9 December 1991, AlRES/46/51, preambular 
para 14. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States was adopted by the General Assembly 
in its Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, AlRES/25/2625. Prior to this, 
the paragraph quoted was restated in United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions 31/lO2 of 15 December 1976, AlRES/31/102, para 3; 321147 of 16 
December 1977, AlRES/321147, para 3; 341145 of 17 December 1979, preambular 
para 5; and 361109 of lO December 1981, preambular para 6. For a more detailed 
discussion on the issue of liberation movements and terrorism see Ganor B, 
"Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?", 
online publications of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 
URL <http://www.ict.org.iVarticles/define.htm> at 7 January 2005. 
27 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime website, above, n 15. 
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Terrorism 28 The Declaration was based on the notion of peace and 
security and the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in 
international relations.29 It pronounced that terrorism constitutes a grave 
violation of the purpose and principles of the United Nations?O While it 
did not purport to define "terrorism", it did say that criminal acts intended 
or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public for political 
purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable: 31 
The States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their 
unequivocal condemnation of acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism, as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever 
committed, including those which jeopardise the friendly relations 
among States and peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and 
security of States. [emphasis added] 
In reaffirming the Declaration in 1995,32 the Assembly was even more 
. h" 33 precIse on t IS pomt: 
Reiterates that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of 
terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons are 
in any circumstances unjustifiable, ~=::..;...;:..::.......;=--=..:======---,,=--= 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any 
other nature that may be invoked to justify them; [emphasis added] 
Of even greater value in this respect, according to the Executive Director of 
the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, is the Security 
28 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60, Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, AlRES/49/60, 9 December 1994. 
29 Ibid, as is evident through its preamble. 
30 Ibid, paragraph 2. 
31 Ibid, paragraph 1. 
32 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/53 of 11 December 1995, 
AlRES/50/53, para 3. 
33 Ibid, para 2. See also paras 2 of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
511210 of 17 December 1996, AIRES/51 121 0; 52/165 of 19 January 1998, 
AlRES/52/165; 541110 of 2 February 2000, AlRES/54111O; 551158 of 30 January 
2001, AlRES/55/158; 56/88 of 24 January 2002, AlRES/56/88; 57/27 of 15 
January 2003, AlRES/57127; 58/81 of8 January 2004, AlRES/58/81; and 59/46 of 
2 December 2004, AlRES/59/46. 
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Council's Resolution 1269?4 While the Resolution also fails to define 
terrorism, it does clearly take an objective approach to the question of 
terrorist conduct, stating that the Security Council: 35 
1. Unequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices of 
terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, 
in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever 
committed, in particular those which would threaten international peace 
and security; [emphasis added] 
Resolution 1373 also points to an objective approach, paragraph 3(g) of the 
Resolution calling upon States to ensure that "claims of political 
motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the 
extradition of alleged terrorists".36 Even more directly on point is the latest 
resolution of the Security Council, as at the beginniug of 2005, on the 
subject of terrorism: 37 
3. Recalls that criminal acts, including against civilians, committed 
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of 
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general 
public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a 
population or compel a government or an international organization to 
do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within 
the scope of and as defined iu the international conventions and 
protocols relatiug to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable 
by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, 
ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to 
prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts are 
punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature; [emphasis 
added] 
34 Ganor, above n 9. 
35 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1269 of 19 October 1999, 
S/RES/1269 (1999). 
36 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, 
S/RESIl373 (2001). 
31 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 of 8 October 2004, 
SIRES/1566 (2004), para 3. 
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2.1.3 The Concept of Terrorism 
One further matter bears reflection upon before leaving the issue of 
definition. The word "terrorism", particularly in the vocabulary of the 
media since September 11, has corne to be used as a description of a 
significantly wide range of violent conduct. Little regard is paid in use of 
the word to the three cornmon threads identified above (differential targets; 
terror-inducing conduct; to influence a government or organisation). It has 
become all too common, in the observation of the author, for events with 
some level of "fear-factor" to be sensationalised as terrorist acts. Care 
must be taken when considering and assessing situations and how they 
might impact upon the topic. Civil conflicts where there is no differential 
targeting should be treated as civil conflicts, not as acts of terrorism. 
Criminal acts should likewise be dealt with in the context of normal 
criminal practice and procedure. 
This opens the door to an even more fundamental question: why talk 
about terrorism at all? An act of "terrorism", after all, will comprise a 
series of acts which, in and of themselves, constitute various criminal 
offences. To take an example, a bombing of an Embassy will likely 
involve the unlawful possession of explosives, the wilful destruction of 
property and the wilful injury to or killing of persons. Each element is a 
criminal offence in most jurisdictions and, as such, is capable of being 
dealt with by the relevant municipal jurisdiction. In submissions before the 
New Zealand Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the 
Counter-Terrorism Bill, for example, Professor Matthew Palmer argued 
that there are no good policy grounds to justify a separate, parallel regime 
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of counter-terrorism law?8 Having regard to the composite nature of 
terrorist conduct, there is some merit to that argument. 
The need to establish a separate regime must also be questioned having 
regard to the frequency and material affect of terrorist conduct. The annual 
publication of the United States Department of State, Patterns of Global 
Terrorism, has tracked the following patterns: 208 acts of international 
terrorism took place in 2003, up slightly from the 198 attacks in 2002, but 
down from the 355 attacks in 2001; with a corresponding death toll of 625 
persons in 2003, 725 in 2002 and 3636 killed and injured in 2001. 39 In the 
twenty years up to September 11, the incidents of terrorist conduct 
fluctuated, without any discernable pattern, from the high 200s to the high 
600s.40 While one can never undervalue the loss of human life, it must be 
acknow ledged that there are many more causes of death resulting in higher 
death tolls than as a result of terrorist conduct. If that is the case, then why 
add to the extant law? 
38 New Zealand, Counter-Terrorism, Bill. Government Bill. Commentary, as 
reported from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (2003) 2. See 
also Professor Palmer's article "Counter-Terrorism Law", (2002) New Zealand 
Law Journal 456. 
39 United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, May 
2002, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, April 2003, Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 2003, April 2004 (Revised 22 June 2004). The New Zealand Law 
Commission report on emergencies likewise speaks of the perception of high 
death tolls resulting from terrorist activity, while at the same time recognising the 
broad psychological impact of terrorism upon society. In 1985, the report notes, 
17 of the 28,000,000 US citizens who travelled abroad that year were killed by 
terrorists - equal to a one-in-l,600,000 chance of becoming a terrorist victim: 
Keith K, Final Report on Emergencies (New Zealand Law Commission Report 
22, 1991), para 7.14. 
40 The 2001 Report, in reviewing patterns over a twenty-year period from 1981, 
also identifies that the least number of terrorist attacks, at 274, was recorded in 
1998, with the highest number of incidents in 1987 at 666 attacks: ibid. It should 
be noted, of course, that a total of 3,030 people died during the September 11 
attacks, as recorded in the remembrance pages of September 11 News.com, URL 
<http://www.september11news.coml911Art.htm> at 7 January 2004. 
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The answer seems to lie in a combination of factors, not all of which 
are unique to terrorism, but which cumulatively appear to have been seen 
by States as calling for a different treatment of the subject matter. The 
common thread in each factor, or at least in the way each factor can be 
perceived, is the political interests of States. The writer posits that at least 
the following factors are relevant to the move by the international 
community towards treating terrorism as a unique form of crime deserving 
. 1 . 41 specla attentlOn. The most apparent is the fear-inducing nature of 
tenorist conduct and the attention this brings to terrorist events through the 
media and public alike. This in turn adversely affects the credibility of 
national executive administrations in the eyes of the domestic public, and 
also the credibility of the United Nations as an institution established to 
maintain international peace and security in the eyes of the international 
community. The more severe the terrorist act, the greater the tenor 
induced, to the extent that the public may in fact be paralysed in a real 
sense, affecting their freedom of movement and association, and enjoyment 
of life.42 That again serves to adversely impact upon national and 
international "executive" credibility. As will be seen through the 
41 These are views posited in an attempt to illustrate some of the reasons that 
terrorism has been treated differently by the international community and 
constituting policy reasons (whether sound or not) for a separate or parallel 
counter-terrorism regime. Ultimately, however, this Chapter seeks to outline the 
international framework on counter-terrorism and is restricted in its consideration 
to that existing framework in order to deduce what consequent international 
obligations New Zealand has. 
42 As explicitly recognised within United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
54/164 of 24 February 2000, AlRES/54/164. The Resolution is very similar to its 
three predecessors: AlRES/49/185 of 23 December 1994; AlRES/50/186 of 22 
December 1995; and AlRES/52/133 of 27 February 1998. Its contents were 
similarly reaffirmed within subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly: 
AlRES/56/160 of 13 February 2002; and AlRES/58/174 of lO March 2004. See 
also Chapter Five, concerning the impact of terrorism upon human rights. 
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discussion of international documents on terrorism that follows, terrorism 
is therefore viewed as being a crime of "international concern" (using the 
wording of the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court). 
Terrorism was, as already indicated, proposed to be included within the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, to stand beside genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.43 
A further issue of concern to States IS the transnational nature of 
terrorist offending. Whether through Embassy bombings on foreign soil or 
direct attacks within the territory of a State (such as the September 11 
attacks and the Madrid rail bombing), national interest and national 
security are affected. Through an international framework on counter-
terrorism, those interests can be arguably better protected through the 
ability to secure the extradition of perpetrators of such attacks44 and cut off 
the means by which terrorist organisations operate.45 
A final and individual self-interest of States is that of combating 
revolutionary and secessionist terrorism, that is, terrorism occurring solely 
within a State and aimed at destabilising or overthrowing the established 
government of the State, or conduct aimed at 'breaking away' from the 
State.46 The established government has, in those circumstances, a very 
real and pressing desire to eradicate terrorism. 47 The international 
community, in seeking to maintain the integrity of statehood and the 
43 Above n 13. 
44 This being a common feature of the counter-terrorist conventions: see below. 
45 Whether by obliging States to prevent the use of their territories for training 
facilities or suppressing access to funds, explosives and the like. 
46 For more discussion on this point, see Ganor, above n 22. 
47 By way of example, India's Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002 describes a 
terrorist act as one including conduct by a person "with intent to threaten the 
unity, integrity, security or sovereignty ofIndia" (section 3(l)(a) of the Act). 
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stability of regions, also has a vested interest. Examples include the 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty movement in Spain,48 the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party in Turkel9 and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 
Sri Lanka.5o It should be noted that the classification of some such entities 
as terrorist organisations is disputed on the basis that these are freedom-
fighting or liberation movements, illustrating the complex nature of 
defining terrorism and terrorist entities. 
Although this philosophical question is important, hence it being raised 
and discussed, the ultimate policy reason for New Zealand enacting 
counter-terrorism legislation must be that it has international legal 
obligations to do so. The balance of this Chapter addresses the 
international framework upon which those obligations arc based. 
2.2 International Conventions on "-"'U' .......... a 
Following the September 11 attacks, the United Nations was quick to 
defend its position, stating that it has long been active in the fight against 
international terrorism. 51 This is correct in substance, since the 
organisation has, from as early as 1963, been a catalyst for the creation of a 
number of agreements providing the basic legal means to counter 
international terrorism, from the seizure of the aircraft to the financing of 
terrorism. 
48 See Appendix A "Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations" in Howard RD and Sawyer RL (eds), Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism. Understanding the New Security Environment (Revised and 
Updated), The McGraw-Hill Companies (2003), 507. 
49 Ihid, 514. 
50 Ihid, 516. 
51 UN Press Release, 19 September 2001. 
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The phenomenon of terrorism became an international concern in the 
1960s when a series of aircraft hijackings hit the headlines. When the 1972 
Munich Olympic Games were disrupted the kidnapping of Israeli athletes 
by a Palestinian group, the then Secretary-General of the UN, Kurt 
Waldheim, asked that the issue be placed on the General Assembly's 
agenda. In the heated debate that followed, the Assembly assigned the 
issue to its Sixth (Legal) Committee, which subsequently proposed several 
conventions on terrorism. There are now twelve conventions and protocols 
on terrorism, all of which have entered into force. 52 Those conventions and 
protocols are identified by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Committee and Terrorism Prevention Branch as the principal international 
counter-terrorist treaties. If one were to take a more comprehensive 
approach, a considerably greater list of international treaties would be 
adopted.53 In its first report to the Security Council Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, for example, New Zealand referred to its decision to ratify the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its 
52 A situation that had not existed at the time of the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
as discussed below in the context of Security Council Resolution 1373 at 2.2.2 
Utility of the International Conventions. 
53 Including, by way of illustration, the Convention on the Safety of United 
Nations and Associated Personnel (opened for signature 9 December 1994, 2051 
lJNTS 391, entered into force 15 January 1999), the Convention for the 
Reciprocal Recognition of Proof Marks on Small Arms (opened for signature 1 
July 1969, 795 UNTS 248, entered into force 3 July 1971), the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (opened for signature 
10 April 1972, 1015 UNTS 168, entered into force 26 March 1975), Convention 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signature 1 July 1968 , 
729 UNTS 169, entered into force 5 March 1970), and the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction (opened for signature 13 January 1993, 
CDICWIWPAOOlRev.l, entered into force 29 April 1997). The Terrorism 
Prevention Branch itself identifies a list of factors that require action in the 
elimination of terrorism. The list of factors alone runs to seven pages - see 
"Classification of Counter-Terrorism Measures" URL <www.odccp.org/ 
terrorism_measures.html> at 2 June 2002. 
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two Protocols against the Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in 
Persons. 54 For the purpose of this thesis, however, consideration will be 
confined to the twelve instruments identified by the Terrorism Prevention 
Branch, these being commonly identified as the principal anti-terrorism 
conventions.55 Having said that, it might be noted within the subsequent 
description of extant conventions that a number of the offences created 
apply to anyone committing the offences described (such as the hijacking 
of an aircraft, for example), whether or not this is done in pursuit of 
terrorist motives. 
1 The Extant Conventions 
In chronological order, one starts with the Convention on Offences and 
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (the Tokyo 
Convention).56 The Convention applies to acts affecting in-flight safety. 
It authorises the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, 
including restraint, on any person he or she believes has committed or is 
about to commit an act affecting in-flight safety, when necessary to protect 
the safety of the aircraft. It also requires contracting States to take custody 
of offenders and to return control of the aircraft to the lawful commander. 
The second and third conventions are also concerned with air safety. The 
54 New Zealand Government, Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 
September 2001, lodged by New Zealand's Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations, Don McKay, 24 December 2001, S12001l1269, 4. 
55 See, for example, the United Nations Treaty Collection list of "Conventions on 
Terrorism", URL <http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp> at 7 January 
2004; and Greenwood C, "International Law and the 'War Against Terrorism''', 
International Affairs 78,2 (2002) 301. 
56 Opened for signature 14 September 1963, 704 UNTS 219 (entered into force 4 
December 1969). There are currently 178 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://www.icao.int/icao/enllebffokyo.htm> at 5 January 2005. 
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Convention for the Suppression of Unlmiful Seizure of Aircraft (the Hague 
Convention),57 makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in 
flight to "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of 
intimidation, seize or exercise control of that aircraft" or to attempt to do 
so. It requires parties to the Convention to make hijackings punishable by 
severe penalties. It requires parties that have custody of offenders to either 
extradite the offender or submit the case for prosecution and also requires 
parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings brought 
under the Convention. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlav.1ul 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal Convention)58 
makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform 
an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act 
is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; to place an explosive device 
on an aircraft; and to attempt such acts or be an accomplice of a person 
who performs or attempts to perform such acts. As for the Seizure of 
Aircraft Convention just mentioned, it requires parties to make offences 
punishable by severe penalties and again requires parties that have custody 
of offenders to either extradite the offender or submit the case for 
prosecution. 
In 1973, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against International Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (the 
57 Opened for signature 16 December 1970, 860 UNTS 105 (entered into force 14 
October 1971). There are currently 178 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://www.icao.intlicao/enlleb/Hague.htm> at 5 January 2005. 
58 Opened for signature 23 September 1971,974 UNTS 177 (entered into force 26 
January 1073). There are currently 180 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://www.icao.intlicao/enileblMtl71.htm> at 5 January 2005. 
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Protected Persons Convention) was adopted.59 Internationally protected 
persons are defined as a Head of State, a Minister for Foreign Affairs, a 
representative or official of a State or of an international organisation who 
is entitled to special protection from attack under international law (these 
people being popular terrorist targets). The Convention requires each State 
party to criminalise and make punishable by appropriate penalties which 
take into account their grave nature, the intentional murder, kidnapping, or 
other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected 
person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the private 
accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or 
attempt to commit such an attack; and an act constituting participation as 
an accomplice. Also within the theme of protecting persons, the 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (the Hostages 
Convention)60 states that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to 
kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a 
. .. State, an international intergovernmental organisation, a natural or 
juridical person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act 
as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage" commits 
the offence of taking of hostage within the meaning of this Convention. 
59 Opened for signature 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167 (entered into force 
20 February 1977). There are currently 146 States parties to the Convention, 
URL <http://untreaty. un.org/ENGLISHIStatus/Chaptecxviiiltreaty7 . asp> at 5 
Jauuary 2005. 
60 Opened for signature 18 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (entered into force 3 
June 1983). There are currently 138 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://untreaty.un.orglENGLISHIStatus/Chapter_xviiiltreaty5.asp> at 5 January 
2005. 
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Next in time is the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (the Nuclear Materials Convention).61 This criminalises the 
unlawful possession, use or transfer of nuclear material, the theft of nuclear 
material, and threats to use nuclear material (to cause death or serious 
injury to any person or substantial property damage). 
The Protocol on the Suppression of UnlaYljul Acts of Violence at 
Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (the Montreal Protocol) was a 
further addition to air-safety-related counter-terrorist conventions.62 The 
Protocol extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention of 1971 to 
encompass terrorist acts at airports servicing international civil aviation. 
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation (the Rome Convention) was adopted in 1988.63 
Here, the treaty establishes a legal regime applicable to international 
maritime navigation that is similar to the regimes established concerning 
international aviation. More specifically, it makes it an offence for a 
person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or exercise control over a ship 
by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of violence against a 
person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation 
of the ship; to place a destructive device or substance aboard a ship; and 
other acts against the safety of ships. As an optional protocol to the latter 
61 Opened for signature 3 March 1980, 1456 UNTS 124 (entered into force 8 
February 1987). There are currently 109 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://www . iaea.orglPublicationslDocuments/Conventions/ cppn_status. pdf> at 5 
January 2005. 
62 Opened for signature 24 February 1988. lCAO Doc 9518 (entered into force 6 
August 1989). There are currently 148 States parties to the Protocol, URL 
<http://www.icao.intlicao/enlleb/Via.htm> at 5 January 2005. 
63 Opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 
March 1992). There are currently 114 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://www.imo.org/home.asp?flash=false> at 5 January 2005. 
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Convention, the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlavtful Acts against the 
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (the Rome 
Protocol) was also adopted in 1988,64 at the same time as its parent 
Convention. Again by way of extension, the Protocol establishes a legal 
regime applicable to fixed platforms on the continental shelf (similar to the 
regimes established with regard to international aviation). 
Last in the list of conventions relating to air safety, and within the 
jurisdiction of the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, is the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for 
the Purpose of Detection (the Plastic Explosives Convention).65 This is 
designed to control and limit the use of unmarked and undetectable plastic 
explosives (negotiated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing). 
Parties are obligated in their respective territories to ensure effective 
control over "unmarked" plastic explosive, i.e., those that do not contain 
one of the detection agents described in the Technical Annex to the treaty. 
Each party must, among other things: take necessary and effective 
measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked plastic 
explosives; prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or 
out of its territory; ensure that all stocks of such unmarked explosives not 
held by the military or police are destroyed or consumed, marked, or 
rendered permanently ineffective within three years; take necessary 
measures to ensure that unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or 
64 Opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1 
March 1992). There are currently 103 States parties to the Protocol, URL 
<http://www.imo.orglhome.asp?flash=false> at 5 January 2005. 
65 Opened for signature 1 March .1991, ICAO Doc 9571 (entered into force 21 
June 1998). There are currently 113 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://www.icao.intlicao/enilebIMEX.htm> at 5 January 2005. 
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police are destroyed or consumed, marked, or rendered permanently 
ineffective within fifteen years; and ensure the destruction, as soon as 
possible, of any unmarked explosives manufactured after the date of entry 
into force of the Convention for that State. 
More recent in time is the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorist Bombing (the Suppression of Bombing Convention).66 As the 
name suggests, this creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the 
unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, 
or against various public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily 
injury, or with intent to cause extensive destruction in a public place. 
Finally, there is the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism (the Suppression of Financing Convention).67 Of 
the 12 conventions, this is the most controversial. It requires parties to take 
steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether direct or 
indirect, through groups claiming to have charitable, social or cultural 
goals or which also engage in such illicit activities as drug trafficking or 
gun runnmg. It commits States to hold those who finance terrorism 
criminally, civilly or administratively liable for such acts and provides for 
the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for terrorist 
activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other States 
on a case-by-case basis. Banle secrecy will no longer be justification for 
refusing to cooperate under the treaty. 
66 Opened for signature 12 January 1998,2149 UNTS 286 (entered into force 23 
May 2001). There are currently 123 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://untreaty. un.orgIENGLISHIS tatus/Chaptecxviii/treaty9 .asp> at 5 January 
2005. 
67 Above n 20. There are currently 117 States parties to the Convention, URL 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISHIStatus/Chaptecxviii/treatyII.asp> at 5 January 
2005. 
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In summary, then, the twelve anti-terrorism conventions are directed at 
the protection of potential terrorist targets or at the means through which 
terrorist organizations operate and do three main things: they criminalize 
certain conduct, they provide for the prosecution or extradition of 
perpetrators of such criminal acts, and they impose obligations upon States 
to suppress the conduct in question. Three potential target groups exist 
within the twelve conventions: civil aviation (the Tokyo, Hague and 
Montreal Conventions and the Montreal Protocol); persons (the Protected 
Persons Convention and the Hostages Convention); and operations at sea 
(the Rome Convention and Rome Protocol). Four means through which 
terrorist acts might be executed or facilitated are the subject matter of the 
remaining four conventions: the Plastic Explosives and Nuclear Materials 
Conventions and the Suppression of Bombing and Suppression of 
Financing Conventions. 
2.2.2 Utility of the International Conventions 
The number and scope of these conventions might, at fiI'st instance, seem 
impressive and comprehensive. They have, however, various limitations. 
To begin with, they only apply to States parties to the conventions. Even 
then, the conventions themselves are of limited application because of the 
very precise subject matter of each treaty. The conventions are not of 
general application but, rather, relate to specific situations in which 
terrorist acts might have effect, whether on board aircraft, in airports or on 
maritime platforms. 
The only treaty with the potential to impact a wider audience and scope 
of activity is the Suppression of the Financing Convention. This is said for 
Terror versus Tyranny PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 32 
Chapter 2: New Zealand's Intemational Counter-Terrorist Obligations 
two reasons. Firstly, the convention mirrors most of the suppression of 
financing obligations contained in Resolution 1373. As a resolution 
binding upon all members of the United Nations,68 this has had a 
significant impact upon the status of the convention. Prior to September 
11, 2001, there were just four states parties to the convention and, 
accordingly, the convention was not in force. Since then, and largely in 
response to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and the work of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, almost 120 States have becomes parties to 
the convention, which has now come into force.69 
The other reason the Suppression of Financing Convention is of greater 
relevance is the fact that, in prohibiting the financing of terrorist entities or 
operations, it defines (for those purposes) what type of acts one may not 
finance: 70 
Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a 
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the 
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such 
act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel 
a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act. 
The Convention does therefore have some potentially wider application 
and is useful for States in determining the type of conduct they are to 
prohibit. 
68 By application of article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
69 The convention came into force on 10 April 2002. There are now 132 
signatories and 117 parties: URL <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISHIStatus/ 
Chapter_xviiiltreatyl1.asp> at 12 July 2004. 
70 Article 2(1 )(b) of the Suppression of Financing Convention. 
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2.2.3 Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism 
Almost one year prior to the September 11 attacks, India had proposed that 
there be a comprehensive convention against terrorism, and there is much 
merit in this. Kofi Annan had caned for an extensive coalition to combat 
terrorism and has predicted that such a campaign will be a long one and 
must involve all countries. Shortly after September 11, he followed in the 
steps of the Indian proposal and indicated that the General Assembly would 
take steps to complete a comprehensive antiterrorism treaty encompassing 
all current conventions. 71 
It has already been mentioned that the UN General Assembly adopted 
the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism in 
1994.72 At the end of 1996, it established an Ad Hoc Committee, known as 
the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 
511210.73 The Committee was primarily tasked with work on conventions 
for the suppression of terrorist bombings and financing of terrorist 
operations and, thereafter, to address means of developing a comprehensive 
legal framework dealing with international terrorism. 74 
India's Draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism 
(2000) was subsequently referred to the Ad Hoc Committee. As yet, the 
convention has not been finalised and is likely to be some time away, if it 
is ever to become a reality. Due to the lack of unanimity on various issues, 
71 United Nations Secretary-General's Report to the United Nations General 
Assembly, 56th General Assembly Meeting, GN9914, 24 September 2001. For a 
more detailed discussion of the Draft Comprehensive Convention, see Andreu-
Guzman, Terrorism and Human Rights, (International Commission of Jurists, 
2002), 202-210. 
72 Above, page 13. 
73 Established under General Assembly Resolution 511210 of 17 December 1996, 
AlRES/511210. 
74 Ibid, paragraph 9. 
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and the range of issues involved, the Committee has concluded that 
finalizing a comprehensive international treaty on terrorism will depend 
primarily on agreement as to who would be entitled to exclusion from the 
treaty's scope, and on what grounds.75 Otherwise, the majority of the 27 
articles of the Draft Convention have been preliminarily agreed upon by 
the Committee. 
One of the expected sticking points has been definitions, not just in 
terms of defining what amounts to a terrorist act (draft article 2), but also 
with regard to the wording of draft article 18, which concerns exemptions. 
In particular, the definition and/or inclusion of acts of "armed forces" or 
"parties" to a conflict (this being relevant to the proposed limited 
exemptions from jurisdiction and/or liability under the Convention); 
whether "foreign occupation" should be included within that category of 
exemptions; and whether the activities of military forces should be 
"governed" or "in conformity" with international law. Draft article 18 was 
described by the Chairman of the Committee as the crux of the 
convention.76 Hinging upon these matters has been a lack of consensus on 
a preamble. 
The draft Convention definition ofterrorist acts is as follows (article 2): 
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this 
Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, 
causes: 
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or 
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of 
public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation 
system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or 
75 Article 18 of the Draft Comprehensive Convention. 
76 Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly Resolution 511210, UN 
Press Release Ll2993. 
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(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in 
paragraph 1 (b) ofthis article, resulting or likely to result in major 
economic loss, 
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international 
organization to do or abstain from doing any act. 
2. Any person also commits an offence if that person makes a credible 
and serious threat to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of 
this article. 
3. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to 
commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article. 
4. Any person also commits an offence if that person: 
(a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 
1, 2 or 3 of this article; 
(b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offence as set forth in 
paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this article; or 
(c) Contributes to the commission of one or more offences as set forth 
in paragraph 1, 2 or 3 of this article by a group of persons acting 
with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and 
shall either: 
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose 
involves the commission of an offence as set forth in paragraph 
1 of this article; or 
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to 
commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article. 
The very real advantage of the definition proposed is that it is 
comprehensive in nature, rather than operational and limited to addressing 
particular types of terrorist acts,77 or potential targets,78 or potential means 
of furthering terrorist activities. 79 To give two examples, one of which 
poses real issues for agricultural States such as New Zealand, none of the 
twelve extant conventions prohibit or make it a crime to carry out acts of 
77 Aircraft hijacking, for example - see the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, above n 57. 
78 Diplomatic persons, for example - see the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes against International Protected Persons, including 
Diplomatic Agents, above n 59. 
79 Through money laundering or the acquisition of plastic explosives, for example 
- see the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection, above n 20 and 65. 
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cyber-terrorism or bioterrorism. In contrast, the definition contained within 
article 2( 1)( c) of the Draft Comprehensive Convention could, depending on 
the scale of any "attack", constitute a prohibited act under that instrument. 
It is therefore a great pity that scepticism surrounds the potential for the 
Draft Convention to become a reality. 
Customary International Law Nonns 
It should finally be noted that international law on terrorism is not 
restricted to the twelve conventions listed. For example, the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (widely accepted as representing customary 
international law norms, and therefore binding upon all States) prohibit 
violence to life, in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and 
torture, and the taking of hostages.8o Customary international law normally 
has automatic force of law within domestic jurisdictions. 81 
By way of specific example, article 13(2) of the First Optional Protocol 
states that:82 
The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not 
be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose 
of which is to spread terror among the civilian popUlation are 
prohibited. 
80 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 32 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 
(entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
136 (entered into force 21 October 1950); and the Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 288 (entered into force 21 October 1950). 
81 Discussed in more detail within Chapter Three, at 3.1 Modes of 
Implementation. 
82 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for 
signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 4 (entered into force 7 December 1978). 
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2.3 United Nations Action 
Beyond the work of the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the UN General 
Assembly in working towards the various counter-terrorism conventions 
discussed, both the General Assembly and Security Council have been 
working in concert on the issue of counter-terrorism. The extant 
resolutions and declarations of the UN will now be discussed. 
2.3.1 United Nations General Assembly 
In December 1994, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism. 83 The Declaration was 
based on the notion of peace and security and the principle of refraining 
from the threat or use of force in international relations. 84 It pronounced 
that terrorism constitutes a grave violation of the purpose and principles of 
the United Nations.85 While it did not purport to define "terrorism", it did 
say that criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in 
the general public for political purposes are in any circumstances 
unjustifiable. 86 The Declaration urged all States to consider, as a matter of 
priority, becoming party to the conventions on terrorism adopted up to that 
83 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, 
AlRES/49/60. The Declaration has been restated and adopted in subsequent 
resolutions of the General Assembly, with the contents being much the same: see 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions AlRES/50/53 of 11 December 
1995; AlRES/511210 of 17 December 1996; AlRES/52/165 of 19 January 1998; 
AlRES/54/110 of 2 February 2000; AlRES/55/158 of 30 January 2001; 
AlRES/56/88 of 24 January 2002; AlRES/57/27 of 15 January 2003; and 
AlRES/58/81 of 8 January 2004. Similar motives are also reflected within the 
Millennium Declaration of the General Assembly, United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000, in which security and peace, as 
well as the strengthening of the United Nations, was said to be reliant, amongst 
other things, on States taking concerted action against international terrorism, and 
acceding as soon as possible to all the relevant international conventions. 
84 Ibid, as is evident through its Preamble. 
85 Ibid, paragraph 2. 
86 Ibid, paragraph 1. 
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time. 87 It called on States to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting 
or participating in terrorist acts, and from acquiescing in or encouraging 
activities within their territories directed towards the commission of such 
acts.88 
In particular, States were directed that, in order to fulfil this obligation, 
they must refrain from facilitating terrorist activities. Paragraph 5( a) of the 
1994 Declaration appears to indicate that a State must be proactive in doing 
so, obliging States to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that 
their territory is not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for 
the preparation or organisation of terrorist acts. Paragraph 5(b) then refers 
to the obligation to apprehend and prosecute or extradite perpetrators of 
terrorist acts. 
The practical observation to make is that, although compelling and 
strongly worded, this is a declaration of the General Assembly and 
therefore does not have the same weight as a convention, nor does it have 
signatories that are bound by its content. Indeed, article 10 of the UN 
Charter specifically provides that resolutions and declarations of the United 
Nations General Assembly are recommendatory only: 
Article 10 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters 
within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and 
functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except 
as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members 
of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such 
questions or matters. 
It is clear through reading minutes of General Assembly meetings 
immediately following September 11 that there were calls for the United 
87 Ibid, paragraph 6. 
88 Ibid, paragraph 4. 
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Nations to engage its full potential to identify and attempt to eradicate the 
roots of terrorism.89 India's representative pointed out that integral to the 
efforts to end terrorism and prevent armed conflict is the need to deny to 
the perpetrators of such conduct access to arms and ammunition.90 A first 
step towards this has been the adoption of a Programme of Action by the 
United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Anns. Likewise, 
the General Assembly has given specific consideration to the issue of 
counter-terrorism within its very lengthy Resolution on General and 
Complete Disarmament.91 The General Assembly has also urged all States 
to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism. 92 It recently issued a resolution concerned 
with strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in 
promoting the implementation of the terrorism conventions and protocols 
within the framework of the activities of the UNODC Centre for 
International Crime Prevention.93 
2.3.2 United Nations Security Council 
Just as the General Assembly has been long-acting in its consideration of 
and work against international terrorism, the Security Council has also 
89 See, for example, Ad Hoc Committee Established by General Assembly 
Resolution 51/210, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Established by General 
Assembly Resolution 511210 on a Draft Comprehensive Convention on 
International Terrorism, AI AC.25212002/CPR.I and Add.l, I February 2002. 
90 United Nations Press Release, "Poverty Reduction, Terrorism, Disarmament, 
Humanitarian Relief Discussed as General Assembly Continues Review of 
Secretary-General Report", from the 56th General Assembly Plenary Meeting, 25 
September 2001, statement of Kamalesh Sharma, United Nations General 
Assembly representative for India. 
91 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24 of 29 November 2001, 
General and Complete Disarmament, AlRES/56124, see Part T "Multilateral 
Cooperation in the Area of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and Global 
Efforts Against Terrorism". 
92 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 541109 of 9 December 1999, 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
AlRES/54/109. 
93 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 581136 of 22 December 2003, 
Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting 
the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to 
terrorism within the framework of the activities of the Centre for International 
Crime Prevention, AlRESIS81l36. 
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considered the issue for some time. The spate of aircraft hijackings saw 
the Council call on States to take all possible measures to prevent further 
hijackings or interference with international civil air travel. 94 
On the day after the September 11 attacks, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1368, through which it unequivocally 
condemned the terrorist attacks and expressed that it regarded them as a 
threat to international peace and security. 95 It called on all States to 
urgently work together to bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and 
sponsors of the terrorist attacks.96 Security Council Resolution 1373 was 
later adopted, through which the UNSC determined that all States were to 
prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, including the 
criminalisation of such financing and the freezing of funds and financial 
assets.97 Described as one of the most strongly worded resolutions in the 
history of the Security Council98 , it also requires countries to cooperate on 
extradition matters and the sharing of information about terrorist 
networks.99 
94 See, for example, United Nations Security Council Resolution 286 of 9 
September 1970, SIRES/286 (1970). 
95 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, SIRES/1368, 12 September 
2001. 
96 Ibid, paragraph 3. 
97 Above n 36. 
98 Richard Rowe, "Key Developments: Year of International Law in Review", A 
paper presented at the 10th Annual Meeting of the Australian & New Zealand 
Society of International Law, New Challenges and New States; What Role for 
International Law?, 15 June 2002, Australian National University, Canberra. 
Richard Rowe at that time worked in the International Organisations and Legal 
Division of the Australian Department of Foreign Mfairs and Trade. He was the 
Australian representative and Vice-Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee 
Established by General Assembly Resolution 511210 during its Sixth Session, 
which followed the September 11 attacks. 
99 Above n 36, para 3. 
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As a decision made under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
compliance with Resolution 1373 is mandatory for UN members, imposing 
, 
certain obligations upon those members. IOO Those obligations can be 
viewed in two parts. The first is the imposition of specific counter-terrorist 
obligations, as follows: 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter ofthe United Nations, 
1. Decides that all States shall: 
(a) Prevent and suppress the fmancing ofterrorist acts; 
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, 
directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their 
territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist 
acts; 
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist 
acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of 
entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; 
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of 
such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated 
from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such 
persons and associated persons and entities; 
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their 
territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic 
resources or financial or other related services available, directly or 
indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to 
commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist 
acts, of entities owned or controned, directly or indirectly, by such 
persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the 
direction of such persons; 
2. Decides also that all States shall: 
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to 
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by 
suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and 
eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists; 
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, 
including by provision of early warning to other States by exchange 
of information; 
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit 
terrorist acts, or provide safe havens; 
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts 
from using their respective territories for those purposes against 
other States or their citizens; 
100 Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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(e) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, 
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist 
acts is brought to justice and ensure that, in addition to any other 
measures against them, such terrorist acts are established as serious 
criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the 
punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts; 
(t) Afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection 
with criminal investigations or criminal proceedings relating to the 
financing or support of terrorist acts, including assistance in 
obtaining evidence in their possession necessary for the 
proceedings; 
(g) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective 
border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and 
travel documents, and through measures for preventing 
counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and 
travel documents; 
This set of obligations expands upon and significantly strengthens the 
Council's earlier Resolution 1269 of 1999. 101 While Resolution 1269 
considered steps to be taken by States to suppress terrorism, deny safe 
haven to terrorists and cooperate with others in the bringing to justice of 
perpetrators of terrorist conduct, the language of this earlier resolution is 
weaker for two principal reasons. 102 First, paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Resolution 1373 are considerably more specific in the steps to be taken in 
countering terrorism. Second, the instructive words of the more recent 
Resolution provide that "all States shall", whereas the earlier Resolution 
used a less forceful provision calling upon States to take appropriate steps 
to achieve the stated objectives. In short, then, Resolution 1373 takes a 
considerable step forward in the imposition of counter-terrorism 
obligations upon members of the United Nations. 
Using such mandatory language is problematic, from a practical 
perspective, when one considers the specific instructions within paragraphs 
101 Above n 35. 
102 Para 4. 
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1 and Some instructions may not be possible to comply with. Contrast, 
for example, paragraphs 2(d) and 2(f). Paragraph 2(f) requires UN member 
States to "afford one another the greatest measure of assistance" in the 
criminal investigation and prosecution of terrorists, while paragraph 2( d) 
requires States to "prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit 
terrorist acts" from using their territories for those purposes. Compliance 
with paragraph 2(f), assistance in criminal investigations and prosecutions, 
is possible since it is a reactive activity (activity following a terrorist 
incident) and capable of measurement. This cannot be said in the case of 
compliance with paragraph 2(d), prevention of the financing, planning and 
commission of terrorist acts. All that can be done by a State is to undertake 
all reasonable or practicable steps to prevent such conduct, but a member 
State cannot ever truly guarantee that their territory will not be used for 
those purposes. 
2.3.2(a) Reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee. The second 
obligation under Resolution 1373 is a more general requirement to enter 
into what might be described as a reporting and monitoring dialogue 
between States and a special committee of the Security Council established 
under the Resolution, the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Paragraph 6 of 
the Resolution provides as follows: 
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional 
rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of 
all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this 
resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and calls upon 
all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the 
date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a 
timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have 
taken to implement this resolution; 
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Since Resolutions 1368 and 1373, there have been further resolutions of 
the Security Council dealing with the issue of international terrorism. 103 
Recognizing the considerable burden upon States in the domestic 
implementation process following their party status to the 12 international 
conventions and in complying with Resolution 1373, the Council tasked 
the Counter-Terrorism Committee with exploring ways in which States 
could be assisted. 104 Resolution 1455 called upon UN member States to 
submit updated reports. IOS New Zealand has so far submitted four reports 
to the Committee under Resolutions 1373, 1455 and specific questions put 
to New Zealand by the Committee. 106 Those reports are considered further 
when discussing New Zealand's implementing legislation on counter-
terrorism. 107 
103 Interestingly, though, the only resolution of the United Nations Security 
Council prior to September 11 and dealing with terrorism in the international 
context, rather than relating to and restricted to specific events, is Security 
Council Resolution 1189 of 13 August 1998, SIRES/1189 (1998). Although the 
resolution was adopted in response to the 1998 bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and 
Tanzania, it called upon all States "to adopt, in accordance with international law 
and as a matter of priority, effective and practical measures for security 
cooperation, for the prevention of such acts of terrorism, and for the prosecution 
and punishment of their perpetrators" (para 5). 
104 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1377 of 12 November 2001, 
S/RES/1377 (2001). 
105 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1452 of 20 December 2002, 
S/RES/1452 (2002), and 1455 of 17 January 2003, S/RES/1455 (2003). The latter 
Resolution also concerns itself with further reporting by States to the Counter-
Terrorism Committee. 
106 Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, New Zealand, 2 
January 2002, S/200111269, Supplementary report providing additional 
information on the measures taken by New Zealand to implement the provisions of 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), 19 July 2002, S/20021795, New Zealand 
response to the questions and comments of the Security Council Counter-
Terrorism Committee contained in the Chairman's letter of 30 May 2003, 5 
September 2003, S/2003/860, and New Zealand response to the United Nations 
Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee questions for response by 30 
April 2004, 7 May 2004, S/2004/359. 
107 Chapter Three, in particular 3.3.1 Resolutions of the Security Council. 
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23.2(b) "Terrorism". As already noted, there is no unanimously agreed-
upon definition of the term terrorism, nor does Security Council Resolution 
1373 define the term for the purpose of that resolution. Thus, in 
performing the various obligations pertaining to the suppression of 
terrorism under paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Resolution, States have been left 
to define the term themselves. !Os Other than "guidance" through the 
question and answer process with the Council's Committee, States have 
had to determine the means by which obligations are to be imposed. 
Varying definitions of the term have consequently been adopted from one 
. . d' . h 109 JurIS Ict10n to anot er. 
Of some assistance is the fact that the United Nations, through the 
Committee, has undertaken a process by which it designates individuals or 
organisations as terrorist entities based upon information provided to it. 
The process concludes with the adoption by the Security Council of a 
resolution confirming such designation and requiring all member States to 
likewise designate such entities. The process is not formalised in any way. 
The Council is simply required to apply the normal trigger test for the 
making of any resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: 
the Council must be satisfied that a situation poses a threat to international 
peace and security, in which case it can take any of the measures provided 
for within articles 40 to 42 of the Charter (provisional measures, non-
military sanctions, and enforcement measures). This topic is given further 
108 Confirmed in discussions with the then Deputy Director of the Legal Division 
to the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Mr Julian Ludbrook, 
on the event of the 10th Annual Meeting of the Australian & New Zealand Society 
of International Law, 15 June 2002, Canberra. 
109 A comprehensive comparison of definitions is not proposed, although some 
comparison is made (within Chapter Four) to definitions within Australia, the 
United States, United Kingdom and Canada. 
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consideration in the context of the impact of the designation process upon 
natural justice rights. 110 
2.3.2(c) Further obligations upon States? One further issue arises from the 
Security Council's Resolution 1373 and its later Resolution 1456.111 
Adopted in January 2003, Resolution 1456 calls upon the Counter-
Terrorism Committee to intensify its efforts to promote the implementation 
of Resolution 1373, which is discussed further below. 112 It also contains 
the following provisions: 
The Security Council therefore calls for the following steps to be taken: 
1. All States must take urgent action to prevent and suppress all active 
and passive support to terrorism, and in particular comply fully with all 
relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolutions 
1373 (2001), 1390 (2002) and 1455 (2003); 
2. The Security Council calls upon States to: 
(a) become a party, as a matter of urgency, to all relevant international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, in particular the 
1999 international convention for the suppression of the financing 
of terrorism and to support all international initiatives taken to that 
aim, and to make full use of the sources of assistance and guidance 
which are now becoming available; 
(b) assist each other, to the maximum extent possible, in the 
prevention, investigation, prosecution and punishment of acts of 
terrorism, wherever they occur; 
(c) cooperate closely to implement fully the sanctions against terrorists 
and their associates, in particular Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and 
their associates, as reflected in resolutions 1267 (1999), 1390 
(2002) and 1455 (2003), to take urgent actions to deny them access 
to the financial resources they need to carry out their actions, and to 
cooperate fully with the Monitoring Group established pursuant to 
resolution 1363 (2001); 
110 See Chapters Three (for discussion on the operation of the designation process 
under New Zealand legislation) and Seven (for discussion of the interface 
between this particular process and the right to natural justice). 
111 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1456 of 20 January 2003, 
S/RES/1456 (2003). 
112 See para 4 . 
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The content of paragraph 1 and paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c), by themselves, 
do not cause any particular concern. Indeed, they are entirely consistent 
with earlier resolutions of the Council. It is paragraph 2(a), building upon 
paragraph 3( d) of Resolution 1373, that raises some issues about the proper 
role of the Security Council. 113 By calling upon States to become party to 
an counter-terrorist conventions and protocols, is the Council over-stepping 
its function and impinging upon State sovereignty? 
This is an interesting constitutional question that warrants at least some 
consideration. On the one hand, member States of the United Nations have 
to some degree surrendered their sovereignty by becoming a party to the 
United Nations Charter, to the extent that they have agreed to be bound by 
decisions of the Security Council. 114 At the same time, however, it could 
hardly have been intended by those becoming party to the Charter to grant 
the Security Council the authority to direct members in their treaty-making 
decision processes. A considerable number of States have involved 
constitutional rules concerning the executive's treaty-making power which 
must be complied with before a State can ratify or accede to a treaty. Is the 
Security Council, by issuing the directions contained in paragraph 3(f) of 
Resolution 1373 and paragraph 2(a) of Resolution 1456, able to override 
such domestic constitutional safeguards? 
Answering that question appears to lie in one further enquiry: whether 
any such resolution is indeed binding within the terms of article 25 of the 
113 Note that this provision is reflected with resolutions of the General Assembly, 
although such resolutions are expressly not binding by virtue of article lO of the 
Charter of the United Nations. See United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution6 56/88 of 24 January 2002, AlRES156/88, para 7; 57/27 of 15 January 
2003, AlRES/57127, para 7; 58181 of 8 January 2004, AlRES/58/81, para 7; and 
59/46 of 2 December 2004, AlRES/59/46, para 9. 
114 Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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Charter. There appear to be two bases upon which this second question 
might be answered. The first is to consider whether the resolution has been 
made within the mandate of the Security Council, since the various powers 
given to the Council, conferred under article 24, are so conferred to 
discharge its duties for the maintenance of international peace and security 
and for no other reason. Thus, if a resolution is not made for that purpose, 
the resolution would be made outside the authority of the Security Council 
and could not then be binding upon member States. In the context of the 
resolutions at hand, the subject matter concerns the suppression of 
terrorism which, as repeatedly stated by both the Security Council and 
General Assembly, is seen as one of the most serious threats to peace and 
security. Resolutions 1373 and 1456 were made, it is therefore concluded, 
within the proper authority of the Security Council. 
The second consideration is whether the provisions at hand are 
"decisions" within the meaning of article 25 of the Charter, which provides 
that: 
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter. 
The answer turns on whether exhortatory provisions constitute "decisions" 
within the meaning of article 25 and, in turn, whether the provisions at 
hand are exhortatory. This issue was considered by the International Court 
of Justice in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, where the Court took the 
position that a resolution couched in non-mandatory language should not 
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be taken as imposing a legal duty upon a member State. lIS Turning to the 
paragraphs in issue, if the Security Council "calls upon States" to become 
party to counter-terrorism treaties, is this mandatory or exhortatory? The 
phrase is certainly not as forceful as "all States shall/must", but it is at the 
same time more compelling than "requesting" or even "strongly 
encouraging" States to do so. U6 
Bearing in mind that the more forceful terms "shall" or "must" were 
not used (whereas they were used within other provisions of the 
resolutions) and that the provisions concern the treaty-making process (a 
matter that has always been regarded as within the sole purview of State 
executives), it is posited that a restrictive interpretation must be given to 
the provisions. The provisions must be seen as exhortatory and, fonowing 
the Namibia Advisory Opinion, do not impose a legal duty upon States to 
become signatories to the various international counter-terrorism 
conventions. 
In the case of New Zealand, this discussion is somewhat academic. 
Prior to September 11, New Zealand was party to eight of the twelve 
conventions, excluding the Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 117 the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material,118 the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombing1l9 and the International Convention for 
115 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 
(1990), (1970-1971), Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 
June 1971, 53. 
116 Both terms/phrases being commonly used in Security Council resolutions. 
117 New Zealand had neither signed nor ratified the convention by this time. 
118 New Zealand had neither signed nor ratified the convention by this time. 
119 New Zealand had neither signed nor ratified the convention by this time. 
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the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 120 New Zealand is now 
party to all twelve conventions and protocols. It is nevertheless an 
interesting point to note in the dynamics between the United Nations and 
its organs with members of the organisation. Whether New Zealand would 
have ratified all outstanding conventions, even absent the provisions of 
Resolution 1456, is moot - although its first report to the Counter-
Terrorism Committee indicated that it had already intended to do SO.121 
2.3.2(d) Revitalisation of the Counter-Terrorism Committee. Notable 
terrorist events since September 11 have drawn the condemnation of the 
Security Council and prompting it to reiterate its earlier resolutions, 
including the bomb attacks in Bali, Indonesia on 12 October 2002;122 the 
taking of hostages in Moscow, the Russian Federation, on 23 October 
2002; 123 the bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya and the 
attempted missile attack on Arkia Israeli Airlines flight 582 departing 
Mombasa, Kenya (al-Qaida claiming responsibility for those acts);124 and 
the bombing in Madrid, Spain on 11 March 2004. 125 
120 New Zealand had signed the convention on 7 September 2000, but not yet 
ratified. 
121 Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, New Zealand, 2 
January 2002, S/200111269, 16. This report predates United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1456 by approximately twelve months. 
122 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1438 of 14 October 2002, 
S/RES/1438 (2002). 
123 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1440 of 24 October 2002, 
S/RES/1440 (2002). 
124 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1450 of 13 December 2002, 
S/RESI1450 (2002). 
125 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1530 of 11 March 2004, 
SIRES/1530 (2004). The Resolution records the ETA as having perpetrated the 
bombing, on advice of the Spanish Government to this effect: see para 1. It has 
subsequently been established that the bombing was undertaken by a mixture of 
Spanish, Moroccan and Syrian nationals with suspected links to al-Qaida: see, for 
example, 'Madrid Bombing Suspects', BBC News UK Edition, URL 
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With these events in mind, the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
has undergone revitalisation under Security Council Resolution 1535.126 
The Committee's reform has been implemented to give it further means to 
fulfil its mandate of monitoring the implementation of Resolution 1373. 
The Committee now consists of two main organs. The fIrst, the "Plenary", 
is composed of the Security Council member States and acts to monitor the 
second part of the Committee and provide it with policy guidance. The 
functional part of the Committee is the "Bureau" composed of the Chair 
and Vice-Chairs of the Security Council and a renamed "Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate" (which comprises, in real 
terms, those members of the CTC that had worked in the Committee up to 
its restructuring). 127 
2.4 Role .u .. ' ... "', ...... Counter~ TelTorism 
A view often repeated in submissions to the New Zealand Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee on the Terrorism Suppression Bill was that 
<http://news.bbc.co.uklllhilworld/europel3560603.stm> at 12 March 2005. The 
ETA, Ezukadi Ta Askatasuna (roughly translated as "Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty") was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent 
homeland in the northern Spanish provinces based on Marxist principles and 
operating primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and 
south-western France: see Appendix A "Background Information on Designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations" in Howard RD and Sawyer RL (eds), Terrorism 
and Counterterrorism. Understanding the New Security Environment (Revised 
and Updated), The McGraw-Hill Companies (2003), 507. 
126 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1535 of 26 March 2004, 
S/RES/1536 (2004). It should be noted, however, that the proposal to revitalise 
the Committee pre-dated the Madrid Bombing: see United Nations Information 
Service, "Security Council Considers Proposal to Revitalize Counter-Terrorism 
Committee", 5 March 2004, SC/8020. Interestingly, the Council was briefed on 
the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee by the CTC's Chairman, Inocencio 
Arias, Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations. 
127 A very useful web site has been established by the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, explaining the mandate, practices and assistance programme of the 
Committee and containing State reports to the Committee and other useful 
documents and papers: see URL <http://www.un.orglDocs/sclcommittees/1373>. 
Terror versus Tyranny PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 52 
Chapter 2: New Zealand's International Counfer-Terrorist Obligations 
there was no need for New Zealand to adopt counter-terrorist legislation. 
From a regional perspective, Pacific Island States128 have not been subject 
to, or had to deal directly with, international terrorism other than the 
bombing by French military agents of the Rainbow Warrior in New 
Zealand in 1985. 
2.4.1 International Obligations 
One of the most simple reasons for the relevance of, and need for, counter-
terrorist action in New Zealand is that such action is an obligation at 
international law. The conventions, protocols and resolutions discussed 
within this chapter form the basis of obligations at international law which 
must be implemented by New Zealand into domestic legislation (at least to 
the extent necessary to comply with those obligations). 
It is also relevant to note that at the thirty-third Pacific Island Forum in 
Fiji, New Zealand being a member of the Forum, Forum Leaders adopted 
the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security.129 The Declaration 
underlined the commitment of Forum Leaders to the implementation of 
internationally agreed anti-terrorism measures, with express reference to 
Resolution 1373, and tasked the Forum Regional Security Committee to 
review the regional implementation of the Resolution.13o 
128 For the purpose of this chapter, Pacific Island States are limited to those 
members of the Pacific Forum, being: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand (incorporating the non-self 
governing territory of Tokelau), Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. This 
excludes French Polynesian States and American Samoa, being States that are 
governed by France and the United States respectively. 
129 Thirty-Third Pacific Islands Forum, Suva, Fiji Islands, 15-17 August 2002, 
Forum Communique, Annex 1, 'N asonini Declaration on Regional Security'. 
130 Ibid, paras 5 and 9. 
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2.4.2 Terrorist Acts in the South Pacific 
Having said that the Rainbow Warrior bombing was the only incident of 
international terrorism within the South Pacific, it should be recognized 
that this statement is dependent on what definition of terrorism is adopted. 
Certainly, it is the only international terrorist act occurring within the 
Pacific. On 10 July 1985, Frcnch military agents Mafart and Pricr bombed 
and sank the Greenpeace flag-ship the Rainbow Warrior in the Auckland 
harbour port, resulting in the death of a Greenpeace activist on board the 
vessel. The bombing took place just days before the Rainbow Warrior was 
to undertake a protest voyage to the French nuclear test site at Moruroa 
Atoll. 131 
Simpson, however, points to various internal acts of terrorism within 
the Pacific. 132 In New Caledonia in the 1980s, the Kanak Socialist 
National Liberation Front (FLNKS) was denounced as a separatist terrorist 
movement. 133 It subsequently formed part of the coalition government in 
2001 and is now the main opposition party in New Caledonia. 134 The Fiji 
131 Greenpeace, 'The Bombing of the Warrior', URL 
<http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/rw/pkbomb.html> at 16 September 2004. 
Mention might also be made to other incidents (which may, or may not, be 
considered to amount to terrorist acts, depending on the definition adopted) within 
New Zealand. For example, on 18 November 1982, Neil Roberts carried and 
exploded a gelignite bomb in the entrance to the Wanganui police computer, said 
to have been perpetrated to advance his anarchist beliefs: see 
<http://cwI78.tripod.com/neill.htm> at 6 July 2005. Two years later, there was a 
bomb attack at the Wellington Trade Union Centre, in which one person was 
killed: see Submissions of the Socialist Workers' Organisation to the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the Terrorism Suppression Bill at URL 
<www.converge.org.nz> at 6 July 2005. 
132 Simpson S, "A Brief History of Terrorism in the South Pacific", presentation at 
the public workshop, How Should Fiji Respond to the Threat of Terrorism?, 
hosted by the Citizens' Constitutional Forum and the Fiji Human Rights 
Commission, 17 July 2004, Suva, Fiji. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Electionworld.org, 'Elections in New Caledonia', URL 
<http://www.electionworld.org/newcaledonia.htm> at 16 September 2004. 
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coups of 1987 and 2000 have likewise been classified as terrorist events,135 
although they might more properly be categorized as internal civil 
conflicts. 136 The "civil conflict" in the Solomon Islands during 2000, in 
contrast, has been said to include terrorist conduct on the part of both main 
factions, the Malaita Eagles Force and the Isatabu Freedom Movement. 137 
2.4.3 The Risk of Terrorism in the South Pacific 
As already noted, there is a common view that the likelihood of terrorist 
acts being perpetrated within the Pacific is remote, such that counter-
terrorism should remain at the low-end of priorities for the region. While 
this risk assessment might well be correct, there are various factors that 
count in favour of a more proactive approach, from even a purely self-
serving perspective. As evident from the foregoing discussion, the South 
Pacific has been subject to terrorist incidents in the past, however defined. 
Regard should also be had to the possibility and consequences of a direct 
attack. Of particular relevance to a number of Pacific Island States, as 
States reliant upon the export of commodities such as dairy, meat and 
fruit,138 is the bio security of those States. This is a matter dealt with 
primarily under the domestic legislation of each State including, for 
135 Simpson, above n 133. 
136 See the discussion above concerning the misuse of the term "terrorism" in the 
absence of differential targeting and fear-inducing conduct. 
137 Simpson, above n l33. 
138 By way of example, Statistics New Zealand identifies exports for the years 
ended June 2001, 2002 and 2003 to be as follows: milk powder, butter and cheese 
at $(million) 5,790 (2001), 5,891 (2002) and 4,679 (2003); meat and edible offal 
at $(million) 4,182 (2001), 4,429 (2002) and 4,112 (2003); logs, wood and wood 
article at $(million) 2,192 (2001), 2,378 (2002) and 2,386 (2003); fish, 
crustaceans and molluscs at $(million) 1,374 (2001), 1,402 (2002) and 1,032 
(2003); and fruit at $(million) 1,045 (2001), 1,159 (2002) and 1,032 (2003): see 
Statistics New Zealand online information 'Quick Facts Economy', URL 
<http://www.stats.govt.nz/domino/externaVweb/nzstories.nsflhtmldocs/Quick+Fa 
cts+-+Economy> at 17 September 2004. 
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example, the Biosecurity Act 1993 in New Zealand. Bioterrorism might, 
as discussed above, fall within the global definition of terrorism under 
article 2(1)(c) of the Draft Comprehensive Convention on International 
T . 139 erronsm. New Zealand recently took steps towards including 
bioterrorism as an offence under its domestic law, effected through the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2003.140 
Despite its geographical isolation, the reality of the contemporary 
world is that globalisation has dissolved distances that may have once 
protected the Pacific Islands. Transport and communications systems, 
access to the internet, and more efficient means of moving people and 
money, mean that it is easier for the world to interact with the Pacific. 141 
Individuals thought to be connected with al-Qaeda have been reported to 
have been present in New Zealand, Australia and Fiji,142 Pacific Forum 
Secretary General, Greg Urwin, adds that while terrorists may not seek to 
attack citizens and institutions of Pacific countries, the region might prove 
to be a tempting target, either for an attack like the one in Bali in October 
2002, or as a base or staging point from which terrorist cells might 
undertake planning for an attack elsewhere. 143 The New Zealand Security 
139 On that subject, however, see (as a starting point) Hoffman RE, "Preparing for 
a Bioterrorist Attack: Legal and Administrative Strategies", 9(2) (2003) Emerging 
Infectious Diseases 241. 
140 Section 6 of the Act amended the Crimes Act 1961 to include new sections 
298A and 298B, making it an offence to contaminate food, crops, water or other 
products. 
141 Urwin G, "The Need for Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Fiji", presentation at the 
public workshop, How Should Fiji Respond to the Threat of Terrorism?, hosted 
by the Citizens' Constitutional Forum and the Fiji Human Rights Commission, 17 
July 2004, Suva, Fiji, para 8. 
142 Ibid, para 9. Anecdotal reports are that one of the September 11 hijackers 
spent a considerable time living in Fiji up until six months prior to the World 
Trade Centre attacks. 
143 Ibid, para 10. 
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Intelligence Service recently reported, for example, that Islamic extremists 
with links to international terrorist organizations are likely to be operating 
in New Zealand: 144 
From the Service's own investigations we assess that there are 
individuals in or from New Zealand who support Islamic extremist 
causes. The Service views these developments, most of which have 
come to attention within 2003/04, with considerable concern. They 
indicate attempts to use New Zealand as a safe haven from which 
activities of security concern elsewhere can be facilitated and/or the 
involvement of people from New Zealand in such activities. 
2.4.4 Supporting an International Framework on Counter-Terrorism 
One of the most important points to make in this chapter is a relatively 
simple one, although the consequences of it are wide-ranging. The 
international conventions and protocols, reinforced by customary law and 
resolutions of the General Assembly, and added to by Security Council 
resolutions, create an international framework for counter-terrorism. A 
considerable measure of their effectiveness lies in the universal adoption 
and implementation of the obligations under that framework in order to 
prevent any State being either targeted by terrorists or used by them as a 
base of operations (whether that be the establishment of physical training 
camps or the laundering of money to fund activities of terrorist 
organisations). 
Following the train bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004, in which 
nearly 200 people were killed, Spain's Ambassador to the United Nations 
(who also chairs the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee) 
144 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Report to the House of 
Representatives for the year ended 30 June 2004, presented to the House of 
Representatives pursuant to section 4J of the New Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service Act 1969, 11. 
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criticised unnamed nations for a "lack of effort" in countering terrorism. 145 
The point was also later made by the US Ambassador to the United Nations 
John Danworth: 146 
[The Counter-Terrorism Committee] must never forget that so long as a 
few states are not acting quickly enough to raise their capacity to fight 
terrorism or are not meeting their international counterterrorism 
obligations, an of us remain vulnerable. 
The question is no longer one of domestic security in order to prevent 
attacks from occurring within a State's own borders and, in doing so, 
assessmg the risks of such attacks and the appropriate measures in 
response. Although those assessments and corresponding national security 
interests remain, effective counter-terrorism requires - to achieve 
international security and in light of the manner in which terrorists and 
terrorist organisations operate - that all States prevent and preclude 
terrorist conduct and preparations. A high level of threat posed to a State 
might cause that State to impose measures above those required by the 
international framework, but the reverse does not apply. Even if it is 
accepted that New Zealand does not bear any substantial risk of being the 
subject of a terrorist attack, its role in combating international terrorism 
through the implementation of the obligations set out in this chapter are 
equal to all other States. 
145 United Nations Foundation, 'Spanish Diplomat Blames Nations for "Lack of 
Effort" on Terrorism', UN Wire, 12 March 2004, URL <http://www.unwire.orgl 
UNWire>. 
146 United Nations Foundation, 'Counterterrorism Cooperation Improving, 
Security Council Told', UN Wire, 20 July 2004, URL 
<http://www. unwire.orgiUNWire>. 
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All of these various points are reiterated on the website of the New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Service: 147 
The terrorist threat to New Zealand is low, but it cannot be discounted. 
The country learned at the time of the Rainbow Warrior bombing that 
relative geographic isolation, in itself, is no guarantee of immunity. 
The events in the United States on 11 September 2001 confirmed that 
terrorism is an international phenomenon and terrorists consider the 
world their stage when they look for a way to advance their cause. 
There are individuals and groups in New Zealand with links to overseas 
organisations that are committed to acts of terrorism, violence and 
intimidation. Some have developed local structures that are dedicated 
to the support of their overseas parent bodies. There are also isolated 
extremists in New Zealand who advocate using violence to impress on 
others their own political, ethnic or religious viewpoint. 
But the threat of terrorism could come equally from beyond New 
Zealand. Modern transport and communication have effectively made 
the world a smaller place. Events such as a visit by and overseas 
dignitary, or a major international gathering may be seen by off-shore 
terrorists as providing the opportunity to do something spectacular to 
capture world wide publicity, or to otherwise further their cause. 
There is also the risk that individuals or groups may use New Zealand 
as a safe haven from which to plan or facilitate terrorist acts elsewhere. 
2.5 Conclusion 
International terrorism has been identified by both the UN General 
Assembly and Security Council as one of the most serious threats to 
international peace and security. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, ultimately prompted the intervention in Afghanistan. They also 
shook the United Nations into concerted action in the fight to eradicate 
terrorism. Primarily due to a lack of international consensus on the 
meaning of the term, however, that action has failed to produce a 
comprehensive convention on terrorism. Despite the considerable work of 
147 New Zealand Security Inte1ligence Service website, Protecting New Zealand 
from Terrorism, URL <http://www.nzsis.govt.nzlworklwork.htm1> at 16 
November 2004. 
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the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Ad Hoc 
Committee Established under General Assembly Resolution 511210, the 
international law on counter-terrorism is mainly based upon twelve very 
specific conventions that do not have general application and are limited in 
their binding nature to States parties to those treaties. Having said this, the 
Suppression of Financing Convention does have potentially wider 
application in its description of conduct that may not be financed. While 
Security Council Resolutions 1269 and 1373 also fail to define the term, 
Resolution 1269 makes it clear that the Council has adopted an objective 
understanding of the term, condemning all acts of terrorism regardless of 
their motivation. 
Both the General Assembly and Security Council have issued 
numerous resolutions on the topic of counter-terrorism. Although not 
binding, the General Assembly has built on various guiding principles and 
expectations in its declarations on measures to eliminate international 
terrorism. The Security Council established a Counter-Terrorism 
Committee very soon after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200 I, with 
the role of liaising with UN members on the implementation of Resolution 
1373 and the twelve counter-terrorism conventions, as well as to provide 
means by which States could be assisted in doing so. The Council has 
imposed various specific obligations upon States under Resolutions 1373 
and 1456. 
New Zealand, as a party to all twelve conventions on counter-terrorism, 
has accepted its part in establishing an international legal framework on 
counter-terrorism. This, combined with the obligations under the relevant 
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Security Council resolutions and the principles enumerated within 
comparative General Assembly resolutions, places the issue beyond one of 
domestic security. These obligations form part of an international 
framework to counter terrorism, so that the question of implementation is 
not necessarily concerned with the particular terrorist threats faced by New 
Zealand, but rather with New Zealand's contribution to and participation in 
establishing an effective international framework. 
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As seen through the previous chapter, there are various sources of 
international counter-terrorist obligations. This chapter will examine the 
domestic legislation through which those obligations have been 
implemented by New Zealand, as well as considering counter-terrorist 
legislation that exists outside the scope of those obligations. In doing so, 
this chapter looks at the various modes through which the international 
obligations can be and have been implemented. The focus will then turn 
on an overview and explanation of seven items of domestic legislation: the 
Aviation Crimes Act 1972; the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, 
United Nations and A<isociated Personnel, and Hostages) Act 1980; the 
International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987; Maritime Crimes 
Act 1999; the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and 
Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001; the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002; and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
It should be mentioned that there are numerous other pIeces of 
legislation that might be seen as contributing to countering terrorism. Just 
as with international law, there are various matters that are relevant to the 
issue of countering terrorist activities.! This thesis restricts itself, however, 
to the items of legislation just mentioned, those having been identified by 
New Zealand as being part of its counter-terrorist legislative regime. 
I As discussed within Chapter Two. 
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Legislation and issues concerning refugee status, immigration, and 
detention in the context of immigration and refugee status will not, by way 
of example, be considered. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part A considers the means by 
which New Zealand's international counter-terrorist obligations have been 
implemented by New Zealand which, as will be seen, depends on the 
nature, scope and source of the international obligation. Part B then 
examines the actual legislation through which those obligations have been 
implemented, identifying potential civil and political rights concerns in the 
course of doing so. 
PART A: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTER-TERRORIST OBLIGATIONS 
3.1 Modes of Implementation 
The preceding chapter made reference to New Zealand's counter-terrorist 
obligations through various sources of international law: through 
customary international law; through New Zealand's membership of the 
United Nations; and as a State party to the twelve international conventions 
concerning terrorism. Each source of law displays different means of 
implementation and obligation. In turn, those different means of 
implementation bear upon the way in which domestic courts can deal with 
the application of the law. 
It is useful to briefly note, at this stage, the divergent views on the 
status of international law norms in domestic law. As explained by 
Brownlie, there are two theories on the relationship between municipal and 
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international la w. 2 The dualist theory posits that international and 
domestic laws operate in entirely separate systems, and is largely based 
upon the notion of State sovereignty: the principle that a State has the right 
to perform governmental actions to the exclusion of all others within its 
territory. 3 Dualists distinguish international law from municipal law by 
three principal means. First, the subjects of international law are sovereign 
States, while in municipal law individuals and the State enjoy legal 
personality. Next, the sources of international law are founded on the 
notion of the equality of its subjects (States), whereas domestic law is 
derived from the parliamentary authority of the State. Finally, the inter-
State strncture of international law is different from the intra-State 
implementation and enforcement of domestic law. On those bases, dualist 
exponents such as Triepel and Strupp hold that international law is an 
inferior source of law and therefore does not apply at the national level 
unless there has been some act on the part of the State transforming the 
international norm into a domestic one.4 
The monist theory on the "reception" of international obligations in 
domestic law holds that there is one, all-embracing legal order, comprising 
both international and domestic law. Lauterpacht, one of the more forceful 
and practical proponents of monism, argues that it is impossible for two 
norms with separate bases to be valid at the same time in the same 
2 Brownlie I, Principles of Public International Law (6th edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 31-53. 
3 As defined by Arbitrator Huber in the Island of Palmas Case, United Nations, 2 
Reports of International Arbitral Awards 829, 858-859. 
4 Triepel, Volkerrecht und Landesrecht (1899), and Strupp, Elements (2nd edition, 
1930), as cited by Brownlie, above n 2,31 (n 2). 
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territory.5 Indeed, he effectively turns the dualist approach on its head and 
proposes that international law employs domestic law to govern human 
affairs. That is, the idea that the State is purely a vehicle used by 
individuals to represent their interests in the international community (by 
extension of the idea of the social contract by which the State is 
empowered to govern its people) so that when the "State" does something 
at international law, it is simply acting under the authority given to it by 
those individuals. Under the monist view there is no need to transform an 
international law rule into a domestic one. 
Turning from theory to practice, it is interesting that many domestic 
courts adopt different approaches, depending upon the particular source of 
the international law obligation. New Zealand is no different. In the 
context of treaties, the courts take the dualist view that provisions of an 
international treaty are not applicable unless there has been some act of 
incorporation. 6 As has been evidenced through a long Hne of authority in 
New Zealand courts concerning the doctrine of sovereign immunity, on the 
other hand, norms of customary international law need no act of 
transformation to be received by the courts.7 New Zealand courts therefore 
adopt a monist approach to norms of customary international law. 
5 See, by way of example, Lauterpacht H, International Law and Human Rights 
(Stevens, London, 1950). 
6 To be discussed further below, at 3.4.1 Status of International Treaties in 
Domestic Law. 
7 See Marine Steel v Government of the Marshall Island [1981] 2 NZLR 1, 9-10 
(HC) in which Barker J recognised, in an obiter statement, the relevance of the 
customary international law rule of sovereign immunity and that no special act of 
transformation was required in the application of such rules by New Zealand 
courts. In Reef Shipping v The Ship "Fua Kavenga" [1987] 1 NZLR 550, 569 
(HC) in which Smellie J indeed applied the doctrine in New Zealand. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal also applied the doctrine in Governor of Pitcairn and 
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3.2 Customary International Law 
As noted within Chapter Two, international obligations concermng 
terrorism are not restricted to treaties and resolutions of the United Nations. 
The customary international law norms reflected within the Geneva 
Conventions include the prohibition against acts or threats of violence, the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population 
article 13(2) of the First Protocol. 8 What should be noted at this stage is 
that there is no corresponding domestic law provision in New Zealand. 
New Zealand is a party to all four Geneva Conventions and its two 
protocols,9 and has "incorporating legislation" through the Geneva 
Conventions Act 1958. However, the Act only prohibits "grave breaches" 
of the Conventions or First Protocol under section 3(1). Subsection (2) sets 
out which provisions of the Conventions or First Protocol amount to "grave 
breaches", but this does not include breach of article 13(2) of the First 
ProtocoL 
Associated Islands v Sutton [1995] 1 NZLR 426, Cooke P referring to the doctrine 
as part of "common law, reflecting international law" (428): 
8 Article 13(2) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 4 (entered into force 7 
December 1978). 
9 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 32 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 
(entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 
136 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 
1949, 75 UNTS 288 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Protocol I, ibid; and the 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 610 (entered into force 7 
December 1978). 
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The customary norm reflected in article 13(2) is thus not reflected 
within New Zealand's domestic legislation. As a norm of customary 
international law, however, it is applicable at domestic law without any act 
of transformation. The question, then, is what is the resultant significance 
of the prohibition? In the writer's view, the significance is two-fold. First, 
the New Zealand State is prohibited from undertaking such acts or threats. 
Second, the description of prohibited conduct within article 13(2) is a norm 
of customary law that is directly applicable by New Zealand's courts. 
Before taking either point any further, however, it should be noted that the 
First Protocol is not framed in general terms. Its full title is the "Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts" (emphasis 
added). Thus (1) the New Zealand State is prohibited from engaging in 
such conduct when involved in an international armed conflict; and (2) 
although directly applicable in domestic law by New Zealand courts, this 
norm would be restricted in its application to the consideration by the 
courts of the conduct of a person or agency involved in an international 
armed conflict. 
The only potentially wider utility of the norm would lie in a willingness 
by the New Zealand courts to interpret legislation concerning counter-
terrorism in a manner that is consistent with the prohibition: a prohibition 
against acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to 
spread terror among the civilian popUlation. 
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3.3 United Nations Action 
Both the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have 
been active in adopting resolutions concerning the combating of terrorism. 
Due to the differing status of resolutions by each body, consideration of 
Security Council and General Assembly action is undertaken separately. 
3.3.1 Resolutions of the Security Council 
Two resolutions of the UN Security Council have been identified as 
imposing obligations upon member States of the United Nations 
concerning counter-terrorism: Resolutions 1269 and 1373.10 As also 
discussed within Chapter Two, resolutions of the Security Council are 
binding upon members of the United Nations by virtue of article 25 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
It must be determined, therefore, whether the resolutions in question 
are "decisions of the Security Council" within the terms of article 25. If so, 
then their provisions must be complied with by New Zealand, and 
consideration of the nature of the obligations and means of compliance will 
then need to be had. the resolutions, or parts of them, are not binding 
under article 25, then different considerations will result. In that regard, it 
was concluded within Chapter Two that (1) the resolutions were made 
within the proper mandate of the Security Council under article 24 and 
Chapter V of the UN Charter; and (2) whether a particular provision of a 
10 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1269 of 19 October 1999, 
S/RESI1269 (1999), and 1373 of 21 September 2001, S/RES/1373 (2001). 
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resolution is a "decision" within the meaning of article 25 turns on whether 
the provision uses exhortatory or mandatory language. 11 
The result of the latter analysis, as well as the nature of the provisions 
at hand, is that the obligations under resolutions 1269 and 1373 fall within 
three categories: binding obligations; non-binding directions; and non-
binding reporting obligations. 
3.3.1(a) Non-binding reporting regime. Under Resolution 1373, the 
Security Council established what the writer describes as a reporting and 
monitoring dialogue between UN members and the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee: 
6. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional 
rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, consisting of 
all the members of the Council, to monitor implementation of this 
resolution, with the assistance of appropriate expertise, and calls upon 
all States to report to the Committee, no later than 90 days from the 
date of adoption of this resolution and thereafter according to a 
timetable to be proposed by the Committee, on the steps they have 
taken to implement this resolution; 
New Zealand has so far submitted four reports to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee under the procedure initiated under Resolution 1373. 12 The 
11 Applying the decision of the International Court of Justice in Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1990), 
(1970-1971), Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 
1971,53. 
12 New Zealand's reports to the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee 
were lodged between 2001 and 2004 as follows: 
• New Zealand's first report: Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 
September 2001, New Zealand, 2 January 2002, S/200111269; 
• New Zealand second report: Supplementary report providing additional 
information on the measures taken by New Zealand to implement the 
provisions of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), 19 July 2002, 
S/2002/795; 
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reports contend that New Zealand is now fully compliant with its 
international counter-terrorist obligations. The accuracy or otherwise of 
that contention is considered within the examination of various items of 
New Zealand legislation, later in this chapter, and within the following 
discussion on the binding substantive provisions of Resolutions 1373. 
3.3.1(b) Binding obligations. Interestingly, Resolution 1269 contains no 
binding substantive obligations, which reflects the increased attention paid 
to counter-terrorism since September 11. Two of those non-binding 
directions, however, transformed into mandatory obligations within 
Resolutions 1373. The first of those relates to the prevention and 
suppression of the financing of terrorism,13 which became the subject of 
detailed attention within paragraphs 1 and 2 of Resolution 1373. The 
second concerns the apprehension, prosecution or extradition of those who 
plan, finance or commit terrorist acts,14 now the subject of attention within 
paragraph 2 of Resolution 1373. The entirety of the binding substantive 
obligations is contained within paragraphs 1 and 2 of Resolution 1373, set 
out earlier within Chapter Two.15 
These binding obligations were implemented into New Zealand law 
under the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and 
Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001, by Order in Council on 26 
• New Zealand's third report: New Zealand response to the questions and 
comments of the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee contained in 
the Chairman's letter of 30 May 2003,5 September 2003, S12003/860; and 
.. New Zealand's fourth report: New Zealand reJponse to the United Nations 
Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee questions for response by 30 
April 2004, 7 May 2004, S/2004/359. 
13 Resolution 1269, para 4 (second unnumbered subparagraph). 
14 Resolution 1269, para 4 (third unnumbered subparagraph). 
15 Chapter Two, 2.3.2 United Nations Security Council. 
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November 2001 under the United Nations Act 1946. As indicated by New 
Zealand to the Counter-Terrorism Committee in its first report to the 
Committee, these regulations were made by way of interim measure, 
pending tbe enactment of the then Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) 
Bil1. 16 The regulations were to expire on 30 June 2002, by which time the 
Bill was expected to have passed through Parliament. 17 Due, however, to 
the early dissolution of the New Zealand Parliament prompted by early 
elections in July 2002, the life of the regulations was extended to 31 
December 2002 by the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression 
and Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2002. The substance of the 
regulations is considered in more detail below. 18 
The obligations under Resolution 1373 have since been incorporated 
within the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.19 The substance of this piece 
of legislation is also considered in more detail below. The reason for 
translating these obligations into the Terrorism Suppression Act, rather 
than leaving them as regulatory provisions, lies in the fact that penalties for 
regulatory offences are limited.20 Liability for the breach of regulations 
made under the United Nations Act is set at a maximum of 12 months 
imprisonment, or a $10,000 fine in the case of a person, or a fine up to 
16 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12,7. 
17 Regulation 3. 
18 Discussed at 3.10 United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and 
Mghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001 and Amending Regulations. 
19 For a detailed account on how New Zealand's sees that it has complied with 
these operative provisions (paragraphs 1 and 2), see its first report to the Counter-
Terrorism Committee, above n 12, 6-15. 
20 As explained in New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, ibid, 5. 
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$100,000 in the case of a company or corporation.21 The nature of 
terrorist-related offences calls, however, for severe penalties.22 Offences 
under the Terrorism Suppression Act reflect this. 23 
New Zealand has identified the following features of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act as measures by which it has implemented Resolution 
1373: 
.. Para I (a): prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts. 
Paragraph l(a), which requires the prevention and suppression of the 
financing of terrorist acts, is a general provision, expanded upon by the 
subparagraphs that follow it. In addition of those more specific 
requirements, New Zealand identified the fact that the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand took steps to notify financial institutions of these 
requirements and prohibitions?4 In addition, funding for security and 
counter-terrorism has been boosted, with the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs and Trade identifying the post-September 11 environment as 
. . h' 25 requmng tiS .. 
21 United Nations Act 1946, section 3(1). 
22 As called for within the various international anti-terrorism treaties concerned, 
and within United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. 
23 Discussed at 3. 11.2(b) Offences. 
24 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12,6. 
25 The Budget 2003 provided an additional $5.9 million for 2004 and $1.9 million 
in future years: Hon Phil Goff, 'Funding boost for security, counter-terrorism and 
emergency responses', Beehive Press Release 12 May 2003, URL 
<http://www.behive.govt.nzlPrintDocumentcfm ?DocumentID= 16723> at 17 May 
2003. 
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.. Para 1 (b): criminalise the provision of funds for terrorist acts. In 
compliance with this provision of Resolution 1373, the Act creates 
offence of the fmancing of terrorism. 26 
.. Para 1 (c): freeze fUluls and assets of terrorist entities. The freezing of 
assets is said to be given effect to through various provisions of the 
Act.27 New Zealand has described the establishment of various stages 
in achieving this obligation.28 The first stage is to identify the assets to 
be frozen, through sections 20 to 42 inclusive, which provide a process 
by which individuals or groups may be designated as terrorist or 
associated entities?9 Next, obligations are imposed upon financial 
institutions to report suspicions of the holding or control of property 
belonging to or controlled by such entities (sections 43 to 47)?O Third, 
section 9 of the Act prohibits dealing with property belonging to 
terrorist entities? 1 Finally, sections to 61 establish procedures 
through which terrorist assets can be forfeited. 32 
"" Para 1( d): prohibit the provision of financial or related services to 
terrorist entities. Responding to paragraph 1(d) of the Resolution, 
section 10 makes it unlawful to make property, or financial or related 
26 Section 8 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2004, discussed below at 3.11.2(b) 
Offences. See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, 
ibid, 6-7, which also refers to the defining provisions of the Act (sections 4 and 5 
- discussed below at 3.11. 2( a) Definition of H terrorist act") and the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction attached to the offences (sections 14, 15, 17 and 18). 
27 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12, 7-9. 
28 As explained within New Zealand's report to the United Nations 1267 
Committee, Response of New Zealand to the Security Council Committee under 
Security Council resolution 1455 (2003), 17 April 2003, 4-7. 
29 Discussed at 3.11. 2( c) Designation of H terrorist entities". 
30 Discussed at 3.11.2(e) Financial transactions reporting. 
31 Discussed at 3.1l.2(b) D.ffences. 
32 Discussed at 3.11.2(d) Fotfeiture of terrorist property. 
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services available to terrorist or associated entities (subject to the 
express permission of the Prime Minister under section 11). 
.. Para 2(a): suppress support to terrorists and eliminate supply of 
weapons. In compliance with paragraph 2(a), the Terrorism 
Suppression Act prohibits the recruitment of persons into terrorist 
groups, under section 12, and participation in terrorist groups (section 
13).33 New Zealand reported that existing law would see New Zealand 
comply with the requirement to work towards the elimination of the 
supply of weapons to terrorists, pointing to the Customs Prohibition 
Order 1996,34 the Arms Act 1983,35 the Crimes Act 1961 (prohibiting 
the unlawful possession of an offensive weapon),36 the New Zealand 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 
1987,37 and the Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act 1966,38 together 
with its intended ratification of the Firearm..;; Protocol to the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. 39 New 
Zealand also reported that it would become party to the plastic 
explosives and nuclear materials conventions, which would see it create 
offences under the Terrorism Suppression Act, as required by the 
treaties and create corresponding offences.40 This was ultimately done 
through sections 13B, 13C and 13D of the latter Act. 
33 Discussed at 3.11.2(b) Offences. 
34 Made under the Customs and Excise Act 1996. 
35 See New Zealand's second report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12,6. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Not yet in force. See New Zealand's first report, above n 12, 11. See, also, 
New Zealand's report to tbe United Nations 1267 Committee, above n 28,8-9. 
40 See New Zealand's second report, above n 12, 6. 
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It Para 2(b): prevent the commission of terrorist acts. Additional to the 
above matters, New Zealand identified measures through which the 
New Zealand police and intelligence community can investigate groups 
or organisations of interest.41 Under the Counter-Terrorism Act, this 
has seen the creation of authority to obtain interception warrants, 
warrants to attach tracking devices to persons or things, deterrence 
through more severe penalties, and requiring a computer owner or user 
to provide information to access data subject to security codes and the 
.. Para 2(c): deny safe haven. Sections 7, 73 and 75 of the Immigration 
Act 1987 (already extant at the time of the adoption of Resolution 
1373) were identified by New Zealand as satisfying the requirement to 
deny safe haven to terrorists.43 
.. Para 2( d): prevent the use of State territory by terrorists. The 
extraterritorial nature of the offences created under the Terrorism 
Suppression Act, together with extant party liability provisions under 
I 
the Crimes Act 1961, were identified as further measures to prevent 
terrorists acting from New Zealand territory against other States of 
citizens.44 The further creation of offences of harbouring or concealing 
terrorists was relied on (offences under 13A of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act).45 
41 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12, 11. 
42 Discussed at 3.12.3 Parts 1 and 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act. 
43 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12, 11-12. 
44 Ibid, 12. 
45 Discussed at 3.11.2(b) Offences. 
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.. Para 2(e): ensure prosecution and severe punishment. As discussed 
later in this chapter, the various offences created under the Terrorism 
Suppression Act carry severe penalties.46 
co Para 2(j): assist in criminal investigations and prosecutions. New 
Zealand again reported that current Jaw permitted New Zealand to 
comply with this paragraph, referring to the Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters Act 1992 and the Extradition Act 1999.47 
.. Para 2(g): effective border controls to prevent the movement of 
terrorists. The Passports Act 1992 and Immigration Act 1987 were 
identified by New Zealand as means through which compliance with 
paragraph 2(g) of the Resolution could be achieved.48 
3.3.1(c) Non-binding directions. Both Resolutions 1269 and 1373 contain 
exhortatory, and therefore non-binding, directions. To begin with, both 
resolutions call upon States to become party to and fully implement all 
twelve conventions concerning terrorism.49 They also call upon United 
Nations members to: 
.. Find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational 
information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist 
persons or networks; forged or falsified travel documents; traffic in 
arms, explosives or sensitive materials; use of communications 
46 Discussed at 3.11.2(b) Oflences. See also See New Zealand's first report to the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 12, 13-14. 
47 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, ibid, 14. 
48 Ibid, 14-15. 
49 Resolutions 1269, para 2, and 1373, para 3(d) and (e). 
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technologies by terrorist groups; and the threat posed by the possession 
of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groupS.50 
.. Exchange information in accordance with international and domestic 
law and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters to prevent the 
commission of terrorist acts.51 
.. Cooperate, particularly through bilateral and multilateral arrangements 
and agreements, to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take 
action against perpetrators of such acts.52 
.. Take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions 
of national and international law, including international standards of 
human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of 
ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or 
participated in the commission of terrorist acts. 53 
.. Ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not 
abused by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts, 
and that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds 
for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.54 
An important point needs to be made about the latter two directions, 
concerning refugee status. The impact of counter-terrorism upon refugee 
status applications and, by executive extension, upon immigration policies 
and legislation is something that has been of considerable concern to civil 
libertarians and refugee and immigration lawyers in many States. The 
50 Resolution 1373, para 3(a). 
51 Resolution 1373, para 3(b). 
52 Resolutions 1269, para 4 (fIrst unnumbered subparagraph), and 1373, para 3(c). 
53 Resolutions 1269, para 4 (fourth unnumbered subparagraph), and 1373, para 
3(f) 
54 Resolution 1373, para 3(g). 
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detention of such persons has been of particular concern. These clearly are 
issues that affect the interface of counter-terrorism with the human rights of 
immigrants and asylum seekers. Notwithstanding that fact, consideration 
of this particular interface will not be had within this thesis. This is not to 
downplay the significance of the issues involved, but it is to reflect the 
reality that immigration and refugee law is a very specialised and extensive 
area of law. Given the number of issues that will be identified within 
examination of principal counter-terrorist legislation (below), one cannot 
possibly hope to cover those issues as well as refugee and immigration 
issues within one thesis. 
In terms of the balance of non-binding directions, the first point to note 
IS that New Zealand has become party to all twelve anti-terrorism 
conventions. Although this direction has been identified as a non-binding 
one, it is interesting to note that this is an area where a great number of 
States have acted to become party to the conventions. This is partly due, it 
is posited, to the fact that the issue of participation in these treaties has 
been one of the recurring matters addressed by the Security Council 
Counter-Terrorism Committee in its "dialogue" with States. A striking 
example can be seen in the case of New Zealand becoming party to the 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials.55 It was noted within the two relevant National Interest 
55 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
opened for signature 1 March 1991, ICAO Doc 9571 (entered into force 21 June 
1998), and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, 
opened for signature 3 March 1980, 1456 UNTS 124 (entered into force 8 
February 1987). 
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Analyses prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (discussed 
below) that New Zealand neither manufactures explosives domestically, 
nor engages in the transportation of nuclear material. 56 Notwithstanding 
this, the Analyses referred to the call by the Security Council for UN 
members to become party to all anti-terrorism conventions57 as a sound 
reason for New Zealand becoming a party to the conventions.58 
The balance of the directions concern cooperation in the international 
framework to counter terrorism. Within the very first paragraph of New 
Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, New Zealand 
declared that it was contributing to counter-terrorism "across the full range 
of diplomatic, legal financial, humanitarian, intelligence and military 
activities".59 New Zealand has pointed to executive action as including an 
ad hoc working group of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
examining the existing and potential measures to combat terrorism, and an 
increase in the physical protection of high profile or significant facilities, 
aviation security and border control.60 New Zealand identified itself as 
active in consulting with other countries on how to strengthen anti-terrorist 
56 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest Analysis, 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
para 2, and National Interest Analysis, Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials, para 4. 
57 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of 21 September 2001, 
S/RES/1373 (2001), para 3(d). 
58 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest Analysis, 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 
para 2, and National Interest Analysis, Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials, paras 5 and 7. 
59 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12,3. 
60 Ibid, 4. 
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measures, including work of raIsmg the awareness of Pacific Island 
countries.61 
One particular issue warrants some discussion before concluding the 
examination of Resolution 1373. In response to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee's question concerning steps taken by New Zealand to intensify 
the obtaining and exchange of operational information, New Zealand has 
pointed to the Interception Capability Bill as the vehicle through which 
telecommunications network operators would need to make their networks 
"interception capable".62 The Bil1 was enacted in 2004 as the 
Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act 2004. What should be 
noted is that the Act does not create any powers of interception, nor any 
authority to apply for warrants of interception. Its aim is to require 
network operators to ensure that public telecommunications networks and 
services have interception capability.63 For that reason, the Act will not be 
given separate consideration within this chapter. It is relevant, in the 
privacy context, to simply note the principles identified within section 6 of 
the Act: 
The following principles must be applied by persons who exercise 
powers and carry out duties under this Act if those principles are 
relevant to those powers or duties: 
(a) the principle that the privacy of telecommunications that are not 
subject to an interception warrant or any other lawful interception 
authority must be maintained to the extent provided for in law: 
(b) the principle that the interception of telecommunications, when 
authorised under an interception warrant or any other lawful 
interception authority, must be carried out without unduly 
interfering with any telecommunications. 
61 Ibid,S. See, in particular, pages 15-18 of the report. 
62 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12, 11. See also New Zealand's second report, above n 12, 10. 
63 See sections 5 and 7 of the Act. 
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3.3.2 Resolutions of the General Assembly 
The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on Measures to 
Eliminate International Terrorism in 1994, calling upon members of the 
United Nations to take various measures to prevent and suppress terrorism, 
and prevent their territories from being used as bases for terrorist training 
and support.64 The Declaration has been restated and expanded upon by 
the Assembly in 1995,65 1996,66 1998,672000,682001,692002,70200371 and 
2004.72 As also discussed within Chapter Two, however, is that although 
these resolutions are compelling and strongly worded (despite their lack of 
a definition of the term "terrorism") they are not, in and of themselves, 
binding upon members of the UN. Article 10 of the Charter dictates that 
resolutions of the General Assembly are recommendatory only. 
At first instance, then, the utility and relevance of the Declarations, 
from a domestic law perspective, may seem lacking. There is, however, a 
means through which the contents of the Declarations might influence or 
inform municipal courts. Although resolutions of the Assembly are not, by 
virtue of article 10, binding upon members of the United Nations, they 
64 As discussed within Chapter Two. See United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, AlRES/49/60. 
65 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/53 of 11 December 1995, 
AlRES/50/53. 
66 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 511210 of 17 December 1996, 
AlRES/51121O. 
67 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 52/165 of 19 January 1998, 
AlRES/52/165. 
68 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/110 of 2 February 2000, 
AlRES/54/11O. 
69 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 55/158 of 30 January 2001, 
AlRES/55/158. 
70 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/88 of 24 January 2002, 
AlRES/56/88. 
71 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 57/27 of 15 January 2003, 
AlRES/57127. 
72 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58181 of 8 January 2004, 
AlRES/58/81. 
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might nevertheless constitute pnma facie evidence of customary 
international law. If the Declarations do indeed retlect customary 
international law, they are binding in domestic law without any act of 
transformation. 73 
In brief terms, customary international law comprises two elements: a 
corpus (a custom or practice that has evolved over time) and an animus (an 
sense on the part of the participants in the custom that they act in they way 
they do because they are legally bound to - opinio juris sive necessitatis).74 
Custom must take the form of State conduct. It must be uniform and 
consistent to a degree that the core of the State practice exhibits these 
h .. 75 C aractenstics. The practice must be participated in by a sufficient 
number of States so that it can be said to be generally applied.76 It must 
normally also have existed for a period of time so that it may indeed be 
called a "custOm',.77 Most importantly, it must be exercised through a 
sense of legal obligation, rather than for political expedience or 
. 78 
convemence. 
Whether or not the General Assembly Declarations are reflective of 
customary law is therefore dependent on whether they are reflective of 
73 See above discussion concerning customary law, 3.1 Modes of Transformation. 
74 BrownHe, above n 2,6-9. 
75 See, for example, the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru) (1950) ICJ Reports 266, 276-277. 
76 See, for example, the judgment of the International Court of Justice in the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v Iceland) (1974) ICJ Reports 3, 23-
26. 
77 Although it should be said that if the other two aspects of consistency and 
generality are found in strong measure, the requirement for duration is not as 
important: see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany 
v Denmark; Federal Republic of Gennany v The Netherlands) (1969) ICJ Reports 
3, para 74. 
78 See, for example, the Lotus Case, Permanent Court of International Justice, Ser. 
A, no. 10, 28, and the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ibid, para 71. 
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actual State practice, such practice undertaken through a sense of legal 
obligation. If one considers the various State reports lodged with the 
Security Council Counter-Tenorism Committee, assuming that those 
reports minor actual conduct, one can see that there has been a reasonable 
level of consistency between State conduct and the various principles 
enumerated in the Declarations.79 Furthermore, the repeated adoption of 
the principles tends to point towards a practice of duration, from 1994 to 
the present, albeit that this is reasonably brief in the normal life of the 
emergence of customary law. In terms of generality, however, although an 
members of the United Nations have reported to the Committee, they have 
not all adopted counter-terrorist measures within the terms recommended 
within the Declarations. 80 In determining whether the elements of 
generality and opinio juris are satisfied, therefore, one would need to 
undertake a very close analysis of the State reports and the actual status and 
use of counter-telTorist legislation within each reporting State. 
This is not an issue that will be taken any further in this thesis for two 
reasons. First, such an examination would need to be very extensive to 
produce any determinative findings. Second, the value of those findings 
does not appear to add little to the thesis topic. This is the case because 
79 State reports to the Committee are available online at URL 
<http://www.un.orglDocs/sc/committees/1373/reports.htm1>. 
80 Take for example, Fiji, who reported to the Committee in 2002 and 2003, but 
has only recently announced that it is preparing counter-terrorist legislation: see 
Report of the Government of Fiji pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council 
resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001,4 June 2002, S/2002l616, and Fiji's 
second round of re:-.ponses based on the letter dated 8 August 2002, 25 April 
2003, S/2003/481; and compare with Shameem S, "Tension Between Anti-
Terrorism Laws and Human Rights", presentation at the public workshop, How 
Should Fiji Respond to the. Threat of Terrorism?, hosted by the Citizens' 
Constitutional Forum and the Fiji Human Rights Commission, 17 July 2004, 
Suva, Fiji. 
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such norms (if they are customary norms) hold little relevance to domestic 
law in the hands of the judiciary. In general terms, the principles within 
the Declarations are mirrored within the Security Council resolutions 
discussed and within the internationa1 conventions on terrorism to which 
New Zealand is a party. Through incorporating legislation, those 
obligations have become part of municipal law. The Declarations therefore 
add little, in practical terms, to the manner in which New Zealand's 
domestic law on counter-terrorism is to be applied by the judiciary. 
3.4 International Treaties 
New Zealand is party to all twelve conventions identified within Chapter 
Two as international treaties on terrorism. This part of the chapter 
considers the status of treaties in municipal law and the manner in which 
they are incorporated, or transformed, into domestic law, Consideration is 
then given to each of the twelve conventions and the means by which these 
have been incorporated. 
3.4.1 Status of International Treaties in Dmnestic Law 
Unlike customary international law, which is part of the law of New 
Zealand without the need for incorporation by statute, treaties require 
incorporation to become part of domestic law. Here, the New Zealand 
courts adopt a dualist approach. 
In the often cited decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General 
for Canada v Attorney-General for Ontario, Lord Atkin drew a distinction 
between the formation of a treaty on the one hand and the performance of 
Terror versus Tyranny PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 84 
Chapter 3: New Zealand's Counter-Terrorist Legislation 
the obligations under the treaty on the other.8l He observed that, in the 
British Empire, the formation of a treaty is a matter for the executive, while 
performance lay within the purview of the legislature, by enactment into 
statute of the responsibilities undertaken through the treaty. 
The latter decision was relied on by the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
in the court's consideration of a police warrant to recover the black boxes 
of an Ansett aircraft in New Zealand Air Line Pilot's Association 
Incorporated v Attorney-General and Others.82 Although certain 
provisions of the Chicago Convention on International Civil A viation83 
seemed to preclude the recovery of black boxes, the particular provisions 
had not been implemented in New Zealand law by legislation and the 
warrants were allowed to stand. Similarly, in considering the status of the 
Treaty of Waitangi in Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land 
Board, Chief Justice Myers had earlier held that: 84 
A treaty only becomes enforceable as part of the municipal law if and 
when it is made so by legislative authority. 
3.4.2 Incorporation of International Treaties 
In response to a report of the New Zealand Law Commission in 1997,85 
mainly concerned with the issue of democratic oversight in the treaty-
making process, procedures for the making of treaties and the incorporation 
of their provisions are now set out within Parliamentary Stating Orders 382 
81 Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-General for Ontario [1937] AC 326, 
347-348. 
82 New Zealand Air Line Pilot's Association Incorporated v Attorney-General and 
Others [1997] 3 NZLR 269,280-285. 
83 Opened for signature 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295 (entered into force 4 
April 1947). 
84 Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1939] NZLR 107, 120. 
85 New Zealand Law Commission, 111e Treaty Making Process: Reform and the 
Role of Parliament, Report No 45 (1997, Wellington). 
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to 385 inclusive.86 The Standing Orders establish a three-step process, 
effective from September 1999.87 The first involves steps to be taken when 
a treaty is fIrst adopted and signed, or where the Executive is 
contemplating acceding to a treaty. In that event, Standing Order 382 
requires all multilateral treaties and "significant" bilateral treaties to be 
presented to the House with a National Interest Assessment (NIA). 
Standing Order 383 sets out the various issues that must be address within 
a NIA, including the reasons for becoming a party to the treaty, the 
advantages and disadvantages of this, the costs of compliance and the steps 
that need to be taken to implement the obligations under the treaty. The 
treaty, with the accompanying NIA, must then be considered by the 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee for it to prepare a report to 
the House. In doing so, the Corrunittee is required to determine whether 
the treaty should be brought to the attention of the House due to any 
matters covered by the NIA or "for any other reason". 88 
The second step is to introduce legislation through which the treaty 
obligations are to be incorporated into domestic law. This will be 
accompanied by the Committee's report, to which the National Interest 
Assessment must be appended. 89 Only once the legislation is passed as an 
Act of Parliament will the Executive take the final step of ratifying the 
86 New Zealand, Standing Orders of the House of Representatives, brought into 
force 20 February 1996, amended 22 August 1996, 8 September 1999 and 16 
December 2003. 
87 The Standing Orders in question were included in the amendment of the 
Standing Orders of the House of Representative of 8 September 1999, ibid. 
88 Standing Orders 384 and 385. 
89 Standing Order 385. 
Ten'or versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 86 
Chapter 3: New Zealand's Counter-Terrorist Legislation 
treaty, thereby making its provlSlons (as translated by an enactment) 
binding at international law upon New Zealand.9o 
3.4.3 Incorporation of the International Terrorism Treaties 
At the time of the September 11 attacks and adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 1373 in 2001, New Zealand was a party to eight of the twelve 
international terrorism conventions, as follows. 
3.4.3(a) Safety of aviation. Four international conventions on terrorism 
relate to the safety of aircraft and civil aviation in general: 
.. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft.91 Adopted in 1963, the "Tokyo Convention" was signed by 
New Zealand on 12 February 1974 and ratified on 13 May 1974.92 
.. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.93 
Adopted in 1970, New Zealand signed the "Hague Convention" on 15 
September 1971 and ratified on 12 February 1974.94 
.. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation. 95 Adopted in 1971, the "Montreal Convention" was 
90 Assuming that the treaty has come into force. The question of when a treaty 
comes into force is a matter provided for within the text of the treaty itself, 
normally calling for a certain number of ratifications to be lodged. 
91 Opened for signature 14 September 1963, 704 UNTS 219 (entered into force 4 
December 1969). 
92 As recorded by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in its 
Treaty Collection, as at 12 October 2004 at URL <http://www.icao.intlicao/enlleb/ 
Tokyo.htm>. 
93 Opened for signature 16 December 1970, 860 UNTS 105 (entered into force 14 
October 1971). 
94 As recorded ICAO, above n 92, at URL <http://www.icao.intlicao/en/leb/ 
Hague.htm>. 
95 Opened for signature 23 September 1971,974 UNTS 177 (entered into force 26 
January 1073). 
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signed by New Zealand on 26 September 1972 and ratified at the same 
time as the latter convention, on 12 February 1974.96 
.. Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation. 97 The "Montreal Protocol", 
adopted in 1988, was signed by New Zealand on 11 April 1989 and 
ratified on 2 August 1999.98 
These treaties were incorporated into New Zealand law by the Aviation 
Crimes Act 1972, considered further below.99 New Zealand did not lodge 
reservations to any of the four aviation conventions. 
3.4.3(b) Safety of persons. The following two conventions are directed 
towards the safety of persons: 
.. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. 100 
This treaty was adopted in December 1973, with New Zealand not 
being an original party to the treaty. New Zealand became a State party 
by accession on 6 December 1988.101 
96 As recorded ICAO, above n 92, at lJRL <http://www.icao.int/icao/enl1eb/ 
Mt171.htm>. 
97 Opened for signature February 1988, ICAO Doc 9518 (entered into force 6 
August 1989). 
98 As recorded ICAO, above n 92, at URL <http://www.icao-int/icao/enlleb/ 
Via.htm>. 
99 Discussed at 3.6 Aviation Crimes Act 1972. 
100 Opened for signature 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167 (entered into force 
20 February 1977). 
LOl As recorded by the United Nations in its record on Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited with the Secretary-General, as at 12 October 2004 at URL 
<http://untreaty. un.orglENGLISHIStatus/Chaptecxviii/treaty7 . asp> . 
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.. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages. 102 Adopted 
in 1979, the treaty was signed by New Zealand on 24 December 1980 
and ratified on 12 November 1985.103 
Also relevant to the protection and safety of persons, although not listed by 
the Terrorism Prevention Branch as one of the twelve conventions relating 
to terrorism, is the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and 
Associated Personnel. 104 All three treaties were incorporated under the 
Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations and Associated 
Personnel, and Hostages) Act 1980. The Act is considered below. 
3.4.3(c) Maritime safety. Finally, of the eight terrorism conventions to 
which New Zealand was a party prior to Resolution 1373, there are two 
treaties concerning maritime safety: 
.. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation. 105 Adopted in 1988, the "Rome Convention" 
was signed by New Zealand as an original signatory on 10 March 1988. 
.. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. 106 The "Rome 
Protocol", adopted at the same time as its parent convention, was again 
signed by New Zealand on 10 March 1988. 
102 Opened for signature 18 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (entered into force 3 
June 1983). 
103 As recorded by the United Nations, above n 101, <http://untreaty.un.org/ 
ENGLISHlStatus/Chapter_xviiiltreaty5.asp>. 
104 Opened for signature 9 December 1994, 2051 UNTS 391 (entered into force 15 
January 1999). 
105 Opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 
March 1992). 
106 Opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304 (entered into force 1 
March 1992). 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 89 
Chapter 3: New Zealand's Counter-Terrorist Legislation 
The conventions were incorporated under the Maritime Crimes Act 1999, 
also considered further below. 107 
3.4.4 Legislative Incorporation since September 11 
At the date of the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1373, New 
Zealand was not a party to the following four international treaties on 
telTorism: 
" International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing. lOS 
" International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
T . 109 erronsm 
" Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. 110 
.. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection. III 
As reported by New Zealand to the Counter-TelTorism Committee, New 
Zealand became party to the first two of these treaties after the enactment 
of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.112 It became party to the 
107 Discussed at 3.8 Maritime Crimes Act 1999. 
108 Opened for signature 12 January 1998, 21491JNTS 286 (entered into force 23 
May 2001). 
109 Opened for signature 10 January 2000,2179 UNTS 232 (entered into force 10 
April 1992). 
IlO Above n 55. 
III Ibid. 
112 As confirmed m New Zealand's third report to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, above n 12, 6-7. New Zealand acceded to the International 
Convention for the Suppression of TelTorist Bombing on 4 November 2002: as 
recorded by the United Nations, above n 101, <http://untreaty.un.org/ 
ENGLISHIStatus/Chaptecxviiiltreaty9.asp>. The International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was signed by New Zealand on 7 
September 2000 but not ratified until 4 November 2002: as recorded by the 
United Nations, above n 101, <http://untreaty.un.orglENGLISHIStatus/ 
Chaptecxviii/treaty 1 1. asp> . 
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remaining conventions on September 2004, after enactment of the 
Co unter -Terrorism Act 2003. 113 
In terms of the incorporating procedures discussed above, 114 the three-
step process for implementation of the treaties identified was followed, 
albeit with some points of interest. As treaties that were subject to 
ratification or accession by New Zealand, Parliamentary Standing Order 
(PSO) 384 applied,115 so that the four conventions had to be referred to the 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee (FADTC)116 with a 
National Interest Analysis117 and then presented to the House.l1S 
The National Interest Analyses (NIAs) were prepared by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, addressing each of the matters required under 
PSO 385, and then forwarded to the FADTC. In preparation of the 
Analyses, the Ministry consulted with the Ministry of Justice, Police, New 
Zealand Defence Force, Ministry of Defence, Security Intelligence Service, 
Treasury, Reserve Bank, Departments for Courts and of Corrections, Te 
Puni Kokiri, Customs, the Immigration Service, the Environmental Risk 
Management Authority, Ministry of Transport, Civil Aviation Authority, 
Occupational Health and Safety Service, Ministry of Health (National 
113 In its third report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, New Zealand indicated 
it would become party to these conventions following the enactment of the 
Counter-Terrorism Bill, ibid, 4. New Zealand's accession to the Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material is recorded in the Status Register of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, as at 21 September 2004, at URL 
<http://www .iaealorglPublicationslDocuments/Conventions/cppn_status. pdf>. 
It's accession to the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection is recorded by ICAO, above n 92, at URL 
<http://www.icao.intlicao/enllebIMEX.htm>. 
114 See 3.4.2 Incorporation of International Treaties. 
115 See Parliamentary Standing Order 384, para (1). 
116 Ibid, para (3). 
117 Ibid, para (2). 
118 Ibid, para (1). 
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Radiation Laboratory), Maritime Safety Authority, Land Transport Safety 
Authority and the Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences. 119 
The Analyses, which are each contained within the respective 
international treaty examination reports of the F ADTC, identify New 
Zealand's desire to become party to the conventions as being based upon 
its support of efforts to strengthen the rule of law at the international 
level120 and support for an effective and well-supported network of 
multilateral legal instruments to combat terrorism. 121 In the case of the 
"Plastic Explosives" and "Nuclear Materials" conventions,122 the NIAs 
noted that New Zealand neither manufactures explosives domestically, nor 
engages in the transportation of nuclear material. I23 Notwithstanding this, 
the Analyses noted the change in the post-September 11 international 
context and the call by the Security Council for UN members to become 
119 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
para 10, National Interest Analysis, International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism, para 13, National Interest Analysis, Convention on 
the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, para 15, and 
National Interest Analysis, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials, para 22. 
120 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
para 2, and National Interest Analysis, International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, para 2. 
121 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
para 2, National Interest Analysis, International Convention for the Suppression 
of the Financing of Terrorism, para 2, and National Interest Analysis, Convention 
on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, para 2, and 
National Interest Analysis, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Materials, para 2. 
122 Above n 55. 
m New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, para 2, and National Interest Analysis, Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials, para 4. 
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party to all anti-terrorism conventions 124 as sound bases for New Zealand 
becoming a party to the conventions. 125 
The Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee duly met to 
consider each treaty and NIA, as required. 126 In each case, the Committee 
reported to the House, attaching a copy of the relevant NIA, and simply 
advising that it had conducted an examination of the treaty in question and 
had no matters to bring to the attention of the House. 127 This completed the 
first (preparatory and consultative) step in the implementation process for 
each treaty. 
In the second phase of implementation, legislation was prepared and 
introduced to the House. For the purpose of the bombing and financing 
conventions, this was through the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) 
Bill, introduced in early 2001, which ultimately became the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002. This is discussed in detail below.128 The Counter-
Terrorism Bill, introduced in April 2002, was the vehicle through which 
the obligations under the plastic explosives and nuclear materials 
124 Resolution 1373, above n 57, para 3(d). 
125 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, para 2, and National Interest Analysis, Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials, paras 5 and 7. 
126 See Parliamentary Standing Orders 382(3), 384 and 385. 
127 The latter question being a decision of the Committee under Parliamentary 
Standing Order 385(2). For the reports of the Committee, see New Zealand 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Report on International Treaty 
Examination of the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, 
presented to the House 1 December 2000, Report on International Treaty 
Examination of the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
presented to the House 1 December 2000, Report on International Treaty 
Examination of the Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose 
of Identification, presented to the House 22 February 2002, and Report on 
International Treaty Examination of the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material, presented to the House 22 February 2002. 
128 Discussed at 3.11 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 
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conventions were incorporated. The Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 is also 
discussed below. 129 
As a result of the legislation mentioned, the final process was 
completed in New Zealand's post-September 11 counter-terrorist treaty-
making. The Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing was 
acceded to on 4 November 2002 and the International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was ratified by New Zealand on 
the same day. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the 
Purpose of Detection were both acceded to on 21 September 2004. 
Summary: Transformation of New Zealand's International 
Terrorism Obligations 
Evident through the discussion to this point of the chapter is that the 
interface between international and municipal law is a complex one at the 
best of times, added to in the context of counter-terrorism by reso lutions of 
the UN General Assembly and Security Council. By way of summary, the 
following can be said about the application and/or incorporation of New 
Zealand's international counter-terrorist obligations: 
.. Article 13(2) of the First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions contains 
a prohibition against acts or threats of violence intended to spread terror 
amongst the civilian population. Although New Zealand has not 
incorporated this prohibition within the Geneva Conventions Act 1958, 
the prohibition is applicable at domestic law as being reflective of 
customary international law (which requires no act of transformation). 
129 Discussed at 3.12 Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
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In practical terms, however, the prohibition is limited in application to 
international armed conflicts and its only potential impact upon New 
Zealand courts might be through informing the interpretation of 
counter-terrorist legislation consistently with the prohibition. 
e According to New Zealand's reports to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee, the non-binding directions of Security Council Resolutions 
1269 and 1373 have been, and continue to be, complied with through 
the diplomatic, legal, financial, humanitarian, intelligence and military 
activities of the New Zealand State. 
ED The binding directions under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Security Council 
Resolutions 1373 have, also according to New Zealand's reports, been 
implemented: (1) by way of interim measure, through the United 
Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and Afghanistan Measures) 
Regulations 2001 and Amending Regulations; and (2) permanently, 
through the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 
.. The resolutions of the General Assembly, adopting, reiterating and 
expanding upon the Assembly's Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism are not binding upon New Zealand in and of 
themselves. It is possible that they might be reflective of customary 
international law, in which case the principles within the Declarations 
are applicable at domestic law. The reality, however, is that the 
principles reflect matters addressed either through Security Council 
resolutions or within a number of the international conventions on 
terrorism, and therefore add little to the domestic law debate. 
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., The twelve international treaties on terrorism have been incorporated 
into New Zealand law through the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, the 
Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, and Hostages) Act 1980, the Maritime Crimes 
Act 1999, the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2003. 
What follows from this point is an examination of the items of domestic 
legislation identified as incorporating New Zealand's international 
obligations on counter-terrorism. This examination, considering each item 
of legislation in chronological order, is aimed at achieving three things. 
First, an overview of the nature and operation of the legislation will be 
provided. Next, an analysis will be conducted on whether each item of 
legislation in fact transforms into domestic law the international obligations 
it purports to incorporate. Finally, examination of the legislation seeks to 
identify provisions that might impact upon human rights. 
As well as examining the legislation which incorporates New Zealand's 
counter-terrorism obligations, consideration will be had to the International 
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. The rationale for doing so is 
that, even though this legislation is not an incorporating Act, it is 
nevertheless directly targeted at countering and responding to terrorist acts. 
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PART B: 
DOMESTIC INCORPORATING 
Having outlined the means by which New Zealand has acted to implement 
its international counter-terrorist obligations, this part of the chapter 
considers the various items of legislation through which implementation 
has occurred. As indicated, this part will provide an overview and 
explanation of seven items of domestic legislation: the Aviation Crimes 
Act 1972; the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations 
and Associated Personnel, and Hostages) Act 1980; the International 
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987; Maritime Crimes Act 1999; the 
United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and Afghanistan 
Measures) Regulations 2001; the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002; and the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. In the course of doing this, provisions or 
features of this legislation that have the potential to impact upon civil and 
political rights will be highlighted, thus identifying the nature of issues to 
be considered within Chapter Six onwards of this thesis. It should be 
emphasised that this Chapter only sets out to identify potential issues. The 
proper examination of the content of rights and limits is left for Part Two 
of the thesis. 130 
3.6 Aviation Crimes Act 1972 
The Aviation Crimes Act 1972 was the vehicle through which New 
Zealand transformed its obligations under the four conventions concerning 
130 Discussed at 3.14 Potential Civil and Political Rights Issues. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 97 
Chapter 3: Nell' Zealand's Counter-Terrorist Legislation 
the safety of aviation, it preamble stating that it is: 
An Act to give effect to the provisions of the Hague Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the Montreal Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, the Montreal Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, and the 
Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on 
Board Aircraft, and for matters incidental thereto. 
The Act contains 21 sections and establishes the following offences 
relating to aircraft and international airports: 
.. Hijacking,131 being the unlawful seizure of, or exercise of control over, 
an aircraft (while on board an aircraft "in flight", which is from the 
time when all the aircraft's external doors are closed after embarkation 
until any external door is opened for disembarkation)132 by force, 
intimidation or threat of force, whether in or outside New Zealand.133 
Conviction on indictment renders a person liable to life 
.. 134 Impnsonment. 
.. Crimes in connection with hijacking,135 which includes any act or 
omission that is an offence under New Zealand law and occurs while 
on board an aircraft in flight and "in connection with the crime of 
hijacking".136 Section 4(2) deems such a connection to exist when the 
131 Offences mandated by articles l(a) and 2 of the Hague Convention. 
132 This is in fact a wider definition than that provided under the Tokyo 
Convention, which provides under Chapter I, article 1(3) that "For the purposes of 
this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in flight from the moment when 
power is applied for the purpose of take-off until the moment when the landing 
run ends". The broader definition found in the Aviation Crimes Act is found, 
however, within Chapter III of the Convention, article 5(2); article 3(l) of the 
Hague Convention; and article 2(a) of the Montreal Convention. 
133 The offenee is created under section 3 of the Act. The term "in flight" is 
defined by section 2(2) of the Act. 
134 Section 3. 
135 Offences mandated by article 1 (b) of the Hague Convention, above n 94. 
136 Section 4(1). Section 4 does not itself specify the maximum penalty for such 
offending. 
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conduct facilitates a hijacking or is intended to avoid the detection or 
arrest of any person connected with the hijacking. 
.. Crimes relating to aircraft,137 being a list of specific offences under 
section 5 of the Act relating to conduct affecting an aircraft in flight or 
"in service" (as defined by section 2(3)). The offences relate to 
conduct that might damage an aircraft or otherwise put it at risk. 
.. Crimes relating to international airports,138 which again sets out a list 
of specific offences concerning the use of any "device, substance or 
weapon" which endangers the safety of an international airport through 
violence, damage of facilities or aircraft not in service, or disruption of 
. 139 
serVIces. 
The commission of any of these offences renders a person liable to 
prosecution under New Zealand law or, in the alternative, liable to 
extradition in accordance with the procedures under the Extradition Act 
1999.140 
The Aviation Crimes Act also makes it an offence to take firearms, 
dangerous or offensive weapons or instruments, ammunition, or any 
explosive substance or device onto an aircraft without lawful authority or 
reasonable excuse. 141 
In terms of compliance with obligations, the Tokyo Convention 
requires contracting States to take measures necessary to establish 
jurisdiction over offences committed on board aircraft registered in their 
137 Offences mandated by article 1(2) of the Tokyo Convention and article 1 of the 
Montreal Convention, above n 92 and 9S. 
138 Offences mandated by article 2(1) of the Montreal Protocol, above n 97. 
139 Section SA 
140 Sections 7 and 7 A. 
141 Section 11, punishable by a maximum of S years' imprisonment. 
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State. 142 The more specific obligations imposed under the Tokyo 
Convention appear to have been fully implemented through sections 5 
(offences), 15 to 17 inclusive (powers of the aircraft commander) and 19 
(exemption of military, customs or police services) of the Aviation Crimes 
Act. 
The Hague Convention, concerning the hijacking of aircraft, requires 
States parties to make hijacking an offence punishable by severe 
penalties. 143 Again, the requirements of the convention appear to have 
been fully implemented. The position is also true of the Montreal 
Convention and its Protocol. 
Sections 12 and 13 of the Act set out powers of search of passengers, 
baggage and cargo. Since search and seizure is a matter specifically 
addressed within both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 144 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, further 
consideration of these provisions will be had. 145 
Security of the person is also a matter impacted upon by the Aviation 
Crimes Act, an aircraft commander holding powers of search and restraint 
under sections 15 and 17.146 Related to the powers of restraint are the 
provisions of articles 6 to 10 and 13 to 15 inclusive of the Tokyo 
Convention, and article 6 of the Hague Convention. 
142 Article 3(2). 
143 Article 2. 
144 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999l1NTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976). 
145 Chapter Nine. 
146 Also to be addressed within Chapter Nine. 
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3.7 Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, and Hostages) Act 1980 
The Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, and Hostages) Act 1980 incorporates the two treaties 
on terrorism concerning the safety of persons, as well as the Convention on 
the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. Its preamble 
reads: 
An Act to give effect to-
(a) The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic 
Agents 1973; and 
(b) The Convention Against the Taking of Hostages1979; and 
(c) The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated 
Personnel 1994;-
and for matters incidental to the implementation of those Conventions. 
This discussion focuses on the first two conventions, identified within the 
Act as the 1973 and 1979 Conventions, as terrorism-related conventions 
identified by the Terrorism Prevention Branch. The Act establishes three 
categories of offending: 
.. Hostage-taking,147 defined as the unlawful seizure or detention of any 
person, whether in or outside New Zealand, with intent to compel the 
government of any country or any international intergovernmental 
organisation to do or abstain from doing something. 148 Section 8(2) 
excludes conduct that would essentially amount to the domestic-based 
offence of kidnapping. 
147 As mandated by article 1 of the International Convention against the Taking of 
Hostages, above n 102. 
148 Section 8(1). 
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.. C .. db' 149 h' h' I d rtmes agal11st persons protecte y a conventlOn, w IC mc u es 
conduct in or outside New Zealand in relation to a person who is 
known to be a protected person that would amount to certain crimes 
listed in the first Schedule to the Act (section 3), or threats of such 
conduct (section 5),150 
" Crimes against premises or vehicles of persons protected by a 
convention,151 again including conduct within or outside New Zealand 
this time in relation to the official premises of, or vehicles used by, 
protected persons that would amount to certain crimes listed in the 
second Schedule to the Act (section 4), or threats of such conduct 
(section 6).152 
As for the Aviation Crimes Act, any offence against the Crimes 
(Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations and Associated 
Personnel, and Hostages) Act renders an offender liable to prosecution in 
New Zealand or, in the alternative, to extradition. To that end, the 
international obligations under the two conventions identified as relating to 
terrorism,153 appear to have been fully implemented into national law. 
There do not appear to be any issues of potential concern relating to civil 
and political rights within the 17 sections of the Act. 
149 As mandated by article lea), (c), (d) and (e) of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, above n 100. 
150 Including homicide, violent offending, sexual offending and kidnapping. 
151 As mandated by article l(b), (c), (d) and (e) of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punislunent of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, 
including Diplomatic Agents, above n 100. 
152 Arson, attempted arson, intentional damage and endangering transport 
sections 267,268,269 and 270 respectively of the Crimes Act 1961. 
153 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against 
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents and the 
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, above n 102. 
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3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 
The International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 is an Act 
adopted by New Zealand in direct response to the Rainbow Warrior 
bombing, rather than in response to international counter-terrorist 
obligations, and in the realisation that New Zealand was not safe from 
terrorist activity within its borders. 1s4 In the Parliamentary debates 
concerning the Bill, the then Minister of Justice Geoffrey Palmer said: 155 
Sadly, it can no longer be assumed that New Zealand will remain 
immune from acts of international terrorism. 
The Act establishes emergency powers, which can be authorised by a 
meeting of at least three Ministers of the Crown if they reasonably believe 
(based on advice to the Prime Minister from the Commissioner of Police) 
that an international terrorist emergency is occurring and that the exercise 
of emergency powers is necessary to deal with that emergency.lS6 This 
authority must be given by way of a notice in writing (within the terms 
specified under section 6(3)) and tabled before the House of 
Representatives with reasons for giving the notice. IS? The House then has 
the authority to either revoke the notice or, if necessary, to extend it at any 
time and for any reason. 158 The emergency authority otherwise remains 
valid for seven days, unless extended by a resolution of Parliament under 
154 Although it should be recognised that not all agreed at the time that this was 
the case and that specific anti-terrorism legislation was necessary: see, for 
example, New Zealand Human Rights Commission, Report on the International 
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Bill 1987, 1987. 
155 New Zealand, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, No 482, 10115, 30 June 
1987. 
156 Sections 5 and 6. 
157 Section 7. The notice must be tabled immediately if the House is at that time 
sitting, or otherwise at the earliest practicable opportunity - section 7(1). 
158 Sections 7(2) and 8. 
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section 7(2) of the Act - each resolution only enabling an extension of a 
maximum of seven days. 
Where an international terrorist emergency is declared, certain 
emergency powers are vested in the police under section lOaf the Act, also 
exercisable by members of the armed forces acting as an aid to the civil 
power and where requested to act by a member of the police: 159 
(2) Subject to this Act, any member of the Police may, for the 
purpose of dealing with any emergency to which this section applies, or 
of preserving life or property threatened by that emergency,-
(a) Require the evacuation of any premises or place (including any 
public place), or the exclusion of persons or vehicles from any 
premises or place (including any public place), within the area in 
which the emergency is occurring: 
(b) Enter, and if necessary break into, any premises or place, or any 
aircraft, hovercraft, ship or ferry or other vessel, train, or vehicle, 
within the area in which the emergency is occurring: 
(c) Totally or partially prohibit or restrict public access, with or 
without vehicles, on any road or public place within the area in 
which the emergency is occurring: 
(d) Remove from any road or public place within the area in which 
the emergency is occurring any aircraft, hovercraft, ship or ferry 
or other vessel, train, or vehicle impeding measures to deal with 
that emergency; and, where reasonably necessary for that 
purpose, may use force or may break into any such aircraft, 
hovercraft, ship or ferry or other vessel, train, or vehicle: 
(e) Destroy any propelty which is within the area in which the 
emergency is occurring and which that member of the Police 
believes, on reasonable grounds, constitutes a danger to any 
person: 
(t) Require the owner or person for the time being in control of any 
land, building, vehicle, boat, apparatus, implement, or equipment 
(in this paragraph referred to as requisitioned property) that is 
within the area in which the emergency is occurring forthwith to 
place that requisitioned property under the direction and control 
of that member of the Police, or of any other member of the 
Police: 
(g) Totally or partially prohibit or restrict land, air, or water traffic 
within the area in which the emergency is occurring. 
(3) Notwithstanding anything in any other Act, but subject to this 
Act, any member of the Police may, for the purpose of preserving life 
threatened by any emergency to which this section applies,-
159 Section 12. 
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(a) Connect any additional apparatus to, or otherwise interfere with 
the operation of, any part of the telecommunications system; and 
(b) Intercept private communications-
in the area in which the emergency is occurring. 
The latter power of interception is exercisable by police only. 160 The Act 
also provides an emergency power to requisition any property, with 
compensation later payable to the owner of the property. 161 The powers 
thus far have the potential to impact upon rights pertaining to search and 
seizure, detention and privacy. Added to this is the exemption from 
liability of the police or members of the armed forces exercising powers 
under the Act. 
Perhaps most controversial is section 14 of the Act which allows the 
Prime Minister to restrict or prohibit the publication or broadcasting of the 
identity (or any information capable of identifying) of any person involved 
in dealing with an international terrorist emergency, as well as restricting 
or prohibiting information about any piece of equipment used to deal with 
the emergency that could prejudice measures used to resolve an 
international terrorist emergency.162 In effect these powers could be used 
for a ban on all media for up to twenty-one days. Criticisms that the 
censorship provisions amounted to an unjustified encroachment on the 
right to freedom of expression163 led to the New Zealand Law Commission 
160 Section 10(4). 
161 Sections 11 and 13. 
162 The section, its triggering provisions, and effect are considered in Chapter 
Eight. 
163 Discussed in the report of the Advisory Council of Jurists, Reference on the 
Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism, Final Report to the Asia Pacific Forum of 
National Human Rights Institutions, May 2004, 116. 
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to recommend that the Act be repealed. 164 The Act remains In force 
without amendment. 
The Act also creates offences for failure to comply with directions 
issued by police or military under the powers under section 10,165 or for 
breach of a section 14 media gag. 166 
A "terrorist emergency" is defined under the Act as: 
Section 2 Interpretation 
"International terrorist emergency" means a situation in which any 
person is threatening, causing, or attempting to cause--
(a) The death of, or serious injury or serious harm to, any person or 
persons; or 
(b) The destruction of, or serious damage or serious injury 
(i) Any premises, building, erection, structure, installation, or 
road; or 
(ii) Any aircraft, hovercraft, ship or ferry or other vessel, train, or 
vehicle; or 
(iii) Any natural feature which is of such beauty, uniqueness, or 
scientific, economic, or cultural importance that its preservation 
from destruction, damage or injury is in the national interest; or 
(iv) Any chattel of any kind which is of significant historical, 
archaeological, scientific, cultural, literary, or artistic value or 
importance; or 
(v) Any animal-
in order to coerce, deter, or intimidate-
(c) The Government of New Zealand, or any agency of the 
Government of New Zealand; or 
(d) The Government of any other country, or any agency of the 
Government of any other country; or 
(e) Any body or group of persons, whether inside or outside New 
Zealand,-
for the purpose of furthering, outside New Zealand, any political aim 
There are two main things to note about this definition. Although, at first 
sight, it appears to be detailed, it is in fact relatively broad. A wide range 
of criminal conduct, accompanied by coercive or intimidatory elements, 
164 Keith K, Final Report on Emergencies (New Zealand Law Commission Report 
22, 1991), para 7.139. The Commission's recommendations are discussed when 
considering the impact and legitimacy of sections 14 and 15 of the Act within 
Chapter Eight. 
165 Section 21(1)(a), qualified by the defences under subsection (4). 
166 Section 21(1 )(b), qualified by the defences under subsection (4). 
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will satisfy the definition and might thereby invoke the powers discussed. 
The second aspect of the definition to note is the final sentence, which 
qualifies that the conduct in question is done for the purpose of furthering 
any political aim outside New Zealand. In other words, if a bombing (or 
other criminal act) was committed with the aim of changing the New 
Zealand Government's policy and/or conduct within New Zealand, this 
would not give rise to an "international terrorist emergency". The 
reasoning must be that this would be "national" rather than "international", 
although it is not clear why the State should want to have emergency 
powers to deal with international terrorists and not domestic ones. In 
considering this point in its report on emergencies, the New Zealand Law 
Commission described the distinction between international and internal 
terrorism as being unsustainable. 167 Pointing to the 1976 report of Sir Guy 
Powels on the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service,168 the 
Commission proposed that although international terrorism may pose the 
most likely threat against New Zealand, the possibility of a terrorist threat 
that has as its motive the furtherance of a political aim within New Zealand 
should not be discounted. 169 
167 Above n 164, para 7.82. 
168 Powels G, Security Intelligence Service: Report by Chief Ombudsman, AJHR 
1976 A 3A, 31. 
169 Above n 164, para 7.81. Opposed to that, the New Zealand delegation to the 
Human Rights Committee (during the Committee's consideration of New 
Zealand's second periodic report under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights) explained that the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) 
Act 1987 had been confined to international terrorism because that was a known 
reality, as opposed to 'home grown' terrorism (para 7.81): see Concluding 
observations of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand, CCPRJAl44/40 
(1989), para 372. 
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3.9 Maritime Crimes Act 1999 
The two maritime safety conventions relating to terrorism were 
incorporated into New Zealand law through the final piece of pre-
September 11 legislation, the Maritime Crimes Act 1999, being an Act: 170 
... to give effect to the provisions of the Rome Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation and the Rome Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental 
Shelf. 
Similar in nature to the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, the Maritime Crimes 
Act establishes offences mandated by the Rome Convention and Protocol 
and aimed at securing the safety of ships (other than warships, customs or 
police vessels)!7! and maritime platforms: 
.. Crimes relating to ships,!72 prohibiting the unlawful seizure of ships 
and acts that damage ships or place their safe navigation in danger. 173 
It also renders a person liable to prosecution if, in the commission of 
the latter acts, s/he injures or causes death to any person. 174 
" Crimes relating to fixed platfonns, 175 prohibiting the same conduct, but 
relating to fixed platforms (any artificial island, installation or structure 
permanently attached to the seabed for the purpose of exploration or 
I · . ) 176 resources exp OltatIOn . 
170 See the preamble to the Maritime Crimes Act 1999. 
171 Section 3. 
172 As mandated by article 3 of the Rome Convention, above n 105. 
173 Section 4(1) and (2). 
174 Section 4(2). 
175 As mandated by article 2 of the Rome Protocol, above n 106. 
176 As defined under section 2. 
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Such conduct, whether within or outside New Zealand,177 renders a person 
liable to prosecution within New Zealand or arrest and surrender to a State 
party to the Rome Convention or Protocol, as applicable. 17S 
The Act also provides the master of a ship with powers of detention and 
surrender, as well as search and seizure, of any person on board a ship, 
incorporating the obligations under article 8 of the Rome Convention.179 
The Convention and Protocol are in all other respects implemented into 
New Zealand law. As rights of arrest and detention, as well as search and 
seizure, are involved, those provisions of the Act require further 
examination in the context of human rights. 1SO 
3.10 United Nations (Terrorism Suppression and 
Afghanistan Measures) A· ........ ""."" ... VJlj'" 2001 and Amending Regulations 
As mentioned, the obligations imposed by the Security Council upon New 
Zealand under Resolution 1373 were, by way of interim measure, 
incorporated into domestic law under the United Nations Sanctions 
(Terrorism Suppression and Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001 and 
Amending Regulations of 2002 - the Terrorism Regulations. 1S1 The 
Terrorism Regulations were made pursuant to the empowering provision of 
the United Nations Act 1946, that provision established to permit the New 
Zealand Government to implement directions of the Security Council by 
Order in Council. 
177 See sections 8 and 9. 
178 Sections 13 to 16 inclusive. 
179 Sections 11 and 12. 
180 See below at 3.14 Potential Civil and Political Rights Issues. 
181 Discussed at 3.3.1(b) Binding obligations. 
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The Terrorism Regulations did four things. 18? First, they prohibited 
certain conduct relating to the financing of terrorist activities (the provision 
of funds to specified entities, the dealing with property of such entities and 
the making services and property available to entities).183 The Regulations 
also imposed duties upon any person in possession or control of property 
suspected to be owned or controlled by a specified entity to report this to 
the police. 184 Third, the Regulations prohibited the recruitment of any 
person as a member of a specified entity, or the participation by any person 
. h . 185 III suc an entIty. Finally, the Regulations identified al-Qaida, the 
Taliban and U sarna bin Laden as "specified entities" under these 
Regulations. 186 The prohibitions potentially impact upon the freedom of 
association, to be discussed within Chapter Eight. 
Quite apart from the prohibitions mentioned, the Terrorism Regulations 
also raise an interesting and complex issue concerning the relationship 
between the Executive and Parliament pertaining to subordinate law-
making authority and the potential to limit rights. This matter, as indicated 
earlier, is addressed further within Chapter Six. 
182 Gobbi M, "Treaty Action and Implementation", (2004) 1 New Zealand 
Yearbook of International Law 277. 
183 Regulations 6, 7 and 9 of the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression 
and Mghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001. 
184 Regulation 8 of the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and 
Mghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001. Regulation 8(2) excludes, from 
application of this duty, any "privileged communication" with a lawyer, as 
defined under the Financial Transactions Reporting Act 1996. 
185 Regulations 11 and 12 of the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression 
and Mghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001. 
186 Regulation 4(1) and 5 and the Schedule to the United Nations Sanctions 
(Terrorism Suppression and Mghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001, and 
Regulation 3 of the United Nations Sanctions (Mghanistan) Amendment 
Regulations 2001. 
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3.11 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 
As indicated above, the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 is an enactment 
passed to achieve two purposes: first to allow New Zealand to become 
party to the conventions on the suppression of terrorist bombings and the 
suppression of the financing of terrorism;187 and also to give effect to 
obligations upon New Zealand under Security Council Resolution 1373.188 
Because of the timing of New Zealand's decision to pursue each objective, 
and the intervening attacks of September 11, the process from Bill to Act 
was a rather unusual one. 
3.11.1 From Bill to the Current Act 
As indicated, this piece of legislation has undergone a long and somewhat 
unusual transformation from its original form and content as the Terrorism 
(Bombings and Financing) Bill to the current form and content of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. The first two stages reflect the dual 
purposes of the legislation as noted above. First, the Bill was introduced as 
simple incorporating legislation for the bombings and financing 
conventions. Next, the Bill was significantly amended to incorporate 
obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373. A further set of 
substantive provisions were added to the Act through the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2003 (which created the Terrorism Suppression Amendment 
Act 2003). Finally, the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) 
was introduced in December 2004. 
187 Discussed at 3.4.4 Legislative Incorporation Since September 11. 
188 Discussed at 3.3.1(b) Binding obligations. See also Gobbi M, "Treaty Action 
and Implementation", (2004) 1 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 260. 
Note that the Act does not contain any preambular statement setting out the 
purpose of the legislation, but that the purpose of the legislation is addressed 
within section 3 of the Act. 
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3.11.1 (a) Treaty implementation. The Terrorism Suppression Act began its 
life as the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, introduced in early 
2001 (prior to the September 11 attacks) following the Executive's 
decision to become party to the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings189 and the International Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 190 As discussed, National 
Interest Analyses were prepared, with the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee subsequently lodging treaty examination reports with the 
House on 1 December 2000. 191 The reports did not bring any matters to the 
attention of the House, but the Analyses each noted that domestic 
implementing legislation would be needed to create new criminal offences, 
establish extra-territorial jurisdiction and facilitate the prosecution or 
extradition of alleged offenders. 192 
3.11.1 (b) Security Council Resolution 1373. After the preparation of the 
National Interest Analyses and the presentation of reports required by 
Parliamentary Standing Orders,193 the horrific events of September 11, 
2001, transpired. The Security Council subsequently adopted Resolution 
1373,194 imposing both binding and non-binding obligations upon New 
Zealand (as a member of the United Nations).195 The Resolution was 
189 Above n 108. 
190 Above n 109. 
191 Discussed at 3.4.4 Legislative Incorporation Since September 11. 
192 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 
para 9, and National Interest Analysis, International Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, para 12. 
193 Discussed at 3.4.4 Legislative Incorporation Since September 11 and 3.11.1 
Treaty Implementation. 
194 Above n 57. 
195 Discussed at 3.3.1 Resolutions of the Security Council. 
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adopted when the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill was in its final 
stages of the select committee process. 196 Compliance with the obligations 
under the Resolution was the second aim of the Bill, as amended. To 
achieve that objective, the reasonably unusual step was taken of adding a 
considerable number of new substantive provisions to the Bill, seeing the 
Bill almost double in size. 197 Due to these circumstances, the Foreign 
Mfairs Defence and Trade Committee presented to the House an interim 
report on the Bill, drawing to the attention of the House the new provisions 
in the Bill, with explanatory notes. 198 The Committee also called for public 
submissions on the draft amendments199 and received 143 submissions 
from interest groups and individuals. 200 In contrast, the Committee had 
received no submissions on the original Terrorism (Bombings and 
F· .) B'11 201 mancmg . 
3.ll.i(e) Counter-Terrorism Aet 2003. The next stage in the development 
of the Terrorism Suppression Act came through amendments to the 
legislation enacted under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. The latter 
legislation is discussed in more detail below, concerning the purpose of the 
legislation and the nature of legislative amendments achieved under that 
Act. What should be noted at this stage is that Part 2 of the Counter-
Terrorism Act was directed towards amendment of the Terrorism 
196 See New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, above n 
12,3. 
197 As noted in New Zealand's first report, ibid. 
198 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Interim Report on the 
Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, 8 November 2001. 
199 Ibid, cover page. . 
200 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Final Report on the Terrorism 
«Bombings and Financing» Suppression Bill, 22 March 2002,2. 
201 See the Committee's interim report, above n 195, 2. 
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Suppression Act. The primary purpose of these amendments was to 
incorporate obligations under the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material and the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives 
for the Purpose of Detection.202 The amendments also add substantive 
provisions concerning the search and seizure, and related issues, by the 
Customs Service of goods owned or controlled by terrorist entities or 
associated persons. 203 
3.ll.l(d) Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004 
On 14 December 2004, the most recent amending legislation was 
introduced to the House, the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 
2). The Bill seeks to do two things: create a new offence of providing 
financial support to all terrorist organisations (including those that might 
not yet be formally designated under the TSA); and extend the length of 
time that designations remain in force without further extension by High 
Court order (from three years to five).204 
3.ll.l(e) Attorney-General's advice. As will be discussed within Chapter 
Four, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) requires the 
Attorney-General to advise the House of any inconsistency between any 
provision of a Bill before the House and the NZBORA. 205 In practical 
terms, this in turn relies on advice given to the Attorney-General by the 
New Zealand Crown Law Office. In the case of the Terrorism (Bombings 
202 Sections 10 to 14 and 16 to 23 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
203 Section 15 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
204 New Zealand Parliamentary Library, Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill 
(No 2) 2004, Bills Digest No. 1204,21 December 2004, 1. 
205 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, section 7: see Chapter Four, 4.2.4 
Attorney-General's Scrutiny in the Enactment of Legislation. 
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and Financing) Bill, the Solicitor-General examined the Bill206 and 
concluded that it was consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.207 That advice 
is considered in more detail within the later examination of civil and 
1·· 1 . h' 208 po ItIca fIg ts Issues. 
Reflecting this somewhat staggered development of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act, and the various objectives sought to be achieved under it, 
section 3 describes its purpose as being: 
(a) to make further provision in New Zealand law for the suppression 
of terrorism; and 
(b) to make provision to implement in New Zealand law New 
Zealand's obligations under-
(i) the Bombings Convention; and 
(ii) the Financing Convention; and 
(iii) the Anti-terrorism Resolution; and 
(iv) the Nuclear Material Convention; and 
(v) the Plastic Explosives Convention. 
What follows is an overview of the nature, and concerns with, the 
Terrorism Suppression Act, including amendments made to it under Part 2 
of the Counter-Terrorism Act. 
3.11.2 Counter-Terrorist Framework under the Act 
The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 is a significant piece of legislation, 
containing 81 sections, five schedules and running to over 120 pages (in its 
amended form). It contains definitions of the term terrorism. It creates 
206 As contained within the interim report of the select committee, above n 195. 
207 Letter from the Solicitor-General to the Attorney-General, "re Terrorism 
Suppression Bill: Slip Amendments - PCO 3814BIll Our Ref: ATT114/1048 
(15)", 9 November 2001. It should be noted, as pointed out by the Solicitor-
General in his letter, that his office was only provided with the Slip Amendments 
(which amended the original form of the Bill to incorporate the Resolution 1373 
obligations) on the previous day, 8 November 2001. 
208 See Chapters Seven (Terrorist Designations and Rights to Justice) and Eight 
(Democratic and Civil Rights). 
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offences and provides for associated issues of jurisdiction, prosecution and 
extradition. It establishes a process by which persons or entities may be 
designated as terrorists and contains various provisions aimed at 
suppressing the fmancing of terrorist activities. 
3.11.2(a) Dejznition of "terrorist act". As discussed within Chapter Two, 
there has been no overwhelming consensus within the international 
community on a definition of terrorism, resulting in the lack of a definition 
within relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.209 
The result has been that individual States have been required to formulate 
their own definitions of the term. In the New Zealand context, this is 
addressed within sections 4 and 5 of the Terrorism Suppression Act. 
Section 5 of the Act, combined with definitions contained within 
section 4(1) and conventions listed in Schedule 3, provides for three 
distinct types of "terrorist acts". The term is significant for two reasons?lO 
It is linked to offences such as the financing of terrorist acts?l1 Its also 
plays a role in the designation of terrorist or associated entities, which 
include those entities that have perpetrated terrorist acts. 212 
The first type of terrorist act defined reflects the international 
obligations assumed by New Zealand under the various international anti-
terrorist conventions. Sections 4(1)213 and 5(1)(b) prohibit acts that 
constitute an offence under one of the nine terrorism conventions listed in 
209 Chapter Two, 2.1.1 Attempts to Define Terrorism, and 2.1.2 Why a Lack of 
Consensus? 
210 As highlighted in the Interim Report on the Bill, above n 195, 5. 
211 Section 8, discussed at 3.11.2(b) Offences. 
212 Discussed at 3.11.2(c) Designation of "terrorist entities". 
213 Through its definition of "act against a specified terrorism convention" and 
"specified terrorism convention", and through the associated list of conventions 
contained in Schedule 3 to the Act. 
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Schedule 3 to the Act. Interestingly, Schedule 3 does not list the 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, the 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, nor the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts 
Committed On Board Aircraft. In submissions to the Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee on the Counter-Terrorism Bill, the writer 
notified the Committee of this omission.214 Clause 22 of the Counter-
Terrorism Bill proposed to amend Schedule 3 to the Terrorism Suppression 
Act by including in the list of treaties the Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material. The author submitted to the Committee 
that this was not sufficient since, upon the enactment of the Counter-
Terrorism Act, New Zealand was to become party to all twelve of the 
international conventions on counter-terrorism. The Terrorism 
Suppression Act should therefore include in its definition of a "terrorist 
act", it was submitted, any act against any of those twelve conventions.2ls 
The Committee did not, however, recommend amendment of clause 22, nor 
did it report on the reasons for this. 
The second type of terrorist act defined is that of terrorist acts in armed 
conflict. Sections 5(1)(c) and 4(1) make terrorist acts in armed conflict 
those:216 
(a) that occurs in a situation of armed conflict; and 
(b) the purpose of which, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
popUlation, or to compel a government or an international 
organisation to do or abstain from doing any act; and 
214 Conte A, Submissions to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on 
the Counter-Terrorism Bill (27-1, 2003), 12 May 2003, part IlIA. 
215 Ibid, paras 23 and 24. 
216 As defined by section 4(1). 
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(c) that is intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian 
or other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in that 
situation; and 
(d) that is not excluded from the application of the Financing 
Convention by article 3 of that Convention. 
Finally, a more general (albeit complex) definition is provided within the 
balance of section 5. A terrorist act is: 
.. conduct intended to advance an ideological, political, or religious 
cause 217 , 
.. and with the following intention: 218 
(a) to induce terror in a civilian population; or 
(b) to unduly compel or to force a government or an international 
organisation to do or abstain from doing any act, 
" and with the intention to cause:219 
(a) the death of, or other serious bodily injury to, 1 or more persons 
(other than a person carrying out the act): 
(b) a serious risk to the health or safety of a population: 
(c) destruction of, or serious damage to, property of great value or 
importance, or major economic loss, or major environmental damage, if 
likely to result in 1 or more outcomes specified in paragraphs (a), (b), 
and (d): 
(d) serious interference with, or serious disruption to, an infrastructure 
facility, if likely to endanger human life: 
(e) introduction or release of a disease-bearing organism, if likely to 
devastate the national economy of a country. 
217 Section 5(2). 
218 Sections 5(2)(a) and (b). 
219 Section 5(3). 
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Notable in all definitions is that the three characteristics of "terrorism", 
discussed in Chapter Two, are found: 22o differential targeting; inducing fear 
or aiming to unduly compel an organisation or government; aimed at 
advancing an ideological, political, or religious cause. 
A final point worth mentioning is that the three definitions each seem 
precise in their terms, and capable of adequate interpretation by the 
judiciary. This is an important point, since it is a recognised principle of 
human rights that definitions of criminal offences must be precise and 
unambiguous: nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena.221 
3.11.2(b) Offences. The Act establishes the following offences: 
co Terrorist bombing,222 prohibiting the intentional and unlawful delivery, 
placement, discharge or detonation of an explosive or other lethal 
device with the intention to cause death (or serious injury) or extensive 
destruction. Of interest, the provision does not specify that such 
conduct be aimed at inducing fear or influencing an organisation or 
government, nor does it specify that this be for the advancement of any 
particular cause. It only holds one of the common characteristics of 
terrorism (targeting). If one considers the definition of the offence 
closely, however, it is not one of "terrorist bombing", it is simply one 
of "bombing" where death or serious injury results, or where extensive 
220 Chapter Two, 2.1.1 Attempts to Define Terrorism .. 
221 For discussion on this point and its application to the definition of terrorism, 
see Andreu-Guzman, Terrorism and Human Rights, (International Commission of 
Jurists, 2002), 213-215 and 249. 
222 Section 7. 
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damage to public facilities results. Conviction renders an offender 
liable to imprisonment for life. 
" Financing of terrorism,223 prohibiting the wilful provision or collection 
of funds (directly or indirectly), intending (or knowing) that those funds 
are to be used to carry out a "terrorist act" (as defined above), without 
lawful justification or reasonable excuse. The maximum penalty, upon 
conviction, is 14 years' imprisonment. 
This prohibition is to be added to by the Terrorism Suppression 
Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004?24 The explanatory notes to the Bill 
refer to doubt that the current offence, just described, is enough to 
prohibit general financial support to an organisation involved in 
terrorism (whether designated or not), such as the payment of routine 
expenses (e.g., rent).225 In explaining the need for this, the Bills Digest 
and General Policy Statement for the Bill point to the requirement to 
comply with international standards set by the Financial Action Task 
Force on Money Laundering.226 Minister of Justice Phil Goff added:227 
Given the fluidity of terrorist movements, and the unpredictable 
emergence of new terrorist groups, this change is the most 
workable way of ensuring that New Zealand will always remain 
223 Section 8. 
224 By creating an offence provision and amendment of the definition of the term 
"financing of terrorism" under section 2 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 
(through clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill). 
225 New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 
2), Government Bill, 242-1, Explanatory Note, presented to the House 14 
December 2005, 1. Clause 4 of the Bill proposes to create this offence through a 
new section 8(2A) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 
226 Above n 204, L 
227 Press Release, 'Amendments to Tighten Terrorism Suppression Act', URL 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nzlViewDocument.cfm.?DocumentID=21825> at 8 
January 2005. New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Terrorism Suppression 
Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004, Government Bill, 242-1, Explanatory Note, 
presented to the House 14 December 2004, 2. 
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compliant with international obligations prohibiting the funding 
of terrorist organisations. 
This may well be problematic in its application, since there will not be 
the same element of notice to the public as. is achieved through the 
Gazetting of designations under the Act. Prosecution of such 
offending, where the entity is not designated, will have the added 
difficulty of establishing knowledge in the mind of the accused that the 
entity was a terrorist entity, within the terms of the Act. 
.. Dealing with terrorist property,228 making it an offence to deal with 
property known to be owned, controlled or derived by a "terrorist 
entity", 229 without lawful justification or reasonable excuse. 
Conviction renders a person liable to a maximum of seven years' 
imprisonment. To "deal with" terrorist property:230 
(a) means to use or deal with the property, in any way and be any 
means (for example, to acquire possession of, or a legal or 
equitable interest in, transfer, pay for, sell, assign or dispose of 
(including by way of gift) the property); and 
(b) includes allowing the property to be used or dealt with, or 
facilitating the use of it of dealing with it. 
.. Making property, or financial or related senJices, available,231 
prohibiting the provision (direct or indirect) of any property, or any 
financial or related services, to (or for the benefit of) a terrorist entity, 
without lawful justification or reasonable excuse. Section 11 limits the 
operation of this prohibition, where the Prime Minister permits, by 
notice in writing, any particular dealing. Otherwise, the offence 
renders a convicted person liable to up to seven years' imprisonment. 
228 Section 9. 
229 As designated, see below 3.11.2( c) Designation of "terrorist entities". 
230 Section 9(5). 
231 Section 10. 
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The terms "make available,,232 and "property,,233 are defined within the 
Act, but the phrase "financial or related services" is not. 
.. Recruiting members of terrorist groups,234 making it an offence to 
recruit another person into an organisation or group, knowing that the 
organisation or group is either a "terrorist entity" or participates in 
"terrorist acts". This is much broader in its scope than the previous 
three offences, since it goes beyond conduct relating to a "terrorist 
entity" as designated under the Act by also prohibiting conduct relating 
to entities that participate in "terrorist acts". As seen already, there are 
three categories and definitions of terrorist acts under the combination 
of sections 4 and 5, the more general of which is reasonably 
complex. 235 
.. Participating in terrorist groups,236 prohibiting participation in an 
organisation or group, knowing that the organisation or group is either 
a "terrorist entity" or participates in "terrorist acts" and for the purpose 
of enhancing the ability of the group to carry out terrorist acts. The 
maximum penalty is fourteen years imprisonment. 
.. Harbouring or concealing terrorists,237 making the intended assistance 
of a person to avoid arrest, escape custody, or avoid conviction an 
offence where it is known (or ought to be known) that the person has 
carried out, or intends to commit, a "terrorist act". Seven years' 
imprisonment can result from conviction. 
232 Section 10(6). 
233 Section 4(1). 
234 Section 12. 
235 Discussed at 3.11.2( a) Definition of "terrorist act", 
236 Section 13. 
237 Section 13A, added to the Terrorism Suppression Act by section 12 of the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2003, 
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.. Using or moving unmarked plastic explosives,238 prohibiting the 
possession, use, manufacture, importation or export of unmarked 
plastic explosives, except as allowed by the Hazardous Substances and 
New Organisms Act 1996 or by the Environmental Risk Management 
Authority. The maximum penalties are a fine of $500,000 or 
imprisonment of no more than ten years. 
.. Offences involving nuclear material,239 prohibiting a range of conduct 
relating to nuclear material, including its importation and its use to 
intimidate. 
3.11.2(c) Designation of "terrorist entities". As seen from the foregoing 
discussion, a number of offences under the Terrorism Suppression Act 
concern conduct in support of or related to a "terrorist entity" or 
"associated entity", The Act establishes a regime by which organisations, 
groups, or even individuals may be designated as such. The designation 
process, governed by sections 20 to 42 inclusive, empowers the Prime 
Minister to designate terrorist entities based on information from the 
United Nations Security Councilor "any relevant information, including 
1 'f' d .. +: ." 240 C ass I Ie secunty 1ll10rmatlOn . 
The Prime Minister may make an interim designation, after consulting 
with the Attorney-General and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, if 
s/he has good cause to believe that the entity has in the past undertaken one 
238 Section 13B, added to the Terrorism Suppression Act by section 12 of the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
239 Sections 13C and 13D, added to the Terrorism Suppression Act by section 12 
of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
240 See sections 30 to 32 inclusive. 
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or more "terrorist acts" or is knowingly facilitating such acts.241 An 
interim designation automatically expires after 30 days, during which time 
certain notice must be given about the designation?42 The Act 
contemplates that a final designation, if appropriate, will be made prior to 
the expiry of the interim designation.243 Again, steps are required to notify 
and, in addition, publish the designation. 244 
A final designation currently expires after three years, unless the High 
Court extends the designation.245 The period of final designation is to be 
extended under the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004. 
To allow consideration of the Select Committee's review of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act (as required under section 70 of the Act),z46 part of which 
will address the designation process, current designations are to continue 
for two years after presentation of the Committee's report to the House?47 
Minister of Justice Phil Goff explained:248 
At the time the original Bill was first introduced, there was uncertainty 
as to the nature and extent of the terrorism phenomenon. An 
assumption that some designations might be short-lived has since 
proved false. 
He continued:249 
Provisions in the existing Act mean that New Zealand's designations of 
terrorist organisations including the 318 organisations listed by the 
United Nations Security Council - expire after three years unless 
renewed by order of the High Court. 
241 Section 20. 
242 Sections 21 and 26 to 29. 
243 Section 22. 
244 Section 23 and 26 to 29 
245 Sections 23(g) and 35 to 41. 
246 Discussed below at 3.11.3 Review Mechanism. 
247 Due 1 December 2005, under section 70(3) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002. 
248 Above n 227. 
249 Ibid. See also the Explanatory Note to the Bill, above n 227,2. 
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Drafting of that provision created the unintended need for each 
designation to be renewed individually, meaning it will be impossible 
to renewal all the 318 UNSC-listed designations before they expire 
next October. That would put New Zealand in breach of Security 
Council Resolution 1373 - which was passed unanimously by the UN 
in the wake 0 f September 11 - and related resolutions. 
Both the interim and final designation processes are open to judicial 
review.250 A designated entity may at any time apply to the Prime Minister 
to revoke the designation.251 
Currently, New Zealand has only designated as terrorist entities those 
identified by the United Nations 1267 Cornmittee252 in its most recent 
consolidated liSt.253 The failure by New Zealand to utilise this procedure 
for the designation of non-UN listed terrorist entities has been criticised as 
a failure by New Zealand to "add its considerable moral and symbolic 
voice to the international chorus against terrorist violence,,?54 
3.11.2(d) Foifeiture of terrorist property. In almmg to suppress the 
financing of terrorism, the Terrorism Suppression Act impacts upon both 
individuals and institutions in two ways. First, by the creation of offences 
(financing of terrorism, dealing with terrorist property, and making 
property, or financial or related services, available) and by the designation 
of individuals or groups as terrorist or associated entities (resulting in 
250 Section 33. 
251 See sections 34 and 42. 
252 Formally known as the "Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to 
Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning AI-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated 
Individuals and Entities". 
253 See New Zealand's third report, above n 12, 4. The consolidated list is 
available at URL <http://www.un.orgIDocs/sc/committeesIl267/tablelist.htm>. 
For more details, see also New Zealand's report to the United Nations 1267 
Committee, above n 28, 2-4. 
254 Smith IE, New Zealand's Anti-Terrorism Campaign: Balancing Civil Liberties, 
National Security, and International Responsibilities, Ian Axford New Zealand 
Fellowship in Public Policy, December 2003, 3. 
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prohibited dealings with such entities as a result of the offences just 
mentioned). The second means by which the Act seeks to suppress the 
financing of terrorist activities is through the establishment of a financial 
transactions reporting regime and providing for the forfeiture of terrorist 
property. The power of forfeiture is one vested in the High Court under 
section 55 of the Terrorism Suppression Act, allowing the Attorney-
General to apply for an order for forfeiture in respect of property owned by 
an entity in respect of which a final designation has been made and where 
the mere prohibition against dealing with such property255 is not enough, 
by itself. 256 
3.1l.2(e) Financial transactions reporting. In terms of financial 
transactions reporting, section 43 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 
requires financial institutions and other persons in possession or control of 
suspected terrorist property to report that suspicion to the Police. The 
provision was enacted, explained the Se]ect Committee, to ensure that the 
mere holding of terrorist property, without necessarily dealing in it, is 
detected and made unlawful. 257 The process for reporting suspicious 
property is aligned with the process for reporting suspicious transactions in 
the Financial Transactions Reporting Act 1996, which is limited to 
reporting for the purposes of money laundering offences or for proceeds of 
crime action.258 "Double-reporting" is avoided by deeming a report under 
255 Under the offences described, at 3. 11.2(b) Offences. 
256 See section 55(2)(b). 
257 See the final report on the Bill, above n 200, 13. 
258 Reporting under the Terrorism Suppression Act operates, however, 
independently of section 15 of the Financial Transactions Reporting Act the 
latter Act being limited to reporting for the purposes of the investigation or 
prosecution of money laundering offences or for Proceeds of Crime Act action 
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the Terrorism Suppression Act to be notice under section 15 of the 
Financial Transactions Reporting ACt.259 
The provision applies to property directly, or indirectly, owned or 
controlled by any entity that has been designated a terrorist or associated 
entity. Two main points arise from that general statement of operation. 
Firstly, "property" is defined within the Act in such a way as to include any 
form or real or personal property or interest therein. Secondly, it applies to 
such property within the ownership or control of a "terrorist" entity, as 
designated, such designation resulting in public notification of both interim 
and permanent designations in the Gazette?60 There is, from that 
perspective, a small level of certainty for financial and other institutions in 
knowing the extent to which the reporting procedures apply: institutions 
need not bother themselves with the question of whether any particular 
organisation or person is a terrorist.261 They will be informed of this 
through the Gazetted designation. However, the reporting procedures 
apply not only to property within the ownership or control of a "terrorist" 
259 See sections 44(4) and 77 of the Terrorism Suppression Act and the (amended) 
section 15(1) of the Financial Transactions Reporting Act. 
260 See sections 21(a), pertaining to interim designations, and 23(e) as to 
permanent designations. Upon permanent designation, such designation remains 
in force for a period of three years, unless earlier revoked or later extended by 
Court order: see section 35. Notification of revocation, expiry or invalidity is also 
subject to notification through the Gazette: see section 42. 
261 It has to be said, however, that the New Zealand Bankers' Association had in 
fact asked for an even greater level of notice to financial institutions when the Bill 
was being considered before the Select Committee. The Association requested 
that its members receive automatic direct notice of interim and final designations, 
thereby achieving a more effective reporting regime and ensuring that members 
did not unwittingly assist in the financing of terrorism through ignorance. See 
Submissions by the New Zealand Bankers' Association to the Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee on the Terrorism <Bombings and Finance> 
Suppression Bill, TERR0I133, Parliamentary Library, paragraph 2.2. By way of 
compromise, the Act contains a provision whereby the Prime Minister can direct 
that notice of designations be made to any persons or bodies that the Prime 
Minster thinks fit (see section 28(2)). No such directions have yet been made. 
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entity (section 43(1)(a)), but also to any property derived or generated from 
any such property (section 43(1)(b». It will be interesting to see the extent 
to which the Government reviews, or even requires, compliance with these 
reporting provisions given their potentially wide application. It is 
suggested that if one was to apply the provisions to their full extent, such 
compliance would involve a level of financial regulation and investigation 
that is not commonly seen within New Zealand's deregulated 
environment.262 
Once these preliminary issues are dealt with, it is then a question of 
what obligations are in fact imposed upon financial institutions. Having 
just made the criticism that proper compliance would be burdensome, this 
is countered by what is in the author's view a low threshold. The test for 
determining whether an institution is obliged to report to the Commissioner 
of Police is that of "suspicion, on reasonable grounds" that the institution is 
in possession or control of "property" within the jurisdiction of section 
43?63 Of use, the oEcn264 Financial Action Task Force on Money 
262 On that point, a high-level official within the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Mfairs and Trade advised the author of their view that New Zealand could, for 
that very reason, find itself receiving harsh criticism from the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD) Financial Action Task Force 
(which is in the process of consulting with member States on the suppression of 
terrorist financing). 
263 See section 43(2). Where such suspicion exists, a report is to be made as soon 
as practicable in accordance with section 44 and Schedule 5 to the Act. Failure to 
report constitutes an offence under section 43(4) of the Act, punishable by up to 
one year's imprisonment. Note that section 43(2) does not require a lawyer to 
disclose any "privileged communication" (although the term is restricted 
somewhat by statutory definition in section 45), For a more detailed examination 
of the reporting provisions of the Terrorism Suppression Act, see Conte A, "New 
Challenges for Financial Regulation: The Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism" in Essays in Commercial Law. A New Zealand Collection, Centre for 
Commercial & Corporate Law Inc 2003, Hawes & Rowe (Eds.), 63. 
264 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, of which New 
Zealand is a member. 
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Laundering has issued guidelines on how financial institutions can detect 
terrorist financing.265 
3.11.3 Review Mechanism, 
Following receipt of public submissions on the November 2001 version of 
the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, the Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade Committee recommended inclusion of a review mechanism 
pertaining to provisions through which Resolution 1373 was 
implemented.266 Now section 70 of the Terrorism Suppression Act, the 
mechanism requires a select committee to consider the operation of those 
provisions and whether they should be retained or amended.267 The review 
is to take place as soon as practicable after 1 December 2004, with the 
committee required to report to the House by no later than 1 December 
Of interest, neither section 70 nor the Select Committee 
recommendation for inclusion of the provision identify which provisions of 
the Terrorism Suppression Act are "provisions of this Act that are to 
implement New Zealand's obligations under the Anti-terrorism 
Resolution". 269 This can, however, be gleaned through close examination 
of New Zealand's reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee in which 
265 OECD Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Guidance for 
Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorist Financing, 24 April 2002. 
266 See the Committee's Interim Report, above n 195, 16. 
267 Section 70(2). 
268 Section 70(2) and (3). 
269 Section 70(1). 
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New Zealand has had to report on how it has given effect to the provisions 
of Resolutions 1373:270 
• Offences created under sections 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 13A, 13B, 13C and 
13D. 
.. The definition of the term "terrorist act", through the combination of 
sections 4(1) and 5. 
.. The authority of the Prime Minister under section 11 to allow financial 
or related services to be provided to terrorist or associated entities. 
.. The designation process under sections 20 to 42 inclusive. 
.. The financial reporting obligations under sections 43 to 47. 
.. The terrorist property forfeiture provisions within sections to 61 
inclusive. 
Interestingly, New Zealand's first report to the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee identifies compliance with paragraph 2(b) of Resolution 1373 
as being achieved through legislation other than the Terrorism Suppression 
Act. This was to be the case, whereby amendments to the Crimes Act 1961 
and Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (through the Counter-Terrorism Act 
2003) created the authority to obtain interception warrants, warrants to 
attach tracking devices to person.<=; or things, deterrence through more 
severe penalties, and requiring a computer owner or user to provide 
information to access data subject to security codes and the like.271 Under 
section 70 of the Terrorism Suppression Act, however, those provisions 
270 Discussed at 3.3.1(b) Binding obligations. See also New Zealand 
Parliamentary Library, Counter-Terrorism Bill 2002, Bills Digest No. 943, 4 
February 2003, 3-5. 
271 Discussed at 3.12.3 Parts 1 and 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act. 
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will not be the subject of review, since section 70 only requires the review 
of "provisions of this Act that are to implement New Zealand's obligations 
under the Anti-Terrorism Resolution" [emphasis added]. 
3.11.4 Potential Civil and Political Rights Issues 
The prohibition against the provision or collection of funds under section 8 
of the Act may be seen as impacting upon one's freedom of association, as 
is the prohibition against making property or services available under 
section 10. The prohibition against participation in groups or organisations 
under section 13 might also adversely impact upon this right. 
Closer examination of the process by which a person or group can be 
designated a "terrorist entity" seems called for. Various aspects of the right 
to natural justice will be in issue in that regard, particularly concerning 
access by a designated person to information upon which the Prime 
Minister has based his or her decision and the consequent ability of a 
person to properly respond to an allegation of being a terrorist or associated 
entity. The use and status of classified security information will be 
particularly relevant in that regard. 
3.12 Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 
The Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 was also a multi-purpose pIece of 
legislation: primarily enacted to allow New Zealand to become party to the 
plastic explosives and nuclear materials conventions;272 to implement the 
272 Discussed at 3.4.4 Legislative Incorporation Since September 1 J. See also 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Report on the Counter-Terrorism 
Bill, A Government Bill, 27-2, Commentary, presented to the House 8 August 
2003, 1. 
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remaining obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373;273 and to 
establish supplementary powers and investigative measures "designed to 
combat terrorism and address problems encountered by agencies in the 
investigation and enforcement of [terrorism-related] offences".274 
3.12.1 Purposes of the Counter-Terrorism Act 
As indicated, the Counter-Terrorist Act w.as enacted to serve various 
purposes. Before considering those, and the status of the Act, it is notable 
to mention that the Counter-Terrorism Bill was also subject to scrutiny by 
the New Zealand Crown Law Office, inherent in the execution of the 
Attomey-General's function under section 7 of the Bill of Rights ACt.275 
Again, the Attorney-General was advised that there appeared to be no 
inconsistency between the Bill and the Bill of Rights Act.276 
3.12.1(a) Treaty implementation. Within the scope of the first objective, to 
allow treaty accession, National Interest Analyses were presented to the 
House on February 2002 with the accompanying reports of the Foreign 
273 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Report on the Counter-
Terrorism Bill, A Government Bill, 27-2, Commentary, presented to the House 8 
August 2003, 1. 
274 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Counter-Terrorism Bill, A 
Government Bill, 27-1, Explanatory Note, presented to the House 2 April 2003, l. 
See also Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Report on the Counter-
Terrorism Bill, A Government Bill, 27-2, Commentary, presented to the House 8 
August 2003, 2. See also Gobbi M, "Treaty Action and Implementation", (2004) 
1 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 265-266. 
275 Just as the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill was: discussed above at 
3.l1.l(e) Attorney-General's advice. 
276 Letter from Crown Counsel to the Attorney General, "re: Counter-Terrorism 
Bill PCO 4663/14 Our Ref: ATT 1 1411124 (15)", 10 December 2002. 
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Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee.277 The Analyses noted that 
implementing legislation would need to create new criminal offences 
prohibiting the movement or use of unmarked plastic explosives and 
nuclear materials. 278 The Counter-Terrorism Act achieves this through 
section 12 of the Act.279 
The National Interest Analyses also considered the question of 
reporting, registration and monitoring obligations under the relevant 
treaties. It was noted that the transport safety standards within the Nuclear 
Materials Convention280 would not require implementation, since New 
Zealand had already incorporated International Atomic Energy Agency 
regulations, which are more stringent than those under the Nuclear 
Materials Convention. 281 The Analysis on the Plastic Explosives 
Convention282 reported:283 
A reporting and registration regime needs to be put in place adequately 
to control the existing stock of unmarked plastic explosives in New 
Zealand. This administrative function is already carried out in relation 
277 Discussed at 3.4.4 Legislative Incorporation Since September 11. The 
Counter-Terrorism Bill was introduced on 17 December 2002: see Bills Digest 
No. 943, above n 270. 
278 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, para 13, and National Interest Analysis, Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Materials, para 21. 
279 Which, in turn, amended the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 to become 
offences under sections 13B (use and movement of plastic explosives), 13C 
(physical protection of nuclear material) and 13D (importation and acquisition of 
radioactive material) of that Act. Note that the unlawful possession of nuclear 
material and nuclear explosive devices was already prohibited under New Zealand 
law under the Hazardous Substances and New Zealand Organisms Act 1996 and 
the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. 
280 Above n 55. 
281 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, para 20. 
Incorporation was effected through the Radiation Protection Act 1965. 
282 Above n 55. 
283 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, National Interest 
Analysis, Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection, para 14. 
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to other explosives under the Hazardous Substances and New 
Organisms Act 1996. Slight modifications to the operationa1 
procedures under that Act would be required to facilitate plastic 
explosives of the type covered by the Convention being captured by the 
tracking and reporting mechanisms of the HSNO Act. 
The Counter-Terrorism Act did not, however, address this issue. To that 
extent, the plastic explosives reporting and registration regime has not been 
fully implemented into New Zealand law.284 
3.12.1(b) Resolution obligations and investigative/supplementary powers. 
The Explanatory Notes to the Counter-TerTOrism Bill identify two further 
objectives of implementing the remaining obligations under Resolution 
1373 and establishing investigative powers to a<;sist in the detection of 
terrorists, terrorist acts and terrorist or associated entities. The reality, 
however, is that the latter objective supports the former objective. Within 
New Zealand's reports to the Counter-Terrorism Committee, New Zea1and 
identifies the various new investigative powers as furthering New 
Zealand's compliance with Resolution 1373?85 The earlier consideration 
of the binding obligations under the Resolution disclose that the following 
provisions of the Counter-Terrorism Act (CTA) furthered compliance with 
the Resolution: 
.. Sections 4, 5, 33 and 34 of the CTA (pertaining to interception 
warrants, tracking devices and computer access each discussed 
further below)286 were identified by New Zealand as adding to its 
compliance with paragraph 2(b) of the Resolution. 
284 This is not an issue that will be explored any further, since it does not impact 
upon the question of the interface between counter-terrorism and human rights. 
285 Discussed at 3.3. 1 (b) Binding obligations. 
286 Discussed at 3.12.3 Parts 1 and 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act. 
Terror versus Tyranny PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 134 
Chapter 3: New Zealand's Counter-Terrorist Legislation 
.. Creation of the offence of harbouring or concealing terrorists under 
section 12 of the CTA (discussed above)287 was said to add to New 
Zealand's compliance with Resolution 1373, paragraph 2(d). 
.. Sentencing directions under sections 30 and 31 of the CTA (discussed 
belowi88 were in furtherance of the requirements of paragraph 2(e) of 
Resolution 1373. 
Status of the Counter-Terrorism Act 
What should be noted about this item of legislation is that it does not exist 
as an Act of Parliament with its own life. As introduced, the Bill was to 
become a stand-alone Act.289 Following submissions during the select 
committee process, however, its provision were instead incorporated into 
other extant legislation, namely: 
'" The Crimes Act 1961, under Part 1 of the Counter-Terrorism Act; 
.. The Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, including consequential 
amendments to the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1992, 
under Part 2 of the Counter-Terrorism Act; and 
" The Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978, the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969, the Sentencing Act 2002, and the 
Summary Proceedings Act 1957, under Part 3 of the Counter-Terrorism 
Act. 
What follows is an overview of the nature, and concerns with, amendments 
under Parts 1 and 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act. Any similar issues 
287 Discussed at 3.11.2(b) Offences. 
288 Discussed at 3.12.3 Parts 1 and 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act. 
289 Advisory Council of Jurists, above n 163, 114. 
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relating to Part 2 have been discussed under the examination of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act,29o 
3.12.3 Parts 1 and 3 afthe Caunter-TerrorismAct 
Reflecting the second and third stated purposes of the Counter-Terrorism 
Act, to further implement Resolution 1373 and to establish supplementary 
powers and investigative measures, Parts 1 and 3 of the Act amend the 
various items of legislation identified to achieve six main things: 
.. First, new terrorism-related offences were created under the Crimes Act 
1961. New sections 298A, 298B and 307 A make it an offence to cause 
disease or sickness in animals; contaminate food, crops, water or other 
products; or make threats of harm to people or property to achieve 
. d 291 terronst en s. Associated provisions provide extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over these offences and restrict the ability to prosecute by 
requiring the consent of the Attorney-GeneraL 292 
.. The second feature of Parts 1 and 3 is to extend the ability of police to 
obtain warrants to intercept private communications relating to terrorist 
offences, by amending section 312 of the Crimes Act 1961 and section 
26 of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 1978.293 
.. Next, a new section 198B was inserted into the Summary Proceedings 
Act 1957, allowing police to demand assistance to access computer 
290 Discussed at 3.11.2 Counter-Terrorist Framework under the Act and 3.11.3 
Potential Civil and Political Rights Issues. 
291 Sections 6 and 7 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
292 Sections 4 and 5 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
293 Sections 7B, 8 and 26 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
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data by providing police with any data protection codes necessary to 
effect access to that data?94 
.. Fourth, the Summary Proceedings Act is further amended to authorise 
police or customs officers to obtain a warrant to attach a tracking 
device to any property or person where it is suspected that an offence 
has been, is being, or will be committed. The power, and restrictions 
thereon, is enacted through new sections 200A to 2000 of the 
Summary Proceedings Act.295 Notably, the suspected offence is not 
limited to terrorism-related offences. 296 
.. The fifth feature is a minor amendment of the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969, with major potential effect.297 The 
amendment concerns the definition of the term "security" within the 
Act. Terrorism was already a matter within the ambit of the Act, but 
not in as wide terms as it is following the amendment in question. Prior 
to the Counter-Terrorism Act, "security" included the protection of 
New Zealand fTom acts of terrorism. 298 The term now includes:299 
Cd) the prevention of any terrorist act and of any activity relating to 
the carrying out or facilitating of any terrorist act. 
294 Section 33 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
295 Amendments effected under section 34 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
296 See section 200B(2) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. This is a matter 
discussed within Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
297 Section 27 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
298 This was a matter included within the definition from 16 November 1977 
tlu'ough section 2(2)(b) of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 
Amendment Act 1977. 
299 Section 2 of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969. 
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Interception and seizure warrants may be authorised for the purpose of 
detecting activities prejudicial to "security" or for the purpose of 
gathering foreign intelligence information essential to "security". 300 
.. Finally, the Sentencing Act 2002 is amended so that offending that 
forms part of, or involves, a terrorist act is to be treated as an 
aggravating feature under section 9 of that Act.301 Where murder is 
committed as part of a terrorist act, section 104 of the Sentencing Act 
has been amended to provide for a minimum period of 17 years 
imprisonment for such offending.302 
In terms of civil and political rights implications, three of the latter 
amendments clearly have the potential to have an impact: warrants to 
intercept private communications; and warrants to attach tracking devices 
to persons or property. Perhaps a little less clear, but equally important, is 
the new power of police to require assistance to access computer data, 
potentially impacting upon the privilege against self-incrimination. 
3.13 Other Legislation? 
As already indicated, there are numerous other pieces of legislation that 
add, to greater orIesser extents, to the body of New Zealand's "anti-terror" 
legislation. When referring to the Border Security Bill303 and the Maritime 
300 Section 4 of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969. 
301 Section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
302 Section 31 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. 
303 Bill 53-2 introduced to Parliament on 18 June 2003. The Bill passed the 
second reading on 20 May 2004 but awaits the third reading (as at 1 December 
2004). 
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Security Bill,304 by way of example, Customs Minister Rick Barker said 
this: 305 
[This] is part of a whole-of-government approach toward strengthening 
New Zealand's national security in the post-September 11 environment. 
While such legislation does indeed act to strengthen national security and 
impacts upon counter-terrorism, this thesis restricts itself to consideration 
of the seven items of legislation identified. Those enactments and 
regulations are specifically targeted to New Zealand's compliance with 
international anti-terrorism obligations and with counter-terrorism within 
New Zealand. As will be seen next, they raise a considerable number of 
issues to be considered within the second part of this thesis. 
3.14 Potential "''''u,,",''''. Rights Issues 
The foregoing examination of New Zealand's domestic counter-terrorist 
legislation has drawn out various matters that call for further detailed 
consideration in the context of this thesis. Of the six sets of rights and 
freedoms contained within the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,306 four 
main groups of issues come into play. The first, to be accurate, is not a 
right as such but involves an important constitutional question concerning 
the interface between Parliament and the Executive, with the potential to 
304 Now the Maritime Security Act 2004, assented to on 5 April 2004. 
305 New Zealand Government Press Release, 'Minister of Customs introduces 
Border Security Bill', 18 June 2003. 
306 The New Zealand Department of Justice describes the Act as containing six 
main sets of rights, as relating to: life and security of the person; democratic and 
civil rights; non-discrimination and minority rights; search, arrest and detention 
rights; criminal procedure rights; and rights to justice. See New Zealand 
Department of Justice, "Chapter 4: New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and 
Human Rights Act 1993" in Guidelines on Process & Content of Legislation, 
2001 edition IJRL <http://www.justice.govt.nzJlac/pubsI2001lIegislative_guide 
_2000/chaptec 4.html> at 4 January 2005. 
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adversely impact on all rights and freedoms. This first question involves 
the making of regulations under the United Nations Act 1946 and the 
balance between security and human rights. Second is a reasonably broad 
right, encompassing various procedural rights and notions of justice and 
fairness: the right to natural justice in the terrorist designation process. The 
third set of rights involves two first-generation civil rights: the freedoms of 
expression and association. The final set of issues affects criminal 
procedure rights and search, arrest and detention rights: privacy and 
surveillance; search and seizure; arrest and detention; and the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
Summarising the issues and provisions of concern within the thesis 
chapter numbers in which they will be dealt: 
Chapter Six 
The United Nations Act 1946 and the Safeguarding of Human Rights in 
Executive Law-Making 
regulations made under the United Nations Act 1946, the United 
Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and Afghanistan Measures) 
Regulations 2001 raise some interesting issues about potential conflicts 
between United Nations regulations and civil and political rights.3D? 
Chapter Six will consider the regulations, and the empowering provision 
under the United Nations Act, and the mechanisms by which a balance can 
be achieved in that context between security and human rights (as well as 
the maintenance of the separation of powers doctrine). 
307 Discussed at 3.10 United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and 
Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001 and Amending Regulations. 
Terror versus Tyranny PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 140 
Chapter 3: New Zealand's Counter-Terrorist Legislation 
Chapter Seven 
Terrorist Designations and Rights to Justice 
The process by which a person or group can be designated a "terrorist 
entity" or "associated entity" under the Terrorism Suppression Act is one 
calling for careful examination. 308 Various aspects of the right to natural 
justice will be in issue in that regard, particularly concerning access by a 
designated person to information upon which the Prime Minister has 
decided to make the designation and the consequent ability of a person to 
properly respond to an allegation of being a terrorist or associated entity. 
The use and status of classified security information will be particularly 
relevant in that regard, as will safety measures such as the ability and 
jurisdiction to revoke designations, judicial review and appeal. 
Chapter Eight 
Democratic and Civil Rights 
Also identified within this chapter has been the ability of the Prime 
Minister to issue media gags under the International Terrorism (Emergency 
Powers) Act (sections 14 and 15), clearly impacting upon the right to 
freedom of expression, as guaranteed under article 19 of the ICCPR and 
section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act. 309 
A further issue arising out of the suppression of financing provisions of 
h T . R l' 310 d h T . S . A 311· h t e erroflsm egu atIons an t e erroflsm uppresslOn ct IS t at 
308 Discussed at 3.11. 2( c) Designation of "terrorist entities". 
309 Discussed at 3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. 
310 Discussed at 3.10 United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and 
Mghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001 and Amending Regulations. 
311 Discussed at 3.11.2(b) Offences. 
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of the freedom of association. The right is again reflected within both the 
ICCPR (article 22) and the NZBORA (section 17). In particular: 
.. Regulation 6 of the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression 
and Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001 prohibits the wilful 
collection or provision of funds, directly or indirectly, to specified 
entities. 
.. Regulation 7 of the same Regulations prohibits the dealing with any 
property that is known to be owned or controlled by specified entities. 
.. Regulation 9 makes it an offence to make property or financial services 
available to specified entities. 
.. Regulation 11 prohibits the recruitment of any person as a member of a 
specified entity. 
.. Regulation 12 outlaws the participation III a group or organisation, 
knowing that it is a specified entity. 
Section 8 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 makes it an offence to 
provide or collect funds to or for specified entities. 
.. Section 10 of the latter Act makes it an offence to make property or 
services available to a specified entity. 
.. Section 12 makes it an offence to recruit another person into an 
organisation or group, knowing that the organisation or group is either 
a "terrorist entity" or participates in "terrorist acts", 
.. Section 13 prohibits participation in an organisation or group that is 
either a "terrorist entity" or participates in "terrorist acts", 
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.. Section 13A criminalises the harbouring or concealing of a person, 
where it is known (or ought to be known) that the person has carried 
out, or intends to commit, a "terrorist act". 
Chapter Nine 
Criminal Procedure Rights and Search, Arrest and Detention Rights 
Within this final grouping, four sub-groups of rights will be examined: 
privacy and surveillance; search and seizure; arrest and detention; and the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
The right to privacy is one that lies at the core of the right to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure. That specific right will be examined 
within Chapter Nine, as well as looking at privacy of the person, 
particularly concerning communications, as reflected within article 17 of 
the ICCPR and the Privacy Act 1993. Identified above as relevant to this 
are: 
" Section 10(3) of the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act, 
authorising the police to intercept private communications within an 
area in which an international terrorist emergency is occurring, with the 
qualifying provisions concerning use of such communications (sections 
18 to 20 inclusive)?12 
.. Sections 7B, 8 and 26 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003, which 
extend the ability of police to obtain warrants to intercept private 
communications relating to terrorist offences (by amending section 312 
312 Discussed at 3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. 
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of the Crimes Act 1961 and section 26 of the Misuse of Drugs 
Amendment Act 1978)?13 
.. It will be relevant, in the examination of the latter interception 
capabilities, to consider the principles set out in the 
Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act 2004.314 
EO Section 27 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 amended the definition 
of "security" within the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 
1969 to include the prevention of any terrorist act and of any activity 
relating to the carrying out or facilitating of any terrorist act. Section 4 
of the latter Act authorises the issuing of interception and seizure 
warrants may be authorised for the purpose of detecting activities 
prejudicial to "security". 315 
.. Section 34 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 authorises police or 
customs officers to obtain a warrant to attach a tracking device to any 
property or person where it is suspected that an offence has been, is 
being, or will be committed (by adding new sections 200A to 2000 of 
the Summary Proceedings Act).316 
Next, security of the person from unreasonable search and seizure IS 
something guaranteed by both the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (article 17) and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
313 Discussed at 3.12.3 Parts 1 and 3 of the Co un ter-Terrorism Act. 
314 Discussed at 3.3.1 (c) Non-binding directions. 
315 Discussed at 3.12.3 Parts 1 and 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act. 
316 Discussed at 3.12.3 Parts 1 and 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act. 
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(section 21). The following provisions will be considered within Chapter 
Nine, as ones that impact upon this right: 
" Sections 12 and 13 of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, which set out 
powers of search of passengers, baggage and cargo?17 
" Section 17 of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, which confers upon an 
aircraft commander certain powers of persons on an aircraft?18 
" Section 10(2)(b), (d) and (e) of the International Terrorism (Emergency 
Powers) Act 1987, conferring upon police and military acting as an aid 
to the police various powers of entry into, or seizure or destruction of, 
property. 319 
.. Section 12 of the Maritime Crimes Act 1999, conferring upon a ship 
master and crew certain powers of search of a person or baggage on the 
ship.320 
Arrested and detention are matters that strike at the heart of personal 
security and are impacted upon by various provisions of the ICCPR 
(articles 9 and 10) and the Bill of Rights (sections to 24 inclusive). 
Chapter Nine will therefore examine: 
.. Section 15 of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, which confers upon an 
aircraft commander certain powers of restraint and forced 
disembarkation. 321 
317 Discussed at 3.6.2 Potential Civil and Political Rights Implications. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Discussed at 3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. 
320 Discussed at 3.9 Maritime Crimes Act 1999. 
321 Discussed at 3.6.2 Potential Civil and Political Rights Implications. 
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.. Section 1O(2)(a), (c) and (g) of the International Terrorism (Emergency 
Powers) Act 1987, conferring upon po lice and military acting as an aid 
to the police various powers of restricted entry and evacuation. 322 
.. Section 11 of the Maritime Crimes Act 1999, authorising a ship captain 
to detain and surrender a person who commits an offence relating to 
ships (offences under section 4 of that Act).323 
Finally, regard will be had to section 33 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 
2003, through which a new section 198B was inserted into the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957, allowing police to demand assistance to access 
computer data by providing police with any data protection codes 
necessary to access that data. The new power may potentially impact upon 
the long-held privilege against self-incrimination.324 
Conclusion 
An examination of New Zealand's counter-terrorist legislation is not as 
simple as one might first imagine. This chapter is evidence of that. 
Although the preceding chapter, Chapter Two, spent some time looking at 
the international anti-terrorism framework and the obligations that stem 
from that framework, this chapter has had to frrst consider the nature of 
those obligations and the means by which the obligations apply in domestic 
law and/or require acts of transformation. Through that examination it has 
been shown that the obligations upon New Zealand are effectively limited 
322 Discussed at 3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. 
323 Discussed at 3.9 Maritime Crimes Act 1999. 
324 Discussed at 3.12.3 Parts I and 3 of the Counter-Terrorism Act. 
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to ones that require transformation into municipal law through legislative 
action. 
Six items of domestic legislation have been identified as the vehicles 
through which transformation has been effected: the Aviation Crimes Act 
1972; the Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations and 
Associated Personnel, and Hostages) Act 1980; Maritime Crimes Act 
1999; the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and 
Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001; the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002; and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. Although not an item of 
legislation enacted in response to international obligations, the 
International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 has also been 
identified as a document requiring consideration, since it is an item of 
legislation specifically addressing counter-terrorism and thereby 
complementing New Zealand's participating in the international agenda to 
suppress terrorism. 
Examination of each item of legislation has revealed that New Zealand 
has, other than in some very minor and usually technical ways, fully 
implemented its international anti-terrorism obligations. By reviewing the 
structure and operation of each item of legislation, various provisions have 
been identified as having the potential to impact upon civil and political 
rights. In doing so, Chapters Two and Three have established important 
characteristics about the extant law on counter-terrorism. Further 
contributing to this frrst part of the thesis, the following chapter, Chapter 
Four, will consider the extant position on civil and political rights in New 
Zealand. The combination of Chapters Two to Four will be invaluable in 
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the analysis of issues within the second part of the thesis. By establishing 
the international and domestic law on counter-terrorism and human rights, 
part two of the thesis can consider their interface. Importantly, particular 
issues have been identified within this chapter for close examination within 
the second part. Additionally, the international and domestic policy 
considerations identifiable through this chapter will inform subsequent 
evaluations. 
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In establishing the foundations for the examination of the interface between 
counter-terrorism and human rights, the previous two chapters have 
considered New Zealand's international counter-terrorist obligations, and 
the domestic implementation of those obligations. This chapter, the final in 
Part I of the thesis, looks at New Zealand's civil and political rights 
framework. In doing so, however, a focussed approach is adopted, limiting 
the scope of this chapter to consideration of the key issues that will be 
involved in the examination of the interface between human rights and 
counter-terrorism under Part II of this thesis, and to matters that go to the 
reasons for undertaking that examination. 
Adopting that approach, this chapter starts with an overview of New 
Zealand's international human rights obligations and the domestic 
instruments through which human rights are protected in New Zealand. 
The chapter then seeks to answer three questions. First, why consider New 
Zealand's civil and political rights framework when examining its counter-
terrorist legislation? Next, how are the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA) to be applied? Finally, how do the NZBORA and the ICCPR 
deal with the limitation of rights? 
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4.1 New Zealand's Civil and Political Rights Framework 
Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a proliferation of 
international human rights treaties, with New Zealand now party to a 
significant number of those instruments.! The atrocious events of that war 
led, directly and naturally, to the establishment of the United Nations. 
With its primary mandate to create a cooperative and responsible 
international community, the United Nations set about establishing a body 
of multilateral treaties aimed at both protecting individuals and preventing 
a reoccurrence of the atrocities committed under the Nazi regime in Europe 
and the prisoner of war camps in Japan. A distinction has continued to 
develop between the concepts of human rights law and humanitarian law: 
the dichotomy is essentially between the declaration and protection of 
individual rights, and the imposition of duties upon individuals (largely 
imposed to prevent human rights abuses). 
4.1.1 The International Human Rights Regime 
Certain rights, seen as inherent to being human and having human dignity, 
were set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2 Various 
further, and more specific, international human rights treaties flowed from 
this document. New Zealand is party to what are regarded to be the six 
I At the turn of this Century, approximately 970 multilateral treaties and 717 
bilateral treaties bound New Zealand: see Palmer G, "Human Rights and the New 
Zealand Government's Treaty Obligations" (1999) 29 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 57, 58. It should be noted, of course, that the 
development of international human rights norms, and norms of international 
humanitarian law, substantially precede the establishment and work of the United 
Nations. Having said that, the common acceptance of the terminology of "human 
rights" (as opposed to its concept) was something that did develop since World 
War Two. See, for example, Ishay M, The Histmy of Human Rights: From 
Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (University of California Press, 2004). 
2 Adopted by the United Nations in 1948 under United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 2 17 (III) of 10 December 1948. 
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'core' human rights treaties stemming from the Universal Declaration? 
The most significant of those, at least for the purpose of this chapter, is the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR). The 
ICCPR consists of 27 articles enunciating a wide range of civil and 
political rights, from the right to self-determination, to freedom of speech 
and association, to minimum guarantees for the conduct of the criminal 
process. 
Although the articulation of those rights is significant in itself, it is not 
just this aspect that makes the ICCPR an important human rights 
document. The ICCPR is the instrument through which the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee was established.4 The Committee has three 
functions, all linked to civil and political rights protection. The first of 
these is to receive and comment on periodic reports from States parties to 
the ICCPR.5 New Zealand has submitted four reports to the Human Rights 
3 Those being: (1) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination ("CERD"), opened for signature 7 March 1966, 9464 UNTS 211 
(entered into force 4 January 1969 and ratified by New Zealand in 1975); (2) the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), opened for 
signature 16 December 1966,999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976 
and ratified by New Zealand in 1978); (3) the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), opened for signature 16 
December 1966,993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976 and ratified by 
New Zealand in 1978); (4) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women ("CEDA W"), opened for signature 18 December 
1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force 3 September 1981 and ratified by New 
Zealand in 1984); (5) the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), opened for signature 10 
December 1984, 1465 UNTS 112 (entered into force 26 June 1987 and ratified by 
New Zealand in 1989); and (6) the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 43 (entered into force 2 
September 1990 and ratified by New Zealand in 1993). 
4 The Human Rights Committee was established under article 28(1) of the ICCPR. 
5 See article 40(1) of the ICCPR. States parties are required to submit reports to 
the Human Rights Committee every five years, detailing the measures adopted to 
give effect to the rights recognised in the ICCPR and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of those rights. 
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Committee under this procedure.6 Next, the Committee is empowered to 
make general comments, of its own volition, on any matter touching upon 
the rights set out in the ICCPR7 Finally, and significantly in terms of the 
enforcement of rights, the Committee carries out a quasi-judicial function 
under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which establishes a 
complaints procedure.8 The Optional Protocol gives individuals within 
States which are party to the Protocol the right of direct petition to the 
Human Rights Committee in certain well-defined circumstances.9 Of 
interest, although prior to the enactment of the NZBORA, Professor 
Jerome Elkind saw this mechanism as establishing within New Zealand a 
'Bill of Rights' in itself and changing the helplessness of New Zealanders 
in the human rights arena.lO The NZBORA came into force five months 
later. 
6 For the latest report by New Zealand to, and comments of, the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New 
Zealand's Fourth Periodic Report to the Human Rights Committee (2001) 
CCPR/CINZL/2001l4; and Human Rights Committee Comments on New 
Zealand's 4th Periodic Report, (2002) CCPR/C0I75INZL. 
7 General Comments by the Human Rights Committee are authorised by article 
40(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. On reading that 
provision, it might appear that comments are limited to responses to specific 
periodic reports submitted by states party to the ICCPR. The Committee has 
adopted the practice, however, of making its comments open to all states parties 
and in more general terms, with the aim of assisting states with the interpretation 
and implementation of the Covenant. To view the general comments of the 
Committee, see URL <wwwl.urnn.edu/humanrts/gencommlhrcomms.htm>. 
8 First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 302 (entered into 
force March 1976 and ratified by New Zealand in 1989). 
9 For a comprehensive explanation of the communication procedure, see PR 
Ghandi, The Human Righls Committee and the Right of Individual 
Communication (Ashgate Dartmouth Publishing Ltd, 1998). 
10 Elkind J "The Optional Protocol: A Bill of rights for New Zealand" [1990] 
NZLR 96, 101. 
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4.1.2 Legislative Implementation of International Human Rights 
Obligations in New Zealand 
As discussed within Chapter Three, treaties are not law of the land unless 
incorporated by statute. This begs the question: given the number of 
international human rights treaty obligations adopted by the New Zealand 
Executive, which of those have been incorporated by statute and to what 
extent, therefore, are New Zealand's international human rights obligations 
reflected in domestic law? The question is important in order to determine 
what rights and freedoms are guaranteed, albeit that some may already find 
support through the common law. l1 For the purpose of this chapter and 
thesis, only the implementation of the ICCPR (governing civil and political 
rights) is considered. 
When one talks of implementation, this can mean a number of things. 
It can mean that a treaty has been implemented in its entirety by a statute. 
This might be done by translating the terms of the treaty into domestic law 
or by annexing it to an Act of Parliament. The former can sometimes lead 
to imperfect implementation if there is a divergence between the text of the 
treaty and the text of the Act. Implementation is also achieved if, to all 
intents and purposes, the rules established by the treaty are already given 
effect to by existing law. 12 Alternatively, it might require modification of 
existing law. 13 
t1 That rights exist in the absence of legislation is implicitly accepted through the 
wording of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 1990: see ss2 ("rights affirmed") and 
28 ("other rights not affected"). See also the discussion below at 4.1.5(b) The 
affirmation of rights. 
12 This was arguably the case when New Zealand ratified the two International 
Covenants in 1978 (the ICCPR and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights) - i.e., those rights were arguably already being given 
effect to through various items of legislation, including the Race Relations Act 
1971 and Human Rights Commission Act 1977. However, in response to New 
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There have been a number of statutes said to give effect to New 
Zealand's international human rights obligations under the ICCPR. The 
three major enactments are the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the 
Human Rights Act 1993 and the Privacy Act 1993.14 Through its 
preamble, the NZBORA declares itself as: 
An Act - (a) To affirm, protect and promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in New Zealand; and (b) To affirm New 
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
Similarly, the Human Rights Act provides in its long title that it is: 
An Act to consolidate and amend the Race Relations Act 1971 and the 
Human Rights Commission Act 1977 and to provide better protection 
of human rights in New Zealand in general accordance with the United 
Nations Covenants or Conventions on Human Rights. 
Although the long title to the Privacy Act does not make explicit reference 
to obligations under the International Covenant, it does hold itself out as 
being an Act to establish principles concerning: 15 
(i) The collection, use, and disclosure, by public and private sector 
agencies, of information relating to individuals; and 
Zealand's Third Periodic Report to the UN Human Rights Committee, It IS 
notable that the Committee expressed "regret" that some rights guaranteed by the 
ICCPR remained unrecognised (at least not expressed) by New Zealand law: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Human Rights in New Zealand. Report to 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee under the Intemational Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Information Bulletin No 54, June 1995, Wellington, 69. 
13 Aspects of the Crimes Act 1961, for example, were amended to give effect to 
the Convention Against Torture, and (more recently) to give effect to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
14 The Fourth Periodic Report to the HRC identifies the following additional 
enactments as creating the legislative structure within which human rights are 
protected in New Zealand: Ombudsman Act 1975, Official Information Act 1982, 
Privacy Act 1993, Police Complaints Authority Act 1988, Children, Young 
Persons and Their Families Act 1989, and the Health and Disability 
Commissioner Act 1994: above n 6, p 13 of the "Core Document". 
15 See preambular paragraph (a) to the Privacy Act 1993. Note, also, that the long 
title does make reference to the recommendation of the Council of the OECD 
Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data. 
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Cii) Access by each individual to information relating to that individual 
and held by public and private sector agencies; and 
Those are clearly matters that bear upon the implementation of the right to 
privacy, as set out in article 17 of the ICCPR,16 
4.1.3 The Human Rights Act 1993 
The Human Rights Act (HRA) was enacted in 1993 to combine and extend 
the Race Relations Act 1971 and Human Rights Commission Act 1977. 
The original grounds of discrimination under the Race Relations Act and 
Human Rights Commission Act continue to be prohibited under the HRA 
through section 21Ca) to (g): discrimination on the grounds of sex, marital 
status, religious belief, ethical belief, colour, race and ethnic or national 
origins. The 1993 Act also extends protection against discrimination on 
the grounds of disability, age, political opinion, employment status, family 
status and sexual orientation through section 21(h) to (m).17 
Part of the HRA sets out the conditions which are deemed to amount 
to "unlawful discrimination" in relation to employment, partnerships, 
16 Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
Article 17 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
It is not clear why article 17 was not implemented through the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990. In the 1985 White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand, the implementation of New Zealand's obligations under the International 
Covenant was identified as one of the reasons in favour of New Zealand adopting 
a Bill of Rights: see New Zealand Department of Justice, A Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand A White Paper (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985), 30 (para 4.21). 
The paper then states that "some provisions of the Covenant do not appear in the 
draft", but gives no explanation for this: para 4.23. 
17 The ground of age is not, strictly speaking, a "new" ground of prohibited 
discrimination. It was in fact added to the Human Rights Commission Act 1977 
in 1992 - see section 4 of the Human Rights Commission Amendment Act 1992. 
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membership in professional or trade associations, membership in 
qualifying bodies and vocational training bodies, access to facilities open to 
the public, the provision of goods and services to the public, the provision 
of land, housing and other accommodation and access to educational 
establishments. 18 Additionally, section 65 of the Act (pertaining to indirect 
discrimination) is a catch all, prohibiting any policy or practice from 
having the effect of treating a person or group of persons differently on the 
basis of one of the prohibited grounds of discrimination, unless there is 
some "good reason". 
Through the linking provisions between the HRA and NZBORA, 19 
discriminatory conduct on the part of the State is also prohibited and 
subjects government to the discrimination complaints process under Part 3 
of the Human Rights Act. 
4.1.4 The Privacy Act 1993 
The Privacy Act 1993 impacts upon the examination of issues concerning 
search and seizure, surveillance and access to personal information?O The 
relevance of the right to privacy upon these issues is something that has 
been seen, for example, within the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights 
Committee?l 
18 See sections 22, 36, 37, 38, 40, 42, 44, 53 and 57 of the Human Rights Act 
1993. 
19 See sections 3 and 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Part lA 
of the Human Rights Act 1993 (inserted by the Human Rights Amendment Act 
2001). 
20 See Chapter Nine (concerning surveillance and tracking devices). 
21 For a detailed examination of the right under article 17 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and its impact upon these matters, see 
Conte A, Davidson S and Burchill R, Defining Civil and Political Rights. The 
Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2004), chapter 7. 
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The Privacy Act was enacted on 17 May 1993 "to promote and protect 
individual privacy" in both the public and private sectors?2 Section 6 of 
the Privacy Act establishes 12 Information Privacy Principles, which are 
concerned with the collection, storage, use and disclosure of personal 
information. Personal information is defined, under section 2 of the Act, as 
"information about an identifiable individual" . The Act has been 
characterised as both a human rights statute and freedom of information 
statute?3 
The Act applies to the Crown, and any "agency" dealing with personal 
information. 24 In a way similar to the Human Rights Act, the Privacy Act 
establishes a complaints procedure for the investigation of complaints 
under the Act. It also provides individuals with the means to have access 
to their records and request correction of any wrong information; and it 
requires every agency to have Privacy Officers, whose role it is to 
administer the application of the Privacy Act in their organisation, deal 
with information privacy requests and work with the Privacy 
Commissioner on any investigations. 
The breach of an Information Privacy Principle will normally amount 
to an interference with the privacy of an individual, depending on the 
consequences of the breach. 25 If such a breach proceeds to the Human 
Rights Review Tribunal, the Tribunal has the power to grant various 
remedies, including damages up to $200,000.00. Section 127 of the Act 
22 See preamble to the Privacy Act 1993. 
23 See Mackay Rand McArtney R, Privacy Law and Practice (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1995), Al6. 
24 See sections 2 to 5 of the Privacy Act 1993. 
25 See section 66 of the Privacy Act 1993. 
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sets out the only criminal offences under the Act, which pertain to 
interference with the Privacy Commissioner's investigations or 
instructions. 
4.1.5 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is, as already noted and reflected 
within the long title to the Act, the primary instrument through which New 
Zealand has implemented its obligations under the ICCPR. This part of the 
chapter only seeks to provide an overview of the Bill of Rights. A more 
detailed consideration of the operative provisions of the Act, and its 
'limitations clause' in particular, is given later in the chapter.26 For now, it 
is sufficient to briefly consider the development of the Bill of Rights, the 
affirmation of rights within the Act, the application of the Act to the State, 
and the special role of the Attorney-General under the Act. 
4.1.5(a) A Bill ~f' Rights for New Zealand. In his introduction to the White 
Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand, Sir Geoffrey Palmer set out the 
motives ofthe Bill as follows: 27 
A Bill of Rights for New Zealand is based on the idea that New 
Zealand's system of government is in need of improvement. We have 
no second House of Parliament. And we have a small Parliament. We 
are lacking in most of the safeguards which many other countries take 
for granted. A Bill of Rights will provide greater protection for the 
fundamental rights and freedoms vital to the survival of New Zealand's 
democratic and multicultural society. 
The adoption of a Bill of Rights in New Zealand will place new limits 
on the powers of Government. It will guarantee the protection of 
fundamental values and freedoms. It will restrain the abuse of power 
by the Executive branch of Government aud Parliament itself. It will 
26 See below at 4.3.2 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and 4.4.2 Limiting Rights 
under the Bill of Rights Act and Human Rights Act. 
27 New Zealand Department of Justice, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White 
Paper (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985),5. 
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provide a source of education and inspiration about the importance of 
fundamental freedoms in a democratic society. It will provide a 
remedy to those individuals who have suffered under a law or conduct 
which breaches the standards laid down in the Bill of Rights. It will 
provide a set of minimum standards to which public decision making 
must conform. 
In its original form, Sir Geoffrey Palmer intended the NZBORA to have an 
enormous impact on the field of civil liberties in New Zealand. It was to 
be supreme law, overriding all other Acts of Parliament, all subordinate 
legislation and all public practices, in the same way as the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982 (the Canadian Charter),zs In its final 
form however, there were many significant changes made to the Bill and 
differences therefore exist between it and its Canadian equivalent. The 
most important of these relates to the status of the New Zealand instrument. 
Under the Canadian Charter, all forms of legislation are subject to the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Charter. Any provisions of an 
Act of Parliament inconsistent with those rights and freedoms can be struck 
down by the judiciary. The rights and freedoms affirmed in the NZBORA, 
however, are subject to ordinary legislation: the Charter is "supreme" law, 
while the NZBORA is part of "ordinary" law. 
This is a matter that has drawn the repeated criticism by the UN Human 
Rights Committee in its comments upon New Zealand's reports to the 
28 The Canadian Charter is not an instrument on its own, but is in fact Part I of 
Canada's Constitution Act 1982, which is in turn Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK). 
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Committee under article 40 of the ICCPR. In its comments on New 
Zealand's Third Periodic Report in 1994, the Committee said this: 29 
The Committee regrets that the provisions of the Covenant have not 
been fully incorporated into domestic law and given an overriding 
status in the legal system. Article paragraph 2, of the Covenant 
requires States parties to take such legislative or other measures which 
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the 
Covenant. In this regard the Committee regrets that certain rights 
guaranteed under the Covenant are not reflected in the Bill of Rights, 
and that it does not repeal earlier inconsistent legislation, and has no 
higher status than ordinary legislation. The Committee notes that it is 
expressly possible, under the terms of the Bill of Rights, to enact 
legislation contrary to its provisions and regrets that this appears to 
have been done in a few cases. 
In reply to those criticisms by the Committee, the Fourth Report of 2000 
seems to have either failed to answer the criticism, or misunderstood it.30 
The Government's response was to redirect the HRC criticism to the 
limited issue of the ability of Parliament to be able to pass legislation 
despite a report from the Attorney-General under section 7 of the 
29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand's Third Periodic Report to 
the Human Rights Committee (1994) CCPR/C/64/Add.1O; and Human Rights 
Committee Comments on New Zealand's 3rd Periodic Report, (1995) 
CCPR/CI79/Add.47, para 11. 
30 Fourth Periodic Report, above n 6, paras 24 to 34 inclusive. One should not, 
however, take this article as treating the Human Rights Committee's criticism as 
being entirely meritorious. It is, in fact, rather simplistic in its approach and 
assumes that the judiciary should be the ultimate body deciding upon the extent to 
which citizens should enjoy rights and freedoms. In a recent report of the 
Regulations Review Committee, for example, Parliament was described as having 
this role, the Committee referring to Parliament as the "guardian of the public 
interest": see Report of the Regulations Review Committee, Inquiry into 
Regulation-Making Powers that Authorise International Treaties to Override any 
Provisions of New Zealand Enactments, NZAJHR (2002) I. 16H, 16. That is, 
however, a subject outside the scope of this chapter. What is being illustrated is 
that New Zealand's Fourth Periodic Report effectively ignored the criticism. 
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NZBORA, allowing the possibility of some legislation enacted in breach of 
the Act and possibly the Covenant. The Fourth Report explained: 31 
Section 7 constitutes a safeguard designed to alert Members of 
Parliament to legislation which may give rise to an inconsistency with 
the Bill of Rights Act and, accordingly, to enable them to debate the 
proposals on that basis (see Mangawaro Enterprises Ltd. v. Attomey-
General [1994] 2 NZLR 451, 457). The role of scrutinizing bills for 
consistency with the Bill of Rights Act and providing advice to the 
Attorney-General on the exercise of his or her duties under Section 7 is 
performed by the Ministry of Justice (in the case of legislation being 
promoted by a Minister other than the Minister of Justice), and by the 
Crown Law Office (in the case of legislation being promoted by the 
Minister of Justice). 
The New Zealand Government pointed out that this vetting process can 
involve complex issues and that, in a number of circumstances, it is quite 
possible for there to be reasonably held competing points of view as to 
whether a provision does or does not infringe the provisions of the Act. 
While that is entirely rational, this response failed to answer the 
Committee's earlier comments to the Third Periodic Report. The 
comments of the Human Rights Committee did not amount to a criticism of 
the legislative safeguards against enacting inconsistent legislation; they 
were in essence stating that this should not be a question for Parliament but 
one for the judiciary, with the power for the judiciary to strike down 
inconsistent provisions. 
4.1.5(b) The affirmation o.frights. Part II of the Bill of Rights Act sets out 
the substantive rights affirmed by the Act, largely reflecting the content of 
the ICCPR on the subjects of life and security of the person, democratic 
and civil rights, non-discrimination and minority rights, search, arrest and 
31 Fourth Periodic Report, ibid, para 27. 
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detention, and rights to justice. A point to note is that the Act expresses 
itself as 'affirming' those rights (section 2), making it specifically clear 
under section 28 that: 
An existing right or freedom shall not be held to be abrogated or 
restricted by reason only that the right or freedom is not included in this 
Bill of Rights or is included only in part. 
4.1.5(c) Application to the State. In broad terms, the application of the Bill 
of Rights is limited to the conduct of the State and its agents: 
3. Application 
This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done-
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the 
government of New Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, 
power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or 
pursuant to law. 
The text of Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican and Richard 
Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill of Rights, talks at great length about the 
impact of section 3 upon the legislative, executive and judicial roles of 
each branch of the State.32 For the purpose of this thesis, it is sufficient to 
note that the Bill of Rights applies to legislation,33 and the conduct of the 
executive branch, and the judiciary. 34 
32 Rishworth P, Huscroft G, Optican S and Mahoney R, The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights (Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 3,70-115. 
33 Ibid, 72. 
34 Ibid, 81-83. 
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4.1.5(d) The role of the Attorney-General. Already noted within Chapter 
Three is the fact that the NZBORA requires the Attorney-General to report 
to the House during the process of law-making: 35 
7. Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears 
to be inconsistent with Bill of Rights 
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the 
Attorney-General shall,-
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; 
or 
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of 
the Bill,-
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in 
the Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. 
The role of Attorney-General under section 7 was not something that had 
been provided for under the White Paper version of the Bill of Rights, but 
was introduced as a compromise in the removal of the entrenched status of 
the Act and the introduction of the section 4 'sovereignty' clause?6 The 
purpose of the provision is to promote compliance with the Bill of Rights' 
substantive rights and freedoms protection, prompting Parliament to turn 
its mind to the passing of any legislation that would abrogate one of those 
substantive rights?7 Two particular matters are relevant. Firstly, the 
obligation to report to the House only arises when any Bill is "introduced". 
There is no duty to review and report on any amendments to a Bill made or 
recommended as a result of the select committee review process. 38 The 
second matter of importance is the relevance of section 5 to the Attorney-
General's function. Section 5 sets out a 'justified limitations' provision 
35 Chapter Three, 3.ll.l(e) Attorney-GeneraL's advice. 
36 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand - A White Paper, above n 27. 
37 Rishworth et aI, above n 32, 195-196. 
38 Ibid, 196-197. 
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and, according to Crown Law officer Andrew Butler, "almost all advices 
prepared by the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Law Office for the 
Attorney-General as part of the section 7 NZBORA vetting process rely to 
. 5" 39 some extent on sectIon . 
On the question of law-making, it should also be noted that the 
Legislative Advisory Committee40 has adopted Guidelines on Process and 
Content of Legisiation.41 Part of the Committee's mandate is to "help 
improve the quality of law-making by attempting to ensure that legislation 
gives clear effect to government policy, ensuring that legislative proposals 
conform with the LAC Guidelines".42 The Guidelines require law-makers 
to confirm that proposed legislation complies with the NZBORA, Human 
Rights Act, Privacy Act, and international obligations.43 
Why Consider .. .& ...... ~AA_ •• _ ...... __ 
Terrorist Legislation? 
the Examination of 
Having outlined the basic features of New Zealand's civil and political 
rights framework, but before proceeding to consider the application of the 
ICCPR and NZBORA, some brief consideration should be given to the 
question of 'why'. Why consider the International Covenant and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights in a thesis on counter-terrorism? The answer lies in 
several parts. The obvious reason is that the preceding chapter, in 
39 Butler A, "Limiting Rights", (2002) 33 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 537,538. See also Rishworth et aI, above n 32, 197. 
40 Established by the Minister of Justice in 1996: see Department of Justice, 'Who 
and What is the Legislative Advisory Committee?' at URL 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/lac/who/index.html> at 24 March 2004. 
41 Legislative Advisory Committee, Guidelines on Process and Content of 
Legislation (2001 ed, including 2003 supplement), available at URL 
<http://www.justice.govt.nzllac/>. 
42 Above n 40, Term of Reference (e). 
43 Above n 41, chapters 4, 6 and 15. 
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revIewmg New Zealand's counter-terrorist legislation, identified several 
aspects of the legislation that could adversely impact upon civil and 
political rights in particular, upon rights to justice; the freedoms of 
expression, assembly and association; and criminal procedure rights, 
search, arrest and detention rights.44 This, by itself, calls for further 
consideration of the impact of counter-terrorist measures upon human 
rights, although it is important to recognise that New Zealand is not the 
only jurisdiction in which such issues have arisen.45 Linked with the 
international concern about the impact of counter-terrorism upon human 
44 Chapter Three, 3.14 Potential Civil and Political Rights Issues. 
45 At the United Nations Conference on Human Rights in 2002, for example, the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that "excessive measures have 
been taken in several parts of the world that suppress or restrict individual rights 
including privacy rights, freedom of thought, presumption of innocence, fair trial, 
the right to seek asylum, political participation, freedom of expression and 
peaceful assembly": see Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and Follow-up to the World. Conference on Human Rights, Report 
of the High Commissioner submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 
48/81, 27 February 2002, E/CN.4/20018, para 9. Various international non-
governmental organisations have similarly pointed to human rights violations 
occurring in pursuit of the war on terror including, by way of example, the 
International Federation for Human Rights, the World Organization Against 
Torture and Amnesty International - see United Nations Foundation, 'HUMAN 
RIGHTS: Observatory Says Anti-Terror Efforts Cover for Repression', UN Wire, 
27 March 2003, URL <http://www.unfoundation.org/unwire/utilldisplay_ 
stories.asp?objid=32834> at 29 March 2003, and 'TERRORISM: Rights Group 
Blasts Governments' Responses, Cites Abuses' , 29 March 2003, URL 
<http://www . unfoundation. org/unwire/utilldisplay _stories. asp ?objid=32834> at 
29 March 2003. See also United Nations Foundation, 'Counter-Terrorism To 
Blame For Erosion Of Rights, Expert Says', UN Wire, 11 November 2003, URL 
<http://www.unfoundation.org/unwire/utilldisplay-stories.asp?objid=136617> at 
17 November 2003. The Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee has 
itself acknowledged that there have been expressions of concern about human 
rights arising from anti-terrorism efforts: see United Nations Foundation, 
'RIGHTS COMMITTEE: UN Panel Hears From Terror Expert, Ends Session', 
UN Wire, 7 April 2003, URL <http://www.unfoundation.org/unwire/utilldisplay_ 
stories.asp?objid=33033> at 14 April 2003. In March 2003, Human Rights Watch 
issued a briefing paper on purported human rights abuses, including studies on ten 
States in which it was said that violations of human rights were occurring through 
the implementation of counter-terrorist measures: Human Rights Watch Briefing 
Paper, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights Abuses Worldwide, 
(Human Rights Watch, 2003), part III. The countries identified were China, 
Egypt, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Russia (Chechnya), Spain, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Uzbekistan. 
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rights (both before and since September 11), various bodies have 
considered the issue of compliance with human rights when countering 
terrorism. As is discussed in more detail within Chapter Five, a substantial 
body of both 'hard' and 'soft' law directs that counter-terrorism must 
indeed be pursued in a manner that is consistent with human rights.46 
There are then three additional, practical, features arising from New 
Zealand's human rights framework that require its consideration. The first 
is that if counter-terrorist legislation is found to be in contravention of the 
ICCPR this will draw adverse comments from the Human Rights 
Committee (under the Covenant's reporting procedure) or, in the case of 
individual communications to the Committee, directions from the 
Committee for New Zealand to take remedial steps. This is particularly so, 
having regard to the Committee's observations in response to New 
Zealand's latest periodic report under the ICCPR:47 
The State party is under an obligation to ensure that measures taken to 
implement Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) are in ful] 
conformity with the Covenant. 
From a domestic perspective, the Bill of Rights Act will itself impact upon 
any counter-terrorist legislation that is inconsistent with the rights and 
freedom", contained in the Bill of Rights bringing into play the second and 
third practical reasons requiring consideration of human rights. On one 
level, the Bill of Rights impacts upon statutory interpretation, calling (in 
very broad terms) for legislation to be interpreted consistently with it and 
46 That is, a mixture of documentation representing guiding principles and non-
binding resolutions and recommendations ('soft law'), together with binding 
resolutions, treaty provisions and customary law ('hard law'). See Chapter Five, 
5.2 Is Compliance with Human Rights Necessary? 
47 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: New Zealand, 17 July 2002, CCPRlC0I75INZL, para 1 L 
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the ICCPR.48 The third feature to bear in mind is that, despite the absence 
of a remedies provision within the NZBORA, it must also be remembered 
that a finding of a breach of the Bill of Rights wil1 likely result in some 
form of remedy being awarded by the courtS.49 It should be noted in that 
regard, that the New Zealand Court of Appeal and the House of Lords have 
recently shown themselves to be willing to act as a check and balance upon 
the executive and legislature, even in matters concerning the national 
interest. 50 It is therefore essential, it is posited, to examine the potential 
48 Consider, for example, Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher [1980] AC 319, 328, 
where Lord Wilberforce spoke of broad and simple language within human rights 
legislation needing to be given a generous interpretation designed to give 
individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to. 
Furthermore, despite the well known proposition of statutory interpretation 
requiring application of clear and unambiguous terms of a statute to be applied 
(see Evans J, Statutory Interpretation. Problems of Communication, Oxford 
University Press, 1989, 2), it is clear that where possible the courts will attempt 
to reconcile the meaning of a statute so as to give effect to treaty obligations. This 
stems from the basic constitutional presumption that Parliament does not intend to 
legislate in a manner contrary to its international legal obligations. See, for 
example, Lord Scarman's comments in Attorney-General v British Broadcasting 
Corp [1981] AC 303, 354; and R v Chief Immigration Ojjker, Heathrow Airport, 
ex parte Salemat Bidi [1967] 1 WLR 979, 984 (per Denning LJ). This is, however, 
subordinate to the strict doctrine of statutory interpretation ah'eady mentioned. 
Nevertheless, the idea of searching for consistency is not new. In the 1974 case of 
Police v Hicks [1974] 1 NZLR 763, the Court readily accepted the relevance of 
the Single Convention on Narcotics (ratified by New Zealand in 1963) in 
interpreting the Narcotics Act 1965. For a further discussion of the differing 
approaches to interpretation concerning language, intent, uniformity, and 
conflicting doctrines, see Evans J, "Questioning the Dogmas of Realism" (2001) 
New Zealand Law Review 145. 
49 Whether that be by way of a stay of prosecution in the case of unduly delayed 
criminal proceedings (see, for example, Martin v Tauranga District Court [1995] 
2 NZLR 419, where the Court of Appeal held that a 17 month delay from charge 
to trial date was, on the facts, a breach of section 25(b) of the NZBORA and that 
stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy); or civil damages where no other 
effective remedy is available (as occurred in Simpson v Attorney-General 
(Baigent's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 and Auckland Unemployed Workers' Rights 
Centre Inc v Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 720); or even the controversial 
indication of inconsistency (as considered in Moonen v Film and Literature 
Review Board [2000] 2 NZLR 9, R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695, and R v Pora 
[2001] 2 NZLR 37). 
50 See Attorney-General v Zaoui (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 690, and A (FC) and 
others (FC) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent), 16 December 2004, [2004] UKHL 56. 
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civil and political rights issues identified in Chapter Three. The first step 
in doing that, through this chapter, is to consider how the ICCPR and 
NZBORA are to be applied and what allowance each instrument makes for 
the limitation of rights. 
4.3 Application of the ICCPR and NZBORA 
As discussed, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act stand as the primary instruments in 
New Zealand's civil and political rights framework51 It is therefore 
important to understand, at least in general terms, how these two 
instruments are to be applied. 
4.3.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
In providing an overview of the application of the ICCPR, three matters 
warrant discussion: the role of the document's treaty-monitoring body, the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee; the different status within the 
Covenant accorded to 'non-derogable' rights; and the ability to derogate 
from the Covenant in times of emergency. This part of the chapter 
considers the first matter only. Examination of derogable and non-
derogable rights and the suspension of rights in times of public emergency 
will be had later in this chapter when discussing the limitation of rights. 52 
In providing an overview of New Zealand's obligations under the 
international human rights regime, mention was made of the special role 
and functions of the UN Human Rights Committee, established under the 
5l Discussed above at 4.1 New Zealand's Civil and Political Rights Framework. 
52 Discussed below at 4.4.1 Limiting Rights under the International Covenant. 
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Two functions of the 
Committee warranting some comment are those under the periodic 
reporting requirements of the Covenant and the individual communications 
procedures under its First Optional Protoco1.53 
Article 40 of the ICCPR requires States parties to submit periodic 
reports to the Committee on the measures they have adopted to give effect 
to the rights recognised in the Covenant and on the progress made in the 
enjoyment of those rights. New Zealand has submitted four periodic 
reports since it became a party to the ICCPR in 1978.54 When reports are 
lodged with the Committee, they are considered by it and any observations 
or comments are transmitted to the State party by way of a report.55 The 
observations of the Committee to New Zealand's reports have generally 
been positive, although it has adversely commented upon the fact that the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is unable to repeal earlier inconsistent 
legislation and has no higher status than ordinary legislation. Where 
particularly adverse observations are being made, the Committee is able to 
transmit these comments to the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council in what has been described as a 'naming and shaming' exercise.56 
53 The third function identified was that of making general comments on the 
interpretation and application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. While that is certainly an important role which will assist in the later 
analysis of particular rights, this part of the chapter seeks to consider the role of 
the Human Rights Committee vis a vis New Zealand. 
54 For a more detailed discussion of the contents of New Zealand's latest (fourth) 
periodic report, and the comments of the Human Rights Committee to that reports, 
see Conte A, "International Reflections on Civil and Political Rights in New 
Zealand" (2002) 8 The Canterbury Law Review 480. 
55 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 40(4). 
56 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 40(4). Use of the 
term 'name and shame' was made by the current Chair of the Commission of 
Human Rights, Ambassador Mike Smith, The UN Commission on Human Rights: 
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The second means of Committee scrutiny of State party compliance 
with the International Covenant is through the individual communications 
(complaints) procedure established under the First Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, to which New Zealand is a party. Article 1 of the Protocol 
recognises the competence of HRC "to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be 
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant". Individuals in New Zealand (including those in New Zealand's 
territory that are not citizens) who claim that any of their substantive rights 
enumerated in the ICCPR have been violated and who have exhausted all 
available domestic remedies may submit a written communication to the 
Committee for consideration. Upon receipt of such a communication (after 
a finding that the communication is admissible )57 the Committee will 
consider in detail the allegation made by the author of the communication 
to determine whether there has been a breach of the ICCPR and, if so, what 
remedial steps should be directed.58 A number of individual 
Reflections on a Year as Chair, 31 August 2004, Centre for International and 
Public Law seminar, Australian National University. 
57 On the issue of admissibility, the First Optional Protocol sets out various 
criteria. For discussion of this, see Conte, Davidson and Burchill, above n 21, 
chapter 2. 
58 By article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Committee will direct the State to put into place "effective remedies", the nature 
of which will depend on the particular complaint. On the issue of the status of 
'decisions' of the Human Rights Committee (technically called "views"), see: 
Davidson JS, "Intention and Effect: The Legal Status of the Final Views of the 
Human Rights Committee", in Huscroft G and Rishworth P (eds), Litigating 
Rights: Perspectives from Domestic and International Law (Hart Publishing Ltd, 
2002), 305; McGoldrick D, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the 
Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1990), 
chapters 2. 3 and 4; Pocar F, "Legal Value of the Human Rights Committee's 
Views" 1991-1992 Canadian Yearbook of Human Rights, 119; and Tomuschat C, 
"Evolving Procedural Rules: The United Nations Human Rights Committee's 
First Two Years of Dealing with Individual Communications" (1980) 1 Human 
Rights Law Journal 249. 
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communications have been lodged against New Zealand, with an adverse 
finding having recently been made by the Committee in Rameka et al v 
New Zealand. 59 
4.3.2 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights stands as New Zealand's primary piece of 
Domestic legislation through which civil and political rights are protected. 
Having already provided a general overview of matters impacting upon the 
application of the Act,60 this part of the chapter will consider two issues in 
detail: the operative provisions of sections 4, 5 and 6; and the meaning of 
the term "enactments" (as used in sections 4 and 6 of the Act). 
4.3.2( a) The 'unholy trinity' of sections 4, 5 and 6. The precise application 
of the NZBORA to any perceived conflict between it and any other rule is 
governed by what Dr James Allan has described as the "unholy trinity" of 
sections 4, 5 and 6 of the ACt:61 
4. Other enactments not affected 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made 
before or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),-
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or 
revoked, or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment-
by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any provision of 
this Bill of Rights. 
59 Rameka et al v New Zealand, Human Rights Committee Communication 
1090/2002. Concerning this communication, see Conte A, "Human Rights, Non-
Parole Periods and Preventive Detention" (2004) New Zealand Law Journal 202. 
Concerning communications against New Zealand in general, see Conte A, 
"International Reflections on Civil and Political Rights in New Zealand" (2003) 8 
The Canterbury Law Review 480,497-498. 
60 Discussed above at 4.1.5 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
61 Allan J, "The Operative Provisions - An Unholy Trinity" [1995] Bill of Rights 
Bulletin 79. 
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Justified limitations 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
6. Interpretation consistent with Bill of Rights to be preferred 
Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with 
the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning 
shall be preferred to any other meaning. 
In general terms, the provisions are easy enough to understand. Section 4, 
a last-minute iJ1'~ertion into the Bill as a means of protecting Parliamentary 
sovereignty, 'protects' enactments by preventing the courts from ruling 
them to be invalid or ineffective as a result only of their inconsistency with 
the NZBORA. Section 6 requires that, where a provision of an enactment 
is open to more than one interpretation, then the interpretation that is 
consistent with the NZBORA is to be adopted. Section an almost 
identical reflection of article 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 1982, permits limitations to be placed upon the rights and 
freedoms within the NZBORA where this reasonable, prescribed by law, 
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 
The difficulty lies with the inter-relationship of the sections and the 
order in which they are to be applied. Section 4 talks of protecting 
provisions that are "inconsistent" with the Bill of Rights, while section 6 
speaks of adopting meanings that are "consistent" with it. Section 5 sets 
out a limitations test, but expresses itself to be "subject to section 4". The 
early approaches to the application of these provisions were set by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in Noort v MOT; Curran v Police.62 On the one 
hand, Cooke P took the view that primary focus should be placed upon 
62 Noort v MOT; Curran v Police [1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
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sections 4 and 6 by determining whether there is an "irreconcilable 
conflict" between the legislation and the NZBORA. That is, the Court 
should first apply section 6 to try to achieve a consistent interpretation and 
then, if there is no consistent application, apply section 4 to override the 
NZBORA. In contrast, the approach of Justices Richardson, Hardie Boys 
and McKay placed emphasis on section 5 by first asking whether or not the 
provision or practice in question can be justified under section 5 of the Act. 
Delivering a more recent judgment of the same Court in Moonen v Film 
and Literature Board of Review, Tipping J outlined a five-step approach 
that he described as 'helpful' to the practical application of the operative 
provisions.63 It is notable, however, that this methodology was later 
expressed by the Court of Appeal as not intended to be prescriptive and 
that other approaches were open to application of the operative provisions 
of the Bill of Rights Act.64 
63 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 17. The 
five-step process was described as follows: 
1. Identify the different interpretations of the words contained in the enactment 
being examined: if only one interpretation is open: that meaning should be 
adopted (s4); if more than one meaning is open, proceed to the next step. 
2. Identify the meaning which constitutes the least possible limitation on the right or 
freedom in question and adopt that meaning (s6). 
3. Having adopted the appropriate meaning (through either steps one or two), 
identify the extent - if any - to which that meaning limits the relevant right or 
freedom. 
4. Consider whether that limitation (if found) can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society (s5): if it can, then that is the end of the matter; if it 
cannot, proceed to the next step. 
5. Although a particular meaning to the enactment will have been adopted by this 
stage (ss4 or 6), if that meaning "fails" the s5 test, then it is a limitation that is not 
justifiable in a free and democratic society. Step 5 accordingly requires the Court 
to issue a declaration to that effect (termed a declaration of inconsistency or 
incompatibility). 
64 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review (No 2) [2002] 2 NZLR 754, 
760 (para 15). See also Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704, 709 (para 28), in 
which France J in the High Court observed that the five-step process outlined in 
Moonen (No 1) was not a prescriptive one and other approaches were available in 
Bill of Rights cases. 
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Taking into account that the final step advocated in Moonen is merely 
announcing the result of the fourth step, Professor Rishworth's text arrives 
at a four-step process in the application of sections 4, 5 and 6. The text 
also explains that the second and third steps in Moonen are reversed, 
rationalising that although there is little practical difference in doing so 
overall, the change makes the exercise more efficient by considering 
consistency before ambiguity. 65 For the purpose of this thesis, it is that 
text's approach that is adopted, and summarised as follows: 66 
.. Step 1: Does the enactment establish a limit on a right? 
It is for the party seeking to invoke the Bill of Rights to firstly define 
the right being invoked and demonstrate that it applies to the 
circumstances being complained of. If the party is unable to do so, then 
the NZBORA is neither applicable nor relevant.67 
Step 2: Is the advocated meaning 'inconsistent' with the right? 
An enactment is 'consistent' with the Bill of Rights, explains the text, if 
"it either (a) effects no limitation on a right or freedom at all, or (b) 
limits a right or freedom to the extent permitted by s. 5".68 This second 
step therefore calls for careful consideration of whether the enactment 
limit a right or freedom and, if it does, whether (by application of 
65 Rishworth et aI, above n 32, 136. 
66 Ibid, 135-157. 
67 See, for example, Palmer v Superintendent Auckland Maximum Security Prison 
[1991] 3 NZLR 315 (where it was held that section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1985 had no application to the right of a prisoner to be credited with time spent on 
remand in determining eligibility for parole), and Hart v Parole Board [1999] 3 
NZLR 97 (where it was held that recall from parole was part of the punishment 
for the original offending and did not therefore amount to a double punishment). 
68 Rishworth et aI, above n 32, 138. 
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section 5) such a limit is justified.69 There are three potential 
outcomes. Firstly, the enactment does not effect a limitation upon the 
advocated right, in which case the right is fully protected and there is 
no need for further enquiries to be made.7o Secondly, if the enactment 
does effect a limitation, it might be concluded that the limitation is 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. In that event, 
the enactment is not 'inconsistent' with the Bill of Rights and this again 
brings consideration of the NZBORA to a c1ose. It is only in the third 
potential outcome that the matter must proceed to steps 3 and 4: where 
the enactment does effect a limitation upon a right or freedom and the 
limitation ~~~ be justified under section 5 of the NZBORA. 
.. Step 3: Is an alternative meaning possible? 
The third step is to establish whether an alternative interpretation of the 
enactment (one that is consistent with the right invoked) is possible. 
The important feature here is that any alternative meaning must not be 
as a result of a strained interpretation of the enactment, contrary to its 
ordinary meaning or to Parliament's intent.71 Andrew Butler adds that, 
since consideration of section 5 needs to precede the determination of a 
69 Which is, as pointed out by Rishworth, analogous to the methodology adopted 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: ibid, 138; see also R v Oakes 
[1986] 1 SCR 103, 138-139. 
70 That is effectively the same outcome as failing to demonstrate that the right 
invoked applies to the circumstances being complained of (step 1). 
71 Above n 32, 143-147. See, in particular, R v Clarke [1985] 2 NZLR 212, 214, 
where the Court of Appeal criticised an earlier obiter approach in Flickenger v 
Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 439, in which the Court has 
discounted the statutory context and history of section 66 of the Judicature Act 
1908 in favour of a literal meaning of the provision. The meaning adopted must 
be 'reasonably available': see, for example, R v Phillips [1991] 3 NZLR 175, 176-
177, Noort v MOT; Curran v Police [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 272, and Simpson v 
Attorney-General (Baigent's Case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 674. 
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binding interpretation of an enactment, section 6 can only demand that 
the courts apply a meaning which least reasonably limits the 
NZBORA. 72 
.. Step 4: Adopt the consistent meaning, if properly available. 
The previous investigations all lead to the application of the directions 
under sections 4 and 6 of the Bill of Rights Act. If there is an 
alternative meaning properly available in the interpretation of the 
enactment, then section 6 directs that this must be adopted. If there is 
no alternative meaning, then the enactment is (in the words of Cooke P) 
in an "irreconcilable conflict" with the Bill of Rights and must, by 
application of section 4, prevaiL 
4.3.2(b) The meaning of the tenn "enactments". As might be evident from 
the preceding discussion, the meaning of the term "enactments" has 
significant consequences upon the application of the operative provisions. 
In basic terms, if the provision being complained of is not an "enactment", 
then section 4 of the NZBORA cannot act to 'preserve' the provision 
where it is in conflict with one of the rights and freedoms within the Bill of 
Rights. Against that background, the issue to consider is what the meaning 
of "enactments" is - in particular, whether subordinate legislation falls 
within the scope of the term. Two potentials exist. The first, by way of a 
broad interpretation, is that the term is taken to include subordinate 
legislation as well as Acts of Parliament. Alternatively, by way of 
72 Butler, above n 39,577. Compare this to the approach under section 3(1) of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), where the UK Parliament rejected the New 
Zealand model of requiring a reasonable interpretation: see discussion on this 
point by the House of Lords in Ghaidan v Mendoza [2004] 3 All ER 411, 426. 
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restrictive interpretation, the term could be taken to refer to Acts of 
Parliament alone.73 
There are a number of arguments that could be made in support of both 
approaches. With respect to the broad approach, three main points can be 
made that tend to favour that approach. The first pertains to the 
Interpretation Act 1999, in which the term "enactment" is defined as 
inclusive of both primary and subordinate legislation.74 Following this 
approach, an enactment is the whole or part of any Act of Parliament and 
includes subordinate legislation made under its principal. In his most 
recent edition of Statute Law in New Zealand, Professor John Burrows 
concludes that this definition is to be applied to the terms as used in section 
4 of the Bill of Rights, unless the regulations were ultra vires.75 
In his second edition of Statute Law in New Zealand, Professor 
Burrows discussed the matter in more detail and posited that the term 
"enactments" must extend to regulations as well as Acts of Parliament if 
one considers the language of section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act.76 In 
doing so he points to the fact that section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act refers 
to enactments "passed" or "made". Since Acts of Parliament are passed by 
Parliament, and subordinate legislation made by delegates, the logical 
conclusion to be drawn is that Parliament must have intended "enactments" 
73 The various arguments presented below are discussed in more detail in the 
author's article "The Application of Section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 to 
Subordinate Legislation" [1997] 3 Human Rights Law and Practice 146. 
74 The earlier Acts Interpretation Act 1924 only defined the term "Act" (as "an 
Act of the General Assembly and includes all rules and regulations made 
thereunder"); whereas its successor, the Interpretation Act 1999, defines 
"enactment" as "the whole or a portion of an Act or regulations". 
75 Burrows JF, Statute Law in New Zealand, (3rd ed, LexisNexis, 2003), 259. The 
question of regulations being ultra vires through application of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 is discussed later in this section of the chapter. 
76 Burrows JF, Statute Law in New Zealand, (2nd ed, Butterworths, 1999),337. 
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to include both Acts of Parliament and subordinate legislation, There is 
weight in this argument, particularly when one has further regard to the 
wording of section 4 (sub-paragraph (a) in particular), which refers to 
provisions impliedly "repealed" or "revoked", As before, an Act of 
Parliament is repealed, whereas subordinate legislation is revoked. 
A third argument in favour of a broad interpretation of the term 
"enactments" could be based on the case of Black v Fulcher,77 The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal held in that case that, generally, the word 
"enactment" is a convenient and succinct term embracing any Act or rules 
or regulations made thereunder and any provision thereof. In the absence 
of some "good reason", the then President Cooke would not accept that the 
term should be given a restrictive interpretation to refer only to an Act or 
any provision of an Act. This position must be tempered, however, by the 
fact that this decision was made prior to the Interpretation Act 1999. At 
that time, the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 was in force, which only 
defined the term "Act", whereas the current Interpretation Act defines the 
term "enactment", 78 
In favour of a restrictive interpretation (excluding regulations from the 
meaning of enactments under section 4), it is posited that one needs to start 
with consideration of the general rule of statutory interpretation that an Act 
of Parliament has primacy over subordinate legislation so that, if there is a 
conflict between an Act and a regulation, the regulation must give way,79 
77 Black v Fulcher [1988] 1 NZLR 417. 
78 Above n 74. 
79 See dictum of Lord Herschell in Institute of Patent Agents v Lockwood [1894J AC 
347,360 - followed by Stout CJ and Adams J in Lee v Macpherson (No 1) [1923J 
NZLR 1296, 1304. 
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If that is correct, it should follow that where there is a conflict between the 
NZBORA and an item of subordinate legislation, then section 4 cannot 
save the subordinate legislation and the Bill of Rights will prevail. 
The next point to note is Justice Henry's consideration of the term 
"enactments", as used in the Third Schedule of the Transport Amendment 
Act (No 2) 1963, in the case of Munro v Auckland City.8o In that case, 
Justice Henry concluded that: 81 
... the word 'enactments' does not include the Act and the regulations 
which are described in the first column of Part IV. The word 
'enactments' is of narrower import and should not be extended to mean 
the whole Act and regulations unless the context so requires. 
Considering the constitutional importance of the Bill of Rights Act, and the 
purposive approach adopted by the jUdiciary in the application of the Act, it 
is suggested that this context does not require the word to be given a broad 
interpretation so as to allow delegates to legislate inconsistently with the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Bill of Rights Act. 
Regard might also be had to Hansard. its second reading, the Bill of 
Rights Bill was presented before the House with a new "Clause 3A" 
inserted (now section 4 of the Act). During the debates of the second 
reading, Attorney-General Paul East discussed the motives of this new 
provision.82 The purpose of the clause was said to protect Parliament's role 
of making law. 83 While the original Bill was introduced as supreme 
80 Munro v Auckland City [1967] NZLR 873. Again, this decision was made prior 
to the enactment of the Interpretation Act 1999. 
81 Ibid, 874. 
82 New Zealand, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, No 19, 3460, 14 August 
1990. 
83 This was clearly a concern of various members of Parliament, as evident in their 
debates on the Bill of Rights Bill. See New Zealand, New Zealand Parliamentary 
Debates, No 62, 13038, 10 October 1989 (introduction); New Zealand, New 
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legislation, clause 3A was added to do away with this so that Parliament 
was not prevented from effecting changes to human rights aspects of the 
law if it felt it should do so in the future. However, the Parliamentary 
debates did not focus on a delegate's power to make subordinate 
legislation. Similarly, the specific wording of the clause ("pass" versus 
"made" and "repeal" versus "revoke") was a product of Select Committee 
recommendations and the distinctions alluded to by Professor Burrows 
were not contemplated by Parliament in its debates. 
Furthermore, section 7 of the Bill of Rights itself points to the adoption 
of a restrictive interpretation of the term "enactments" so that it refers to 
Acts of Parliament alone. The NZBORA is an ordinary statute, giving 
Parliament the freedom to legislate inconsistently with its provisions. 
However, section 7 of the Act makes this power conditional in that it 
requires the Attorney-General to bring to the attention of the House of 
Representatives any provision in a Bill which appears to be inconsistent 
with the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights Act. By 
doing so, Parliamentary supremacy84 is still preserved since the final 
decision as to whether to contravene any right or freedom is left with 
Parliament, New Zealand's elected officials. It is in this context of limiting 
fundamental rights that the importance of section 7 can be seen. On a 
political level, section 7 brings any potential contravention of the Bill of 
Rights Act by any Bill before the House out into the open and forces 
Zealand Parliamentary Debates, No 19, 3460, 14 August 1990 (second reading); 
and New Zealand, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, No 20, 3759, 21 August 
1990 (third reading). 
84 The protection of which is the aim of section 4: see Paccioco DM, "The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Curial Cures for a Debilitated Bill" [1990] New 
Zealand Law Review 353, 355. 
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Parliament to make a conscious decision on whether to limit any right or 
freedom. Therefore, Parliament's legislative powers are well monitored to 
protect our fundamental freedoms. 
The Regulations (Disallowance) Act now require all regulations to be 
laid before the House of Representatives, including regulations made under 
the United Nations Act 1946.85 The House may then, by resolution, 
disallow any regulations or provisions of regulations or amend or substitute 
I · 86 any regu atIons. The Disallowance Act does not provide for any 
reporting procedure relating to apparent contraventions of the Bill of 
Rights Act, as section 7 of the NZBORA does in respect of Parliamentary 
Bills. Nevertheless, since January 1995, all draft regulations submitted to 
Cabinet for approval must be accompanied by a specified cover sheet.87 
The cover sheet is based on that used for draft Bills and is designed to 
ensure that Cabinet has due regard to a number of factors prior to approval 
of such regulations. Item 4(a) of the cover sheet requires the submitting 
Minister to indicate whether the regulations comply with the Bill of Rights 
Act. 88 It therefore appears that the abrogation of human rights by a 
delegate of legislative power is guarded against to some extent, although 
the extent to which the Regulations Review Committee is able to consider 
potential conflicts (having regard to time and resources) is debateable. 
85 Regulations under the United Nations Act 1946 are made by the Governor-
General in Council: see section 2(1) of that Act. "Regulations" within the 
jurisdiction of the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 include regulations made 
by the Governor-General in Council: see section 2(a)(i) of that Act. 
86 See sections 5 and 9 of the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989. 
87 See Cabinet Office circular "Procedures for Regulations Made by Order in 
Council" of 13 December 1994 CO(94)17; and Cabinet Office circular "Revised 
Procedures for regulations made by Order in Council" of 6 April 1995 CO(95)5. 
88 See Cabinet Office circular "Revised Procedures for Regulations Made by Order 
in Council" of 6 April 1995 CO(95)5, Appendix 2. 
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Notwithstanding the author's position that the term "enactments" might 
be given a restrictive interpretation for the purpose of section 4 (to exclude 
subordinate legislation), the practical approach taken by the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in Drew v Attorney-General does away with the need to 
determine the issue.89 Facing a charge of using heroin without the 
authority of a medical officer, Drew (a prison inmate) was heard by the 
deputy superintendent of the prison, who found the charge against him 
proved. On appeal to the Visiting Justice, Drew was refused permission to 
be represented by a lawyer at the hearing (in accordance with regulation 
144 of the Penal Institutions Regulations 1999) and the Visiting Justice 
also found the case proved. The question before the Court of Appeal was 
whether Drew had the right to legal representation in prison disciplinary 
hearings and whether regulation 144 (made under the empowering 
provision of section 45( 1) of the Penal Institutions Act 1954) properly did 
away with the right to representation. Although the Court concluded that 
regulation 144 was an "enactment", it held that the regulation was not 
protected by section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act. Instead, the Court 
focussed on the issue of interpreting the empowering provision in a manner 
consist with the NZBORA so to exclude the possibility of making 
regulations made under the empowering provision in conflict with the Bill 
of Rights:9o 
It is therefore not really necessary to respond to Mr Butler's argument 
that the regulations in question are protected by s4 of the Bill of 
Rights ... Counsel was correct, of course, when he said that a regulation 
is an "enactment." Section 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999 confirms 
that position. But the answer to counsel's argument is that, in striking 
89 Drew v Attomey-General [2002] 1 NZLR 58. 
90 Ibid, 73 (para 68). 
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down the regulations because they are ultra vires the empowering 
section (s45), the Court is not doing so only because they are 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. To the extent that it is necessary to 
refer to the Bill of Rights, the regulation is invalid because the 
empowering provision, read, just like any other section, in accordance 
with s6 of the Bill of Rights, does not authorise the regulation. The 
Court merely gives s45 a meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights. In accordance with s6, that 
meaning is to be preferred to any other meaning. As Mr Wilding said, 
s4 is not reached. 
Thus, the conclusion is this: the arguments in favour of adopting a broad 
interpretation of the term "enactments", to include subordinate legislation, 
appear to be dominant. There are, at least in theory and in the writer's 
opinion, considerable problems with that position. Ultimately, however, 
those problems are mollified by the approach of applying section 6 of the 
NZBORA to the empowering provision of an Act. In doing so, regulations 
made under the authority of the empowering provision, so as not to be ultra 
vires, must be made consistently with the NZBORA. 
The question of "enactments" and the potential for empowering 
provisions to allow the making of regulations inconsistent with the Bm of 
Rights is examined later in this thesis, in the context of regulations made 
under the United Nations Act 1946.91 
4.4 Limitations under the Domestic Law 
The final issue to be considered within this chapter is that of how and when 
human rights may be limited. Some human rights are seen as absolute: 
rights and freedoms from which no derogation is permitted. Through 
91 Chapter Six, see especially 6.4.3 Applying section 4 of the NZBORA to section 
2(2) of the UN Act. 
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article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, they 
include the right to life and the prohibitions against torture and slavery.92 
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that most human rights are 
not absolute. In some circumstances, rights and freedoms must be 
qualified in order to achieve other democratic objectives. As stated by Sir 
Ivor Richardson of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v B:93 
Individual freedoms are necessarily limited by membership of society 
and by the rights of others and the interests of the community. 
Typically, as recognised by Sir Ivor, this occurs in two scenarios. The first 
is where a right or freedom conflicts with or must be measured against 
another right or freedom. 94 For example, freedom of expression does not 
carry with it the right to incite violence or racial hatred, defame others, 
engage in commercial fraud, or distribute objectionable material. 95 A 
further example is commonly seen in questions concerning the medical 
treatment of children. In such cases and for various reasons including 
religious belief, the parents of a child may choose not to permit their child 
92 As defined within articles 6, 7 and 8(1) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. Refer, in this regard, to Chapter Five where further 
consideration is given to the idea of absolute rights: 5.3.2 The Fiction of Non-
Derogable Rights. 
93 R vB [1995] 2 NZLR 178,182. 
94 As recognised in the preamble of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
95 Example given in the White Paper, above n 27, 71. See, for example, Living 
Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group [2000] 3 NZLR 570, concerning 
two videos discussing aspects of homosexuality which had been classified under 
section 3(1) of the Films Videos and Publications Classification Act 1993 as 
"objectionable" . 
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to receive medical treatment, which exposes a conflict between the rights 
of the child96 and the right to religious belief. 97 
The next category of permissible derogation of rights is within the 
context of a conflict between a right or freedom and some important 
objective of the State. This, in turn, can be viewed within the framework 
of two categories: derogation of rights because of a state of emergency, as 
permitted by article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; and/or where there is some pressing and substantial objective of the 
State that needs to be met (by proportionate means) for the maintenance of 
society itself. The latter qualified guarantee is effected within New 
Zealand legislation through section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, to be 
discussed. 
4.4.1 Limiting Rights under the International Covenant 
The ICCPR recognises within its preamble and article 4 that not all rights 
are absolute. The preamble to the Covenant reads as follows: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant, 
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the 
Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and 
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family 
is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person, 
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and 
96 More specifically, the right to life, as reflected in article 6 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the requirement in article 3 of the 
Convention to give effect to the best interests of the child. 
97 See article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
and section 13 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. See, for example, Re 
J (An Infant): B&B v DGSW[1996] 2 NZLR 134, concerning parents of J who 
were Jehovah's Witnesses and had objected to a blood transfusion recommended 
by hospital authorities. 
Terror versus Tyranny· PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 185 
Chapter 4: Civil and Political Rights in New Zealand 
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved 
if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and 
political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights, 
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United 
Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and freedoms, 
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to 
the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive 
for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, [emphasis added] 
Agree upon the following articles ... 
The Covenant does not, however, contain what might be termed a 
"general" limitations clause. Instead, the enunciation of rights and 
freedoms within the document contain, within the expression of the right or 
freedom, particular limitations that may be permitted as against that 
provision. Article 9(1) of the Covenant provides, for example: 
No one shan be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedure as are established by law. [emphasis 
added] 
This feature of the Covenant calls for an article-by-article consideration of 
the ICCPR according to the particular right(s) being examined. This 
chapter does not seek to do so, instead leaving such analysis to the more 
specific and detailed examinations within Chapters Seven, Eight and 
Nine. 98 
The only thing close to a general limitations provision is within article 
4 of the International Covenant, which allows certain rights to be 
temporarily suspended in times of public emergency. Under article 4(1) of 
the ICCPR, a State party can further derogate from certain provisions of the 
98 For a consideration of the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee in 
examining the content and meaning of the rights contained within the ICCPR, se 
Conte, Davidson and Burchill, above n 21. 
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Covenant when a public emergency arises which threatens the life of that 
State:99 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and 
the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the 
present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations 
under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do 
not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin. 
Although this chapter does not seek to consider whether terrorism falls 
within the scope of a public emergency, nor whether counter-terrorist 
measures can thus suspend rights in accordance with article 4, a number of 
provisos need to be noted concerning the operation of article 4(1).100 
4.4.1(a) Non-derogable rights. Article 4(2) of the Covenant sets out a list 
of rights that may not be derogated from when a public emergency is 
declared by a State party, being: the right to life (article 6); freedom from 
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 7); 
the prohibition of slavery and servitude (article 8(1) and (2)); freedom from 
imprisonment for failure to fulfil a contract (article 11); freedom from 
retrospective penalties (article 15); the right to be recognised as a person 
before the law (article 16); and freedom ofthought, conscience and religion 
(article 18). Notwithstanding that this is a clearly expressed provision 
within the ICCPR, and that international obligations flow from it, the 
99 Similar emergency measures are permitted under the (European) Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 
1953), article 15(1); and the American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 lINTS 
123 (entered into force 18 July 1978), article 27(1). 
100 These issued are examined within Chapter Five at 5.3.1 Terrorism and 
Emergency Measures. 
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author has some difficulty with the notion that some rights are absolute and 
non-derogable. Certainly, some rights are particularly important. One's 
right to life is clearly of more significance that the right to be tried in 
criminal proceedings without undue delay. In the context of counter-
terrorism, Chapter Five will return to this point and more closely examine 
the relationship (by way of example) between the right to life and counter-
terrorism. 101 
4.4.1(b) Notice of derogation(s). A brief point to note is that paragraph 3 
of article 4 requires any derogations implemented by a State party to be 
notified to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, identifying the 
rights and limitations being imposed, and the reasons for this. Equally, 
notice must be given when the derogation(s) are terminated. Notable at 
this point is the fact that New Zealand has never lodged a notice of 
derogation. 
4.4.1(c) Public emergency. The Human Rights Committee has issued two 
general comments on the application of article 4 (the second replacing the 
first).102 It clearly considers that this is limited to states of emergency, as 
provided for within municipal legislation setting out grounds upon which a 
state of emergency may be declared.103 While the Committee does not 
101 Chapter Five, 5.3.2 The Fiction of Non-Derogable Rights. 
102 Human Rights Committee, Derogation of Rights (Art 4), CCPR General 
Comment 5 (1981), subsequently replaced by Human Rights Committee, States of 
Emergency (article 4), CCPR General Comment 29 (2001). 
103 General Comment 29, ibid, para 2. The term "state of emergency", rather than 
"public emergency" is that adopted by the Human Rights Committee within its 
general comments. It does not, however, reflect the actual wording of article 4(1), 
which refers to "public emergency" only. This is an important distinction, since 
(in the author's view) the latter phrase has a wider meaning than "state of 
emergency". Ultimately, it should be noted that General Comments of the Human 
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explain its rationale in coming to this view, it seems to be based upon the 
wording of article 4(1) and upon the idea of certainty and the rule of law: 
the principle that there be certainty in the law, reasonably ascertainable by 
the people within a State so that they are able to regulate their conduct 
accordingly and know the basis upon which the State can act. 
4.4.1(d) Exceptional and temporary nature. Finally, the Human Rights 
Committee has repeatedly stated that measures under article 4 must be of 
an exceptional and temporary nature, and may only continue for as long as 
the life of the nation concerned is threatened. 104 It added that such 
derogations must be both necessary and proportional, limited to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. lOS 
4.4.2 Limiting Rights under the Bill of Rights Act and Human Rights Act 
As indicated, the provision by which New Zealand law accommodates 
limitations upon human rights and freedoms is section 5 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, which provides: 106 
Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
Rights Committee are made by the Committee for the purpose of assisting 
interpretation and application of ICCPR provisions and are without legal standing. 
While they certainly might indicate the way in which the Committee might 
address a complaint presented to it, General Comments do not function as a 
binding interpretation or direction. In fact, the making of General Comments is 
not even set out within the ICCPR or its optional protocols as part of the Human 
Rights Committee's functions. 
104 Ibid, para 2. 
105 Ibid, para 4. 
106 Similarly, article I of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, upon 
which New Zealand's section 5 NZBORA is based, provides that "[t]he Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it 
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society". 
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This limitation provision is equally application to discriminatory conduct 
on the part of the State, through section 20L of the Human Rights Act 
1993:107 
20L. Acts or omissions in breach of the Part-
(1) An act or omission in relation to which this Part applies 
(including an enactment) is in breach of this Part if it is inconsistent 
with section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an act or omission is 
inconsistent with section 19 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 if the act or omission-
(a) limits the right to freedom from discrimination affirmed by that 
section; and 
(b) is not, under section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, a justified limitation on that right. 
(3) To avoid doubt, subsections (1) and (2) apply in relation to an act 
or omission even if it is authorised or required by an enactment. 
In discussing the application of section 5 of the NZBORA, a number of 
preliminary points need to be made. 
4.4.2(a) Balancing methodology. An interesting technical issue in the 
application of section 5 is raised by Andrew Butler in his work on Limiting 
Rights. 108 He raises the question of whether consideration of limitations 
upon rights should, within the context of the NZBORA, be based upon a 
"definitional balancing" or an "ad hoc balancing". That is, whether one 
should interpret the meaning of, and limitations upon, substantive rights 
provisions when defining the right or freedom being considered, and 
thereby largely do away with the need to consider section 5 (definitional 
balancing); or fIrst define the right or freedom broadly and then determine, 
as a separate question, the reasonableness of limitations upon those rights 
107 This part of the Act was inserted by the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001. 
A breach of the Act triggers the various remedial provisions and procedures, as 
discussed above at 4.1.3 The Human Rights Act 1993. 
108 Butler, above n 39,541-544. 
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(ad hoc balancing). Butler concludes that a purposive reading of the Act 
calls for the latter approach, based upon the structure of the legislation, the 
burden of proof under section 5, the consequence of greater transparency, 
comparative experiences and the very existence of section 5. 
Having said this, it is important to recognise that the expression of 
some rights will call for a definitional and ad hoc approach. This is due to 
the fact that a number of provisions within the Bill of Rights contain 
internal modifiers. As illustrated by Butler, section 21 of the Act 
guarantees a right to be free from "unreasonable" searches and seizures 
and, similarly, section 9 protects the right to be free from 
"d' . 1 " . h 109 Isproportlonate y severe treatment or pums ment. 
The particular wording of section 5 discloses four further issues to be 
considered in its application. 
4.4.2(b) Onus and standard of proof First, section 5 allows limits" ... as 
can be demonstrably justified ... " in a free and democratic society. The 
question is: demonstrated by whom? The short answer is that the onus of 
proof rests on the party seeking to uphold the limitation. 
Once the complainant of a NZBORA breach has established the 
existence of a prima facie rights violation (including the extent of any 
internal modification required),ll0 the onus of proving that the breach is 
justified under section 5 is placed on the party relying on section 5. This 
was held to be so by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Southam (No 
109 Ibid, 544. 
uo See above discussion concerning balance methodology. 
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J)yl The New Zealand Court of Appeal has taken the same view, stating 
that it is for the party seeking reliance on section 5 to advance the argument 
that limits on rights are reasonable. 1l2 In Solicitor-General v Radio New 
Zealand Ltd, the onus of proof was again said to lie with the party relying 
on section 113 The Court added that the standard of proof is the civil 
standard of the balance of probability but that must be applied rigorously, 
consistent with the requirement that the restriction be demonstrably 
. 'f' d 114 Justl1e . 
The result of this burden and standard of proof upon the State to justify 
limits it places upon rights contributes to the transparency of rights 
limitations and what might be described as a culture of justification. lIS 
4.4.2( c) Reasonable "limitation". The reference in section 5 to 
" ... reasonable limits ... " means that the 'limitations' must be limitations 
and not more than that. This might seem to be a trite observation, but it has 
never been considered in New Zealand, although there is law on the point 
in Canada. 
Canadian case law has drawn a distinction between "limits" and 
"exceptions". In Attorney General of Quebec v Quebec Association of 
Protestant School Boards, the rule of non-justifiability was set out. 1l6 In 
that case, section 72 of the Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) 
III Re Southam (No 1) [1983] 41 OR (2d) 113, 124. 
H2 MOT v Noort; Police v Curran, above n 62, 271 and 283. 
113 Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd (1994] 1 NZLR 48. Note that the 
position regarding the standard of proof is not as clear in Canada: see KIS FilnIs 
Inc v Vancouver (1992) CRR (2d) 98,113-114. 
114 Ibid, 61. Consider also Butler's consideration of the "intensity of review" in 
the application of section 5, above n 39,561-564. 
l!5 Above n 39, 550. 
116 Attorney General of Quebec v Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards 
[1984] 2 SCR 66. 
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restricted the teaching of English. The Supreme Court held that this 
restriction amounted to an "exception" to a provision of the Charter of 
Rights. The Court stated that a prescription of law cannot create an 
exception to a provision of the Charter of Rights, nor can it purport to 
amend any provision thereof. It held that if a prescription collides directly 
with a provision of the Charter so as to negate it in whole, that prescription 
is not a "limit" capable of justification. 117 
The latter case was considered in Ford v Quebec (Attorney General) 
where the Supreme Court examined the distinction between "limits" and 
"exclusions" in more detail. 118 The Court started by describing the Quebec 
Association of Protestant School Boards case as a "rare case of a truly 
complete denial of a guaranteed right or freedom" and, in doing so, 
recognised that most (if not all) legislative qualifications of a right or 
freedom will amount to a denial of the right or freedom to that limited 
extent. 119 On the other hand, it said, a limit that permits no exercise of a 
guaranteed right or freedom in a limited area of its potential exercise is not 
. if' bl 120 Just Ia e. 
To comply with this requirement, any limitation under an enactment 
must therefore not entirely exclude a right or freedom, although it may be 
rare to find a legislative provision that has such a strong effect, although 
section 4 of the NZBORA would act to 'save' the provision. 
117 Ibid, 87. 
118 Ford v Quebec (Attorney General) [1988] 2 SCR 712. 
119 Ibid, 773. 
120 Ibid, 773-774. 
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4.4.2(d) The limitation must be "prescribed by law". The wording of 
section 5 clearly requires any limitation to be "prescribed by law". This 
expression was considered by the European Court of Human Rights in the 
Sunday Times Case, where the Court concluded that two requirements 
flowed from the expression: 121 
(a) the law must be adequately accessible so that the citizen has an 
adequate indication of how "the law" limits his or her rights; and 
(b) the law must be formulated with sufficient precision so that the 
citizen can regulate his or her conduct. 
The Sunday Times requirements were accepted and applied in New 
Zealand by the Indecent Publications Tribunal in Re "Penthouse (US)" Vol 
] 9 No 5 and others .122 The test was later reaffirmed by the European Court 
in the case of Silver v UK. 123 Putting this test into a practical perspective, 
Le Dain J of the Supreme Court of Canada said that this included common 
law rules, statutes and regulations. 124 This consideration of the expression 
"prescribed by law" was approved by the NZCA in MOT v Noort; Police v 
Curran. 125 
In Canada it has also been held that the "operating requirements" of a 
statute amount to a prescription by law. The term "operating 
requirements" refers to those limits on rights which are not expressed in a 
121 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1978) 58 ILR 491,524-527. 
122 Re "Penthouse (US)" Vol 19 No 5 and others 1 NZBORR 429. 
123 Silver v UK [1983] 5 EHRR 347. 
124 R v Thomsen (1988) 63 CR (3d) 1, 10. Regulations were also held to be 
satisfactory by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613. 
Application of the Sunday Times test can be seen in Re "Penthouse (US)" Vol 19 
No 5 and others, 1 NZBORR 429, where the Indecent Publications Tribunal of New 
Zealand held that policies based on statutory Lnteria satisfy the test. 1be European 
Court in Silver v UK, above n 123, found that while the Prison Act and Prison Rules 
(UK) met the criterion of adequate accessibility, unpublished orders and instructions 
did not. 
125 Above n 62, 272 and 283. 
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statute, nor implied, but which simply arise as a result of the practical 
operation of the enactment in the manner in which it was designed to 
operate. In R v Therens, a case concerning blood/breath alcohol 
legislation, it was held that the operating requirements of the Canadian 
statute meant that full opportunity to consult and instruct a lawyer was not 
possible, and that telephone access within a reasonable time only could be 
permitted.126 In a very similar context, the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
inMOTv Noort; Police v Curran adopted this approach, holding that limits 
on rights resulting from the "operating requirements" of the Land 
Transport Act 1962 would constitute limits which were "prescribed by 
law". The Court also noted that the concept of discerning "operating 
requirements" is to be seen in New Zealand as part of the interpretation 
process.127 
Notably, the second limb of the Sunday Times test (regarding the 
precise formulation of any limitation) has been applied to strike down 
powers or discretions that are so broad as to be considered "unfettered". In 
Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society, for example, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal held that a statute authorising film censorship failed to 
meet the requirements of a limitation "prescribed by law" because the 
censor board was given an unfettered discretion to ban or cut films. 128 
4.4.2(e) The substantive test under section 5. Finally, the limitation in 
question must be shown to satisfy what is the very substance of section 
i.e., that it is " ... demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". 
126 R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613. 
127 Above n 62, 283 (per Richardson J). 
128 Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society [1984] 45 OR (2d) 80. 
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To determine this issue, Canadian and New Zealand Courts have developed 
similar principles. The relevant authorities were discussed by a Full Court 
of the High Court in Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd. 129 It was 
stated there that the starting point in applying the substantive test is R v 
Oakes where a detailed test was set out by the Supreme Court of Canada. 130 
In an early formulation of the applicable test, the Supreme Court said that a 
limit will be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
. 'f 131 SOCIety 1 : 
(i) the objective sought to be achieved by the limitation at hand must 
relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and 
democratic society; and 
(li) the means utilised must be proportional or appropriate to the 
objective. In this connection there are three aspects: 
1. the limiting measures must be carefully designed or 
rational1y connected to the objective; 
they must impair the right or freedom as little as possible; 
3. their effects must not so severely trench on individual or 
group rights that the objective of the limitation, albeit 
important, is nevertheless outweighed by the restriction of 
the right or freedom concerned. 
Soon after Oakes, the Supreme Court restated the test to ask whether the 
provision being examined infringed a protected right or freedom "as little 
as reasonably possible" (rather than as little as possible)Y2 Interestingly, 
although the New Zealand High Court in SG v Radio NZ Ltd has adopted a 
129 Above n 113. 
130 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200. 
131 That decision was later affirmed and followed by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney-General) (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 577 and Re A 
Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act [1987] 1 SCR 313,373-374. 
The latter case was referred to with approval by the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
in MOT v Noort; Police v Curran, above n 62, 283. However, cases have moved 
away from requiring limitations to impair rights "as little as possible" 
(requirement (2) of the proportionality test) to a more flexible test of "as little as 
reasonably possible". 
132 R v Edwards Books &Art Limited [1986] 2 SCR 713,772 (per Dickson CJ). 
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rephrased version of the Oakes test slightly, it retained the phrase "as little 
as possible" rather than "as little as reasonably possible": 133 
... To establish that the limit is both reasonable and demonstrably 
justified in a free and a democratic society the law creating the limit on 
the right of freedom must have an objective of sufficient importance to 
warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom . 
. . . The means chosen by the law to achieve the objective must be 
proportional and appropriate to be objective . 
. .. To meet the requirement of the proportionality test there are three 
components. First, the limiting measures or the law must be designed 
to achieve the objective not being arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considerations. This is described as being rationally 
connected to the objective. Second, the measures or the law should 
impair as little as possible the right or freedom. Third, there must be a 
proportionality between the effects of the measures or the law 
responsible for limiting the right or freedom and the objective. The law 
which restricts the right must not be so severe or so broad in application 
as to outweigh the objective. [emphasis added] 
A point of distinction needs to be made when talking of impairing rights as 
little as possible. In the context of the current subject of limitations under 
section 5, and applying the Radio NZ case, a limitation will be 
proportionate if (with the other two components) it impairs the right or 
freedom "as little as possible". In the context of the overall application of 
sections 4, 5 and 6, however, Andrew Butler properly talks about section 6 
only demanding that the courts apply a meaning which "least reasonably 
limits" the NZBORA. 134 Why the difference in terminology (as little as 
133 Above niB, 60-61. This was subsequently cited with approval in Duff v 
Communicado Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 89. Note that in MOT v Noort; Police v 
Curran, Above n 62, 283, Richardson J said: "It is worth emphasising too that in 
principle an abridging inquiry under section 5 will properly involve consideration 
of all economic, administrative and social implications. In the end it is a matter of 
weighing (l) the significance in the particular case of the values underlying the 
Bill of Rights; (2) the importance in the public interest of the intrusion on the 
particular right protected by the Bill of Rights; (3) the limit sought to be placed on 
the application of the Bill provision in the particular case; and (4) the 
effectiveness of the intrusion in protecting the interests put forward to justify 
those limits." 
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possible versus least reasonably possible)? The point to make is that the 
expressions are entirely compatible with each other, since the first relates 
to the application of section 5 and the second relates to the application of 
section 6. In the latter situation, Butler's point concerns the use of section 
6 to determine what meaning to give an enactment - section 6 requiring that 
"a meaning consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights ... shall be preferred". He clarifies that this does not demand an 
interpretation of enactments that favours rights in their absolute form. 135 
Rather, he says: 
Because section 5 NZBORA is a step in the process which needs must 
precede the determination of a binding interpretation of the other 
enactment, section 6 can only demand the courts to interpret statutes 
subject to reasonable limits, not subject to the least possible limit that is 
linguistically available. [underlined emphasis added] 
His analysis, it is posited, is both entirely correct and consistent with the 
Radio NZ description of the proportionality test. Butler is saying that 
section 5 (the reasonable limitations test) must be applied prior to 
determining what interpretation to favour under section 6. Radio NZ 
directs that in determining what amounts to a reasonable limit, the 
limitation must (to be proportional) limit the right as little as possible. 
What should also be noted about the substantive application of section 
5 and the tests described is that, as recognised by Justice Richardson in 
Noort and Curran,136 they involve public policy analysis and value 
judgments on the part of the jUdiciary. In terms of the second, 
134 Butler, above n 39, 577 discussed above at 4.3.2(a) The unholy trinity of 
sections 4, 5 and 6. 
135 A fear that had been expressed by Hardie Boys J in MOT v Noort; Police v 
Curran, above n 62,287. 
136 Ibid, 283. 
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proportionality, limb of the test, it should also be noted that the wording of 
section 5 permits limitations that are "demonstrably justified", rather than a 
more restrictive expression of limitations "necessary" to achieve certain 
objectives. 137 That the wording of section 5 thus permits a broader scope 
of restrictions, as has been recognised by both the High Court and Court of 
AppeaL 138 The greater flexibility of expressions such as "reasonable" 
versus "necessary" was also recognised by the European Court of Human 
Rights in the Sunday Times Case. 139 It appears that these issues were 
anticipated in the White Paper on the Bill of Rights: 140 
In a great many cases where controversial issues arise for 
determination, there is no 'right' answer. The action taken by the 
Government of the day will depend upon its own political persuasions, 
and its assessment as to where the balance of the public interest lies. It 
is the very essence of democracy that it allows for people to hold 
differing views on controversial issues, and for the democratically 
elected Government of the day to adopt a standpoint thereon but for 
which of course it must take responsibility in the normal way at the 
next election. The basis test stated in Article 3 [now section 5 of the 
Act] means that in most cases the courts will leave it to Parliament to 
define the public interest, and to enact legislation encapsulating its 
decision. [emphasis added] 
4.4.2(f) A summary on section The reasonable limitations provision 
under section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is by no means a 
simple one, as evident through what has been a reasonably lengthy (albeit 
basic) overview of the provision. From this entirely abstract consideration 
of section 141 the following can be said of its composite requirements: 
137 As in article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
138 See Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd, above n 113, 62-63 (High 
Court, 1994) and TVNZ v Quinn [1996] 3 NZLR 23,58 (Court of Appeal). 
139 Above n 62, 275. 
140 Above n 27, 45. 
141 Which is deliberate on the part of the author, seeking to leave the contextual 
application of section 5 to Part II of this thesis. 
Terror versus Tyranny PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 199 
Chapter 4: Civil and Political Rights in New Zealand 
.. In the majority of cases, depending on the particular expression of the 
right or freedom being invoked, limitations upon rights should be based 
upon an 'ad hoc' balancing of rights - requiring a broad definition of 
the right in the flrst instance, followed by an enquiry as to whether 
limitations are reasonable under section 5. 
.. Once the party seeking to invoke the Bill of Rights has defined the right 
being invoked and demonstrated that it applies to the circumstances 
being complained of (Rishworth's Step 1) and it has been determined 
that the enactment effects a limitation upon the right or freedom 
(Rishworth's Step 2), the onus is then on the Crown to prove on the 
balance of probabilities that the limitation is justifled under section 5 
(Rishworth's Steps 2 and 3). 
.. In doing so, it must be shown that the enactment effects a 'limitation' 
upon the right invoked and not an entire exclusion of it. 
.. The limitation must be "prescribed by law", requiring it to be 
accessible, precise and in such terms that it does not establish powers or 
discretions that are so broad as to be unfettered. 
.. The limitation must pursue an objective which is pressing and 
substantial in a free and democratic society and do so by proportional 
means (the section 5 'substantive test'). 
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4.5 Conclusion 
New Zealand's civil and political rights framework is established primarily 
through its party status to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and, on a municipal level, through the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990. Various implications arise through those instruments, from the 
impact of them upon statutory interpretation, to maters of reporting and the 
provision of effective remedies for breaches of human rights. The primary 
focus of this chapter has been upon the application of those instruments, 
not in any particular context, but in the abstract sense. Special attention 
has been paid to the issue of the limitation of rights. 
Monitoring of compliance with the International Covenant occurs 
through the UN Human Rights Committee, a quasi-judicial body 
established under the ICCPR itself. The Committee receives and 
comments on periodic reports from States parties and, where a State is also 
a party to the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, the Committee may 
also receive direct communications from individuals from within the 
State's territory. The ICCPR recognises within its preamble that 
individuals not only have rights, but also duties to other individuals and to 
the society within which they live. It does not, however, contain a general 
limitations provision, instead leaving the question of limitations upon 
rights to the particular expression of rights within the Covenant. The 
Covenant does, however, allow the temporary suspension of rights in 
situations where the life of the nation is threatened. 
The application of the New Zealand Bill of Rights is a much more 
difficult enterprise. The operative provisions of the Act call for an intricate 
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methodology to be adopted in the examination of any perceived conflict 
between an enactment and the Bill of Rights. This chapter has chosen to 
adopt the methodology explained by Rishworth and others, applying 
sections 4, 5 and 6 through a four-step process. It has been posited that, in 
the case of regulations, the question of whether regulations are 
"enactments" within the meaning of sections 4 and 6 is not so important. 
The enquiry to be made is whether the regulations have been made in a 
manner that is consistent with the Bill of Rights so that they are not ultra 
vires the empowering provision (by application of section 6 of the 
NZBORA). 
The four-step process identified calls for the application of section 5 of 
the Act, permitting reasonable limitations upon rights to be imposed, if 
prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society. Once a party has defined the right being invoked and 
demonstrated that it applies to the circumstances being complained of, the 
onus is then upon the Crown to establish that the substantive test under 
section 5 is satisfied. Limitations must be "prescribed by law", which will 
be the case with the legislative provisions being considered in this thesis, 
so long as the provisions do not confer an unfettered power or discretion. 
Application of substantive test under section 5 requires that the limitation 
under the enactment pursues a pressing and substantial objective in a free 
and democratic society and does so by proportional means. 
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Chapter 5 
The Interface between Counter-Terrorism 
and Human Rights 
Apparent from Part I of this thesis are a number of important points. First, the 
international community has long been active in countering terrorist conduct, 
being conduct identified by that community, and expressly by the United 
Nations Security Council, as a threat to international peace and security.l 
Flowing from that, New Zealand has a number of international obligations to 
counter terrorism, stemming from Security Council resolutions and from New 
Zealand's party status to the twelve principal anti-terrorism conventions? In 
compliance with those obligations, New Zealand has enacted various items of 
legislation, each of which advance counter-terrorism to various degrees. This 
is primarily through seven items of legislation, including regulations made 
under the United Nations Act 1946.3 This legislation has been identified as 
having the potential to impact upon various rights and freedoms guaranteed 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA).4 New Zealand's 
human rights framework, complemented by its international human rights 
obligations and external review mechanisms, is reasonably extensive while at 
I See Chapter Two, New Zealand's International Counter-Terrorist Obligations. 
2 See Chapter Three, New Zealand's Domestic Counter-Terrorist Legislation, Part A. 
3 See Chapter Three, New Zealand's Domestic Counter-Terrorist Legislation, Part B. 
4 See Chapter Three, New Zealand's Domestic Counter-Terrorist Legislation, 3.14 
Potential Civil and Political Rights Issues. 
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the same time providing the scope for the limitation of rights when advancing 
pressing concerns in a free and democratic society. 5 
This chapter is the first of Part II of the thesis. While Part I looked at 
extant obligations and law, thereby seeking to lay the foundation for a more 
detailed examination of the interface between human rights and counter-
terrorism, Part II will now consider that interface in detail. The first step in 
doing so, and the subject of this chapter, is to consider what principles are to 
be applied in the examination of any perceived conflicts between counter-
terrorism and civil and political rights. 
Five questions are to be addressed, in two main parts to the chapter (one 
expository and the other analytical). The fIrst two questions are approached in 
a reasonably descriptive way, providing an overview of relevant United 
Nations resolutions and other significant documents, thereby establishing a 
platform for the analysis of the critical issues in this chapter. First, having 
identified in Part I of the thesis that human rights appear to be adversely 
impacted upon by counter-terrorism, what can be said about the impact of 
terrorism upon human rights? Secondly, is compliance with human rights 
necessary when countering terrorism? It will be concluded that terrorism 
adversely impacts upon both security and human rights (perhaps not 
surprisingly) but that, despite this adverse impact, the means by which 
counter-terrorist measures are implemented must be in compliance with 
human rights. 
Having arrived at this position, this chapter then considers what are the 
questions vital to Part II of the thesis: the assessment of New Zealand's 
5 See Chapter Four, Civil and Political Rights in New Zealand. 
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counter-terrorist legislation against New Zealand's international and domestic 
human rights framework. To start with, this will be undertaken in the context 
of the International Covenant, then under the New Zealand Bill of Rights. 
Consideration will then be given to how the latter two instruments are to 
interact and what, in particular, the consequences would be of finding counter-
terrorist legislation as being valid under one, but not the other, instrument. 
What should be made clear at this point is that this chapter does not seek 
to undertake analyses of specific types of counter-terrorist measures and how 
they might or might not fit within the human rights framework discussed in 
the preceding chapter. That level of analysis is left to Chapters Seven, Eight 
and Nine, which consider those aspects of New Zealand's counter-terrorist 
legislation identified in Part I of the thesis as requiring examination. This 
chapter seeks to establish the principles to be applied when undertaking that 
examination. 
The Impact of Terrorism on Security Rights 
To say that terrorism can adversely impact upon security (whether 
international or territorial) and upon human rights is to state the obvious. The 
events and consequences of the September 11 terrorist attacks are a clear 
illustration of this. Approximately 3,000 lives were lost, the right to life being 
the most fundamental of human rights. The territorial integrity of the United 
States was compromised through the attacks upon the World Trade Centre and 
the Pentagon. International security also felt the adverse consequences of the 
attacks, ultimately resulting in the multinational military intervention in 
Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom. 
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As discussed in Chapter Two, terrorism, its impact, and its suppreSSIOn 
have been issues within the focus of the United Nations since 'modern', 
transnational, acts of terrorism came to international attention in the late 
1960s and early 1970s with the advent of a series of aircraft hijackings and the 
attempted kidnapping of athletes at the Munich Olympic Games.6 It is 
relevant, in that regard, to consider what the United Nations has said about 
terrorism and its impact upon security and human rights. Although much of 
what is observed is obvious, some of the statements are worth noting and 
some commenting upon. In a reasonably linear fashion, this part of the 
chapter will consider the resolutions of the Security Council, General 
Assembly and Commission on Human Rights. Before doing so, it is relevant 
to note that the recent report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges 
and Change (established by the United Nations Secretary-General) also briefly 
addressed the impact of terrorism: 7 
Terrorism attacks the values that lie at the heart of the Charter of the 
United Nations: respect for human rights; the rule of law; rules of war that 
protect civilians; tolerance among people and nations; and the peaceful 
resolution of conflict. 
5.1.1 Security Council Resolutions 
As discussed within Chapter Two, the UN Security Council has long been 
active in considering the issue of terrorism8 and there are a host of individual 
resolutions in which terrorism is mentioned or specifically addressed by the 
Council. Something that should be remembered in considering the language 
6 Chapter Two, 2.2 International Conventions on Counter-Terrorism. 
7 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Annex to the 
United Nations General Assembly's Fifty-ninth Session, Agenda item 55 of 2 
December 2004, A159/656, para 145. 
8 Chapter Two, 2.3.2 United Nations Security Council. 
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and content of these resolutions is the role of the Security CounciL Under 
article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council is 
charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, paragraph 1 
providing that: 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its 
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying 
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf. 
That role is reflected in the language and scope of Security Council 
resolutions on terrorism which, compared with General Assembly resolutions 
on the subject, are much narrower in focus. 9 In general terms, Security 
Council resolutions concern themselves with the adverse impacts of terrorism 
upon the security of States and the maintenance of peaceful relations, while 
the General Assembly takes a much broader approach to the subject given its 
plenary role and wider mandate. lO 
Having made this point, it is interesting to note that the most recent 
resolution of the Security Council, as at the beginning of 2005, makes 
mention of the impact of terrorism upon both security and human rights. The 
preamble to Security Council Resolution 1566 states: 11 
Reaffinning that terrorism in all of its forms and manifestations constitutes 
one of the most serious threats to peace and security, 
Considering that acts of terrorism seriously impair the enjoyment of 
human rights and threaten the social and economic development of all 
States and undermine global stability and prosperity, 
9 General Assembly resolutions are to be discussed below, at 5.1.2 General Assembly 
and Commission on Human Rights Resolutions. 
10 See articles 10 to 17 of the Charter of the United Nations, which sets out the 
powers and functions of the United Nations General A'lsembly. 
11 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 of 8 October 2004, S/RESIl566 
(2004), preamhular paras 7 and 8. 
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This attention upon human rights is, however, a rare one. It is the only 
resolution of the Council to mention human rights since September 11. All 
other resolutions during that time focus upon, and repeatedly reaffirm, the 
notion that terrorism is a threat to international peace and security. 12 Of those 
resolutions, a number warrant specific mention. First of all are the two 
resolutions of the Council which immediately followed the September 11 
attacks. Resolutions 1368 and 1373 both said that terrorism caused threats to 
international peace and security, the latter Resolution going a little further: 13 
Reaffirming further that such acts [the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001], like any act of international terrorism, constitute a threat to 
international peace and security, [emphasis added] 
The author considers that some qualifications need to be made about this 
assertion. Although the events of September 11 clearly did constitute a threat 
to and breach of international peace and security, it is difficult to see that "any 
act of international terrorism" will necessarily do so. An act of international 
terrorism will no doubt always be seen as both a threat to and breach of 
international peace, since the 'international' nature of such terrorism will 
involve an incursion upon the territorial integrity of the State in which the act 
12 From most recent in time through to resolutions dating back to September 11, 
2001, see United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1535 of 26 March 2004, 
S/RESI1535 (2004), preambular para 2; 1530 of 11 March 2004, SIRES/1530 (2004), 
preambular para 2; 1526 pf 30 January 2004, S/RES/1526 (2004), preambular para 3; 
1456 of 21 January 2003, SIRESI1456 (2003), preambular para 1; 1455 of 17 January 
2003, S/RES/1453(2003), preambular para 7; 1450 of 13 December 2002, 
S/RESI1450 (2002), preambular para 4; 1440 of 24 October 2002, S/RES/1440 
(2002), preambular para 2; 1438 of 14 October 2002, S/RESI1438 (2002), 
preambular para 2; 1390 of 28 January 2002, S/RESI1390 (2002), preambular para 9; 
1377 of 12 November 2001, S/RESI1377 (2001), preambular para 2; 1373 of 28 
September 2001, S/RES/1373 (2001), preambular para 3; and 1368 of 12 September 
2001, S/RES/1368 (2001), operative para 1. 
13 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 of 12 September 2001, 
S/RES/1368 (2001), preambular para 2 and operative para 1; and 1373 of 28 
September 2001, S/RES/1373 (2001), preambular para 3. 
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occurs. Such an act need not, however, constitute a breach of international 
security, although it is likely to constitute a threat to such security.I4 Much 
will depend, it is posited, upon the way in which the terrorist event is dealt 
with by both the State attacked and any States in which the terrorists reside or 
have fled to. 
It is important to reflect that these statements of the Security Council do 
not otherwise appear to be an over-reaction to the events of September 11. 
Two resolutions of the Council, made prior to the September 11 attacks, are 
prominent in that regard. Resolution 1269 of 1999 expressed concern over the 
fact that terrorism endangers lives and the well being of individuals, as wen as 
the security of States. IS Following the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi, 
Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, Resolution 1189 condemned the 
bombings and described them as having a damaging effect on international 
relations and jeopardising the security of States.16 Most influentially, both 
resolutions declare that the suppression of the acts of international terrorism is 
essential to the maintenance of peace and security. 17 
5.1.2 General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 
Since December 1972, the UN General Assembly has adopted a series of 
resolutions concerning terrorism. Those resolutions take the form of the 
14 Within the meaning of the terminology used in article 39 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
15 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1269 of 19 October 1999, S/RESI1269 
(1999), preambular para 1. 
16 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1189 of 18 August 1998, SIRES/1189 
(1998), preambular para 2. 
17 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1189 of 18 August 1998, 
SIRES/1189 (1998), preambular para 3; and 1269 of 19 October 1999, SIRES/1269 
(1999), preambular para 8. 
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Assembly's adoption of measures to eliminate international terrorism18 and 
resolutions addressing the topic of terrorism and human rights. 19 Taking a 
18 The very first resolution of the General Assembly concerning itself solely with the 
issue of terrorism was adopted on 18 December 1972 against the background of the 
disruption of the 1972 Olympic Games at Munich: United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972, NRES/27/3034. Its very title 
illustrates the overwhelming view that terrorism is a matter affecting security and the 
enjoyment of rights: "Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or 
takes innocent lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the 
underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in 
misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice 
lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes". The same title 
was used to name eight subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly, from 1976 
to 1989: United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 311102 of 15 December 
1976, NRES/311102; 32/147 of 16 December 1977, AlRES/32/147; 341145 of 17 
December 1979, AlRES/34/145; 361109 of 10 December 1981, NRES/361109; 
38/130 of 19 December 1983, NRES/38/130; 40/61 of 9 December 1985, 
NRES/40/61; 421159 of 7 December 1987, NRES/421159; and 44/29 of 4 December 
1989, AlRES/44129. The last decade has seen the Assembly adopt a Declaration on 
Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, first adopted in early December 1994 
under its Resolution 49/60: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 of 9 
December 1994, NRES/49/60. The Declaration was based on the notion of peace 
and security and the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in 
international relations (through its preamble). It called on States to refrain from 
organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts, and from 
acquiescing in or encouraging activities within their territories directed towards the 
commission of such acts (para 4). Significantly, for the purpose of this chapter, 
Resolution 49/60 pronounced that terrorism constitutes a grave violation of the 
purpose and principles of the United Nations (para 2). The Declaration was 
reaffIrmed in the following two years, with a Declaration to Supplement the 1994 
Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism adopted in 1996: 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 511210 of 17 December 1996, 
NRES/511210, Annex. The Declaration and Supplement were reaffirmed within 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 521165 of 19 January 1998, 
NRES/52/165, para 7, 54/110 of 2 February 2000, NRES/54/11O, para 8; 55/158 of 
30 January 2001, AlRES/55/158, para 9; 56/88 of 24 January 2002, NRES/56/88, 
para 10; 57127 of 15 January 2003, AlRES/57/27, para 10; 58/81 of 8 January 2004, 
A/RES/58/81, para 10; and 59/46 of 2 December 2004, AlRES/59/46, para 12. In 
one of the more recent resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism, 
attention was also paid to the link between terrorism and other forms of crime: 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/136 of 26 January 2004, 
AlRES/58/136, preambular para 8. 
19 The second series of General Assembly resolutions began in late December 1993, 
with the Assembly adopting Resolution 481122, entitled "Terrorism and Human 
Rights": United Nations General Assembly Resolution 481122 of 20 December 1993, 
NRES/48/122. Echoing many of the expressions of concern contained in the 
declarations on measures to eliminate terrorism, the preamble to this later Resolution 
spoke of the serious concern of the General Assembly at the gross violations of 
human rights perpetrated by terrorist groups. Resolutions of 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002 
and 2004 did the same, adding that terrorism creates an environment that destroys the 
right of people to live in freedom from fear: United Nations General Assembly 
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broader approach than the Security Council's resolutions, both types of 
General Assembly resolutions state and reaffirm the idea that terrorism is a 
threat to the maintenance of peace and security, and to the enjoyment of 
human rights. 
In 1994, the Commission on Human Rights20 adopted Resolution 1994/46 
on Terrorism and Human Rights, what was to become a series of annual 
resolutions on the subject. Again for the sake of emphasising that resolutions 
of the Commission on Human Rights concerning the impact of terrorism upon 
human rights cannot be seen as an excessive response to September 11, it is 
useful to consider those resolutions prior to and after September 11. 
Resolutions of the Commission on the subject were not too different from 
year to year. 21 Less that five months prior to the September 11 attacks, the 
Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution 2001/37, in which the 
Resolutions 501186 of 22 December 1995, AlRES/50/186, preambular paras 3, 4, 5 
and 11, and operative para 52/133 of 27 February 1998, AlRES/52/133, 
preambular paras 6, 7, 8 and 10, and operative para 3; and 54/164 of 24 February 
2000, AlRES/54/164, preambular paras 7, 8, 9 and 12, and operative para 3; 56/160 
of 13 February 2002, AlRES/56/160, preambular paras 11, 12 and 13; and 58/174 of 
10 March 2004, AlRES/58/174; preambular paras 12, 13 and 14. The preamble to 
the Assembly's Resolution 56/160 added (para 24): "Noting the growing 
consciousness within the international community of the negative effects of terrorism 
in all its forms and manifestations on the full enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and on the establishment of the rule of law and domestic 
freedoms as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the International 
Covenants on Human Rights". 
20 The Commission on Human Rights is a functional commission of the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council, the Council being one of the principal organs 
of the United Nations: see article 7(1) of the Charter of the United Nations. The 
functions and powers of the Economic and Social Council are set out within articles 
62 to 66 of the Charter. 
21 Following Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/46, and up to 11 
September 2001, seven further resolutions were adopted: Commission on Human 
Rights Resolutions 1995/43 of 3 March 1995, E/CN.4/RES/1995/43; 1996/47 of 19 
April 1996, E/CN.4IRESI1996/47; 1997/42 of 11 April 1997, E/CN.4IRES/1997/42; 
1998/47 of 17 April 1998, ElCNA/RESI1998/47; 1999127 of 23 April 1999, 
E/CN.4IRES/1999/27; 2000/30 of 20 April 2000, ElCN.4/RES/2000/30; and 2001137 
of 23 Apri12001, ElCN.4/RESI2001l37. 
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following preambular and operative paragraphs addressed the impact of 
. h . h 22 terrorIsm upon uman fIg ts: 
Regretting that the negative impact of terrorism, in all its dimensions, on 
human rights continues to remain alarming, despite national and 
international efforts to combat it, 
Convinced that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and 
by whomever committed, can never be justified in any instance, including 
as a means to promote and protect human rights, 
Bearing in mind that the most essential and basic human right is the right 
to life, 
Bearing in mind also that terrorism creates an environment that destroys 
the freedom from fear of the people, 
Bearing in mind further that terrorism in many cases poses a severe 
challenge to democracy, civil society and the rule of law, 
Profoundly deploring the large number of innocent persons, including 
women, children and the elderly, killed, massacred and maimed by 
terrorists in indiscriminate and random acts of violence and terror, which 
cannot be justified under any circumstances, 
Seriously concerned at the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by 
terrorist groups, 
Taking note of the growing consciousness of the international community 
of the negative effects of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on 
the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and on the 
establishment of the rule of law and democratic freedoms as enshrined in 
the Charter and the International Covenants on Human Rights, 
1. Reiterates its unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and 
practices of terrorism, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and 
manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, as acts aimed at 
the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, 
threatening the territorial integrity and security of States, destabilizing 
legitimately constituted Governments, undermining pluralistic civil 
society and the rule of law and having adverse consequences for the 
economic and social development of the State; 
Condemns the violations of the right to live free from fear and of the 
right to life, liberty and security; 
22 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001137 of 23 April 2001, 
E/CNA/RES/2001l37, preambular paras 10 to 14, 16,22 and 23, and operative paras 
1 and 2. 
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Just 17 days prior to September 11, the Commission on Human Rights' Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights reiterated a 
number of those sentiments23 and welcomed a report of the Sub-
Commission's Special Rapporteur. Within her report of June 2001, Special 
Rapporteur Koufa also paid attention to the impact of terrorism on human 
rights, noting in particular its links to international and transnational crime 
and its threat to life and the safety of persons.24 Little has changed in the 
resolutions of the Commission on this subject since September 11. One of the 
most recent resolutions, 2004/44, contains much of what was said prior to 
September 11 and goes no further on the issue of the impact of terrorism upon 
human rights.25 
5.1.3 An Overview of United Nations Observations 
Against the background of the resolutions of the Security Council, General 
Assembly and Commission on Human Rights, it is perfectly clear that 
terrorism is recognised as having an adverse impact upon both human rights 
and upon international security and good order. Taking an of the resolutions 
23 Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001118 of 16 August 2001, 
E/CNAISub.2/2001l18, preambular paras 5 to 10 (reflecting preambular paras 10 to 
14 of Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001137 of 23 April 2001, 
E/CNAIRES/2oo 1137). 
24 Koufa KK (as Special Rapporteur), Progress Report on Terrorism and Human, 27 
June 2001, E/CNAISub.2/2001l31, paras 104,105 and 107. 
25 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004144 of 19 April 2004, 
E/CNA/RES/2004/44, preambular paras 7, 12, 13 and 23, and operative paras 1 and 
2. 
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of those bodies together, the observations made within those resolutions can 
be summarised by saying that terrorism is seen as something that: 
€I has links with transnational organized crime, drug trafficking, money-
laundering, and trafficking in arms as well as illegal transfers of nuclear, 
chemical and biological materials;26 
" is linked to the consequent commission of serious crimes such as murder, 
extortion, kidnapping, assault, the taking of hostages and robbery;27 
" 
d k · l' 28 en angers or ta es mnocent lves; 
.. creates an environment that destroys the freedom from fear of the 
people;29 
26 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 of 28 September 2001, 
SIRES/1373 (2001), para 4; 1456 of 20 January 2003, SIRESI1456 (2003), 
preambular paras 3 and 6; and 1540 of April 2004, SIRESI1540 (2004), 
preambular para 8. See also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 58/136 of 
26 January 2004, AlRES/58/136, preambular para 8. See also Commission on 
Human Rights Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, E/CNAIRES/2001137 , 
preambular para 16; and 2004/44 of 19 April 2004, E/CNAIRES/2004l44, 
preambular para 7. See also Koufa KK, above n 23, paras 104 and 105. 
27 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 481122 of 20 December 1993, 
AlRES/4/122, preambular para 7; 491185 of 23 December 1994, AlRES/49/185, 
preambu1ar para 9; 50/186 of 22 December 1995, AlRES/50/186, preambular para 12 
and operative para 2; 521133 of 27 February 1998, preambular para 11; 54/164 of 24 
February 2000, preambular para 13; 56/160 of 13 February 2002, AlRES/56/l60, 
preambular para 18; and 581174 of 10 March 2004, AlRES/58/174, para 12. See also 
Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, 
E/CNAIRES/2001l37, preambular para 16; and 2004/44 of 19 April 2004, 
ElCNAIRES/2004/44, preambular para 7. See also Koufa KK, above n 23, paras 104 
and 105. 
28 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1269 of 19 October 1999, 
SlRES/1269 (1999), preambular para 1; and 1377 of 12 November 2001, 
SIRESI1377 (2001), Annex (Declaration), para 6. See also the title to United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions 27/3034 to 44/29, as listed above n 17, and the first 
operative provisions of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 3034 (XXVII) 
of 18 December 1972, AlRES/27/3034; 31/102 of 15 December 1976, 
AlRES/311102; 321147 of 16 December 1977, AlRES/32/147; 341145 of 17 
December 1979, AlRES/34/l4S; and 36/109 of 10 December 1981, AlRES/36/l09. 
See also Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, 
E/CNAIRESI2001l37, para 2; and 2004/44 of 19 April 2004, E/CNAIRES12004l44, 
preambular para 7. See also Koufa KK, above n 23, para 107. 
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" threatens the dignity and security of human beings everywhere;30 
" has an adverse effect on the establishment of the rule oflaw;31 
.. jeopardises fundamental freedoms;32 
.. aims at the destruction of human rights;33 
.. undermines pluralistic civil society;34 
29 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 50/186 of 22 December 1995, 
AlRES/50/186, preambular para 5; 52/133 of 27 February 1998, AlRES/52/133, 
preambular para 8; and 54/164 of 24 February 2000, AlRES/54/l64, preambular para 
9. See also Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, 
E/CNA/RES/2001l37, preambular para 12, and operative para 2; and 2004/44 of 19 
April 2004, E/CNAIRES/2004/44, preambular para 12. See also Sub-Commission on 
Human Rights Resolution 2001118 of 16 August 2001, E/CNAISub.2I2001l18, 
preambular para 8. 
30 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1377 of 12 November 2001, 
S/RES/1377 (2001), Annex (Declaration), para 6. See also Commission on Human 
Rights Resolution 2001137 of 23 April 2001, ElCNAIRES/2001l37, para 2. See also 
Koufa KK, above n 23, para 107. 
31 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 561160 of 13 February 2002, 
AlRES/56/160, preambular para 24. See also Commission on Human Rights 
Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, E/CNAIRES/2001l37, preambular para 13, 
and operative para I; and 2004/44 of 19 April 2004, E/CNA/RESI2004/44, 
preambular para 13. See also Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 
2001118 of 16 August 2001, ElCNAISub.212001l18, preambular para 9. 
32 See the title to United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 27/3034 to 44/29, as 
listed above n 17. See also United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 48/122 of 
20 December 1993, AlRES/48/122, para 1; 49/185 of 23 December 1994, 
AlRES/491185, para 1; 50/186 of 22 December 1995, AlRES/50/186, para 2; 521133 
of 27 February 1998, AlRES/52/133, para 3; 561160 of 13 February 2002, 
AlRES/56/160, preambular para 24 and para 3; and 58/174 of 10 March 2004, 
AlRES/581174, para 1. See also Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 2001137 
of 23 April 2001, E/CNAIRESI2001l37, preambular para 23, and operative para 1; 
and 2004/44 of 19 April 2004, E/CNAIRESI2004/44, preambular para 12, and 
operative para 1. 
33 As recognised in the first-stated Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, above n 17, operative para 2. See also United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions 48/122 of 20 December 1993, AlRES/48/122, para I; 
49/185 of 23 December 1994, AlRES/49/185, para 1; 50/186 of 22 December 1995, 
AlRES/50/186, para 2; 521133 of 27 February 1998, AlRES/52/133, para 3; 56/160 
of 13 February 2002, AlRES/561160, preambular para 24 and operative para 3; and 
58/174 of 10 March 2004, AlRES/58/174, para 1. See also Commission on Human 
Rights Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, ElCNAIRES/2001l37, preambular para 
23, and operative para 1; and 2004/44 of 19 April 2004, E/CNA/RESI2004/44, 
preambular para 12 and 23, and operative para 1. See also Report of the High-level 
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Annex to the United Nations General 
Assembly's Fifty-ninth Session, Agenda item 55 of 2 December 2004, Al59/656, 
para 145. 
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.. aims at the destruction of the democratic bases of society;35 
" destabilises legitimately constituted Governments;36 
" has adverse consequences on the econOl111C and social development of 
States.37 , 
34 As recognised in the first-stated Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, above n 17, operative para 2. See also United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions 48/122 of 20 December 1993, AlRES/48/122, para 1; 
49/185 of 23 December 1994, AlRES/49/185, para 1; 50/186 of 22 December 1995, 
AlRES/50/186, para 2; 52/133 of 27 February 1998, AlRES/52/133, para 3; 56/160 
of 13 February 2002, AlRES/56/160, preambular para 24 and operative para 3; and 
58/174 of 10 March 2004, AlRES/58/174, para 1. See also Commission on Human 
Rights Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, E/CNAIRES/2001l37, para 1; and 
2004144 of 19 April 2004, E/CNAIRES12004/44, para 1. See also Report of the 
High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Annex to the United Nations 
General Assembly's Fifty-ninth Session, Agenda item 55 of 2 December 2004, 
Al59/656, para 145. 
35 As recognised in the first-stated Declaration on Measures to Eliminate 
International Terrorism, above n 17, operative para 2. See also United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions 48/122 of 20 December 1993, AlRES/48/122, para 1; 
49/185 of23 December 1994, AlRES/49/185, para 1; 50/186 of 22 December 1995, 
AlRES/50/186, para 2; 52/133 of 27 February 1998, AlRES/52/133, para 3; 56/160 
of 13 February 2002, AlRES/561l60, para 3; and 58/174 of 10 March 2004, 
AlRES/58/174, para 1. See also Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 2001137 
of 23 April 2001, E/CNAIRES/2001l37, preambular para 13; and 2004/44 of 19 
April 2004, E/CNAIRES/2004/44, preambular para 13, and operative para 1. See 
also Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001118 of 16 August 2001, 
E/CNAISub.212001/18, preambular para 9. 
36 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 48/122 of 20 December 1993, 
AlRES/48/122, para 1; 491185 of 23 December 1994, AlRES/48/122 of 23 December 
1994, para 1; 50/186 of 22 December 1995, AlRES/50/186, para 2; 521133 of 27 
February 1998, AlRES/52/133, para 3; 56/160 of 13 February 2002, AlRES/56/160, 
para 3; and 581174 of 10 March 2004, AlRES/58/174, para 1. See also Commission 
on Human Rights Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, E/CNAIRES/2001l37, para 
1; and 2004144 of 19 April 2004, E/CNAIRES/2004/44, para 1. 
37 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 48/122 of 20 December 1993, 
AlRES/48/122, para 1; 49/185 of 23 December 1994, AlRES/48/122 of 23 December 
1994, para 1; 50/186 of 22 December 1995, AlRES/50/186, para 2; 52/133 of 27 
February 1998, AlRES/52/133, para 3; 56/160 of 13 February 2002, AlRES/56/160, 
para 3; and 58/174 of 10 March 2004, AlRES/58/174, para 1. See also United 
Nations Security Council Resolution l377 of 12 November 2001, S/RES/1377 
(2001), Annex (Declaration), para 6. See also United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions 50/186 of 22 December 1995, AlRES/50/186, para 2; 52/133 of 27 
February 1998, AlRES/52/133, para 3; 561160 of 13 February 2002, AlRES/56/160, 
para 3; and 58/174 of 10 March 2004, AlRES/58/174, para 1. See also Commission 
on Human Rights Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, E/CNAIRES/2001l37, para 
1; and 2004144 of 19 April 2004, E/CNAIRES/2004/44, para 1. 
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.. constitutes a grave violation of the purpose and principles of the United 
Nations' 38 , 
.. jeopardises friendly relations among States;39 
.. has a permcI0us impact upon relations of co-operation among States, 
including co-operation for development;40 
• threatens the territorial integrity and security of States;41 
• is a threat to international peace and security;42 and 
38 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1189 of 13 August 1998, 
S/RES/1189 (1998), preambular para 2; 1373 of 28 September 2001, SIRES/1373 
(2001), para 5; and 1377 of 12 November 2001, S/RES/1377 (2001), Annex 
(Declaration), para 5. See also the title to United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions 27/3034 to 44129, as listed above n 17, operative para 2; and United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 511210 of 17 December 1996, AlRES/51121O, 
para 2. See also Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
Annex to the United Nations General Assembly's Fifty-ninth Session, Agenda item 
55 of2 December 2004, Al591656, para 145. 
39 See the first operative paras of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
38/130 of 19 December 1983, AlRES/38/130; 40161 of 9 December 1985, 
A/RES/40/61; 42/159 of 7 December 1987, AlRES/421l59; 44/29 of 4 December 
1989, AlRES/44/29; and 51/210 of 17 December 1996. See also Report of the High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Annex to the United Nations General 
Assembly's Fifty-ninth Session, Agenda item 55 of 2 December 2004, A/59/656, 
para 145. 
40 See United Nations General Assembly Resolution 38/130 of 19 December 1983, 
AlRES/38/130, para I. See also the third operative paras of United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions 40/61 of 9 December 1985, AlRES/40/61; 421159 of 7 
December 1987, AlRES/421159; and 44/29 of 4 December 1989, AlRES/44129. 
41 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1189 of 13 August 1998, 
S/RES/1189 (1998), preambular para 2; and 1377 of 12 November 2001, 
SIRESI1377 (2001), Annex (Declaration), para 3. As also recognised in the first-
stated Declaration on Measures to Eliminate Intemational Terrorism, above n 17, 
preambular para 3 and operative para 1. See also United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions 481122 of 20 December 1993, AlRES/48/122, para 1; and 49/185 of 23 
December 1994, AlRES/49/185, para 1. See also Commission on Human Rights 
Resolutions 2001137 of 23 April 2001, E/CN.4IRES/2001l37, para I; and 2004144 of 
19 April 2004, E/CN.4IRESI2004/44, para 1. 
and 511210 of 17 December 1996, AlRES/51/21O, para 1. 
42 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1566 of 8 October 2004, S/RES/1566 
(2004), preambular para 7; 1535 of 26 March 2004, SIRES/1535 (2004), preambular 
para 2; 1530 of 11 March 2004, S/RES/1530 (2004), preambular para 2; 1526 pf 30 
January 2004, SIRES/1526 (2004), preambular para 3; 1456 of 21 January 2003, 
S/RESI1456 (2003), preambular para I; 1455 of 17 January 2003, 
SIRESI1453(2003), preambular para 7; 1450 of 13 December 2002, S/RESI1450 
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.. must be suppressed as an essential element for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.43 
As already stated, some of these points are obvious. Notwithstanding this, 
they add an international context to the idea that counter-terrorism is a 
pressing and substantial objective to be pursued in a free and democratic 
society. In some instances, in fact, they go further. Some observations go to 
what might be described as the 'life and security' of States. Others reach 
further still, reflecting upon the international relations, security and good 
order of the world at large. These different 'levels' of threat are important and 
will be discussed further in the context of discussing the proportionality 
between the objective of counter-terrorism and the means by which that 
objective is implemented.44 
5.2 Is u .... , .... "' .......... with AJUU .. ""U Rights Necessary? 
The position so far can be summarised as follows. There are concerns 
throughout civil society that the means by which States have implemented 
counter-terrorist measures may be excessive and in numerous instances 
adversely impact upon rights and freedoms. At the same time, terrorism itself 
(2002), preambular para 4; 1440 of 24 October 2002, S/RESIl440 (2002), 
preambular para 2; 1438 of 14 October 2002, SIRES/1438 (2002), prearnbular para 2; 
1390 of 28 January 2002, SIRES/1390 (2002), preambular para 9; 1377 of 12 
November 2001, SIRESI1377 (2001), preambular para 2; 1373 of 28 September 
2001, SIRES/1373 (2001), preambular para 3; 1368 of 12 September 2001, 
S/RES/1368 (2001), operative para 1; 1269 of 19 October 1999, SIRESIl269 (1999), 
preambular para 1; and 1189 of 13 August 1998, SIRES/1189 (1998), preambular 
gar~~ited Nations Security Council Resolutions 1189 of 13 August 1998, 
S/RES/1189 (1998), preambular para 3; and 1269 of 19 October 1999, SIRESI1269 
(1999), preambular para 8. See also United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
27/3034 to 44129, as listed above n 17, preambular para 8. 
44 Discussed below, 5.4.3 Proportionality. 
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IS something that impacts negatively upon human rights, democracy and 
international peace and security and, accordingly, the combating of terrorism 
must be treated as an important objective. Thus we corne to the crux of this 
thesis. A conflict of wills is exposed: the desire to maintain peace and 
security, including the preservation of pluralistic democracies and the rights of 
innocents that might be the physical subjects of terrorist attacks; versus the 
desire to maintain and promote human rights and the rule of law in the 
conduct of international relations and the governance by States of their 
people. Are the two objectives compatible? Indeed, is compliance with 
human rights standards necessary when pursuing an objective as important as 
counter-terrorism? Given the war-like nature of terrorist conduct, should 
Cicero's statement, inter anna silent leges (in time of war laws are silent), be 
adopted?45 
Having earlier considered resolutions of the United Nations Commission 
for Human Rights, the statement of High Commissioner Mary Robinson 
evidences further support for the notion that countering terrorism is an 
objective of significant importance, but at the same time warns that the means 
of achieving this must be measured: 46 
Terrorism is a threat to the most fundamental human rights. Finding 
common approaches to countering terrorism serves the cause of human 
rights. Some have suggested that it is not possible to effectively eliminate 
terrorism while respecting human rights. This suggestion is 
fundamentally flawed. The only long-term guarantor of security is 
45 Cicero, Oratio Pro Annio Milone - see Everitt A, Cicero: The Life and Times of 
Rome's Greatest Politician, (Random House Inc, 2001), 96. For further discussion, 
see also Torres D, Inter Arma Silent Leges: An Examination of the Legal Rights of 
American Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants in the War on Terror, (2003) 3 
The Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law, URL <www.psljournaLcomlarchives/ 
papers/interarma.cfrn> at 25 January 2005. 
46 Robinson M, 'Terrorism and Human Rights', Press Release from the United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 March 2002. 
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through ensuring respect for human rights and humanitarian law. The 
essence of human rights is that human life and dignity must not be 
compromised and that certain acts, whether carried out by State or non-
State actors, are never justified no matter what the ends. 
More recently, the Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
said this: 47 
... for all its immediacy, how we respond to this threat [terrorism] should 
not become disembodied from still broader issues, which are about how 
we want our societies to be and to operate, about our values, our liberties 
and our social obligations. That, after all, is what we are defending in the 
first place. The cure should never be worse than the disease. 
Against the background of these warnings, and the earlier observations of the 
adverse impact that some counter-terrorist measures appear to be having upon 
civil liberties,48 this chapter will next turn to consider the means by which 
limiting measures might be accommodated under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and under New Zealand's Bill of Rights. Before 
doing so, it is important to note that both the Security Council and the General 
Assembly, as well as other prominent bodies, have stated that the achievement 
of counter-terrorist measures must be undertaken in a manner consistent with 
international law and international human rights. 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, this part of the chapter is 
reasonably expository in nature. It seeks to determine what international 
directions there are on the question of human rights compliance, with some 
commentary on the nature and standing of those directions. Having done so, 
47 Unwin G, "The Need for Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Fiji", presentation at the 
public workshop, How Should Fiji Respond to the Threat of Terrorism?, hosted by 
the Citizens' Constitutional Forum and the F~ii Human Rights Commission, 17 July 
2004, Suva, Fiji, para 4. 
48 Chapter Four, 4.2 Why Consider Human Rights in the Examination of Counter-
Terrorist Legislation? 
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the chapter can then seek to measure those directions against New Zealand's 
human rights framework and its interface with counter-terrorist legislation. 
1 Security Council 
In general terms, Security Council resolutions concernmg terrorism have 
confined their attention to the threat of terrorism to international peace and 
security. As already discussed, this reflects the role of the Council as the 
organ of the United Nations charged with the maintenance of peace and 
security.49 Apart from one notable exception, the only inference that might be 
taken about counter-terrorism measures and their need to comply with human 
rights is from general statements within various resolutions that counter-
terrorism is an aim that should be achieved in accordance with the Charter of 
the United Nations and international law. 5o It could be argued that this 
implies that such measures must themselves be compliant with the principles 
of the Charter and international human rights law. 51 In that regard, Members 
of the United Nations have undertaken, under article 55(c) and through the 
preamble to the UN Charter, to universally observe human rights and 
49 Above at 5.2.1 Security Council Resolutions. 
50 See, for example, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373 of 28 
September 2001, S/RESI1373 (2001), prearnbular para 5; 1438 of 14 October 2002, 
S/RES/1438 (2002), preambular para 2; 1440 of 24 October 2002, S/RESI1440 
(2002), preambular para 2; 1450 of 13 December 2002, SIRES/1450 (2002), 
preambular para 4; 1455 of 17 January 2003, S/RES/1455 (2003), preambular para 3; 
1456 of 20 January 2003, S/RES/1456 (2003), preambular para 8; 1535 of 26 March 
2004, S/RESI1535 (2004), preambular para 4; 1540 of 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 
(2004), preambular para 14; and 1566 of 8 October 2004, S/RES/1566 (2004), 
preambu lar para 3. 
51 This is the argument, for example, of Dunworth T, 'New Zealand's Legislative 
Responses to September 11', paper presented at the 10th Annual Meeting of the 
Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law, New Challenges and New 
States: What Role for International Law?, 16 June 2002, Australian National 
University, Canberra. See also Association for the Prevention of Torture, APT 
Position Paper. Protection of the Human Rights and of Fundamental Freedoms in 
the Fight Against Terrorism, URL <http://www.apLch/publlibrary/ppter_en.htm> at 
11 Deeember 2003. 
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fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, language or 
religion. 
The Declaration of the Security Council meeting with Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs on 20 January 2003 adopted under Resolution 1456 - does, 
in fact, specifically direct its attention to the question of compliance with 
human rights. 52 Paragraph 6 of the Dec laration provides: 
6. States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply 
with all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such 
measures in accordance with international law, in particular international 
human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law; 
A further point to make is that, although not proactively seeking compliance 
with human rights standards, the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the 
Security Council has itself undertaken to remain conscious of the issue, the 
Chairman Sir Jeremy Greenstock stating:53 
The Counter-Terrorism Committee is mandated to monitor the 
implementation of resolution 1373 (2001). Monitoring performance 
against other international conventions, including human rights law, is 
outside the scope of the Counter-Terrorism Committee's mandate. But we 
will remain aware of the interaction with human rights concerns, and we 
will keep ourselves briefed as appropriate. It is, of course, open to other 
organizations to study States' reports and take up their content in other 
forums. 
As was noted in Chapter Two, Security Council resolutions (when couched in 
mandatory rather than exhortatory language) are binding upon members of the 
United Nations.54 What should be observed at this stage is that the Security 
Council has not made binding directions that counter-terrorism is to be 
52 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1456 of 20 January 2003, S/RES/1456 
(2003). 
53 See the Chairman's briefing to the Security Council in the record of speeches at the 
meeting of the Security Council, Threats to International Peace and Security Posed 
by Terrorism, 18 January 2002, S/PV.4453, 5. 
54 Chapter Two, 2.3.2(c) Further obligations upon States? 
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effected in compliance with human rights. All that can be said is that this is 
implicit within the broader framework of the United Nations Charter. Even 
the Declaration adopted under Resolution 1456 cannot be treated as binding, 
since the text of the Declaration (including paragraph 6 mentioned above) is 
preceded by the sentence "The Security Council therefore calls for the 
following steps to be taken" [emphasis added]. As concluded in Chapter 
Two, such an expression is not binding. 55 Paragraph 6 itself only provides 
that States "should adopt" counter-terrorist measures in accordance with 
human rights obligations. 
Much more strongly phrased directions will be seen in the following 
discussion of General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights 
resolutions and other significant documents. As also discussed within Chapter 
Two, however, those resolutions are recommendatory only.56 Albeit 
significant, the other documentation referred to (including jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights) is also what might be termed as 'soft 
law' for the purpose of examining New Zealand's human rights framework. 
That is, the documentation represents guiding principles and non-binding 
resolutions and recommendations ('soft law'), rather than binding resolutions, 
treaty provisions or customary law (,hard law'). The author takes the view, 
however, that all resolutions and documents within this part of the chapter, 
having regard to their consistent approach, are highly influentiaL 
55 Ibid. 
56 Chapter Two, 2.3.1 United Nations General Assembly. 
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5.2.2 General Assembly 
Both sets of resolutions by the General Assembly (those on measures to 
eliminate terrorism and those on terrorism and human rights) contain various 
statements about the need - when implementing such measures - to comply 
with international human rights. A standard phrasing of this was seen in 
Resolution 50/186 of 1995:57 
Mindful of the need to protect human rights of and guarantees for the 
individual in accordance with the relevant international human rights 
principles and instruments, particularly the right to life, 
Reaffirming that all measures to counter terrorism must be in strict 
conformity with international human rights standards, 
3. Calls upon States to take all necessary and effective measures in 
accordance with international standards of human rights to prevent, 
combat and eliminate all acts of terrorism wherever and by whomever 
committed; 
A slightly less robust expression of these ideas was seen following the events 
of September 11, although still requiring measures to be taken consistently 
with human rights standards, as first seen in Resolution 56/88:58 
Stressing the need to strengthen further international cooperation among 
States and among international organizations and agencies, regional 
organizations and arrangements and the United Nations in order to 
prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations, wherever and by whomsoever committed, in accordance 
57 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 50/186 of 22 December 1995, 
AlRES/501186, preambular paras 13 and 14, and operative para 3. See also United 
Nations General Assembly Resolutions 521133 of 27 February 1998, AlRES/521133, 
preambular paras 12 and 13, and operative para 4; 541164 of 24 February 2000, 
AlRES/541164, preambu1ar paras 15 and 16, and operative para 4; 561160 of 13 
February 2002, AlRES/561160, preambular paras 22 and 23, and operative paras 5 
and 6; and 581174 of 10 March 2004, AlRES/581174, preambular paras 20 and 21, 
and operative para 7. 
58 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/88 of 24 January 2002, 
AlRES/56/88, preambular para 9 and operative para 3. See also similar statements 
within United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 57127 of 15 January 2003, 
AlRES/57/27, preambular para 8 and operative para 6; 58/81 of 8 January 2004, 
AlRES/58/81, preambular para 9 and operative para 6; 58/136 of 26 January 2004, 
AlRES/58/136, preambular para 10 and operative para 5; and 59/46 of 16 December 
2004, AlRES/59/46, preambular para 10 and operative para 3. 
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with the principles of the Charter, international law and relevant 
international conventions, 
3. Reiterates its call upon all States to adopt further measures in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant 
provisions of international law, including international standards of human 
rights, to prevent terrorism ... [emphasis added] 
This Resolution should not, however, be taken as a signal that the General 
Assembly was minded to turn a blind eye to adverse impacts of counter-
terrorism upon human rights. In 2003 and 2004, the issue became the subject 
of two resolutions on that subject alone, both entitled "Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism".59 The first 
operative paragraphs of each resolution affirm: 
... that States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism 
complies with their obligations under international law, in particular 
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law; 
5.2.3 Commission on Human Rights 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
has paid considerable attention to the issue of the adverse consequences that 
counter-terrorism might have upon the maintenance and promotion of human 
rights. It did so even before the flurry of anti-terrorist legislation that 
followed Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001. In the pre-9fll 
resolutions of the Commission and Sub-Commission already mentioned, the 
following was said about compliance with human rights:6o 
Reiterating that all States have an obligation to promote and proteet 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that everyone should strive 
to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
S9 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 571219 of 27 February 2003, 
AlRES/571219 and 581187 of 22 March 2004, AlRES/581187. 
60 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2001137 of 23 April 2001, 
E/CNAIRES1200l/37, preambular paras 18 and 19 and operative paras 7 and 8. 
Preambular para 19 was later reflected in Sub-Commission on Human Rights 
Resolution 2001118 of 16 August 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.212001l18, preambular para 13. 
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Reaffirming that all measures to counter terrorism must be in strict 
conformity with international law, including international human rights 
standards, 
7. Calls upon States, in particular within their respective national 
frameworks and in conformity with their international commitments in the 
field of human rights, to enhance their cooperation with a view to bringing 
terrorists to justice; 
8. Also calls upon States to take appropriate measures, in conformity 
with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including 
international human rights standards, before granting refugee status, for 
the purpose of ensuring that an asylum-seeker has not participated in 
terrorist acts, including assassinations; 
The report of the Commission's Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights in June that year also addressed the matter. 
Although the mandate of the Special Rapporteur was to consider the impact of 
terrorism on human rights,61 she commented that a State's over-reaction to 
terrorism can also impact upon human rights. She pointed to the rights to 
freedom of speech, association, belief, religion and movement, and the rights 
of refugees as being particularly vulnerable to "undue suspension in the guise 
f ·· " 62 o antI-terrorIst measures . 
Post-September 11, particularly III recent months, resolutions of the 
Commission on Human Rights have been even more strongly worded. Two 
resolutions on the subject were adopted in 2004 alone. First, the issue was. 
addressed within the Commission's annual resolution on human rights and 
terrorism. 63 In a resolution later that month, the Commission reaffirmed that 
61 Consequent to the request of the General Assembly for the Commission to do so 
(see United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/185 of 23 December 1994, 
AlRES/49/185, para 6) and through the Commission's own decision to consider the 
issue (see Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1994/46 of 4 March 1994, 
E/CNAIRES/1994/46). 
62 Koufa KK, above n 23, paras 109 and 110. 
63 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/44 of 19 April 2004, 
E/CNAIRES/2004/44, preambular para 24 and operative paras 10, 11 and 12: 
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States must comply with international human rights obligations when 
countering terrorism and called on States to raise awareness of the importance 
of doing so among their national authorities involved in countering 
terrorism,64 This was coupled with the compilation, in September 2003, of a 
digest of jurisprudence on the protection of human rights while countering 
terrorism, 65 With the aim of assisting policy makers and other concerned 
parties to develop counter-terrorist strategies that respect human rights, the 
d' b' b . 66 Igest egms y saymg: 
No one doubts that States have legitimate and urgent reasons to take all 
due measures to eliminate terrorism. Acts and strategies of terrorism aim 
at the destruction of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. They 
destabilise governments and undermine civil society. Governments 
therefore have not only the right, but also the duty, to protect their 
nationals and others against terrorist attacks and to bring the perpetrators 
Stressing the growing consciousness of the international community of the negative 
effects of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the full enjoyment of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and on the establishment of the rule of law and 
democratic freedoms as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
International Covenants on Human Rights, 
10. Calls upon States to take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant 
provisions of national and international law, including international human rights 
standards, before granting refugee status, with the purpose of ensuring that the 
asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist 
acts, and to ensure, in conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused 
by the perpetrators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts and that claims of political 
motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of 
alleged terrorists; 
11. Urges States and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
to review, with full respect for legal safeguards, the validity of a refugee status decision 
in an indi vidual case if credible and relevant evidence comes to light which indicates that 
the person in question has planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of 
terrorist acts; 
12. Invites the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to 
respond to requests from interested Governments for assistance and advice on ensuring 
full compliance with international human rights standards and obligations when 
undertaking measures to combat terrorism; 
64 Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2004/87 of 21 April 2004, 
E/CN.4/RES/2004/87, paras 1 and 2. 
65 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Digest of 
Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human 
Rights While Countering Terrorism, September 2003, URL <http://www.ohehr.org/ 
english/about/publieations/does/digest.doe> at 13 August 2004. 
66 Ibid, 3. 
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of such acts to justice. The manner in which counter-terrorism efforts are 
conducted, however, can have a far-reaching effect on overall respect for 
human rights. 
The Digest considers decisions of United Nations treaty-monitoring bodies, 
such as the Human Rights Committee, and those of other regional bodies, 
including the European Court of Human Rights and courts within the inter-
American system of human rights. It addresses general considerations, states 
of emergency and specific rights. Within the general considerations, two 
types of jurisprudence are relevant to this chapter. The first is that which 
emphasises the duty of States to protect those within their territories from 
terrorism. 67 The second, and of more relevance, is the identification of 
jurisprudence observing that the lawfulness of counter-terrorism measures 
depends upon their conformity with international human rights law. 68 
In one of the latest reports of the Special Rapporteur, a preliminary draft 
of principles concerning terrorism and human rights was prepared.69 The 
following parts of the draft are particularly pertinent to this chapter:7o 
1. All international, regional and national action concerning terrorism 
should be guided by the United Nations Charter, all general principles of 
law, all norms of human rights as set out in international and regional 
treaties, and all norms of treaty-based and customary humanitarian law. 
Due attention should be paid to United Nations or regional treaty bodies, 
in particular any comments or commentary on specific treaty articles or 
issues. 
8. All counter-terrorism measures should comply fully with all rules of 
international law, including human rights and humanitarian law, as 
interpreted by treaty bodies, experts of Charter-based bodies and other 
sources of international law . 
67 Ibid, 11-12. See, for example, Delgado Paez v Colombia, Human Rights 
Committee communication 195/1985, views adopted 12 July 1990, para 5.5. 
68 Ibid, 13-15. 
69 Koufa KK (as Special Rapporteur), A Preliminary Framework Draft of Principles 
and Guidelines Concerning Human Rights and Terrorism, 11 August 2004, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/47. 
70 Ibid, Part II, paras 1, 8,9 and 10. 
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9. Counter-terrorism measures should directly relate to terrorism and 
terrorist acts, not actions undertaken in armed conflict situations or acts 
that are ordinary crimes. Definitions of terrorist acts must be very 
carefully drawn so as to clearly set out the elements of terrorist crimes. 
Due attention should be paid to what is truly "terrifying." 
10. Any exceptions or derogations in human rights law must be in strict 
conformity with the rules set out in the applicable international or regional 
instruments. In particular, counterterrorism measures must not abrogate 
any existing norm of jus cogens, whether set out in applicable derogation 
clauses or not. 
(a) Given the sporadic occurrence of terrorist acts, great care should be 
taken to ensure that exceptions and derogations meet strict time limits 
and do not become perpetual features of national law . 
(b) Given that most acts of terrorism are carried out by small groups, great 
care should be taken to ensure that measures taken are necessary to 
apprehend actual members of terrorist groups or perpetrators of 
terrorist acts in a way that does not unduly encroach on the lives and 
liberties of ordinary persons. 
Under its Decision 2004/109, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights resolved to establish a sessional working group 
with the mandate to elaborate detailed principles and guidelines, with 
commentary, concerning the protection of human rights when countering 
terrorism. 71 
Prior to that decision, and the Special Rapporteur's report mentioned, the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights reported to the United Nations 
Conference on Human Rights.72 That report contained a detailed list of 
criteria for the balancing of human rights with counter-terrorism.73 
71 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Decision 
2004/109 of 12 August 2004, E/CN.4/Sub.2IDECI2004/109. 
72 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-up 
to the World. Conference on Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner 
submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 48/81, 27 February 2002, 
E/CN .4/2002118. 
73 Ibid, Annex. Proposals for "further guidance" for the submission of reports 
pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Compliance 
with international human rights standards, I General Guidance: Criteria for the 
Balancing of Human Rights Protection and the Combating of Terrorism. 
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Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the criteria are particularly relevant to the issue of 
achieving a balance between counter-terrorism and human rights and are 
considered further in the examination of the New Zealand B ill of Rights Act. 74 
5.2.4 Other International Bodies 
To complement the considerable body of resolutions adopted within the 
framework of the United Nations on the issue of compliance with human 
rights when countering terrorism, a number of other international 
organisations have undertaken studies on the subject and issued guidelines or 
other forms of recommendation. Brief consideration will be given to reports 
of three such bodies: the International Commission of Jurists; the Committee 
of Ministers to the Council of Europe; and the Advisory Council of Jurists to 
the Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions. 
5.2.4( a) International Commission of Jurists. As part of its senes of 
occasional papers, the International Commission of Jurists commissioned a 
74 Discussed below at 5.4 Counter-Terrorism and the NZBORA. Paragraphs 3 and 4 
direct themselves to the question of limiting rights, providing: 
3. Where this is permitted [the limitation of rights], the laws authorizing restrictions: 
(a) Should use precise criteria; 
(b) May not confer an unfettered discretion on those charged with their execution. 
4. For limitations of rights to be lawful they must: 
(a) Be prescribed by law; 
(b) Be necessary for public safety and public order, i.e. the protection of public health or 
morals and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, and serve a 
legitimate purpose; 
(c) Not impair the essence of the right; 
(d) Be interpreted strictly in favour of the rights at issue; 
(e) Be necessary in a democratic society; 
(f) Conform to the principle of proportionality; 
(g) Be appropriate to achieve their protective function, and be the least intrusive 
instrument amongst those which might achieve that protective function; 
(h) Be compatible with the object and purposes of human rights treaties; 
(i) Respect the principle of non-discrimination; 
U) Not be arbitrarily applied. 
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paper on terrorism and human rights.75 The paper concluded with a list of 
basic criteria to be respected in the fight against terrorism. 76 The list 
identified certain minimum criteria that States must observe in the 
administration of justice when it comes to counter-terrorism: 
.. The primacy of the rule of law and of international human rights 
obligations. 
.. The need to strictly comply with international law when declaring a state 
of emergency and using emergency powers. 
" Maintaining and guaranteeing at all times rights and freedoms that are 
non-derogable.77 
.. Precise definitions of criminal offences. 
.. Ensuring that tribunals repressing terrorist acts are independent and 
impartial. 
.. Maintaining proper criminal process rights.78 
75 Andreu-Guzman, Terrorism and Human Rights, (International Commission of 
Jurists, 2002). 
76 Ibid, 248-25l. 
77 Including, according to the paper, the prohibition against torture and ill-treatment; 
the prohibition of discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, political 
opinion, religion or social origin; the prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of life; the 
prohibition of arbitrary deprivation of liberty; and the rights to an independent and 
impartial tribunal, the presumption of innocence and judicial guarantees: ibid, 248-
249. 
78 Including, according to the paper, the right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty; to be informed, as soon as possible, of the charge(s) faced; to be represented 
by counsel of choice; to have the time and facilities required to prepare a defence; to 
be tried without undue delay; to be present at trial; to question prosecution witnesses 
and to call defence witnesses; not to be forced to incriminate oneself or admit guilt; 
to have the right of appeal to a higher court in the event of conviction; and respect for 
the principle of double-jeopardy: ibid, 249-250. 
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5.2.4(b) Council of Europe. In July 2002, the Committee of Ministers to the 
Council of Europe adopted guidelines on human rights and the fight against 
terrorism. 79 In the preface to the Guidelines, Secretary General Walter 
Schwimmer warned that although the suppression of terrorism is an important 
objective, States must not use indiscriminate measures to achieve that 
objective: 80 
For a State to react in such a way would be to fall into the trap set by 
terrorism for democracy and the rule of law. It is precisely in situations on 
crisis, such as those brought about by terrorism, that respect for human 
rights is even more important, and that even greater vigilance is called for. 
Drawing from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
which has compulsory jurisdiction over States parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights,Sl and the ICCPR the Guidelines set out general 
guidelines on the interaction between counter-terrorism and human rights, as 
well as addressing specific rights and freedoms, with commentary on each 
stated guideline. Five of the Guidelines warrant mention within this chapter. 
The first reflects the idea already considered in some detail, that counter-
terrorism is an important objective in a free and democratic society. Article I 
talks of a positive obligation upon States to protect individuals within their 
territory from the scourges of terrorism. The Guidelines point to decisions of 
the European Court, in which it has recognised this duty and the particular 
79 Council of Europe, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, 
(Council of Europe Publishing, 2002). 
80 Ibid, 5. 
8l Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 
September 1953). The Court has compulsory jurisdiction under article 46 of the 
Convention. 
Terror versus Tyranny PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 233 
Chapter 5: The Interface between Counter-Terrorism 
and Human Rights 
problems associated with the prevention and suppression of terrorism. 82 In 
Klass and Others v Germany, for example, the Court said:83 
The Court agrees with the [European] Commission that some compromise 
between the requirements for defending democratic society and individual 
rights is inherent in the system of the Convention. 
The second and third articles are directly relevant to the question of 
compliance with human rights, and have relevance to the application of 
restrictions under both the ICCPR and New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA):84 
II. Prohibition of arbitrariness 
All measures taken by States to fight terrorism must respect human rights 
and the principle of the rule of law, while excluding any form of 
arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory or racist treatment, and must be 
subject to appropriate supervision. 
Ill. Lawfulness of anti-terrorism measures 
1. All measures taken by States to combat terrorism must be lawfuL 
2. When a measure restricts human rights, restrictions must be defined as 
precisely as possible and be necessary and proportionate to the aim 
pursued. 
Further guidance on possible derogations in found in article XV, concerning 
derogations during situations of war or states of emergency threatening the 
life of a nation. Finally, article XVI underlines that States may never act in 
breach of peremptory norms of international law. 
82 See, for example, Ireland v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human 
Rights, 18 January 1978, para 11; Askoy v Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 
18 December 1996, paras 70 and 84; Zana v Turkey, European Court of Human 
Rights, 25 November 1997, paras 59 and 60; Incal v Turkey, European Court of 
Human Rights, 9 June 1998, para 58; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others 
v Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, 20 November 1998, para 59; and 
Brogan and Others v the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights, 29 
November 1999, para 48. 
83 Klass and Others v Germany, European Court of Human Rights, 6 September 
1978, para 59. 
84 Discussed below at 5.4 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and 5.5 The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
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5.2.4(c) Advisory Council of Jurists. Closer to home, the Asia Pacific Forum 
of National Human Rights Institutions (a non-governmental organisation 
based in Sydney) referred to its Advisory Council of Jurists the question of the 
primacy of the rule of law in countering terrorism while protecting human 
rights.85 The Executive Summary of the report is in very similar terms to 
those already seen in the reports of the International Commission of Jurists 
and Council of Europe. 86 
The terms of reference adopted by the Forum and put to the Advisory 
Council are almost all very specific in nature, dealing with particular rights 
and freedoms. Term of reference IX, however, asks what international rights 
standards may be derogated from when countering terrorism and in what 
circumstances. The Council, including New Zealand's own Justice 
Glazebrook, answered by setting out three principles. It firstly reiterated that 
torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment can in no 
circumstances be justified,87 reflecting the non-derogable nature of that 
prohibition. 88 Secondly, it confirmed that certain human rights have become 
norms of customary international law and that such norms must also be 
complied with at all times by all States.89 Finally, its addressed the issue of 
85 Advisory Council of Jurists, Reference on the Rule of Law in Combating 
Terrorism. Final Report, (The Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights 
Institutions, 2004.). 
86 Ibid, 10-12. 
8? Ibid, 62-63. 
88 As reflected, in turn, within the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 
1984, 1465 UNTS 112 (entered into force 26 June 1987 and ratified by New Zealand 
in 1989), article 2(2). 
89 This includes, said the Advisory Council, minimum due process rights such as the 
presumption of innocence, the principles of non-discrimination and the right not to be 
subject to arbitrary detention: above n 84, 63-64. 
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states of emergency under the ICCPR, which is to be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The report of the Advisory Council of Jurists then makes observations and 
recommendations concerning Forum States. Some of New Zealand's counter-
terrorist legislation is commented upon within this part of the report. The 
Council's comments and recommendations will be considered in more detail 
within Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine. 90 
5.2.5 Summary 
Earlier within this part of the chapter, two questions were raised: are the two 
objectives of countering terrorism and protecting human rights compatible; 
and, more fundamentally, is compliance with human rights necessary when 
pursuing an objective as important as counter-terrorism? Against the 
background of the resolutions, guidelines and recommendations just 
discussed, it seems clear that the answer is that the two objectives are 
compatible, so long as counter-terrorism is implemented in a manner that 
complies with human rights. 
The latter conclusion may seem absolute in its terms, but it is not. In 
saying that measures taken to combat terrorism must comply with human 
rights standards, it must be remembered that human rights standards 
themselves allow for limitations. This is a matter that has been discussed in 
general terms within Chapter Four.91 As stated by Andrew Butler in his 
examination of section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, "limits are 
90 Those chapters examine particular rights and freedoms against various provisions 
of New Zealand's counter-terrorist legislation. 
91 Chapter Four, 4.4.2 Limiting Rights under the Bill of Rights Act and Human Rights 
Act. 
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fundamental toO".92 In the Digest of Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional 
Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights While Countering Terrorism, the 
introduction itself recognised that:93 
Human rights law establishes a framework in which terrorism can be 
effectively countered without infringing on fundamental freedoms. 
Within the context of New Zealand's international and domestic human rights 
obligations and framework, the issue to be next addressed is how those 
limiting provisions might accommodate counter-terrorism. 
5.3 Counter-Terrorism and the 
Two important questions arise in placing the application of the ICCPR within 
the context of counter-terrorism. Firstly, can terrorism give rise to a state of 
'public emergency' within the meaning of the ICCPR? Secondly, are the 
'non-derogable' rights identified within the Covenant truly non-derogable 
when countering terrorism? 
5.3.1 Terrorism and Emergency Measures 
The question to consider here is whether article 4(1) would serve as an 
appropriate mechanism (at least for the purpose of the Covenant) by which 
counter-terrorist measures infringing human rights could be justified. The 
provision has indeed been relied upon to do so. In December 1998, the 
Secretary of State for the United Kingdom, Geoffrey Howe, lodged a notice 
advising that the Government found it necessary to take measures derogating 
from certain obligations under article 9 of the ICCPR by reason of a public 
92 Butler A, "Limiting Rights", (2002) 33 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 537, 556. 
93 Above n 65,3. 
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emergency caused by terrorism.94 Needless to say, this was and continues to 
b . I 95 e a controverSIa matter. 
Notably, New Zealand has not lodged, and does not appear to intend to 
lodge, a notice of derogation(s) under article 4 of the International Covenant. 
For that reason, consideration of article 4 in the context of counter-terrorism 
will be brief. Some general observations and thoughts are nevertheless 
expressed. 96 
Due to the provisos attached to the operation of article 4(1), one might 
argue that counter-terrorist measures could only in very limited circumstances 
be said to be within the context of a state of emergency which threatens the 
life of a nation: namely, that such a state of emergency only exists during the 
period of a terrorist attack itself. To counter this, one might posit that the 
threat of acts of terrorism itself activates a state of emergency. Certainly, this 
finds some support in the language of Security Council Resolution 1373, 
which described "any act of international terrorism" [emphasis added] as 
constituting a threat to international peace and security.97 
94 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, Derogations from ICCPR, 
23 December 1998, URL <http://www.law.qub.ac.uklhumanrts/ehris/nilderog/ 
derogiccpr.htm> at 11 December 2003. As set out at para 2 of the notice of 
derogation: 
There have been in the United Kingdom in recent years campaigns of organised terrorism 
connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland which have manifested themselves in 
activities which have included repeated murder. attempted murder, maiming, intimidation 
and violent civil disturbance and in bombing and fire raising which have resulted in 
death, injury and widespread destruction of property. As a result, a public emergency 
within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Covenant exists in the United Kingdom 
95 See, for example, Justice [a non-governmental law reform and human rights 
organisation], Response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights Inquiry into UK 
DerogationsfrOin Convention Rights, (Justice, 2002). 
96 A very worthwhile text on the subject of states of emergency and permissible 
human rights derogations is that by Oraa J, Human Rights in States of Emergency in 
International Law, (Clarendon Press, 1992). 
97 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, 
S/RESI1373 (2001), as discussed at 5.1.1 Security Council Resolutions. 
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While the latter argument might hold some attraction, it is flawed in the 
writer's view for several reasons. Firstly, counter-terrorist measures include 
surveillance, investigation and prosecution: events prior to and after terrorist 
conduct and therefore outside what might be considered to be any state of 
emergency. Next, some such measures are not temporary in nature -
surveillance being the prime example (an activity designed to gain 
information about terrorist threats prior to their being effected and thereby 
prevent them), although it has to be said that surveillance can be implemented 
by way of a temporary measure. Finally, as noted by the Human Rights 
Committee in its General Comment on article 4: 
[I]n times of emergency, the protection of human rights becomes all the 
more important, particularly those rights from which no derogations can 
be made. 
For the foregoing reasons, the conclusion may be drawn that article 4(1) of the 
ICCPR does not, itself, permit counter-terrorist measures to limit rights and 
freedoms except in the very narrow situation of terrorist conduct creating a 
state of emergency threatening the life of the nation and, even then, only by 
way of temporary means and so long as the non-derogable rights set out in 
article 4(2) are left intact. If one applies the permissible limitations within the 
terms described by the Human Rights Committee, this would only be 
available as long as a state of emergency exists. Counter-terrorism, by 
definition, involves the idea of preventing terrorist activities before they create 
a state of public emergency and could not (in that broader context) validate 
emergency measures during a "public emergency" within the meaning of 
article 4. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 239 
Chapter 5: The Inteiface between Counter-Terrorism 
and Human Rights 
This conclusion appears to be the same as that reached by the Council of 
Europe Committee of Ministers in its Guidelines on human rights and 
counter-terrorism. 98 Article XV (1) of the Guidelines provides: 
When the fight against terrorism takes place in a situation of war or public 
emergency which threatens the life of the nation, a State may adopt 
measures temporarily derogating from certain obligations ensuing from 
the international instruments of protection of human rights, to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, as well as within the 
limits and under the conditions fixed by international law. The State must 
notify the competent authorities of the adoption of such measures in 
accordance with the relevant international instruments. [emphasis added] 
5.3.2 The Fiction of Non-Derogable Rights 
Indicated within Chapter Four, in discussing article 4 of the ICCPR, was the 
author's doubt about the notion that some rights are absolute and non-
derogable.99 That notion, having regard to what has been discussed earlier 
within this chapter, is clearly a view also held by the International 
Commission of Jurists lOO and the Advisory Council of JuristS. lOl Interestingly, 
though, the draft guidelines of the High Commissioner for Human Rights do 
not expressly prohibit the limitation of purportedly 'non-derogable' rights. 102 
The issue being explored here is whether rights are absolute and non-
derogable. Is this a fair reflection of what is lawful and/or 'acceptable' at 
international law? To provide some context to this question, consider the 
following fictional example: 
An armed terrorist group from the Balkans has hijacked an Air New 
Zealand aircraft, just prior to its landing at Wellington. It demands the 
New Zealand Government to release General X from its custody (X 
98 Above n 79. 
99 Chapter Four, 4.4. 1 (a) Non-derogable rights. 
100 Above n 75, 248-249. 
101 Above n 85, 62-63. 
102 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the High Commissioner's guidelines, above n 73, set out 
prescriptions and proscriptions for the limitation of rights when countering terrorism. 
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having been convicted of genocide by the International Criminal Court 
and serving his sentence of imprisonment in New Zealand under the 
provisions of the International Crimes and International Criminal Court 
Act 2000). The group demands that the General be released to their 
custody by no later than 10pm that day, failing which it will execute one 
passenger every hour until the General is released. 
As part of standard counter-terrorist operations, the SAS is called on to act 
as an aid to the civil power. Not wanting to release the General and 
fearing that the threats of the terrorist group are real, the SAS unit is 
ordered to seize and secure the aircraft prior to lOpm. In the course of the 
operation, S [one of the SAS soldiers] shoots and kills T [one of the 
terrorists], who was armed at the time and had moved his rifle towards one 
of the hostages. 
The New Zealand police investigate the circumstances of the killing and 
conclude that S had acted in defence of the hostage, believing that Twas 
about to shoot the hostage. Relying on section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961, 
the investigating officer concludes that a homicide charge against S is not 
appropriate. Section 48 provides that "everyone is justified in using, in 
the defence of himself or another, such force as, in the circumstances as he 
believes them to be, it is reasonable to use". 
Such a situation is not unforeseeable and it involves the taking of a life. The 
question is whether New Zealand would be in breach of the ICCPR through 
the action of S (its military agent). If one was to adopt the approach that the 
right to life is non-derogable, even in times of emergency, then the answer 
would be in the affirmative. The author posits, however, that the right to life 
is not entirely non-derogable, and that great care should be taken when trying 
to advance an argument that a right is non-derogable. Taking the fictional 
example further: 
T's family learn of his death and, on the basis that T was in New Zealand 
territory at the time of his being killed, bring a claim against New Zealand 
before the Human Rights Committee, under the First Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR. 
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How would the Human Rights Committee fmd in the matter? Assuming that 
the communication is admissible within the terms of the Optional Protocol, 103 
the Committee would consider article 6 of the Covenant, through which the 
right to life is guaranteed. There are two points to note about article 6. 
Firstly, it recognises that there the right to life is not treated as a universal 
right by all States, some States having retained the death penalty.l04 
Secondly, the enunciation of the right to life within article 6(1) of the 
Covenant is in qualified terms: 
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life. [emphasis 
added] 
The question before the Committee, then, would be whether T had been 
arbitrarily deprived of life. While the Human Rights Committee has not 
attempted to define the term 'arbitrarily', apparently preferring to treat each 
case on the facts, it has issued a general comment of relevance to the scenario 
posed: 105 
The protection against arbitrary deprivation of life which is explicitly 
required by the third sentence of article 6(1) is of paramount importance. 
The Committee considers that States parties should take measures not only 
to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to 
prevent arbitrary killing by their own security forces. The deprivation of 
life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity. 
Therefore, the law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in 
which a person may be deprived of his life by such authorities. 
103 For a discussion on the admissibility of communications before the Human Rights 
Committee under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, see Conte A, Davidson S and Burchill R, Defining Civil and 
Political Rights. The Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2004),17-29. 
104 See paragraphs 2 to 6 of article 6. See also the Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the 
death penalty, opened for signature 15 December 1989, 1642 UNTS 414 (entered 
into force 11 July 1991). 
105 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 6, Article 6, 
HRI\GEN\l\Rev.l at 6 (1994), para 3. 
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Notwithstanding this position, it is posited that the factual scenano being 
considered would lead the Human Rights Committee to conclude that the 
taking of T' s life by S was not, in the particular circumstances, arbitrary. In 
Burrell v Jamaica, the Committee had to consider the shooting of Mr Burrell, 
following the hostage-taking of some warders at St Catherine's Prison. 106 
Because Mr Burrell was shot and killed after the warders had been released 
and rescued, the Committee found that the need to use force no longer existed 
at the time of his shooting and that Jamaica was therefore responsible for a 
violation of article 6(1) of the Covenant. I07 The situation at hand, however, 
does not involve the same element of arbitrariness. The conduct of S was 
based upon S' belief that T was about to take the hostage's life and, acting in 
defence of the hostage, he shot T. That does not, it is suggested, amount to an 
arbitrary taking of life, but instead to a measured and proportional response in 
the circumstances. If the Committee agreed with such a conclusion, then this 
would not support the notion that the right to life is an absolute, non-
derogable one. 
Taking an alternative approach, consider these additional facts: 
Rather than bringing a claim directly against New Zealand, T's family 
persuade the Government of Greece (T being a Greek national) to bring a 
claim against New Zealand. Greece claims that reparations are due to it as 
a result of the killing of one of its nationals by an agent of the New 
Zealand State and under the international law rules of 'State 
Responsibility' . 
How would the International Court of Justice find in the matter? The starting 
point is to consider the Articles on State Responsibility, which have been 
developed over a number of years by the International Law Commission as 
106 Burrell v Jamaica, Human Rights Committee Communication 546/1993. 
107 Ibid, para 9.5. 
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partly codifying and partly developing the rules concerning the responsibility 
of States to one another. 108 The overall idea of State Responsibility is that, 
where a State commits an 'internationally wrongful act', it is responsible to 
make good for that act (by reparation or other means), unless the conduct is 
otherwise defensible. Article 2 provides: 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct 
consisting of an act or omission: 
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and 
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. 
The constant jurisprudence of international tribunals makes it clear that the 
conduct of S, as a member of the SAS, would be attributable to New Zealand 
under international law. 109 Greece would then argue that the taking ofT's life 
constituted a breach of New Zealand's obligation not to take the life of any 
person within its territory. Assuming that it was successful in doing so, which 
is doubtful (in the author's view),110 New Zealand would find itself in a 
position of having committed, prima facie, an internationally wrongful act. 
The question would then be whether New Zealand could otherwise defend the 
conduct of its SAS agent. In that regard, Chapter V of the Articles on State 
108 The Articles on State Responsibility were adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly under its Resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, A/RES/56/83 (Annex). 
109 See article 4 of the Articles on State Responsibility, together with the commentary 
of the International Law Commission, Commentaries to the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Official Records of the 
General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No 10 (A/56/10), November 
2001, 84-92. 
IlO Consider the earlier discussion concerning the arbitrary taking of life versus the 
taking of life in the defence of another. 
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Responsibility sets out 'circumstances precluding wrongfulness'. Article 24 
is of particular relevance: 
Article 24, Distress 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an 
international obligation of that State is precluded if the author of the act in 
question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of distress, of saving 
the author's life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author's care. 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: 
(a) The situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination with 
other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or 
(b) The act in question is likely to create a comparable or greater peril. 
It is the view of the author that New Zealand could successfully argue that the 
conduct of S was in a situation of distress, leaving S with no other reasonable 
way of saving the life of the hostage. 
It appears to the author that the situation is also analogous to the 
international law principle of anticipatory self-defence. Although there is 
some debate about whether this customary law principle has survived the 
advent of the United Nations Charter, it is a principle upon which States 
agreed at the time that the Charter was adopted. 111 The principle goes to 
illustrate that States have considered that the use of force (even on an 
international, State-to-State level) can be permissible III limited 
circumstances. Heralded as the 'case' through which the principle was 
established,112 the Caroline Case established that force may be used if a State 
is able to show a "necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no 
III On the question of whether anticipatory self-defence remains extant, see, for 
example, Brownlie I, Principles of Public International Law (6th ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 701-702, and Harris DJ, Cases and Materials on 
International Law (5 th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998), 896-898. 
112 The Carline Case is not exactly a case, since there was no litigation or arbitration 
that was ruled upon. Rather, it is a situation that existed and in respect of which 
correspondence was exchanged between the governments of the United Kingdom and 
United States: see Jennings RY, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases", (1938) 32 
American Journal of International Law 82. 
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choice of means, and no moment for deliberation".1l3 That description again 
fits with the factual scenario being considered. 
What is to be taken from this discussion and analysis? Although 
somewhat theoretical, the latter discussion illustrates a number of important 
points. Firstly, it is a fictional notion to describe rights as universal and non-
derogable. If the most fundamental of human rights, the right to life, is one 
that can be limited (albeit in very limited circumstances), then great care 
should be taken in advocating that any right is non-derogable. 114 The most 
that can be said, it is posited, is that each legislative measure must be 
examined against the particular right(s) it might affect, and that any limitation 
upon rights must not be arbitrary, requiring it to be both necessary and 
proportionate. 
'er:rm'lSID and NZBORA 
Discussed in the preceding chapter was the manner in which sections 5 and 
6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act are to apply in the examination of 
any provision of an enactment. It is not necessary to repeat that examination 
for the purpose of this chapter. The sole issue of concern here is this: how 
113 Jennings, ibid, 89. 
114 Although it is arguable that the prohibition against torture, identified by the 
International Law Commission as a norm of jus cogens, is an absolute prohibition 
from which no derogation is ever permitted: see the commentary of the Commission 
Special Rapporteur, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, concerning article 53 of the draft Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: Lauterpacht H, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Law of Treaties, International Law Commission Report, AJ2456 (AJ8/9), 
1953, chapter V(II)(i). For a further discussion on the peremptory nature of the 
prohibition against torture, see also Evans MD, Preventing Torture. A Study of the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment (Clarendon Press, 1998), and Conte, Davidson and 
Burchill, above n 103, 93-99. Since there is nothing in New Zealand's counter-
terrorist framework purporting to limit this prohibition, however, this issue is not 
taken any further. 
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would section 5 of the NZBORA be applied III the examination of any 
statutory counter-terrorism provision? 
5.4.1 Preliminary Matters in the Application of Section 5 
Remembering the preliminary points made in Chapter Four about the 
application of section 5,115 and applying these to the examination of counter-
terrorist provisions, a number of points can be made at the outset. Firstly, the 
onus of justifying limitations upon any rights or freedoms set out in the 
NZBORA (through any statutory counter-terrorist provisions) rests with the 
State. 116 The Crown must satisfy a court, on the balance of probabilities, that 
the limitation is a reasonable limit, prescribed by law, and demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. 
Next, any limitation sought to be justified under section 5 must be a 
'limitation' of a right or freedom, rather than an exclusion of it. This 
approach is consistent with the paragraph 4 of the criteria for the balancing of 
human rights with counter-terrorism, as proposed by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. l17 Paragraph 4(a) of the criteria advocates 
that limitations of rights, to be lawful, must not impair the "essence" of the 
right. 
115 See Chapter Four, 4.4.2(b) Onus and standard of proof, 4.4.2(c) Reasonable 
"limitation" and 4.4.2( d) The limitation must be "prescribed by law". 
116 Chapter Four, 4.4.2(b) Onus and standard ofproof 
117 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and Follow-up to the World. Conference on Human Rights, Report 
of the High Commissioner submitted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 
48/81, 27 February 2002, E/CNA/20018, Annex - Proposals for "fUrther guidance" 
for the submission of reports pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 
1373 (2001). Compliance with international human rights standards, I General 
Guidance: Criteria for the Balancing of Human Rights Protection and the Combating 
of Terrorism. 
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Finally, and stemming from the words of section 5 and relevant case law 
interpreting those words, a limitation must be "prescribed by law" - requiring 
the limit to be (1) adequately accessible; (2) formulated with sufficient 
precision; and (3) such that it does not confer an unfettered discretion. ll8 
Adequate accessibility has been held to be satisfied in the case of Acts of 
Parliament and Regulations (which is the form of the counter-terrorist 
provisions being examined within this thesis ).119 Sufficiently precise 
formulation and the absence of an unfettered discretion are matters that will 
need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. Again, these three features 
(accessibility, precision, and no unfettered discretion) are consistent with the 
criteria advocated by the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In 
particular, paragraph 4(a) of the criteria provides that, for limitations of rights 
to be lawful, they must be prescribed by law - with paragraph 3 specifying 
that any law authorising restrictions upon human rights: 
(a) Should use precise criteria; 
(b) May not confer an unfettered discretion on those charged with their 
execution. 
They are also compatible with article II of the Council of Europe's Guidelines 
on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, prohibiting arbitrariness 
and stating that: 
All measures taken by States to fight terrorism must respect human rights 
and the principle of the rule of law, while excluding any form of 
arbitrariness, as well as any discriminatory or racist treatment, and must be 
subject to appropriate supervision. 
us See Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1978) 58 ILR 491, 524-527, and Ontario 
Film and Video Appreciation Society [1984] 45 OR (2d) 80 - discussed in Chapter 
Four at 4.4.2( d) The limitation must be "prescribed by law". 
U9 See R v Thomsen (1988) 63 CR (3d) 1, and R v Therens [1985] 1 SCR 613 -
discussed in Chapter Four at 4.4.2( d) The limitation must be "prescribed by law". 
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Article III(2) adds that "When a measure restricts human rights, restrictions 
must be defined as precisely as possible". 
Once these preliminary matters are attended to, application of the substantive 
test under section 5 of the NZBORA can proceed. 
5.4.2 Application of the Substantive Test under Section 5 
The substance of section 5 is that it permits reasonable limits to be imposed 
upon human rights, where such limits can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.120 This requires that the limitation is in pursuit of a 
pressing and substantial objective and that it is implemented by proportional 
means. The question, then, is this: can statutory counter-terrorist measures (if 
they are in accord with the preliminary matters just mentioned) satisfy the 
substantive requirement of reasonableness in a free and democratic society? 
From this enquiry come two questions: 121 firstly, is counter-terrorism a 
pressing and substantial objective; and, secondly, is the particular limitation 
imposed by the statutory provision proportionate to that objective? 
The frrst question appears to be easily answered in the affirmative. It is 
quite obvious that counter-terrorism is a pressing and substantial objective in a 
free and democratic society. Taking into account the statements of the 
Security Council, General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights, 
terrorism is clearly viewed as something that has a significant and adverse 
impact upon democracy, human rights, and the maintenance of both territorial 
120 Chapter Four, 4.4.2 Limiting Rights under the Bill of Rights Act and Human 
Rights Act. 
121 See the discussion on the substantive test under section five: Chapter Four at 
4.4. 2( e) The substantive test under section 5. 
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d . . 1 . P2 an mternatlona secunty. ~ Indeed, the Security Council and General 
Assembly have said that it is an objective "essential" to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 123 
Despite this conclusion, the criteria of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights clearly seek to require States to give consideration to the necessity of 
limiting measures in each case. Paragraph 4 instructs that limits must: 
(b) Be necessary for public safety and public order, i.e. the protection of 
public health or morals and for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others, and serve a legitimate purpose; 
(e) Be necessary in a democratic society; 
Perhaps the question of establishing a pressmg and substantial objective 
requires more thought? Is its sufficient to say that 'counter-terrorism' 
qualifies as such an objective, or must this first element be applied to the 
consideration of each particular statutory measure? Should, for example, 
there be an assessment of the importance of the objective of countering the 
financing of terrorism, or the protection of nuclear material, or the suppression 
of terrorist bombings, etc, or is that level of assessment something that falls 
within the second (proportionality) limb of the section 5 limitations test? The 
author posits that a combined approach is called for. In saying so, the 
following observations should be made: 
{I When assessing whether any particular counter-terrorist provision IS 
pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society, regard should be 
had to the contribution that provision makes to the overall international 
122 Discussed above at 5.1.3 An Overview of United Nations Observations. 
123 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1189 of 13 August 1998, 
SIRES/1189 (1998), preambular para 3; and 1269 of 19 October 1999, S/RESI1269 
(1999), preambular para 8. See also United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 
27/3034 to 44/29, as listed above n 17, preambular para 8. 
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and domestic legal framework in countering terrorism. Having regard to 
the significant importance of the latter framework, it will normally be 
concluded, it is posited, that the provision satisfies the first limb of section 
5. It is notable, in that regard, that most cases before the Supreme Court 
of Canada have satisfied this first branch of the R v Oakes test. 124 
.. As a responsible international actor, whose domestic national interests rely 
upon the maintenance of a peaceful, secure, and free-functioning 
international society , New Zealand's implementation of its international 
counter-terrorist obligations is important not only to its compliance with 
those obligations but also to the promotion of its own interests. New 
Zealand's Chief Ombudsman in 1976 referred to the growing importance 
of terrorism in the world and "the desirability in the national interest of 
[New Zealand] being well informed and well prepared in this regard" 
[emphasis added] ,125 
.. Regard will also need to be had to any direct threat to the democratic State 
in question. In that regard, Chapter Two has discussed the history of 
terrorist acts in the South Pacific and the risk of terrorism in the region. 126 
To give rise to a pressing objective to eliminate direct terrorist threats, any 
such threat should not, it is posited, be completely hypothetical. 
124 Jamal M, Taylor M and Stratas D, The Charter of Rights in Litigation. Direction 
from the Supreme Court of Canada (Ontario, Loose Leaf, 1990-), July 2004 update, 
6-6.3. Having made that point, the text continues by warning that "the 
characterization of the objective is all-important. If the true objective of the 
impugned provision is administrative convenience or the saving of costs, the Court is 
likely to hold that the objective is not sufficiently pressing and substantial to warrant 
overriding a guaranteed right or freedom". 
125 Powels G, Security Intelligence Service: Report by Chief Ombudsman, AJHR 
1976 A 3A, 31. 
126 See Chapter Three at 2.4.1 Terrorist Threats in the South Pacific and 2.4.3 The 
Risk of Terrorism in the South Pacific. 
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.. The particular importance of the provision (that is, of its objective) will be 
critical to the assessment of whether the limitation(s) it imposes upon 
human rights is/are proportional (in satisfaction of the second limb of 
section 5). 
5.4.3 Proportionality 
The second limb of the test requires the particular means by which the 
objective is implemented to be proportional to the objective (the idea, as 
stated by the Secretary-General of the Pacific Islands Forum when speaking 
on counter-terrorism, that "the cure should never be worse than the 
disease"). 127 In considering this requirement of proportionality, this part of 
the chapter seeks to address two things. Firstly, to consider how the section 5 
proportionality test fits with the various recommendations and guidelines on 
counter-terrorism and human rights. Secondly, to establish some principles 
on how to measure proportionality when considering counter-terrorist 
legislation. 
5.4.3 ( a) Does the section 5 proportionality test fit with external guidelines on 
counter-terrorism and human rights? As set out in the Radio New Zealand 
case, there are three components in determining whether the means chosen by 
127 Unwin G, "The Need for Anti-Terrorism Legislation in Fiji", presentation at the 
public workshop, How Should Fiji Respond to the Threat of Terrorism?, hosted by 
the Citizens' Constitutional Forum and the Fiji Human Rights Commission, 17 July 
2004, Suva, Fiji, para 4. 
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the law to achieve an objective are proportional and appropriate to the 
objective: 128 
1. The limiting measures or the law must be designed to achieve the 
objective not being arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational 
considerations. In other words, the means must be rationally 
connected to the objective. 
2. The measures or the law should impair as little as possible the right or 
freedom. 
3. There must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures or 
the law responsible for limiting the right or freedom and the objective 
- i.e., the law which restricts the right must not be so severe or so 
broad in application as to outweigh the objective. 
This requirement for proportionality not only forms part of New Zealand's 
jurisprudence, but also sits squarely with the recommendations of the Sub-
Commission for Human Rights Special Rapporteur, the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and the Committee of Ministers to the Council of Europe. 
The Special Rapporteur's preliminary draft principles concerning terrorism 
and human rights provides at paragraph lOeb) that: 129 
Given that most acts of terrorism are carried out by small groups, great 
care should be taken to ensure that measures taken are necessary to 
apprehend actual members of terrorist groups or perpetrators of terrorist 
acts in a way that does not unduly encroach on the lives and liberties of 
ordinary persons. 
Articles 111(2) of the Council of Europe's Guidelines on Human Rights and 
the Fight Against Terrorism is equally relevant, directing that when a counter-
terrorist measure restricts human rights it must be "necessary and 
proportionate to the aim pursued". The High Commissioner's guidelines are 
128 Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48,60-61. 
129 Above n 23. 
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also relevant, calling for necessity and proportionality. In that regard, 
paragraph 4 provides (in part) that limitations must, to be lawful: 
4. For limitations of rights to be lawful they must: 
(b) Be necessary for public safety and public order, i.e. the protection of 
public health or morals and for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others, and serve a legitimate purpose; 
(e) Be necessary in a democratic society; 
(f) Conform to the principle of proportionality; 
(g) Be appropriate to achieve their protective function, and be the least 
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve that 
protective function; [emphasis added] 
It is thus concluded that the proportionality limb of the section 5 limitations 
test (as expounded in the Radio NZ and Oakes cases) is consistent with 
international guidelines that have specifically directed themselves to the issue 
of counter-terrorism and human rights. The significance of this comes into 
play later in this chapter, when consideration is given to the possibility of 
finding counter-terrorist objectives justified under section 5 of the NZBORA 
but not under the ICCPR. 130 Having arrived at that conclusion, it is then 
necessary to consider each of the three factors identified within of the 
proportionality test. 
5.4.3(b) Factor 1: Measures rationally connected to the achievement of the 
objective. Require a limiting measure to be rationally connected to the 
achievement of the objective is the fIrst of the threefold proportionality test 
first set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Oakes. The Supreme 
Court Directions on the Charter of Rights notes that the Court has seldom 
found that legislation fails this part of the test, although there are instances 
130 Discussed below at 5.5.2(b) The 'exceptional course' of rendering a conflict 
othelwise acceptable. 
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where this has occurred. l3I In R v Oakes itself, for example, section 8 of the 
Narcotic Control Act 1970 was found to lack rational connection. Section 8 
(which had certain criminal process implications and thereby impacted upon 
criminal process rights) contained a statutory presumption that possession of 
even small amounts of narcotics meant that the offender was deemed to be 
trafficking in narcotics. There was no rational connection, said the Court, 
between the possession of small amounts of narcotics and the countering of 
trafficking. 132 
In the application of the rational connection factor of the proportionality 
test, as part of the overall justified limitations test, one might logically 
conclude that this will require satisfaction on the balance of probabilities.133 
The approach of the Supreme Court of Canada, however, has been much more 
flexible in this area. In the course of finding that the rational connection test 
was satisfied in Lavigne v Ontario Public Senlice Employees Union, the Court 
formulated the following test to determine whether a rational connection 
exists: 134 
The Oakes inquiry into "rational connection" between objectives and 
means to attain them requires nothing more than a showing that the 
legitimate and important goals of the legislature are logically furthered by 
the means the government has chosen to adopt. 
Applying this to any examination of statutory counter-terrorist measures, and 
having already concluded that counter-terrorism is a legitimate and important 
goal, the statutory provision must be shown to 'logically further' counter-
131 Above n 124, 6:06. 
132 R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200. 
133 Chapter Four, 4.4.2(b) Onus and standard of proof 
134 Lavigne v Ontario Public Service Employees Union [1991] SCR 211,219 (Wilson 
J). 
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terrorism. It is suggested that this should not be difficult to establish so long 
as the statutory provision is somehow linked to the pursuit of the international 
counter-terrorism regime or to particular threats faced by New Zealand. 
Having said that a reasonably low threshold is applied for this part of the 
proportionality test, the Supreme Court has taken a more robust approach 
where the connection between objective and means is not plainly evident. In 
the recent case of Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General), for example, the 
Court was critical of aspects of the Canada Elections Act 1985 concerning the 
registration of political parties and the tax benefits that flow from such 
registration. 135 In particular, the Act required that a political party nominate 
candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to qualify for registration. While 
the Court held that it was a pressing objective to ensure that the tax credit 
scheme was cost-efficient, it found that there was no rational connection 
between that objective and the 50-candidate threshold requirement. Iacobucci 
J for the majority was particularly critical of the fact that the government had 
provided no evidence that the threshold actually improved the cost-efficiency 
of the tax credit scheme. 
5.4.3(c) Factor 2: Minimal impairment of the right. As for the fITst part of the 
proportionality test, this has also been applied in a reasonably flexible manner 
by the Supreme Court. The first expression of this factor by the Court in R v 
Oakes required that the law "must impair the right or freedom as little as 
possible". Since Oakes, however, the Supreme Court has tended towards the 
requirement that an impairment of rights should be as little as reasonably 
possible. It is suggested that the same approach would be taken in New 
135 Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General) [2003] 1 SCR 912. 
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Zealand, having regard to the expression in Radio NZ that the law "should" 
impair rights as little as possible, rather than the more compelling expression 
in Oakes that this "must" occur. 
In justifying the more flexible approach in Canada, La Forest J, in R v 
Edwards Books and Art Ltd, spoke of the need to give the legislature some 
room to manoeuvre in choosing the appropriate means to implement its 
legislative objective. 136 In a decision three years later, the Chief Justice 
commented as follows in bwin Toy v Quebec (Attorney General): 137 
Parliament may not have chosen the absolutely least intrusive means of 
meeting its objective, but it has chosen from a range of means which 
impair [the right] as little as is reasonably possible. Within this range of 
means it is virtually impossible to know, let alone be sure, which means 
violate Charter rights the least. 
La Forest CJ later warned, however, that deference to the legislature was not 
unrestricted and that the Crown must show that there was a reasonable basis 
for concluding that the law achieved a minimal impairment. 138 What can be 
said thus far, then, is that a limiting provision should impair rights as little as 
reasonably possible. In determining whether that has occurred, a degree of 
deference is likely to be paid by the judiciary - so long as it can be shown that 
Parliament made a reasonable choice in determining the means by which the 
objective is to be achieved. 
In considering the question of choice, the Supreme Court has shown some 
reluctance to examine the availability of alternative measures. In R v 
Schwartz, for example, it was suggested that the statutory provision (which 
provided for a presumption that a person did not have a firearms licence if 
136 R v Edwards Books and Art Ltd [1986J 2 SCR 713. 
137 Irwin Toy Quebec (Attorney General) [1989] 1 SCR 927, 1343. 
138 McKinney v University of Gllelph [190] 3 SCR 229,286. 
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s/he failed to produce one upon request) unnecessarily infringed the 
presumption of innocence. Counsel for Schwartz argued that police could 
simply check their computerised records to ascertain whether a licence had 
indeed been obtained. McIntyre J stated:139 
Even if there is merit in the suggestion... Parliament has made a 
reasonable choice in the matter and, in my view, it is not for the Court, in 
circumstances where the impugned provision clearly involves, at most, 
minimal or even trivial - interference with the right guaranteed in the 
Charter, to postulate some alternative which in its view would offer a 
better solution to the problem ... 
The particular wording of that statement suggests, however, that the judiciary 
should only be disinclined to examine alternatives where the impugned 
provision inv01ves a minimal, or trivial, impairment of rights. That was the 
approach taken in Figueroa, the Court concluding that the minima1 
impairment test had not been satisfied since cost savings could be achieved 
. h . I' h Ch 140 WIt out VIO atmg t e arter. 
Applying the minimal impairment test to New Zealand's counter-terrorist 
legislation, statutory provisions will need to show that they impair rights as 
little as reasonably possible. In determining whether that has occurred, a 
degree of deference will be paid to allow for Parliamentary discretion in 
determining what means to implement, but the courts are likely to examine the 
availability of alternative measures in instances where the human rights 
interference is more than minimal, or trivial. 
5.4.3( d) Factor 3: Proportionality between the effects of the measures and the 
importance of the legislative objective. At the heart of the second limb to the 
139 R v Schwartz [1988] 2SCR 443, 492-493. 
140 Above n 135. 
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Oakes/Radio NZ test is the balancing of benefits and detriments, namely, the 
weighing of the benefits of the legislative objective against the detriments of 
the limiting provision (its detriments upon the human right invoked). This is 
possibly one of the most difficult issues involved in assessing the validity of 
counter-terrorist measures that limit human rights. It involves a balance 
between an objective and the means and effect of an implementing measure. 
"Objective" versus "means and effect" are, in a figurative sense, different 
sides of the same coin. The larger the head of the coin (objective), the more 
room there is on the tail of the coin (means and effect). Thus, a more severe 
threat will, by logical implication, justify the implementation of a more severe 
level of limitation of rights and freedoms. 
The difficult nature of this part of the test, and its reliance upon its 
application to particular legislative provisions (rather than being able to 
provide a set of concrete principles) has been recognised by Jamal, Taylor and 
Stratas in their commentary upon the application of the test by the Supreme 
Court of Canada: 141 
The Court has said little to explain its approach with respect to this branch 
of the test, which appears to demand a balancing of benefits and 
detriments that cannot be fully articulated. 
An examination of the relevant Supreme Court judgments reveals that the 
Court has indeed provided little, if any, general guidance. Its approach has 
been to consider the particular legislative provision and such a line is the only 
reasonable one to take, it is posited. Much will depend on the specific 
limitation in question and how it impacts upon rights and freedoms. The only 
truly 'guiding' principles are those set out by the Court in R v Oakes and R v 
141 Jamal, Taylor and Stratas, above n 124, 6:09. 
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Lucas. 142 The Court's original formulation of the substantive test in Oakes 
described the final step in the second limb of the test as requiring that: 143 
There must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures or the 
law responsible for limiting the right or freedom and the objective - i.e., 
the law which restricts the right must not be so severe or so broad in 
application as to outweigh the objective. 
In R v Lucas, the Court spoke of the need to assess the degree of protection 
afforded by the expression of the human right invoked, as well as the 
importance of the objective of the provision being examined. The case 
concerned the constitutionality of criminal prohibitions against defamatory 
libel. For the majority, Cory J stated:144 
Defamatory libel is so far removed from the core values of freedom of 
expression that it merits but scant protection. This low degree of 
protection can also be supported by the meritorious objective of the 
impugned sections. They are designed to protect the reputation of the 
individual. 
In an attempt to at least formulate a process by which this limb of the test can 
be applied, having regard to the latter discussion, it is posited that the 
examination of statutory provisions will require consideration of the following 
factors: 
(a) The effect(s) of the limiting provision upon the right invoked; 
(b) The importance of the objective of that provision; 
(c) The importance of (or degree of protection provided by) the right 
invoked; and 
142 R v Lucas [1998] 1 SCR 439. 
143 Above n 132. 
144 Above n 142, 94-95. 
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(d) An assessment of whether the effect (a) is proportional to the 
objective (b), having regard to the importance of the right (c). 
These factors will indeed call for a section-by-section analysis, which win be 
undertaken through the balance of this thesis. However, something that can 
be discussed at this stage (at least at a preliminary level) is the question of 
how to measure the importance of the objective (part (b) of the factors just 
listed). This chapter has clearly identified views that terrorism is a threat to 
human rights and to peace and security.145 How big, however, is that threat? 
How should the threat be measured? As a threat to New Zealand? Or as one 
to the international community, with New Zealand as a responsible actor in 
that community? As identified earlier in this chapter, there are different 
'levels' of threat posed by terrorism146 and one must therefore consider which 
level of threat the provision being examined aims to respond to. 
The matter is complicated by the fact that terrorism occurs on a sporadic 
basis. Due to the sensational and fear-inducing nature of terrorism, it is 
something that draws considerable media attention and has a high impact 
upon individual members of society and upon the credibility of the State to 
protect its citizens. As expressed by Professor Scott Davidson "headline 
issues call for headline responses". 147 From a statistical perspective, however, 
it must be remembered that incidents of terrorism are considerably lower than 
145 Discussed above at 5.1 The Impact of Terrorism on Security and Human Rights. 
146 Discussed above at 5.1.3 An Overview of United Nations Obseroations. 
147 Discussion between the author and Professor Davidson, University of Canterbury, 
2 February 2005. 
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other fatal events. In the twenty years up to September 11, the incidents of 
terrorist conduct fluctuated from the high 200s to the high 600S. 148 
Next, one will also need to consider national versus international interests. 
In plain words, is the objective of the counter-terrorist provision to be 
assessed in terms of countering terrorism's adverse impacts upon human 
rights and security for New Zealand, or for the international community? This 
is also a significant question, since it is arguable that the threat of terrorism to 
New Zealand is significantly less than that to the international community at 
large. Certainly, that was the position advocated within many submissions 
made to the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Committee on the Terrorism 
<Bombings and Financing> Suppression Bil1. 149 As discussed in detail within 
Chapter Two, however, the reality of the contemporary world is that 
globalisation has dissolved distances that may have once protected Pacific 
Island States such as New Zealand, despite its geographical isolation. lso As 
also discussed, the various international conventions and protocols on the 
subject of counter-terrorism, coupled with resolutions of the Security Council 
148 United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, May 2002. 
In reviewing patterns over a twenty-year period from 1981, the report also identifies 
that the least number of terrorist attacks, at 274, was recorded in 1998, with the 
highest number of incidents in 1987 at 666 attacks. It should be noted, of course, that 
a total of 3,030 people died during the September 11 attacks, as recorded in the 
remembrance pages of September 11 News.com, URL 
<http://www.september11news.coml911Art.htm> at 7 January 2005. See also the 
discussion on this point in Chapter Two at 2.1.3 The Concept of Terrorism, especially 
note 39. 
149 See Submissions to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the 
Terrorism <Bombings and Finance> Suppression Bill, Parliamentary Library, 
Wellington, 2002, including for example submissions by the Indonesian Human 
Rights Committee, TERRO/88. 
150 Chapter Two, 2.4 New Zealand's Role in International Counter-Terrorism. 
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and General Assembly, create and international framework for counter-
terrorism which relies on the participation of all States. 151 
The answer, then, might be two-fold. If a particular limiting measure is 
furthering the international framework on counter-terrorism, then the 
importance of the objective of that limiting measure should be assessed 
having regard to the various factors identified concerning the importance of 
countering international terrorism. lS2 If a particular limiting measure is aimed 
at combating a particular threat posed to New Zealand, such as bio-terrorism 
for example, then that objective should be measured against that particular 
threat. 
These are all matters that bear upon the importance of the objective being 
pursued by the statutory provision under examination and will, as a result, 
directly bear upon the question of whether its effect is proportional. 
5.4.3( e) A summary on proportionality. The question of proportionality is 
clearly a difficult one, with much depending on the particular legislative 
provision being examined and the impact of that provision upon the particular 
right concerned. Against the background of the discussion to this point on 
proportionality, the following three-step guidelines are advocated for 
151 Ibid, see in particular 2.4.4 Supporting an International Framework on Counter-
Terrorism. 
152 See above at 5.1.3 Summary of United Nations Observations. 
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determining whether limitations imposed by a statutory counter-terrorist 
measure are proportional: 
.. Step 1: Is the legislative provision rationally connected to the achievement 
of the objective? 
In establishing a rational connection between the statutory provision and 
its objective, it will be sufficient to show that the provision logically 
furthers counter-terrorism (whether the international counter-terrorism 
regime or particular threats faced by New Zealand). Where the connection 
between the provision and objective is not plainly evident, however, 
evidence linking the two may be required. 
.. Step 2: Does the legislative provision impair the right to a minimal extent? 
The legislative provision must impair the right as little as reasonably 
possible. In determining whether that has occurred, a degree of deference 
should be paid to allow for Parliamentary discretion in determining what 
means to implement. A more thorough examination of alternative 
measures will be called for in instances where the human rights 
interference is more than minimal, or trivial. 
.. Step 3: Are the effects of the legislative provision proportional to the 
importance of its objective? 
Here, consideration ofthe following factors is advocated: 
(a) The effect(s) of the limiting provision upon the right invoked; 
(b) The importance of the objective of that provision; 
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(c) The importance of (or degree of protection provided by) the right 
invoked; and 
(d) An assessment of whether the effect (a) is proportional to the 
objective (b), having regard to the importance of the right (c). 
Although this will require an assessment of the particular counter-terrorist 
provision and the particular right invoked, some principles are applicable 
to the assessment of 'factor (b)' - namely, consideration of two questions: 
(1) how does the legislative provision further the pursuit of countering 
international terrorism (and thereby contribute to the international 
framework on counter-terrorism); and (2) is the provision directed at a 
threat against the territorial integrity of New Zealand or the protection of 
its people (and how pressing or substantial is that threat)? 
5.5 The Interaction between Domestic and International Human Rights 
Obligations 
The final question posed in the introduction to this chapter was how the 
ICCPR and NZBORA were to interact and, in particular, what the 
consequences would be of finding that a provision of New Zealand's counter-
terrorist legislation is valid under one, but not the other, instrument. The 
interaction between these two instruments, which are the primary civil and 
political rights instruments relevant to New Zealand, is interesting from a 
theoretical perspective and also raises some important issues from a practical 
perspective when seeking to measure particular provisions of New Zealand's 
counter-terrorist legislation against the ICCPR and NZBORA. 
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5.5.1 The Interaction between the ICCPR and NZBORA 
Broadly speaking, the first point to note concerns international constitutional-
type matters. New Zealand is an independent, sovereign State at international 
law and, as such, is free to determine how to carry out its international affairs 
and how to regulate matters within its municipal dominion. 153 With that 
freedom comes the ability to limit one's own sovereignty, which is the 
foundation upon which States enter into international agreements and 
undertake to act in certain ways, either in their relations with others in the 
international community, or in respect of the treatment of nationals or aliens 
within their territory. 154 New Zealand has, in that context, elected to surrender 
its sovereignty over its internal affairs to the extent that it has undertaken to 
treat individuals within its territory in compliance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In doing so, New Zealand has agreed 
to be subject to the reporting and review mechanisms established under the 
ICCPR (involving the Human Rights Committee).155 New Zealand has also 
elected to allow those within New Zealand's territory to communicate directly 
with the Human Rights Committee when an alleged victim of a violation of 
the ICCPR has exhausted local remedies. 156 As discussed in Chapter Four, 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is the primary domestic instrument 
153 New Zealand is a member State of the United Nations, membership of which is 
only open to all "peace-loving states" (article 5 of the Charter of the United Nations). 
Arbitrator Max Huber, in describing the sovereignty that comes with Statehood in the 
Island of Palmas Case (2 RIAA 829), declared that this was the right to perform 
governmental actions to the exclusion of all others within the territory of a State. 
154 The Wimbledon (decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice), 2 ILR 
99. 
155 Discussed in Chapter Four, at 4.3.1 The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
156 Ibid. 
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through which New Zealand has incorporated those international obligations 
into municipal law . 
It is against that background that one can VIew the broad relationship 
between the ICCPR and NZBORA, although this does depend somewhat upon 
the lens through which one considers the instruments. Through a domestic 
judicial lens, the primary focus of New Zealand courts is naturally upon the 
Bill of Rights, although the ICCPR can be instructive on the meaning of rights 
and the remedies that might flow from any finding that rights have been 
violated. 157 By way of corollary, the New Zealand courts have also 
commented that their determination of matters under the NZBORA might be 
instructive to the Human Rights Committee when considering any matter 
before it concerning an allegation of violation of rights. 158 The Human Rights 
Committee, viewing matters from an international judicial lens, likewise 
focuses upon the instrument it has been established to monitor. In doing so, it 
has tended to view the NZBORA as simply one item (albeit the principal one) 
of legislation through which the ICCPR is to be implemented. 159 Its concern 
is not with anyone particular item of domestic legislation, but with the overall 
structure of domestic law and ensuring that the provisions of the ICCPR are 
adhered to through that overall structure. 
157 Discussed in Chapter Four, 4.2 Why Consider Human Rights in the Examination 
of Counter-Terrorist Legislation? 
158 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 17 (para 20). 
159 This can be gleaned through the overall content of comments by the Human 
Rights Committee in response to New Zealand's periodic reports: see, for example, 
the Committee's Gomments on the two most recent reports by New Zealand, 
Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand, 24 March 
1995, CCPRlC179/Add,47, and Concluding observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: New Zealand, 17 July 2002, CCPRlC0175INZL. 
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As will be seen in the three chapters that follow, the latter background 
shapes the basis upon which New Zealand's domestic counter-terrorist 
legislation is examined. If the ICCPR has been properly implemented into 
New Zealand law, then the result of examining any statutory counter-terrorism 
measure under each instrument should be the same. Chapter Seven of this 
thesis, examining the terrorist designation process under the Terrorism 
Suppression Act, is evidence that this will not always be the case. The 
question, then, is how to deal with differing results. 
Two possibilities arise. The first is where a statutory counter-terrorism 
measure is found to be consistent with the ICCPR but in violation of the 
NZBORA. The author posits that, due to the operative provisions of the 
NZBORA and the sometimes aspirational character of the ICCPR, this is an 
unlikely result. Certainly, it is not one that is arrived at anywhere in this 
thesis. If that outcome was arrived at, however, it would not (it is suggested) 
be a problematic outcome. Rather, it would simply be an exercise of 
territorial sovereignty by New Zealand which was consistent with the ICCPR. 
Any counter-terrorist provision in violation of the NZBORA would, through 
the New Zealand courts, require practical forms of remedy to be granted or 
might even result in law reform following a declaration of incompatibility. 
While this might go beyond the scope of rights-protection envisaged within 
the ICCPR, there are no international implications to such a result. If 
anything, the Human Rights Committee would likely praise New Zealand for 
it. 
It is the alternative possibility that causes problems and requires further 
thought. That is, where a statutory counter-terrorism measure is found to be 
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'valid' (or not 'invalid') for the purposes of the NZ Bill of Rights Act but in 
violation of the ICCPR. In this second situation, there are international 
implications (resulting from New Zealand's surrender of sovereignty under 
the ICCPR) and the Human Rights Committee would, it is posited, be likely to 
make adverse comments against New Zealand (either through the periodic 
reporting system or as a result of an individual communication to the 
committee). What are the implications of the latter outcome? 
5.5.2 'Valid' at Domestic Law but Contrary to the ICCPR 
A preliminary matter, concerning terminology, needs to be explained before 
discussing the implications of the outcome just identified. First, when talking 
of an outcome that is 'valid' at domestic law, this is used to signify an 
outcome where the NZBORA cannot be used to invalidate the statutory 
counter-terrorist measure. This might result from the particular meaning of 
the right or freedom (as expressed under the NZB ORA) , or by operation of 
section 4 of the NZBORA. Next, when speaking of an outcome that, while 
valid at domestic law, is contrary to the ICCPR, this is meant to signify that 
the outcome does not fit within one of the permissible limitations within the 
ICCPR. As will be discussed, however, the outcome might otherwise be 
'acceptable' at international law. 
5.5.2(a) The 'normal course' infinding a conflict. Where a counter-terrorism 
provision is found to be 'valid' at domestic law but contrary to the ICCPR, the 
matter will not normally involve any inquiry of whether that provision is 
otherwise 'acceptable'. The normal outcome will be simple: the provision 
cannot be invalidated under the NZBORA (or is otherwise consistent with the 
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NZBORA's description of the human right in question) but it is contrary to an 
article(s) of the ICCPR. This will be particularly so when a statutory 
provision is only saved by application of section 4 of the Bill of Rights, which 
effectively stands as an acknowledgement that the provision is In an 
irreconcilable conflict with a human rights provision of the NZBORA. What, 
then, is the normal course in such circumstances? 
The starting point is article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which concerns situations where domestic law is in conflict with 
treaty law (the situation at hand): 160 
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty. 
Article 27 stands as a codification of one of the most important rules of 
international law, as first expressed in the Alabama Claims Arbitration. 161 In 
a claim against the United Kingdom by the United States, the had 
unsuccessfully tried to rely on the absence of domestic legislation (prohibiting 
the fitting out of commerce raiders in British ports that were to join the 
Confederated forces in America) as a defence to the international law rule 
requiring States to remain neutral in matters of internal conflicts within other 
States. International courts and tribunals have produced a consistent 
jurisprudence to the effect that internal rules can never be used to justify a 
breach of international obligations. 162 
Applying this principle to the matter at hand, New Zealand could not 
claim that, since a counter-terrorist provision was not invalidated by domestic 
160 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 
1155IJNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 
161 Alabama Claims Arbitration (1872) Moore, International Arbitrations, 653. 
162 For further discussion on this point, see Brownlie, above n 111, 34-35. 
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legislation (the NZBORA), then this rendered any inconsistency with the 
ICCPR as defensible. As such, New Zealand would be subject to adverse 
comments from the Human Rights Committee, whether as a result of the 
periodic reporting regime or an individual complaint under the ICCPR 
Optional Protocol. 
5.5.2(b) The 'exceptional course' of rendering a conflict otherwise 
acceptable. The ability will be limited, it is envisaged, to argue that although 
a statutory counter-terrorism measure is contrary to the ICCPR it is otherwise 
'acceptable'. In exceptional circumstances, however, this may be a 
possibility. Consider the hostage-taking example given earlier: 
Section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961 (self-defence) cannot be invalided 
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, by virtue of the fact that it 
is a provision of an enactment and is therefore saved by application of 
section 4 of the NZBORA. In the admissibility phase of proceedings 
before the Human Rights Committee, the Committee finds that the 
communication against New Zealand is admissible and that there has been 
a prima facie violation of article 6(1) of the ICCPR. 
How might New Zealand respond for the purpose of the merits phase of the 
communication before the Committee? It would no doubt want to argue that 
the killing of T was not arbitrary, and therefore not falling within the article 
6(1) prohibition against the arbitrary taking of life. 163 Consideration of this 
position, above, led to the author to posit that this was a proper conclusion to 
arrive at (on the facts). What if, however, the Human Rights Committee took 
issue with the subjective nature of the section 48 self-defence provision of the 
163 This has been discussed in further detail above, at 5.3.2 The Fiction of Non-
Derogable Rights. 
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Crimes Act?l64 Although the author considers this to be an unlikely outcome, 
it illustrates the problem at hand: section 48 is not 'invalid' at domestic law by 
reason of section 4 of the NZBORA, but it is (for argument's sake) contrary to 
the ICCPR. 
Notwithstanding this fictional result, it is posited that the facts of the 
scenario could give rise to the exceptional course of rendering the conflict 
with the ICCPR otherwise 'acceptable' at international law. By adopting the 
arguments of distress and anticipatory self-defence, as discussed earlier, New 
Zealand could take the position that - notwithstanding the (technical) breach 
of the ICCPR - section 48 and the conduct of S were otherwise acceptable at 
international law as well as at domestic law. The taking of T's life occurred 
in an instant, overwhelming situation, leaving no choice of means, and no 
moment for deliberation,165 and undertaken as the only reasonable way to save 
the hostage's life. 166 
The other factor to consider when contemplating inconsistent outcomes in 
the application of the ICCPR and the NZBORA are the international 
guidelines on the subject. Discussed earlier within this chapter have been 
guidelines of the International Commission of Jurists, the Advisory Council of 
Jurists, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Sub-Commissioner 
164 Section 48 contains both objective and subjective elements. The subjective 
element is that the conduct is measured against the circumstances believed to exist by 
the person acting in self-defence. The objective element is that the conduct of the 
person must be reasonable. For further discussion, see Robertson JB (ed), Adams on 
Criminal Law, (Brooker & Friend, New Zealand, Loose Leaf, 1992-), CA48.07 and 
CA48.08. 
165 Adopting the words of the Caroline Case, above n 112. 
166 Adopting the words of article 24 of the Articles on State Responsibility. 
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for Human Rights Special Rapporteur. 167 Also considered was the 
relationship between these sources of 'soft law' and the limitations test under 
section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.168 The conclusion 
made was that the section 5 limitations test (as expounded in the Radio NZ 
and Oakes cases) is consistent with those international guidelines. Despite the 
soft law status of the guidelines, it is the view of the author that this level of 
consistency is of considerable value for two reasons. Firstly, the various 
guidelines are consistent with each other. Secondly, they are specifically 
concerned with the interface between counter-terrorism and human rights 
unlike the ICCPR, an instrument in which rights and freedoms are expounded 
in a more 'abstract' manner. 
There is an important qualifying point to be made about the latter 
argument, however. As 'soft law' guidelines, reliance upon the guidelines 
cannot render any conflict with the ICCPR justifiable at law. Strictly 
speaking, reliance on non-binding international standards or guidelines can 
only justify a breach of the ICCPR on a policy leveL For that reason, it is 
quite possible that the Human Rights Committee would still make adverse 
comments about such a breach of the ICCPR, notwithstanding what the author 
sees as a justifiable policy basis for breach. However, anticipating the 
approach of the Committee is difficult. Although members of the Committee 
have formally rejected a 'margin of appreciation' 169 doctrine,17o commentators 
167 Discussed above at 533 Commission on Human Rights and 53.4 Other 
International Bodies. 
168 Discussed above at 5.4.2 Application of the Substantive Test under section 5, and 
5.43 ( a) Does section 5 fit with external guidelines on counter-terrorism and human 
rights? 
169 A doctrine utilised by the European Court of Human Rights and defined by Eyal 
Benvenisti as "the notion that each society is entitled to certain latitude in resolving 
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have identified "incipient elements of the doctrine III some of the HRC's 
jurisprudence". 171 
By way of summary, then, New Zealand has surrendered its sovereignty over 
the manner in which it deals with persons within its territory, to the extent of 
the obligations it has undertaken through its party status to the ICCPR. Those 
obligations have been incorporated into domestic law through various New 
Zealand Acts of Parliament, primarily through the NZBORA. The manner of 
incorporation, however, may lead to the possibility of differing results in the 
application of the ICCPR versus the NZBORA to statutory counter-terrorist 
provisions. The most likely outcome, in that regard, is a finding that a 
counter-terrorist provision is 'valid' under domestic law (through application 
of the NZBORA) but contrary to the ICCPR. 
The normal course in finding such a conflict will be that New Zealand is 
in breach of its international obligations (under the ICCPR), notwithstanding 
its domestic law. It will, as such, be subject to adverse comments and 
directions from the UN Human Rights Committee. In exceptional 
circumstances, however, it has been argued that there may be other reasons for 
treating the ICCPR violation as 'acceptable'. In the fictional analysis 
undertaken, for example, application of the principles of State Responsibility 
the inherent conflicts between individual rights and national interests or among 
different moral convictions": Benvenisti E, "Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and 
Universal Standards" (1999) 31 International Law and Politics 843, 843-844. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the doctrine, see Arai-TakahashiY, The Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of 
the ECRR (Inters entia, 2002). 
170 Former Judge Rosalyn Higgins, for example: see Ghandi PR, The Human Rights 
Committee and the Right of Individual Communication (Ashgate Dartmouth 
Publishing Ltd, 1998), 14. 
171 Professor Scott Davidson in Conte, Davidson and Burchill, above n 103, 11. See 
also Harris D and Joseph S (eds), The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and United Kingdom Law (Clarendon Press, 1995), 629. 
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and the notion of anticipatory self-defence have been argued as validating the 
conduct of the SAS soldier in the taking of the terrorist's life in order to save 
the life of the hostage. 
5.6 Counter-Terrorism and Privacy 
Warranting some specific attention is the question of the interface between 
counter-terrorism and privacy. Although the right to privacy is a matter 
addressed within the ICCPR, it is outside the ambit of the Bill of Rights, 
instead gaining protection under the Privacy Act 1993. Privacy, says 
Professor Emanuel Gross, is a deeply rooted value in human culture 
comprising (1) the right of the individual to be left alone, (2) the right of the 
individual to have control over the dissemination of information about him or 
her and the access to his or her person and home, and (3) the right to be 
protected against the unwanted access of the public to the individual. 172 
Notwithstanding the importance of the right to privacy Professor Gross argues 
that, from both a legal and moral perspective, interference with privacy in 
pursuit of national security is permissible: 173 
Contrary to privacy, absolute security is the utopian idea, and therefore 
"national security" as a whole is worthy of legal protection in the sense 
that the state has the duty and the right to protect itself and the persons 
who are located within its borders against security threats. 
172 Gross E, "The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism. Protection of Human 
Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest - the Proper Balance" 
(2004) 37(1) Cornell International Law ]oumaI27, 31. 
173 Ibid, 35. 
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Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, privacy is a 
matter addressed in article 17: 
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
Thus, as far as the ICCPR is concerned, the State is obliged to both desist 
from interfering with privacy, as well as to legislate in a way that protects the 
right to privacy (from both State authorities and natural persons).174 The 
protection of privacy is, however, a necessarily relative matter as a result of 
the fact that all persons live in a society.175 The Human Rights Committee has 
pointed out that the term ''unlawful'' within paragraph 1 of article 17 means 
that an authorisation to interfere with privacy must be established by law, so 
long as this does not establish an arbitrary authority.176 The international 
guidelines on counter-terrorism and human rights also require that any 
limitation upon rights be reasonable and proportional. 177 
In contrast to the International Covenant, the Privacy Act 1993 is weaker 
in its protection of the privacy of New Zealanders. Through the application of 
general principles of statutory interpretation, the impact of the Act is limited 
174 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 6, Article 17, 
HRI/GEN/l/Rev.l (1988), paras 1 and 9. 
175 Ibid, 7. 
176 Ibid, 3. See, for discussion, Conte, Davidson and Burchill, above n 103, 147. 
177 Although these are not an express requirements of either the Privacy Act 1993 or 
any other legislation governing the issuing of interception warrants, proportionality 
and reasonableness are required of the international guidelines on counter-terrorism 
and human rights: see Chapter Five, in particular 5.2.3 Commission on Human 
Rights, 5.2.4(b) Council of Europe, and 5.4.3(a) Does the section 5 proportionality 
test fit with the external guidelines on counter-terrorism and human rights? 
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to governing the collection of "personal information,,178 where this occurs 
outside a statutory authority to do so. Where a statute specifically authorises 
the collection (or interception) of personal information, then the rules of 
'reconciliation', 'implied repeal', and generalia specialihus non derogant 
mean that (unless the statute can be interpreted in a manner that is consistent 
with the Privacy Act) the statutory provision remains unaffected by the 
Privacy ACt.179 The strength of the Privacy Act is in regulating an agency 
(such as a hospital or university) in its collection and storage of personal 
information. In that case, that the agency must comply with the twelve 
privacy principles set out in section 6 of the Privacy Act. Of particular 
importance, privacy principle 5 prohibits the collection of personal 
information by unlawful means or in a manner that is unfair or unreasonably 
intrudes upon the personal affairs of an individual. Notably, this principle 
does not apply to the collection of information by the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service or the Government Communications Security Bureau. ISO 
In summary, then, interference with privacy at the domestic law level is 
only permissible to the extent that such interference either complies with the 
information privacy principles (section 6 of the Privacy Act), or is expressly 
authorised under an enactment which prevails by application of the principles 
178 Defined by section 2 of the Privacy Act 1993 as information about an identifiable 
individual. 
179 Reconcilitaion reflects the aim of the courts to find a construction of two 
conflicting statutory provisions that reconciles that inconsistency and allows the 
provisions to stand together. Implied repeal results in a statute later in time impliedly 
repealing an earlier and totally inconsistent statute. Generalis specialibus non 
derogant means that an earlier, more specific, statutory provision prevails over a 
later, general statutory provision. See Burrows JF, Statute Law in New Zealand (3 rd 
ed, LexisNexis, 2003), 308-317. 
180 Section 57 of the Privacy Act 1993 expresses that principles 1 to 5 and 8 to 11 do 
not apply to information collected by an "intelligence organisation" (defined under 
section 2 as the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Government 
Communications Security Bureau). 
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of implied repeal and generalia specialihus non derogant. To comply with 
the ICCPR and the international standards on counter-terrorism and human 
rights,181 legislative authorisations to interfere with privacy must: (1) not 
permit arbitrary interference; (2) protect the individual against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference; and (3) be reasonable and proportional. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to draw out principles to be applied in the 
examination of any perceived conflict between counter-terrorist legislation 
and human rights standards. In particular, the analysis has sought to 
understand how to resolve conflicts between New Zealand's counter-terrorist 
legislation and its human rights obligations under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
The need to do so has become apparent through the identification in Chapter 
Three of this thesis of potential conflicts between counter-terrorist legislation 
and human rights. It has also been seen that such concerns have been 
expressed about States. 
The preliminary focus of this chapter, before considering the particular 
limiting provisions of the International Covenant and the Bill of Rights, has 
been upon two issues. Firstly, what sort of impact do terrorist acts have on 
human rights and security? Secondly, is compliance with human rights 
necessary when seeking to implement counter-terrorist objectives? The 
conclusions drawn through this first part of the chapter have been reasonably 
181 As discussed earlier in this chapter: see, in particular, 5.2.3 Commission on 
Human Rights, 5.2.4(b) Council of Europe, and 5.4.3(a) Does the section 5 
proportionality test fit with the external guidelines on counter-terrorism and human 
rights? 
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obvious and straight-forward: terrorism adversely impacts upon both security 
and human rights but, despite this adverse impact, the means by which 
counter-terrorist measures are implemented must be in compliance with 
human rights. Terrorism has been identified by bodies within the United 
Nations as having links with transnational and other forms of serious crimes; 
as adversely impacting upon various rights and freedoms, including life, 
liberty, the rule of law and the functioning of pluralistic societies; and as 
negatively impacting upon the social development and territorial integrity of 
States and their international relations and co-operation with other States. 
Both the General Assembly and Security Council have identified counter-
terrorism as an objective essential to the maintenance of international peace 
and security. Notwithstanding the importance of countering these affects, it is 
also clear that the pursuit of that objective must be in compliance with human 
rights standards. Of significant importance to this principle is the fact that 
human rights instruments themselves cater for the limitation of rights in the 
pursuit of pressing and substantial objectives. 
The main focus of this chapter has been upon the feature of human rights 
instruments just mentioned: allowance for the limitation of rights. In the case 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it has been seen 
that there is no generally applicable limitations provision, other than article 4 
(which limits itself to the suspension of rights during states of public 
emergency). In the absence of invoking article 4, the Covenant calls for the 
examination of legislative measures against the particular expression of rights 
within the ICCPR. In the case of article 4, it has been suggested that this 
provision is far from ideal in meeting the needs of counter-terrorism. To 
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begin with, there are problems with treating threats of terrorism as threats that 
give rise to a public emergency within the meaning of article 4 and otherwise 
comply with the temporary and exceptional nature of that provision. It has 
been posited that, although article 4 might be invoked to deal with a 
particular, instant, terrorist threat or event, it is not suitable as a means of 
justifying the suspension of rights on an on-going basis through counter-
terrorist legislation. The second problem with article 4 lies in its distinction 
between derogable and non-derogable rights. It has been suggested that this 
represents a false dichotomy and that, while some rights might certainly be 
more significant than others, great care should be taken in asserting that any 
right is absolute. 
Turning to section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, it has 
been concluded that the various preliminary steps in its application, as well as 
the features of its substantive test, are consistent with the international 
guidelines on meeting the challenges of counter-terrorism in compliance with 
human rights. On the question of privacy, any interference with privacy must 
comply with the information privacy principles of the Privacy Act 1993 or 
otherwise be authorised by an enactment. In either case, any authorisation to 
interfere with privacy must not permit arbitrary interference, it must protect 
the individual against arbitrary or unlawful interference, and be reasonable 
and proportional. 
Finally, this chapter has considered the question of differing results in the 
application of the ICCPR versus the NZBORA to the examination of statutory 
counter-terrorist measures. The possibility exists for differing results, 
particularly in light of the protective status afforded to enactments by section 
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4 of the Bill of Rights. Conflicts of this nature will normally occur in 
situations where the legislative provision is found to be 'valid' under domestic 
law but contrary to the ICCPR. The view taken has been that, in the normal 
course of finding such a conflict, this will mean that New Zealand is in breach 
of its international obligations and must - if it wants to comply with its 
international human rights obligations - take remedial steps. In rare cases, 
however, it has been suggested that non-compliance with the ICCPR might be 
rendered acceptable. This will be so where international law can be invoked 
to justify the legislative provision. It was posited, through examination of a 
fictional scenario, that this would be the case with the right to self-defence 
under section 48 of the Crimes Act 1961 and application of the international 
law principles of State responsibility and anticipatory self-defence. 
Validation might also occur where it could be shown that the statutory 
measure was justifiable under section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act, that provision (as mentioned earlier) being compatible with the 
international guidelines on the interface between counter-terrorism and human 
rights. 
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The New Zealand's counter-terrorist obligations under UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373 were, as discussed within Chapter Three, 
implemented under regulations made pursuant to the United Nations Act 
1946.1 Resolution 1373 placed particular emphasis on the issue of the 
financing of terrorism, calling upon States to become party to the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism2 and requiring certain steps to be taken in the prevention and 
suppression of terrorism. New Zealand's immediate response, by interim 
measure, was to make the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism 
Suppression and Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001 (the Terrorism 
Regulations), pursuant to an empowering provision in the United Nations 
Act. 3 
The object of this thesis is to examine the interface between counter-
terrorist legislation and human rights. Within that context, this chapter 
I United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, 
S/RES/1373 (2001). 
2 Opened for signature 10 January 2000, 2179 UNTS 232 (entered into force 10 
April 1992). 
3 The United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and Mghanistan 
Measures) Regulations 2001 came into force on 1 December 2001 and were to 
expire on 30 June 2002 (by which time it was expected that the Terrorism 
Suppression Bill would have passed through Parliament). Due to the early 
dissolution of Parliament, however, (prompted by early elections in July 2002), 
the life of the Regulations were extended to 31 December 2002 by the United 
Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and Afghanistan Measures) 
Amendment Regulations 2002. 
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examines the potential impact of the Terrorism Regulations upon human 
rights. In doing so, it will be concluded that there are no issues of concern, 
but an interesting aspect of the traditional tension between the Executive 
and Legislature is exposed. There has been, as reflected within the Magna 
Carta of 1215 and the Bill of Rights of 1688, a long-standing tension 
between the need for the Executive to have the ability to carry out certain 
functions, and the sovereignty of Parliament to legislate without 
interference. Although the issues to be discussed are not limited to the 
regulations made by New Zealand in response to Resolution 1373, those 
regulations illustrate an exercise of the regulation-making powers of the 
New Zealand Government in respect of obligations imposed upon it by the 
United Nations Security Council. Particular attention is paid to the 
interaction between regulations made under the United Nations Act and 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, this heightening the tension because of Parliament's role as 
"guardian of the public interest". 4 
6.1 The United Nations Act 1946 
In New Zealand, resolutions made by the United Nations Security Council 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and the obligations 
4 It is, naturally, contestable whether Parliament or the JUdiciary is the ultimate 
"guardian" of the public interest, although most would agree that both are 
responsible for this, a matter outside the scope of discussion within this chapter. 
Notably, however, that phrase was used by the Regulations Review Committee 
when discussing the issue of abrogation of human rights: see Report of the 
Regulations Review Committee, Inquiry into Regulation-Making Powers that 
Authorise International Treaties to Override any Provisions of New Zealand 
Enactments, NZAJHR (2002) I. 16H, 16. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 283 
Chapter 6: Regulations under the United Nations Act 
they impose upon New Zealand, are given effect to through the United 
Nations Act 1946, its preamble stating that it is: 
An Act to confer on the Governor-General in Council power to make 
regulations to enable New Zealand to fulfil the obligations undertaken 
by it under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Section 2(1) of the Act provides that if the Security Council calls upon the 
New Zealand Government to apply any particular measures to give effect 
to a decision of the Council, then the Governor-General in Council may 
make " ... all such regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient 
for enabling those measures to be effectively applied". Regulations made 
under the United Nations Act (United Nations regulations) fall within the 
category of what are known as Henry VIII Clauses, enabling provisions 
that authorise the regulations made thereunder to override primary 
legislation. Sub-section (2) states: 
No regulation made under this Act shall be deemed to be invalid 
because it deals with any matter already provided for by an Act, or 
because of any repugnancy to any Act. 
New Zealand has made various regulations under the United Nations Act in 
response to sanctions imposed by the Security Council. 5 Although the Act 
5 The extant regulations made under the United Nations Act 1946 are: 
& United Nations Sanctions (Afghanistan) Regulations 2001, made for the purpose of 
giving effect to Security Council Resolutions 1267 of 15 October 1999, SIRESI1267 
(1999); and 1333 of 19 December 200, S/RES/1333 (2000). 
United Nations Sanctions (Democratic Republic of the Congo) Regulations 2004, 
made for the purpose of giving effect to Security Council Resolutions 1493 of 28 July 
2003, SlRES/1493 (2003); and 1552 of 27 July 2004, SlRES/1552 (2004). 
• United Nations Sanctions (Iraq) Regulations 1991, made for the purpose of giving 
effect to Security Council Resolutions 661 of 6 August 1990, SIRES/661 (1990); 670 
of 25 September 1990, S/RES/670 (1990); 686 of 2 March 1991, S/RES/686 (1991); 
and 687 of 3 April 1991, S/RES/687 (1991). 
United Nations (Iraq) Reconstruction Regulations 2003, made for the purpose of 
giving effect to Security Council Resolution 1483 of 22 May 2003, S/RES/1483 
(2003). 
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IS principally intended to respond to the making of sanctions by the 
Security Council, which tend to be of an interim nature, the Act does not 
contain any provision linking the life of United Nations regulations to the 
life of the corresponding sanctions. 
6.2 Regulation-Making Powers in New Zealand 
In March 2002, the Regulations Review Committee of New Zealand's 
Forty-Sixth Parliament presented a report entitled Inquiry into Regulation-
Making Powers that Authorise International Treaties to Override any 
Provisions of New Zealand Enactments to the House.6 The report is not 
directly on point, but there are principles enunciated within it that are 
relevant to the question of the Executive's regulation-making powers under 
the United Nations Act and to the interaction between such regulations and 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
As the title suggests, the report of the Regulations Review Committee 
IS concerned with regulations that authorise international treaties to 
United Nations Sanctions (Kimberley Process) Regulations 2004, made for the 
purpose of giving effect to Security Council Resolutions 1306 of 5 July 2000, 
S/RES1l306 (2000); and 1343 of 7 March 2001, S/RES/1343 (2001). 
United Nations Sanctions (Liberia) Regulations 2001, made for the purpose of giving 
effect to Security Council Resolution 1343 of7 March 2001, S/RES/1343 (2001). 
United Nations Sanctions (Rwanda) Regulations 1994, made for the purpose of giving 
effect to Security Council Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994, SlRES/918 (1994). 
United Nations Sanctions (Sierra Leone) Regulations 1997, made for the purpose of 
giving effect to Security Council Resolution 1132 of 8 October 1997, SlRES/1132 
(1997). 
United Nations Sanctions (Somalia) Regulations 1992, made for the purpose of giving 
effect to Security Council Resolution 733 of 23 January 1992, SlRES1733 (1992). 
United Nations Sanctions (Sudan) Regulations 2004, made for the purpose of giving 
effect to Security Council Resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004, S/RES/1556 (2004). 
6 Report of the Regulations Review Committee, Inquiry into Regulation-Making 
Powers that Authorise International Treaties to Override any Provisions of New 
Zealand Enactments, NZAJHR (2002) I. 16H. 
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override any Act of Parliament, the view of the Committee being that (as a 
principle) only Acts should be able to amend other Acts. While this focus 
on international treaties is due to the particular terms of reference of the 
Committee inquiry,7 it is most unfortunate that the Committee did not 
concern itself in any detail with regulation-making powers that might 
authorise obligations under the United Nations Charter (which is, after all, 
one of the most important multilateral treaties in existence) to override any 
Act of Parliament.8 The Committee took a peculiar approach to the issue 
of section 2 of the United Nations Act. On the one hand, it noted concern 
with the breadth of these regulation-making powers. It nevertheless 
dismissed the need to review those powers, stating:9 
We do not seek review of section 2(2) of the United Nations Act 1946, 
as this provision falls within the exceptional circumstances in which 
regulation-making powers authorising overriding treaty regulations are 
justifiable ... 
The Committee did not, however, explain the basis for this conclusion. 
While the issue might appear to be narrow in its focus, it is regrettable that 
it has not been fully considered since it is one that goes to the heart of the 
7 The Committee's terms of reference required it to consider: (1) The 
circumstances in which regulation-making powers that authorise international 
treaties to override any provisions of New Zealand enactments have been used; 
(2) Alternative means of implementing international treaties into New Zealand 
law by regulations that do not authorise the provisions of a treaty to override any 
provisions of New Zealand enactments; (3) The appropriateness of enacting 
regulation-making powers to implement international treaties into New Zealand 
law, notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment; (4) General principles 
for identifying if and when it is appropriate to enact regulation-malting powers 
that authorise international treaties to override any provisions of New Zealand 
enactments; and (5) What limits should be imposed on prescribing regulations to 
implement international treaties by overriding any provisions of New Zealand 
enactments. 
8 It is unclear why the report does not consider the Charter of the United Nations, 
since this is an instrument that would appear to fall within the terms of reference 
(ibid). 
9 Above n 6,29. 
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Committee's inquiry - the balance between Executive law-making 
authority and Parliamentary sovereignty. That, in turn, is an issue that is of 
central importance to this thesis. It should by this stage of the work be 
apparent that consideration of the interface between counter-terrorism and 
human rights is, at a domestic level, one that concerns all three branches of 
the State and involves the separation of powers of each branch and the 
ability of one to check the other. 
Notwithstanding the lack of direct consideration of the United Nations 
Act, there are various matters discussed within the report, and 
recommendations made, that are of relevance to the regulation-making 
power under this legislation. To begin with, the Regulations Review 
Committee was critical of Henry VIII Clauses, the overriding message of 
the Committee being that regulation-making powers should enable the 
derogation of an Act of Parliament only in exceptional circumstances. 1O It 
accordingly recommended that the House consider limiting such powers in 
a number of ways, with the following suggestions having some bearing on 
the power within the United Nations Act 11 
.. Limiting enabling provisions to override the principal Act only; 12 
.. Expressing the particular primary legislation provisions that may be 
overridden by such regulations;13 
10 Ibid, recommendation 1, 17. See also the Regulation Review Committee's 
discussion of Henry VIII Clauses at page 15 and an earlier report of the 
Committee concerning such clauses: Inquiry into the Resource Management 
(Transitional) Regulations 1994 and the Principles that Should Apply to the Use 
of Empowering Provisions Allowing Regulations to Override Primary Legislation 
During a Transitional Period, NZAJHR (1995) 1. 16C. 
11 A number of the recommendations reflect those made by an earlier Committee 
in its 1995 report, above n 6,22. 
12 See Recommendation 3(2), ibid, 4: discussed within pp.21-22 of the report. 
13 See Recommendations 3(3) and 4, ibid, 4: discussed within pp.21-23 of the 
report. 
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.. Limiting such operation to matters of a technical nature or emergency 
measures; 14 
" Providing for additional Parliamentary scrutiny of any such 
regulations; 15 and 
" Prohibiting the derogation of the common law and the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990.16 
Of those recommendations, some warrant further consideration, others only 
brief mention. 
As well as enabling the making of regulations, the United Nations Act 
provides for liability for breach of any regulations made under the Act and 
application of the Act in the Cook Islands. 17 That is, however, the extent of 
the Act. The first recommendation listed above can therefore have little 
application to the Act, the sole purpose of which is to establish a 
mechanism by which the New Zealand Government can comply with 
decisions of the UN Security Council. 
The second recommendation listed, pertaining to explicit reference 
within an empowenng provision to statutory provisions that may be 
overridden by such regulations, is self-explanatory and does not need any 
further consideration. This will effectively be a question for Parliament to 
14 See Recommendation 2, ibid, 4: discussed within pp.19-20 of the report. 
15 See Recommendation 5, ibid, 4: discussed within pp.23-26 of the report. 
16 See Recommendation 3(4), ibid, 4: discussed within pp.16 and 22 of the report. 
17 See sections 3 and 4 of the United Nations Act 1946. The application of the 
Act to the Cook Islands is a carryover of New Zealand's former governance over 
the Cook Islands as a 'non-self-governing territory'. The Cook Islands became 
self-governing in free association with New Zealand on 4 August 1965 and has 
the right at any time to move to full independence by unilateral action: see 
Countryreports.org, 'Cook Islands' URL <http://www.countryreports.org! 
country.asp?countryid=58&countryName=Cook%20Islands> at 20 March 2005. 
Against that background, section 4 of the United Nations Act 1946 provides: 
4. Application to Cook Islands and other territories 
(1) This Act shall be in force in the Cook Islands and, to the extent to which Her 
Majesty has jurisdiction therein, in every other territory for the time being 
administered by Her Majesty's Government in New Zealand. 
(2) Except so far as otherwise expressly provided, regulations made under this Act 
shall not he in force in the Cook Islands or in any such territory as aforesaid. 
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answer. The remaining suggestions do, however, raise some interesting 
issues for United Nations regulations and might assist in deciding the level 
to which these regulations can and should override primary legislation. 
6.2.1 Limiting Enabling Provisions to Emergency Measures 
Although the Committee recognised that there may be a need to make 
regulations which, in a situation of emergency, might require enactments to 
be superseded, it was very cautious in doing so. It noted, for example, that 
mechanisms already exist for the rapid adoption of legislation through the 
House by way of urgency. 18 All the same, it considered that in exceptional 
circumstances, citing the example of the Executive Government needing to 
respond to Security Council resolutions when Parliament is not sitting, 
regulations may be made. 19 
While not given further consideration, it therefore seems that the 
Committee was willing to recognise that regulations made under the United 
Nations Act can be appropriately used to override Acts of Parliament. 
What seems clear, however, is that this should be limited to exceptional 
circumstances. While the Committee does not go on to define the scope of 
such circumstances, it is suggested that the position to be adopted in the 
current context should be to allow Government compliance with UN 
18 The practical observation, however, is that this does not occur very frequently: 
discussion between the author and Professor John Burrows, University of 
Canterbury, 10 March 2005. 
19 Above n 6, 20. The example of the Government being required to establish 
peacekeeping forces under the United Nations Act 1946, in response to measures 
required by the United Nations Security Council, was suggested by the New 
Zealand Law Society as being an appropriate emergency measure justifying 
Henry VIn regulation-making: see Submissions by the New Zealand Law Society 
to the Regulations Review Committee in its Inquiry into Regulation-Making 
Powers that Authorise International Treaties to Override any Provisions of New 
Zealand Enactments, Parliamentary Library, Wellington, paragraph 10. 
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resolutions through regulations only if the resolution requires immediate 
action and when Parliament is not sitting. In the context of the Terrorism 
Regulations, these were made during the 2001 session of Parliament. 
Tying this point to the potential abrogation of human rights, it is 
notable that a similarly restrictive view is adopted within the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As discussed in Chapter Five, 
article 4 of the Covenant permits certain limitations upon rights and 
freedoms when a public emergency which threatens the life of a nation 
arises. A State partin cannot, however, derogate from certain specific 
rights and may not take discriminatory measures on a number of specified 
grounds?l States are also under an obligation to inform other States parties 
immediately, through the UN Secretary-General, of the derogations it has 
made including the reasons for such derogations and the date on which the 
derogations are terminated?2 The Human Rights Committee signalled in 
its general comment on the application of article 4 that this is limited to 
states of emergency, as provided for within municipal legislation setting 
out grounds upon which a state of emergency may be declared.23 It also 
expressed the view that measures taken under article 4 are of an 
20 Which includes New Zealand, as discussed within Chapter Four. 
21 Article 4(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights qualifies 
the ability to derogate by stating that "No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 
(paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision" 
those articles relating to the right to life (article 6), freedom from torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 7), the prohibition of 
slavery and servitude (article 8( 1) and (2», freedom from imprisonment for failure 
to fulfil a contract, freedom from retrospective penalties (article 15), the right to 
be recognised as a person before the law (article 16) and freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (article 18). 
22 Article 4(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
23 See Derogation of Rights (Art. 4), CCPR General Comment 5 (31/07/81), para 
2. 
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exceptional and temporary nature and can only last as long as the life of the 
nation concerned is threatened. 
6.2.2 Providing Additional Parliamentary Scrutiny 
Greater scrutiny by Parliament of Henry VIII regulations was something 
recommended by the Committee. Under current procedures, the 
Regulations (Disallowance) Act provides for what is known as a 
"negative" procedure of Parliamentary approval. 24 That is, regulations 
remain in force unless specifically disallowed by Parliament. The 
alternative "positive" procedure for scrutiny would provide that regulations 
do not corne into force until first allowed by Parliament?5 As recently 
noted by the Regulations Review Committee, this is a reasonably common 
(and growing feature) of the making of regulations in New Zealand.26 As 
well as positive and negative approval procedures, a third method is used in 
England: the 'super affirmative procedure'. The procedure is intended for 
scrutiny of regulations of an important or sensitive nature such that 
Parliament should consider, through a specialised Parliamentary 
Committee, the regulations in their draft form rather than waiting for them 
to be made and subsequently disallowing them.27 The benefits are 
24 See section 6 of the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989 and Standing Order 
382 of New Zealand Standing Orders of the House of Representatives. 
2S For further discussion on positive approval procedures, see Thornton GC, 
Legislative Drafting, (4th ed, Butterworths, 1996), 337. The only positive 
procedures in New Zealand are contained within: (1) the enabling provision of 
section 4(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975, which requires a resolution of the 
House approving any regulations made under that Act before they can come into 
force; and section 78B of the Dog Control Act 1996 (inserted by section 46 of the 
Dog Control Amendment Act 2003). 
26 Regulations Review Committee, Interim Report on the Inquiry into the 
Affilmative Resolution Procedure, NZAJHR (2004), 1 16F, 3. 
27 For further discussion on the proce'ls, see Tudor P, "Secondary Legislation: 
Second Class or Crucial?", Statute Law Review, Volume 21, 149. 
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naturally two-fold: Parliament is able to have input and control of the 
process prior to the regulations coming into force; and the Executive 
Government can be sure that important and sensitive matters are given 
effect to in a timely manner, without the risk of subsequent disallowance.28 
6.2.3 Regulations Abrogating Rights and Freedoms 
In its submissions to the Regulations Review Committee, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade made the very valid point that there are 
significant benefits to be gained from the use of overriding treaty 
regulations. 29 It pointed to this allowing the Executive to ensure 
compliance with treaty obligations and avoiding wasted time by Parliament 
in considering technical, rather than policy, matters. 
A similar approach might be adopted to the situation of international 
obligations under the United Nations Charter, although an important 
distinction needs to be made at this point. The submissions of the Ministry 
made a broad distinction between matters of policy and technical matters 
and equated bilateral treaties as being technical, versus multilateral treaties 
as often involving policy issues.3o Where, within that scale, do obligations 
imposed by the UN Security Council fall? There is no absolute answer. 
From one perspective, resolutions of the Security Council are adopted as an 
exercise by the Council of its mandate under the United Nations Charter31 
28 An example of this procedure in the United Kingdom, cited within the 
Committee's Report, is the approval of remedial orders under the Human Rights 
Act 1998: above n 6,26. 
29 See Submissions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the 
Regulations Review Committee in its Inquiry into Regulation-Making Powers that 
Authorise International Treaties to Override any Provisions of New Zealand 
Enactments, Parliamentary Library, Wellington. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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and are likewise binding upon States through the Charter,32 which is a 
multilateral treaty.33 Adopting the Ministry's broad categorisation, such 
resolutions might therefore be considered as involving matters of policy. 
The reality, however, is that obligations imposed upon States under 
resolution of the Security Council are quite often very specific and 
technical (particularly when. calling.for the imposition of trade: sanctions 
and the like). The question must therefore be addressed having regard to 
the substance of each particular resolution and its effect. 
If the effect of UN regulations is to abrogate human rights, by 
impacting upon the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the Privacy Act, or the 
Human Rights Act, that is clearly a matter of policy rather than mere 
technicalities. Adopting the philosophy behind the Ministry's own 
submissions, such matters must therefore be within the influence of 
Parliament. Where human rights are to be affected, the ability of 
Parliament to carry out its role as "guardian of the public interest,,34 must 
be protected. Central to that role, as recognised by the Committee, is the 
protection of rights and freedoms. 35 
This is not to suggest that non-compliance with Security Council 
resolutions is acceptable. Indeed, non-compliance with mandatory 
provisions of a resolution of the Council36 would be contrary to New 
32 Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
33 There are 191 States parties to the Charter of the United Nations. 
34 That phrase having been adopted by the Regulations Review Committee when 
discussing the issue of abrogation of human rights: above n 6, 16. 
35 Ibid, 17. 
36 That is, with mandatory directions within Security Council resolutions made 
under Chapter vn of the Charter of the United Nations: see discussion of the 
significance of mandatory, as opposed to exhortatory, language in Chapter Three, 
3.3.1 Resolutions of the Security Council. 
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Zealand's obligations as a member of the United Nations.37 If that 
occurred, the Security Council would be entitled to issue sanctions against 
New Zealand for its failure to comply. 38 The issue being addressed here 
concerns the manner in which such obligations are implemented by New 
Zealand, by whom they are implemented (the Executive alone, Parliament 
alone, or the Executive with Parliamentary scrutiny), having regard to the 
consequences of the implementing regulations (potentially abrogating 
human rights). 
6.3 The Issue in Context: Countera Terrorism versus Human Rights 
The issue being considered here (the relationship between regulations made 
under the United Nations Act and human rights) is one that, unless 
subsequently taken up by the Regulations Review Committee, is relatively 
academic in nature. Discussion of the issue, to this point, has 
predominantly been in the abstract. It is therefore useful to place the issue 
in context by considering the Terrorism Regulations made in response to 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. 
6.3.1 Suppressing the Financing of Terrorism 
As discussed within Chapter Two, the primary objective of Resolution 
1373 is to suppress the financing of terrorist activities and entities by 
imposition of specific obligations to achieve those ends. In that regard, 
there is natural logic to the notion that combating terrorism can, at least in 
part, be achieved or assisted by the suppression of the financing of terrorist 
37 Charter of the United Nations, article 25. 
38 See Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, articles 41 and 42 in 
particular. 
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organisations. By cutting off the monetary means of, or access to finance 
by, terrorist groups the ability of those groups to obtain arms and 
explosives and to pay for the various means by which terrorist acts can be 
committed will be stifled. 39 
As also intimated within Chapter Two, of the twelve conventions on 
counter-terrorism, the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism is possibly the most controversial. It requires 
States parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of 
terrorists, whether direct or indirect, through groups claiming to have 
charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in such illicit 
activities as drug trafficking or gun running. It commits States to hold 
those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or administratively liable 
for such acts and provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of 
funds allocated for terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the 
forfeited funds with other States on a case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy is 
no justification for refusing to cooperate under the treaty. 
Security Council Resolution 1373 was adopted soon after 11 September 
2001, through which the Council determined that all States are to prevent 
and suppress the financing of terrorist acts, including the criminalisation of 
such financing and the freezing of funds and financial assets.40 Described 
as one of the most strongly worded resolutions in the history of the 
Security Council,41 it also requires countries to cooperate on extradition 
39 See the preamble to the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, above n 2. 
4{) Above n 1. 
41 Richard Rowe, "Key Developments: Year of International Law in Review", A 
paper presented at the 10th Annual Meeting of the Australian & New Zealand 
Society of International Law, New Challenges and New States: What Role for 
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matters and the sharing of information about terrorist networks.42 As a 
decision made under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 
compliance with the latter Resolution is mandatory under international 
law.43 
6.3.2 The Terrorism Regulations 
In its first report to the Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee 
under paragraph 6 of the Resolution, New Zealand stated that it would be 
in full compliance with the Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism once the Terrorism Suppression Bm was passed 
into law.44 By way of interim measure, the Government implemented the 
relevant obligations by passing the Terrorism Regulations made under the 
United Nations Act. New Zealand reported that further legislation would 
be introduced to give effect to the remaining obligations under Resolution 
1373, adding further provisions to the Terrorism Suppression Bill (now 
Act) and amending other legislation such as the Crimes Act 1961 and the 
Immigration Act 1987. This was eventually achieved through the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2003. 
International Law?, 15 June 2002, Australian National University, Canberra. 
Richard Rowe worked, at that time, in the International Organisations and Legal 
Division of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. He was the 
Australian representative and Vice-Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee 
Established by General Assembly Resolution 511210 during its Sixth Session, 
which followed the September 11 attacks. 
42 Above, n I, para 3. 
43 Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
44 Report to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, New Zealand, 2 
January 2002, S12001l1269. New Zealand's subsequent report, within which it 
addressed various questions posed to it by the Committee, was submitted on 10 
July 2002. The Bill was passed into law in 2002. 
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The question in context is this: were the regulations made within the 
terms of the empowering provision under the United Nations Act 1946? If 
the answer is in the negative, and it is disclosed that the New Zealand 
Government in fact exceeded its authority in an endeavour to present a 
positive report to the Security Council, then the relevant provisions of the 
regulations would have been ultra vires.45 
If, on the other hand, the regulations did no more than what is permitted 
by the United Nations Act, it is suggested that this is not necessarily the 
end of the matter. Under the Regulations (Disallowance) Act 1989, all 
regulations made after 19 December 1989 must be put before the House of 
Representatives. Under Parliamentary Standing Orders, such regulations 
are in fact presented to the Regulations Review Committee.46 Aspects of 
the Committee's 2002 report to the House on regulation-making powers 
raise the issue of whether, notwithstanding the potentially proper making of 
the regulations in question, it was appropriate for the Executive to act in 
the way it did. This involves consideration of issues surrounding the 
treaty-making process within New Zealand, and various comments within 
the Committee's Report concerning the making of regulations that impact 
upon Acts of Parliament. 
6.3.3 l!.xamining the Terrorism Regulations 
Having regard to the controversial nature of the Financing of Terrorism 
Convention, and the fact that New Zealand reported to the Security Council 
45 See, for example. Official Assignee v ChieJ Executive Officer oj the Ministry oj 
Fisheries (CA) [2002J 2 NZLR 722. 
46 Standing Order 382 of New Zealand Standing Orders of the House oj 
Representatives. 
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Committee that (by way of interim measure) it implemented the financial 
regulation obligations through the Terrorism Regulations,47 is there cause 
for concern? First, are the regulations beyond or within the statutory 
authority under the United Nations Act? Next, is there a conflict between 
the Regulations and the Bill of Rights? 
As discussed, the United Nations Act empowering provision permits 
the Executive to make regulations in order to comply with any 
requirements imposed upon New Zealand by the Security Council under 
article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Terrorism Regulations 
contain various provisions relating to financial regulation, creating offences 
where the Government is satisfied that a person has financed a terrorist 
group (as defined within the Schedule to the Regulations).48 This, 
according to the Regulations' preamble, has been done for the purpose of 
giving effect to Resolution 49 If . .. h h , upon exammatlon, It was sown t at 
the regulations were outside the terms of the empowering provision, what 
would the consequences be? First, it would mean that the regulations 
would be ultra vires the empowering Act,5o Added to this would be the 
47 It should be noted, however, that the New Zealand's report does not say that the 
Regulations incorporated the obligations under the International Convention on 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. It only said that the Regulations 
were there to give effect to the financial regulation obligations imposed under 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. 
48 Limited to AI-Qaida, the Taliban and Usama bin Laden: see the Schedule to the 
United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and Afghanistan Measures) 
Regulations 2001 and the Regulation's definitions of those entities within 
regulation 4( I). 
49 The Regulations are also stated to be made to give effect to United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 1267 of 15 October 1999 and United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1333 of 19 December 2000 (which specifically relate 
to the regulation of financial and other assistance to the Taliban regime ill 
Afghanistan). 
50 See Robertson Adams on Criminal Law (Brookers Loose-Leaf), 10-30. 
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fact that the regulations would bypass the legislative process mandated 
within the House of Representatives Standing Orders.51 
Upon close inspection of the Terrorism Regulations, it transpires that 
the regulations do not appear to offend the scope of the empowering 
provision, nor the Bill of Rights. The offences created by the Regulations 
were clearly within the scope of obligations imposed upon New Zealand 
through paragraph 1 of Resolution 1373: 
1. Decides that all States shall: 
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts; 
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, 
directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their 
territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the 
know ledge that they are to. be used, in order to carry out terrorist 
acts; 
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist 
acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of 
entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; 
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of 
such persons and entities, including funds derived or generated 
from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such 
persons and associated persons and entities; 
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their 
territories from making any funds, financial assets or economic 
resources or financial or other related services available, directly or 
indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to 
commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist 
acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such 
persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the 
direction of such persons; 
The Regulations did not go as far as the Financing of Terrorism 
Convention goes, nor the Terrorism Suppression Act (NZ) - through 
Sl See Standing Orders 384 to 387 inclusive of the New Zealand Standing Orders 
of the House of Representatives, which require international treaties (that are 
proposed to be ratified or acceded to by the Executive Government) to be 
presented to the House with a "National Interest Assessment". See also the report 
of the New Zealand Law Commission, The Treaty Making Process: Reform and 
the Role of Parliament, Report 45 (1995), Wellington; and a recent private 
member's bill, the International Treaties Bill. 
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which the Convention was eventually incorporated into domestic law.52 
Neither was the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, nor the Privacy or Human 
Rights Acts, impinged upon. The offences within the Regulations were 
framed within the context of conduct in support of terrorist organisations 
where the person knows that slhe is doing so. This is in fact much 
narrower in focus than the equivalent provisions of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002, which drew much criticism on account of the broad 
definition of terrorist groups and liability for reckless conduct within 
sections 8 and 9 of the Act.53 The Executive acted responsibly, in the 
author's view, to avoid any potential natural justice54 or rule of lawss 
conflicts between the Regulations and human rights. 
This is all positive news and displays a responsible approach on the 
part of the Executive in using regulations for counter-terrorist measures. 
52 It could not, however, be said that New Zealand's initial report to the Security 
Council Counter Terrorism Committee was misleading. As discussed at note 40 
above, it only said that the Regulations were there to give effect to the financial 
regulation obligations imposed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1373. 
53 See, for example, Submissions of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New 
Zealand to the Foreign AfJairs, Defence and Trade Committee on the Terrorism 
<Bombings and Finance> Suppression Bill, TERROI63, and Submissions of the 
New Zealand Banker's Association to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee on the Terrorism <Bombings and Finance> Suppression Bill, 
TERRO/133, Parliamentary Library, Wellington. 
54 A criticism that might be directed towards the Terrorism Suppression Acts 
designation process, through which a group is able to be categorised as being a 
terrorist group on the basis (potentially) of information not disclosed to the 
designee for national security reasons (thereby stifling the right to be heard and 
make a proper response), and the very limited judicial scrutiny of the process and 
potential recourse to the judiciary: see Chapter Seven. 
55 A criticism that might be made of the Terrorism Suppression Act's offence 
regime due to the broad definition of terrorist groups and the consequential 
inability of citizens to regulate their conduct in accordance with reasonably 
accessible law. The Solicitor-General's advice to the Attorney-General, however, 
was that the definitional provisions of the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) 
Bill did not pose such a problem and guaranteed certainty: Letter from the 
Solicitor-General to the Attorney-General, "re Terrorism Suppression Bill: Slip 
Amendments - PCO 3814B/11 Our Ref: ATTI 14/1048 (15)", 9 November 2001, 
paras 6-15. 
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Notwithstanding this, two potential problems remain. First is the fact that 
the power to make "Henry VIII" regulations inconsistent with the 
NZBORA nevertheless remains with the Executive under the United 
Nations Act (whether exercised or not). Secondly, and this might be of 
more concern, is the potential for the UN Security Council to adopt a 
resolution with obligations upon the Executive that do, in fact, impact upon 
rights and freedoms. In such a situation, the New Zealand Government 
would be bound, by reason of article 25 of the United Nations Charter, to 
give effect to such directions. What then? Which obligations are to be 
given priority: those under the United Nations Charter or those under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (as incorporated 
through the NZBORA)? 
6.4 The Issue 
of Rights Act 
How " ..... JOu.u Nations 
The foregoing discussion leads to these conclusions. Regulations made 
under the United Nations Act are open to "negative" procedural scrutiny by 
Parliament, such that they will come into force on the date nominated 
within the regulations unless actively disallowed by Parliament. When in 
force, the regulations have the potential to override the Bill of Rights Act, 
to the extent in which they might limit any right or freedom contained 
therein by the express provisions of the regulations. In view of the 
principles propounded by the Regulations Review Committee, however, 
one might ask (and this, in the writer's view, is a constitutionally 
significant question): how should regulations be made under the United 
Nations Act, in particular to afford New Zealand citizens with protection 
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from unfettered Executive law-making power and/or over-zealous direction 
from the UN Security Council threatening the abrogation of human rights? 
6.4.1 Operative Provisions of the Bill of Rights Act 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the operative provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, sections 4, 5 and 6, direct how the Act is to be applied to other 
legislation and, thereby, how the Bill of Rights is to be used as a tool of 
. • 56 
statutory mterpretatIon. 
Given that regulations made under the United Nations Act are "Henry 
VIII" regulations, how do these operative sections apply? Two issues 
arise: (1) does section 6 of the NZBORA require the regulations to be made 
consistently with the Bill of Rights Act; and (2) does section 4 of the Bill 
of Rights, combined with section 2(2) of the United Nations Act, provide 
United Nations regulations with special protection? 
6.4.2 Applying Section 6 of the NZBORA 
The position here is simple. By application of the general principles of 
statutory interpretation, one could argue that section 6 of the Bill of Rights 
requires subordinate legislation to be made in a manner that is consistent 
with the NZBORA, lest that subordinate legislation (including UN 
regulations) be ultra vires its empowering Act.57 By virtue of section 6, 
wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights Act "that meaning shall be preferred to any 
other meaning". This was the approach taken by the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in Drew v Attorney-General, where the Court was faced with the 
56 Chapter Four, 4.3.2(a) The unholy trinity of sections 4,5 and 6 .. 
57 Above n 41. 
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question of whether regulations preventing legal representation were ultra 
vires the empowering section of the Penal Institutions Act 1954 by reason 
of inconsistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.58 
Adopting that approach, the United Nations Act empowering provision 
must be construed consistently with the NZBORA so that it does not confer 
upon its delegate the power to make subordinate legislation which infringes 
the Bill of Rights Act.59 
6.4.3 Applying section 4 of the NZBORA to section 2(2) of the UN Act 
The next question to consider is whether section 4 of the Bill of Rights, 
combined with section 2(2) of the United Nations Act, provides United 
Nations regulations with special protection. The effect of section 4 of the 
NZBORA is that no provision of an enactment can be treated as invalid or 
ineffective if that provision is irreconcilably in conflict with the Bill of 
Rights.60 Against that background, does section 4 of the Bill of Rights 
protect the "Henry VIII" status of regulations made under the United 
Nations Act?61 To answer this, a further question needs to be considered: 
is section 2(2) of the UN Act irreconcilably in conflict with the Bill of 
Rights? 
58 Drew v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 58: discussed in Chapter Four, 
4.3.2(b) The meaning of the terms "enactments". 
59 Ibid. 
60 Chapter Four, ** 
61 As provided by section 2(2) of the United Nations Act 1946. 
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As just discussed, section 6 of the Bill of Rights requires enactments to 
be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with it. How, then, is section 
2(2) of the United Nations Act to be interpreted? Section 2(2) provides: 
No regulation made under this Act shall be deemed to be invalid 
because it deals with any matter already provided for by an Act, or 
because of any repugnancy to any Act. 
However, nowhere in the United Nations Act is there an authority to 
regulate in a manner inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. One possible 
interpretation, then, is that since such authority is not contained within the 
Act itself, then regulations made under the Act cannot be repugnant to the 
provisions of the NZBORA. This would certainly be an interpretation that 
is more consistent with the Bill of Rights and is therefore to be preferred by 
application of section 6 of the NZBORA to section 2(2) of the UN Act. On 
the other hand, it might be argued that the words of section 2(2) do not 
avail themselves of the potential interpretation proffered, since they clearly 
provide validity to regulations despite "any repugnancy to any Act" 
[emphasis added]. 
6.4.4 Conclusion? 
By arriving at such a relatively neutral position, or at least one that is 
arguable either way, it is difficult to draw a positive conclusion. What the 
analysis illustrates, however, is the potential dichotomy between the 
maintenance of peace and security and that of human rights standards: the 
central conflict being considered within this thesis. Within the 
recommendations that follow, it will be proposed that this dichotomy is 
such that it places itself squarely within the realm of policy considerations 
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that should remain within the purview of Parliament and not the Executive 
Government alone. 
6.5 Recommendations 
In the absence of a specific and comprehensive review and report by the 
Regulations Review Committee itself, the author makes the following 
recommendations regarding the regulation-making power under the United 
Nations Act 1946: 
" First, it is proposed that the issues raised within this chapter are such 
that a review by the New Zealand Parliament of the empowering 
provision under section 2 of the Act is warranted. Such review should 
take place within the framework of the recommendations that follow. 
.. Next, and following very closely III line with the Committee's 
Recommendation 3(3) pertaining to international treaties, Parliament 
should consider expressing the particular primary legislation provisions 
that may be overridden by United Nations regulations. Alternatively, 
and this links with the subsequent recommendations, the empowering 
provision might be amended at least to prohibit the overriding of any 
provision within the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, and 
possibly any provision of the Privacy Act 1993 and Human Rights Act 
1993. 
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It Third, it is recommended that the regulation-making power and process 
should be limited to either of the following extents: 
" Empowering the making of regulations only if the Security 
Council resolution in question requires immediate action and 
Parliament is not sitting. 
and/or 
.. Empowering the making of regulations only if the Security 
Council resolution in question concerns a matter which threatens 
the life of New Zealand and then only by way of temporary 
measures. 
and/or 
.. Introducing a "super affirmative" Parliamentary approval 
procedure for the making of United Nations regulations, through 
which a specialised Parliamentary committee would consider the 
regulations in their draft form and, in doing so, reflect upon the 
question of what limitations those regulations might place upon 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the NZBORA and, if 
any such limitations are exposed, whether these are justifiable in a 
free and democratic society. 
By adopting the latter restriction(s), Parliament would retain control 
over the policy aspects involved in weighing any conflict between New 
Zealand's obligations under the United Nations Charter versus those 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
thereby preserve its role and the protector of the public interest. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
Although examination of the United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism 
Suppression and Afghanistan Measures) Regulations 2001 has not 
disclosed any potentially ultra vires provisions, consideration of the 
Regulations has triggered contemplation of an important issue. Namely, 
how the balance of power is to be attained in the situation of subordinate 
legislation made under the United Nations Act 1946 (in pursuit of 
international security measures mandated by the UN Security Council). 
Regrettably, there has been little direct consideration of the issue within 
New Zealand. This chapter has therefore examined the issue and outlined 
the potential dangers that exist with the regulation-making power under the 
Act. First, the Executive may make regulations that are not subject to 
scrutiny; second, those regulations have superior status over Acts of 
Parliament; and third, they may be used to limit human rights with no 
power of recourse to the Courts. The recommendations made seek to 
achieve a balance between national and international security, with the 
desire to maintain and protect human rights and preserve the "checking" 
function under the separation of powers doctrine. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 307 
Chapter 7 
Terrorist Designations and Rights to Justice 
At the heart of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 is the process by which 
organisations or individuals can be designated "terrorist entities". The 
process is governed by no less than twenty-two sections in the Act. The 
term "terrorist entities" is also linked to the operation of two other 
significant features of the Terrorism Suppression Act (TSA). Firstly, it is 
an offence under the Act to deal with property of terrorist or associated 
entities; to make property, or financial or related services available to such 
entities (unless authorised by the Prime Minister); to recruit any person to 
be a member of a designated terrorist entity; and to participate in the 
activities of such entities, for proscribed purposes. l Secondly, designations 
are significant since they impose repmting obligations upon those that are 
in possession or immediate control of property suspected to be owned or 
controlled by a terrorist or associated entity? 
Within Chapter Three of this thesis, the terrorist designation process 
was identified as one that may potentially conflict with rights to natural 
justice, particularly concerning access by a designated person to 
information upon which the Prime Minister has issued a designation, and 
the consequent ability of a person or organisation to respond to an 
1 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 9 to 13 inclusive: discussed in 
Chapter Three, 3.11.2(b) O.ffences. 
2 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 43 to 47 inclusive: discussed in 
Chapter Three, 3.11.2(e) Financial transactions reporting. 
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allegation of being a terrorist or associated entity.3 The aim of this chapter 
is to consider those questions. In doing so, a more detailed explanation of 
the designation process will be gIVen, followed by identification of 
potentially conflicting provisions within the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 (NZBORA) concerning natural justice. It will then fall to be 
considered whether any limitation of rights is justifiable. 
7.1 The Terrorist Designation Process 
Internally, within the Terrorism Suppression Act, and as indicated above, 
the process of designations is linked with the creation of offences and with 
reporting obligations. Externally, the process is linked with New Zealand's 
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to comply with 
resolutions of the Security Council and, in this particular context, the 
Council's designation of individuals or organisations as terrorist entities.4 
As indicated within Chapter Three, New Zealand has currently only 
designated those entities identified by the Security Council. 5 
This part of the chapter is reasonably expository in nature, with the aim 
of clearly establishing the operation of the designation process for later 
analysis. It considers the making of designations, the means by which 
designations may be reviewed, and the treatment of classified security 
information. 
3 Chapter Three, 3.11.4 Potential Civil and Political Rights Issues, and 3.14 
Potential Civil and Political Rights Issues. 
4 Through the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 
1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and Associated Individuals 
and Entities: discussed in Chapter Three, 3.11.2(c) Designation of "terrorist 
entities". 
5 Ibid. 
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7.1.1 The Making of Designations 
Designations under the Terrorism Suppression Act, whether interim or 
final, have the same consequences in terms of their linkage with offences 
and with reporting obligations (impacting upon third parties directly, and 
upon designated entities as a result of the fact that dealings with them are 
prohibited). The designations can also impact upon designated entities by 
virtue of the fact that property owned or controlled by a person or group 
that is the subject of a final designation can be forfeited to the Crown if that 
property is in New Zealand. 6 The primary difference between the two 
types of designation, as will be seen in the following discussion, is the 
standard of belief required to be had by the Prime Minister before the 
making of a designation, and the life of each type of designation. 
7.1.1(a) Interim versus final designations. As indicated, the primary 
difference between interim and final designations is the level of belief 
required of the Prime Minister regarding the status or conduct of the person 
or group being designated. An interim designation can be made where the 
Prime Minister has "good cause to suspect" that an entity has done certain 
6 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 55: discussed in Chapter Three, 
3.1l.2(d) Forfeiture of terrorist property. Such forfeiture can only occur on 
application to the High Court by the Attorney-General and if the designation is 
one that has been extended beyond the normal three year period (under section 35 
of the Act) and the Court is satisfied that it would be appropriate to forfeit the 
property rather than simply continue with the prohibition against dealing with it 
(section 9). Effectively, then, the property of a designated entity is "frozen", in 
that others are prohibited from dealing with it, but cannot be forfeited unless the 
designation is extended beyond three years and the prohibition against dealing 
with the property is not sufficient. 
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things, while a final designation requires a belief "on reasonable grounds" 
to be held by the Prime Minister. 7 
There is no requirement that an entity be first designated on an interim 
basis before designation on a final basis. A final designation can be made 
in respect of a group or person that has never been the subject of an interim 
designation, or is at that time the subject of an interim designation, or was 
the subject of an interim designation that subsequently expired or was 
revoked.S If, however, a final designation is made in respect of an entity 
that is already the subject of an interim designation, the latter becomes 
revoked as a result of the making of the final designation.9 In the case of 
an entity that has already been the subject of a final designation, and where 
that designation was revoked, a further final designation is permitted, but 
only if this is based on information that became available since the 
revocation of the earlier designation. 10 
7.1.1(b) of designations. A direct reflection of the differing 
standards required for interim versus final designations is found in the 
length of time that each type of designation can remain in force. In the 
case of interim designations, requiring the lower standard of proof of "good 
cause to suspect", the designation can last only up to 30 days,l1 unless 
earlier revoked12 or replaced by a final designation. 13 Importantly, a person 
7 Compare Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 22(1) and (3) (final 
designations) with section 20(1) and (3) (interim designations). 
8 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 23(a). 
9 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 23(b). 
10 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 23(c). 
II Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 21(e). 
12 The Prime Minister has the authority, under section 34 of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002, to revoke interim or final designations. 
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or organisation cannot be made the subject of repeated interim designations 
in an attempt to extend a designation under this lower threshold. 14 The 
only exception to this rule is that an interim designation will continue if it 
becomes the subject of judicial review or other proceedings before a court 
(and is not otherwise revoked)15 until those proceedings are withdrawn or 
finally determined. 16 
In contrast, final designations currently last for three years from the 
date they are made, unless earlier revoked. I? As in the case of interim 
designations, if the final designation becomes the subject of judicial 
proceedings, that designation continues to operate, even beyond the three 
year period. IS Otherwise, for a final designation to continue beyond three 
years, it must be extended for a further period of three years by an order of 
the High Court.19 To do so, the Attorney-General must satisfy the Court, 
on the balance of probabilities, that the entity is the subject of criminal 
proceedings for terrorist acts,20 or has been convicted of terrorist acts in an 
13 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 22: see discussion below at 7.1.2 
Final Designations. 
14 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 21(a). 
15 The designation could be earlier revoked under section 23(b) of 34 of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 
16 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 21(f). 
17 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 23(g)(i) and 34. The Terrorism 
(Bombings and Financing) Bill had provided that designations remain active for 
five years: see clause 17V of the Bill, as contained within the select committee's 
interim report - Foreign Mfairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, Interim 
Report on the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, 8 November 2001. In its 
final report on the Bill, the Committee recommended that this be reduced to three 
years, stating that "it is important that the designation of a person or group as a 
terrorist or associated entity expire, so designations do not continue after the 
reasons for making them cease to exist": see Foreign Mfairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee, Final Report on the Terrorism «Bombings and Financing» 
Suppression Bill, 22 March 2002. 
18 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 23(h). 
19 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 23(g)(ii) and 35(2). 
20 Whether in New Zealand or overseas: see Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, 
section 37(a). 
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overseas tribunal (on a final basis),21 or is a terrorist or associated entity.22 
This can be done on a repeated basis. 23 A decision of the High Court on an 
application for the extension of a designation can be appealed to the Court 
of Appeal by any party to that application. 24 
The Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004 looks to 
extend the life of final designations beyond the current three years.25 In 
explaining the proposed amendment, it is necessary to provide some 
background on two matters. First, and as discussed within Chapter Three, 
the Terrorism Suppression Act contains a review mechanism, whereby a 
parliamentary select committee is to consider the operation of the 
provisions of the Act pertaining to Security Council Resolution 1373?6 
The select committee is to report to the House by 1 December 2005 on the 
findings of its review, including whether any amendments to the Act are 
recommended. 27 The second matter concerns the status of current 
designations under the Act. The current three-year life of final 
designations, means that the 318 entities listed by the Security Council and 
designated under the Act as terrorist or associated entities will expire in 
October 2005?S Coupled with the requirement to obtain extensions by the 
21 That is, convicted in criminal proceedings that are not subject to any appeal and 
that are finally determined: see Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 23(b). 
22 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 35(c) and (d). Compare these tests to 
their equivalents for interim and final designations under sections 20 and 22. 
23 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 35(2) to (5). 
24 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, setion 41. 
25 Chapter Three, 3. 11.2(c) Designation of "terrorist entities", 
26 Chapter Three, 3.11.3 Review Mechanism. 
27 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 70. 
28 Press Release, 'Amendments to Tighten Terrorism Suppression Act', URL 
<http://www.behive.govt.nzlView Document.cfm ?DocumentID=21825> at 8 
January 2005. See also Ministry of Justice, Terrorism Suppression Amendment 
Bill (No 2), Government Bill, 242-1, Explanatory Note, presented to the House 14 
December 2004, 2. 
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High Court, Minister of Justice Phil Goff has said that it would be 
impossible for each designation to be renewed individually. 29 
These two factors (the forthcoming committee review and the need to 
renew hundreds of designations before the High Court) prompted the 
Government to establish a temporary statutory extension of those 
designations. In this regard, the aim of the Terrorism Suppression 
Amendment Bill is to extend current designations so that they do not expire 
until two years after the presentation of the committee's report on the 
review of the Terrorism Suppression Act.3o This seems entirely sensible, 
since the select committee will no doubt give consideration to the 
designation process and the methods of review and extension. The 
committee may, as a result of that process, recommend amendments to this 
feature of the designation process. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice appears 
to anticipate that a new procedure for renewal of designations will emerge 
as a result of the select committee review. In its General Policy Statement 
on the Bill, explaining the need to delay the renewal process, it said that "it 
is desirable that the same procedure apply to all applications for renewal 
under the Act", and continued: 31 
This Bill therefore provides for an extension of the designations for 2 
years after the date on which the select committee reports to 
Parliament. This timeframe will enable the select committee to 
complete its consideration and report, and for any reSUlting changes to 
the legislation to be implemented. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004, clause 6. 
31 New Zealand Ministry of Justice, Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 
2j, Government Bill, 242-1, Explanatory Note, presented to the House 14 
December 2005, 2. 
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7.1.1(c) Terrorist entities and associated entities. A further distinction to 
be made, although one applicable to both interim and final designations, is 
the 'class' of designations that can be made. A person or group can be 
designated as either a "terrorist entity" or an "associated entity", the 
distinction essentially depending upon that person's or group's past 
conduct. Where the Prime Minister has good cause to suspect (interim 
designation) or believes on reasonable grounds (final designation) that an 
entity "has knowingly carried out, or has knowingly participated in the 
carrying out of, 1 or more terrorist acts", then that entity can be designated 
as a terrorist entity.32 Associated entities can be designated where there is 
suspicion or belief that an entity is facilitating or participating in the 
execution of a terrorist act, or is acting on behalf of or at the direction of a 
terrorist entity, or is wholly owned or effectively controlled by a terrorist 
entity.33 the case of final designations, the Prime Minister can later 
change the description of the designation from "terrorist entity" to 
"associated entity" (or vice versa) by signing a written notice to that 
effect.34 
7.1.1(d) Political consultation. Before making interim designations of 
either terrorist or associated entities, the Prime Minister must consult with 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.35 The Prime Minister and 
32 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 20(1) (interim designation as a 
terrorist entity) and 22(1) (final designation as a terrorist entity). Note that the 
term "terrorist acts" is defined through sections 4 and 5 of the Act: see Chapter 
Three, 3.11.2(a) Definition of "terrorist act". 
33 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 20(3) (interim designation as an 
association entity) and 22(3) (final designation as an association entity). 
34 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 29A, as inserted through the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2003, section 14. 
35 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 20(4). 
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Attorney-General must also advise the Leader of the Opposition of the 
making of a designation and, if requested, brief the Leader on the factual 
basis for the making of the designation.36 If practicable, this must be done 
before the designation is publicly notified, or as soon as possible after the 
notification. In the case of final designations, the Prime Minister must first 
consult with the Attorney-General about any proposed final designation, 
rather than the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.37 Advice to the 
Leader of the Opposition is not prescribed.38 Finally, the Prime Minister is 
bound to consult with the Attorney-General before deciding on whether to 
continue or revoke a designation, where the Prime Minister is requested 
under section 34(1) ofthe Act to reconsider the designation. 
7.1.1(e) Material on which designations may be based. In making either an 
interim or final designation, the Prime Minister can rely on "any relevant 
information". 39 Two categories of information, however, are accorded 
special status. The first is information provided by the United Nations 
Security Council, which is deemed by section 31(1) of the Act to be 
sufficient evidence of the matters to which it relates, in the absence of any 
evidence to the contrary. Where such information indicates that the 
Security Council, or one of its Committees, considers that an entity is one 
36 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 20(5). 
37 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 22(4). Compare this with interim 
designations, which require the Prime Minister to consult with the Minister of 
Foreign Mfairs and Trade: section 20(4) of the Act. 
38 Compare with the need to advise and brief in the case of interim designations: 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 20(5). 
39 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 30. 
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that would otherwise satisfy the municipal tests for cause to designate,40 
then the Prime Minister may make a corresponding municipal 
designation. 41 Indeed, the Prime Minister may be obliged to do so to 
enable New Zealand to comply with article 25 of the UN Charter, 
depending on the source and language of the information.42 
The second category of information dealt with under the Act is 
classified security information, being information held by the New Zealand 
police or an intelligence and security agency, where the head of the agency 
has certified that the information cannot be disclosed.43 To be able to give 
such a certificate, the head of the agency must be of the opinion that the 
information is of a certain nature (as specified in section 32(2)), the 
disclosure of which would have certain prejudicial effects (as listed III 
section 32(3).44 The treatment of classified security information IS 
considered further below.45 
7.1.1(j) Notice of designations. The designation itself must be made in 
writing and signed by the Prime Minister, then publicly notified in the 
Gazette as soon as practicable, and by any other means directed by the 
Prime Minister (by internet, for example).46 Where a designated entity, or 
40 Cause to make an interim designation is, as discussed, governed by section 
20(1) and (3) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. Cause to make a final 
designation is governed by 22(1) and (3) of the Act. 
41 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 31(2). 
42 For example, if the Security Council required members of the United Nations to 
do so under a resolution of the Council adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
43 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 4( 1) and 32( 1). 
44 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 32. 
45 Discussed below at 7.1.3 Classified Security Information. 
46 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 21(b) and (c), 22(d) and (e), and 
28(1). The example of notification by internet was given by the Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee in its interim report on the Terrorism Suppression 
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any representative of it, is in New Zealand, and if practicable, notice of the 
designation must also be given to the entity or representative with all 
reasonable speed. 47 The content of any notice of interim or final 
designation is prescribed by section 26: 
A notice under section 21(d)(i) or section 23(f)(i) (to notify the 
designated entity of the making of the designation under section 20 or 
section 22) 
(a) must state the section under which the designation is made, and 
whether the entity concerned is designated as a terrorist entity or 
as an associated entity: 
(b) may describe the entity concerned by reference to any name or 
names or associates or other details by which the entity may be 
identified: 
(c) must state the maximum period for which the designation may 
have effect or, if it is made under section 22, the maximum period 
for which it may have effect without being extended: 
(d) must include general information about how it may be reviewed 
and revoked: 
(e) must include any other information specified for the purposes of 
this paragraph by regulations made under this Act 
notable omission from this prescription of what must be included within 
a notice is the need to provide reasons for the designation. This is a point 
that is further reflected upon later in this chapter. 48 
The Prime Minister can also direct that notice be given to any person 
that may be in possession of property owned or controlled by the entity, or 
who may be in a position to provide property or services to the entity.49 
This will normally involve notice being given to registered banks or other 
financial institutions so that they are in a position to comply with their 
Bill, Interim Report on the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, 8 
November 2001, unnumbered page 9. The content of such notices is prescribed 
by section 27 of the Act. 
47 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 21(d)(i) (notice of interim 
designation) and 23(l)(f) (notice offinal designation). 
48 See 7.2 The Designation Process and Natural Justice. 
49 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 9(1), 10(1), 21(d)(ii), 23(f)(ii) and 
28(2). The content of such notices is prescribed by section 27 of the Act. 
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reporting obligations under the Act.5o Just as designations must be notified 
under the Act, so must the revocation, expiry or invalidity of 
designations. 51 
An important feature of the notice provisions is that the Act specifically 
provides that a designation will not be invalid because the entity concerned 
was not given notice that a designation might be made, or given a chance to 
comment on whether it should be made.52 
7.1.2 Review of Designations 
Once a designation is made, there are three means by which the designation 
can be reviewed. The first has already been mentioned, involving the need 
for the Attorney-General to satisfy the High Court of the need to continue a 
final designation beyond the standard three-year period.53 The other two 
means of reviewing the status of designations involve reviews initiated 
either by the designated entity or reconsideration of the designation at the 
Prime Minister's own volition. 
7.1.2(a) Reviews initiated by a designated entity or interested party. The 
first available option mentioned in the Terrorism Suppression Act open to a 
designated entity is that of judicial review. Indeed, section 33 of the Act is 
unrestricted in its terms, allowing "a person" (presumably any person) to 
bring any judicial review or other proceedings before a court arising out of, 
or related to, the making of a designation under the Act. 
50 See sections 43 to 47 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 
51 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 42. 
52 Terrorism Suppression Act, section 29(a). 
53 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 35: see above discussion at 7.1.1(b) 
Expiry of designations. 
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A designated person, or a third party with "an interest in the 
designation",54 may also apply in writing to the Prime Minister to revoke a 
designation. 55 In doing so, the application must be based on one of two 
grounds: (1) that the designation should be revoked because the entity 
concerned does not satisfy the prescribed requirements for designation; or 
(2) that the entity is no longer involved in any conduct that would 
otherwise legitimate a designation under the Act.56 In determining such an 
application, the Prime Minister is required to consult with the Attorney-
Genera1.57 
7.1.2(b) Government review of designations. The ability to revoke a 
designation under section 34 of the Act can also be initiated at the Prime 
Minister's own initiative.58 This, however, is the only mechanism by 
which an 'internal' review of designations can be initiated. 
In the form presented within the select committee's interim report on 
the Bill, the Terrorism Suppression Act was also to include a mandatory 
review of designations by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and 
Security. The Inspector-General is a former Judge of the High Court, 
appointed by the Governor-General, and primarily tasked with monitoring 
the conduct of New Zealand's intelligence security agencies.59 As the Bill 
was first redrafted when the designation process was introduced, clause 
17N provided that the Inspector-General was to review every interim and 
54 As defined by section 34(2) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 
55 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 34(1). 
56 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 34(3). 
57 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 34(5). 
58 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 34(1). 
59 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996, sections 5 and 11. 
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final designation after being served with the designations.6o The 
mandatory review by the Inspector-General required him or her to 
determine whether the designation should stand by applying the 
designation test in light of the information available to the Prime Minister 
and any additional information available to the Inspector-Genera1.61 
The Bill was also to allow a designated entity to apply to be heard by 
the Inspector-General. 62 Although the application to be heard was to be at 
the discretion of the Inspector-General, certain rights flowed from being 
granted a hearing. The entity could be represented by counsel, or a 
nominee; could make written submissions; and would have been entitled to 
receive any personal information,63 except classified security information.64 
Instead of the automatic review by the Inspector-General, the select 
committee successfully recommended replacing this with the ability to 
apply for judicial review of decisions to designate.65 It did so on the basis 
of receiving submissions that adversely commented upon the review of 
designations by the Solicitor-General alone. As summarised in the 
departmental report on submissions, the Solicitor-General's review process 
was seen by submitters as limited, with most relevant submissions 
60 See the Bill as contained within the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade report, 
Interim Report on the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, 8 November 
200l. 
61 Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, clause 17P(2). 
62 Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, clause 17N(2). A designated entity 
could only do so, however, where it had already applied to the Prime Minister for 
the Prime Minister to revoke the designation (and where no such revocation 
occurred). 
63 As defined within the Privacy Act 1993: see clause 17R(1)(b) of the Terrorism 
(Bombings and Financing) Bill. 
64 Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bm, clause 17R. 
65 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Final Report on the Terrorism 
«Bombings and Financing» Suppression Bill, March 2002, 11. 
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proposing that judicial courts should be the forum for the reviews of and 
appeals against terrorist designations.66 
7.1.3 Classified Security Infonnation 
As indicted within the consideration of the making of designations, the 
information upon which a designation is based (or part of it) can be 
certified by the agency providing the information to the Prime Minister as 
"classificd security information". 67 This will be the case where the head of 
the agency certifies in writing that they are of the opinion that:68 
.. the information is of a kind specified in section 32(2), as information 
that: 
(a) might lead to the identification of, or provide details of, the 
source of the information, the nature, content, or scope of the 
information, or the nature or type of the assistance or operational 
methods available to the specified agency; or 
(b) is about particular operations that have been undertaken, or are 
being or are proposed to be undertaken, in pursuance of any of the 
functions of the specified agency; or 
(c) has been provided to the specified agency by the government of 
another country or by an agency of a government of another 
country or by an international organisation, and is information 
that cannot be disclosed by the specified agency because the 
government or agency or organisation by which the information 
has been provided will not consent to the disclosure. 
and 
.. disclosure of the information would be likely to do any of the following 
things listed in section 32(3): 
(a) to prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand or the 
international relations of the Government of New Zealand; or 
(b) to prejudice the entrusting of information to the Government of 
New Zealand on a basis of confidence by the government of 
66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Terrorism Suppression Bill. Part 2 of the 
Departmental Report on Submissions, LGLlICLfTERJBFC, 25 February 2002, 
26-27. 
67 Discussed above at 7.1.1(e) Material on which designations may be based. 
68 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 32(1)(c). 
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another country or any agency of such a government, or by any 
international organisation; or 
(c) to prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, 
investigation, and detection of offences, and the right to a fair 
trial; or 
(d) to endanger the safety of any person. 
Information might satisfy this test (and therefore be capable of being 
certified as "classified security information") where, for example, the 
information is provided to New Zealand by a security agency of another 
State on a confidential basis (section 32(2)(c)) disclosure of that 
information would thereby prejudice the confidential basis upon which the 
information was provided (section 32(3)(b)).69 
Although the provisions of section 32 will be considered by the head of 
an agency in determining whether or not to issue a classified security 
certificate, the impact of such a certificate is not felt at the level of the 
making of a designation. 70 Within the current framework of the Act, the 
significance of such certification lies in the treatment of classified security 
information in judicial proceedings. Two types of judicial proceedings are 
relevant to the status of designations and the use of classified security 
69 Of potential comparison to this protection of sources of information is the 
protection of the identity of informants leading to the issuing of a search warrant 
under section 198 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. Where an accused 
seeks to challenge the validity of a warrant, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has 
held that the prosecution is entitled to withhold information which would lead to 
the identity of an informant: in R v McNicol [1995] I NZLR 576. The significant 
qualification made by the Court, however, is that a trial Judge is obliged to allow 
disclosure if this would help to show that an accuded is innocent (a qualification 
not contained within the framework of the terrorist designation process). 
70 Sections 20 to 23 (concerning the making of interim and final designations) do 
not require such notice to be given or responses to be provided by an entity before 
the making of a designation. Indeed, section 29(a) specifically states that a 
designation will not be invalid for failure to give prior notice or provide an 
opportunity to be heard. Likewise, any notice given to an entity of their 
designation status does not require information to be given about the factual basis 
upon which the designation is made: see section 26 of the Act. 
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information. First are those proceedings before the High Court in any 
application by the Crown to extend a designation beyond three years. 71 
Next are those where a person brings judicial review or other proceedings 
before a Court arising out of, or relating to, the making of a designation 
under the Act. 72 
7.1.3(a) Proceedings for extension of designations. In the case of Crown 
applications for the extension of a designation under section 35 of the TSA, 
the proceedings and treatment of classified information are prescribed by 
the Act. First of all, section 38 of the Act requires such proceedings to be 
heard by the most senior High Court judge or nominee(s).73 Secondly, and 
most importantly, section 38 allows classified security information to be 
withheld. 
On application by the Attorney-General, and where the Crown satisfies 
the High Court that it is desirable for the protection of classified security 
information, the Court must receive or hear that information in the absence 
of the designated entity concerned, the entity's counsel, and members of 
the public.74 The Court, in such circumstances, will be in a position to hear 
classified evidence in support of the Crown's application to extend the 
designation, in a closed court situation, and without the presence of 
71 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 35: see discussion above, 7.1.1(b) 
Expiry of designations. 
72 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 33: see discussion above, 7.1.2(a) 
Reviews initiated by a designated entity or interested party. 
73 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 38(3)(a). This provision currently 
requires proceedings under sections 35 and 55 to be heard by the Chief Justice or 
nominee(s). The Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004, clause 5, 
proposes to amend this so that proceedings are to be heard by the "Chief High 
Court Judge", reflecting the fact that - since the creation of the Supreme Court in 
New Zealand - the Chief Justice is now effectively two levels of appeal above the 
High Court: see the Ministry'S Explanatory Notes on the Bill, above n 28, 1-3. 
74 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 38(3)(b). 
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opposing counselor the respondent. Two qualifications apply to this. 
Firstly, classified evidence can only be heard in this way where it is 
desirable to do so for the protection of either all or part of the information. 
Secondly, the Crown is required to provide a summary of the information 
concerned, except to the extent that this might prejudice the interests 
referred to in section 32(3) - as set out above. The summary must be 
approved by the Court, following which a copy of that summary will be 
given to the entity concerned.75 This procedure applies to any appeal to the 
Court of Appeal under section 41 of the Act. 76 
Although not directly relevant to the designation process, it should be 
noted that the latter mechanisms under section 38 of the TSA also apply to 
applications brought by the Crown for the forfeiture of terrorist property. 77 
7.1.3(b) Judicial review or other proceedings relating to designations. 
Section 39 of the Terrorism Suppression Act directs itself to the treatment 
of classified security information in the situation where the Crown is the 
respondent to proceedings, rather than the applicant. In such cases, the 
matter must again be heard by the senior High Court judge or nominee(s)78 
and the Court must also hear security information in the absence of the 
entity or counsel where the Court is satisfied that this is desirable for the 
75 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 38(4)(b). 
76 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 38(5) and 41(2). 
77 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 55. Such an application can only be 
brought by the Attorney-General once a designation has been extended beyond 
the normal three-year period (under section 35 of the Act) and if the Court is 
satisfied that forfeiture should be made, rather than simply continuing the 
prohibition against dealing with the property (under section 9). In other words, 
forfeiture cannot occur during the first three-year term of a designation. 
78 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 38(3)(a) and 39(3). 
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protection of the information.79 In this case, however, the Crown is not 
o bHged to provide a summary of the classified security information.8o 
Again, it seems that this mechanism applies to any appeal against a 
decision on whether or not to extend a terrorist designation. 81 The point to 
first make is that there is no provision specifically stating that any appeal 
against a decision on an application under section 33 Qudicial review) must 
be subject to section 39. It might be argued, by implication, that since 
section 41 expresses that appeals against section 35 decisions (extensions) 
must be subject to section 38, then no such restriction applies to appeals 
against section 33 decisions. The author concludes, however, that although 
thL-; restriction is not expressed in specific terms, as is done in section 41, it 
is implicit in the wording of section 39 itself. Firstly, subsection (1) to 
section 39 starts by saying that "this section applies to any proceedings in a 
court ... " [emphasis added]. Next, subsection (3) - which establishes the 
protection of classified security information for section 33 proceedings 
provides, in the final sentence: 
However, if the proceedings are before the Court of Appeal, section 
38(3)(a) does not apply. 
Section 38(3)(a) relates to the appointment of the Chief High Court Judge 
to hear matters and clearly cannot therefore apply to any proceedings on 
appeal against decisions of the High Court. By mentioning section 38 
(which establishes the mechanisms for the protection of classified security 
79 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 38(3)(b), and 39(3) and (4). 
80 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 39(3). Compare with the requirement 
to do so in the case of extensions of a designation: section 38(4) of the Act. 
8! That being a decision under section 35 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 
Section 41 of the Act does not specify the permissible grounds of appeal, simply 
stating that "a party to an application under section 35 may appeal to the Court of 
Appeal against the decision of the High Court". 
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information), however, it is clearly implicit that the balance of the 
protective mechanisms do apply to appeals against section 33 decisions of 
the High Court. 
7.1.3(c) The Supreme Court. A small point to note is that neither sections 
39, nor 41, make mention of appeals to the Supreme Court, since the 
Terrorism Suppression Act was enacted prior to the establishment of the 
Supreme Court. Two questions therefore arise. The first is whether there 
can be a further appeal to the Supreme Court against a decision of the 
Court of Appeal concerning either extension or review proceedings. 
Section 7 of the Supreme Court Act 2003 answers the point very clearly in 
the affirmative: 
The Supreme Court can hear and determine an appeal by a party to a 
civil proceeding in the Court of Appeal against any decision made in 
the proceeding, unless -
(a) an enactment other than this Act makes provision to the effect 
that there is no right of appeal against the decision; or 
(b) the decision is a refusal to give leave or special leave to appeal to 
the Court of Appeal. 
If the Supreme Court was to give leave to hear an appeal against a section 
33 or 35 decision of the Court of Appeal,82 the second issue is whether it 
would be restricted by the section 38 and 39 protections of classified 
security information. The answer is unclear and, not going to the heart of 
this thesis, will not be explored in any detail. Suffice it to say that the 
matter is open to interpretation and seems to arise only because the 
82 Appeals to the Supreme Court can only heard by leave of the Court: see 
Supreme Court Act 2003, section 12. 
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Supreme Court was established after the enactment of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act. 83 
7.1.3(d) The trump card. A final and important point to note about the 
section 38 and 39 protection of classified security information is the 
proviso contained within section 38(7): 
Subsection (2) to (6) and section 39(3) and (4) apply despite any 
enactment or rule of law to the contrary. 
The implications of this statutory exclusion of invalidity are significant 
(relevant to the operative provisions of the Bill of Rights Act) and are 
considered further below.84 
7.2 The Designation Process and Natural.Tustice 
As seen through the preceding overview of the designation process and 
matters pertaining to it, this is a reasonably complex interaction of 
mechanisms, and review and appeal procedures. 85 Summarising the 
important features of the process, there are two types of designation 
(terrorist entity or associated entity), distinguished by the level of current 
and prior involvement in terrorist conduct.86 Applicable to both types of 
designation, there are two levels of designation that can be made by the 
83 The only apparent guidance is contained within section 11 of the Supreme 
Court Act 2003, which provides: 
Sections 7 to 10 are subject to-
(a) the provisions of this Act; and 
(b) all applicable rules, orders, and directions for regulating the terms and 
conditions on which appeals may be allowed, made or given under this Act or the 
Judicature Act 1908. 
84 Discussed below at 7.3.2(c) Status of classified security information. 
85 The designation process and related matters comprise 22 sections of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, most of which are reasonably lengthy m 
themselves. 
815 Discussed above at 7.1.1(c) Terrorist entities and associated entities. 
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Prime Minister (interim and final). Interim designations can be made 
where there is good cause to suspect that an entity satisfies the Act's test 
for what is a terrorist or associated entity,S7 whereas final designations 
require a belief on reasonable grounds that the test has been satisfied. 88 
The different thresholds applicable have correspondingly different time 
limitations. Interim designations can only exist for a maximum of 30 days, 
and can only be made once in respect of anyone entity. 89 A final 
designation can continue for a period of three years,90 with the Attorney-
General having the ability to extend the designation if slhe satisfies the 
High Court (on the balance of probabilities) that the test for designation 
continues to be met.91 
The consequences of both interim and final designations mainly affect 
third parties, who are prohibited from dealing with property owned or 
controlled by terrorist or associated entities or from providing financial 
services to them.92 Naturally, this prohibition indirectly affects the entities 
themselves. Likewise, reporting obligations apply to property owned or 
controlled by terrorist or associated entities. 93 In the case of final 
designations that are extended by the High Court beyond the normal three 
87 The "test" under the Act is set out within the discussion concerning terrorist and 
associated entities, ibid. 
88 Discussed above at 7.1. 1 (a) Interim versus final designations. 
89 Discussed above at 7.1.I(b) Expiry of designations. 
90 Assuming that there are no judicial proceedings that might prolong that period: 
see section 23(h) of the Terrorism Suppression Act, as discussed above at 7.1.I(b) 
Expiry of designations. Note that this three year period does not take into account 
the temporary extension of final designations proposed under the Terrorism 
Suppression Amendment Bill (No 2) 2004. 
91 Discussed above at 7.1.1(b) Expiry of designations. 
92 Discussed in Chapter Three at 3.11.2(b) Offences. 
93 Discussed in Chapter Three at 3.11.2( e) Financial transactions reponing. 
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year period, the Attorney-General can apply to have the property 
forfeited. 94 
The writer has no particular difficulty with the latter aspects of the 
terrorist designation process and its consequences. Of more concern, 
however, are those aspects of the process relating to the giving of notice, 
the rights of review and appeal, and the manner in which classified security 
information is dealt with under such review or appeal. In that regard, a 
number of features of the TSA are relevant. Firstly, the making of a 
designation does not contain any procedure by which the alleged terrorist 
or associated entity can make its case prior to being designated under 
section 20 or 95 Secondly, once a designation is made, any notice given 
to a designated entity in New Zealand (or its representative in New 
Zealand) does not need to give reasons for the designation, whether made 
on an interim or final basis.96 Next, where a designated entity requests the 
Prime Minister to revoke a designation, there is no corresponding right to 
be heard or right to receive information about the basis upon which the 
designation was made. 97 Fourthly, where the Attorney-General applies to 
extend a final designation, the High Court is required to receive any 
classified security information relating to the application without the 
presence of the designated entity (or its counsel) if that is desirable for the 
94 Discussed in Chapter Three at 3.ll.2(d) FOlieiture of terrorist property. 
95 See section 29(a) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, which prevents 
invalidation of a designation "just because... the entity concerned was not. .. 
given notice ... or a chance to comment.. .": discussed above at 7.1.1(f) Notice of 
designations. 
96 Discussed above at 7.1.1 if) Notice of designations. 
97 Discussed above at 7.1.2(a) Reviews initiated by a designated entity or 
interested party. 
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protection of the information.98 Having said that, the Attorney-General is 
obliged to provide a summary of the information to the designated entity, 
except to the extent that this would involve disclosure of information that 
would prejudice those interests listed in section 32(3) of the Act.99 Next, 
any appeal against a decision of the High Court to extend a designation 
restricts (in the way just mentioned) the appeal court's dealings with 
classified security information. 100 Finally, although the Act does not 
prevent a person from bringing judicial review proceedings arising out of 
the making of a designation,lOl the High Court is again required to receive 
any classified security information relating to the application without the 
presence of the designated entity (or its counsel) if that is desirable for the 
protection of the information this time without the requirement for the 
Attorney-General to produce a summary of the information. 102 
7.2.1 The Issue of Natural Justice 
The issue that arises from these features of the statutory designation 
framework is whether it is consistent with the principles of natural justice, 
in particular the right of a respondent to be informed of the case against it 
and the corresponding right to answer the case against it. In particular, are 
98 Discussed above at 7.1.3( a) Proceedings for extension of designations. 
99 Discussed above at 7.1.3 Classified Security Information. 
100 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 41: discussed above at 7.1.3(a) 
Proceedings for extension of designations. 
101 Discussed above at 7.1.2(a) Reviews initiated by a designated entity or 
interested party. 
102 Discussed above at 7.1.3(b) Judicial review or other proceedings relating to 
designations. The rationale behind this difference is unclear, but may be borne 
out of the fact that section 33 proceedings are not at the instigation of the Crown, 
whereas section 35 proceedings are initiated by the Attorney-General (and 
therefore warrant further burdens upon the Crown). Either way, the author does 
not see that this should make any material difference to the enjoyment of the right 
to natural justice. 
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the five situations identified in the preceding paragraph consistent with 
natural justice? Namely, concerning: (1) the making of a designation 
without hearing from the alleged terrorist or associated entity; (2) the 
content of a notice of designation; (3) the manner in which requests to the 
Prime Minister to reconsider a designation are dealt with; (4) the status of 
classified security information in proceedings to extend a designation (or 
any appeal against such proceedings); and (5) the status of classified 
security information in judicial review proceedings (or any appeal against 
such proceedings). 
A sixth situation is indirectly, but very significantly, affected by the 
treatment of classified security information in the designation process. As 
discussed, one of the consequences of designations under the act is to 
prohibit certain dealings with terrorist or associated entities. The Terrorism 
Suppression Act includes four such offences: dealing with property, 
knowing that the property is owned or controlled by a designated entity (or 
derived from such property); making property, or financial or related 
services, to an entity, knowing that the entity is designated under the Act; 
recruiting a person as a member of a group, knowing that the group is a 
designated entity; and participating in a group, knowing that the group is a 
designated entity, with the aim of enhancing its ability to carry out, or 
participate in, a terrorist act. 103 In the context of the last-mentioned 
offence, the writer can see no problem, since the offence is not only linked 
with designation but also with an intention to facilitate terrorist acts. With 
the other three offences, however, the key to the offending is that the 
103 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, sections 9(1), 10(1), 12(1) and 13: see 
Chapter Three, 3.11.2(b) Offences. 
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conduct is otherwise lawful (dealing with property, providing financial 
services, and recruiting group members) except that it is in respect of an 
entity that is known by the actor to be designated under the Act. What 
significance does this hold? The problem that arises is where a defendant 
might seek to challenge the validity of the designation. To give an 
example: 
A (a New Zealand citizen) makes a donation to B (a Muslim 
organisation in Auckland). B has been made the subject of a final 
designation as an associated terrorist entity (the Prime Minister 
concluding under section 22(3 )(b )(i) of the TSA, on receiving classified 
security information, that B [the associated entity] is acting on behalf of 
C to denounce the action of the United States military in Afghanistan). 
C is an organisation in Afghanistan, designated under Security Council 
Resolution 1267 and the Terrorism Suppression Act as a terrorist entity. 
A [the donor] knows that B [the associated entity] has been designated 
as an associated terrorist entity, but claims that he and B had no 
knowledge that C [the terrorist entity] had carried out, or was 
participating in, any terrorist act. A [the donor] is charged, under 
section 10(1) of the Terrorism Suppression Act, with making money 
available to B [the associated entity], knowing that B was designated 
under the Act. 
In that situation, A [the donor] would no doubt want to complain that B 
[the associated entity] had been improperly designated under the Act i.e. 
that the Prime Minister was wrong in concluding that B was an associated 
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entity, since B knew nothing of C' s involvement in any terrorist conduct, 
and since peaceful protest about the military conduct of the United States 
in Afghanistan is not unlawfuL It is not difficult to imagine such a 
situation arising. Indeed, fear of such an outcome was the basis of a 
number of submissions made by the public to the select committee's 
hearings on the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill. 104 What, then, 
might A seek to do? 
The first point to make is that A would be unable to make direct use of 
such an argument as a defence to criminal proceedings. A prosecutor is 
only required to satisfy a criminal court of the elements of an offence and 
WOUld, as such, argue that the only relevant issue before the court is 
whether A [the donor] knew that B [the associated entity] was designated 
under the Act. A prosecutor would furthermore properly argue that any 
challenge to the validity of the designation was not an issue for the court 
exercising its criminal jurisdiction in that matter, but was instead a civil 
matter. And, indeed, the designation process is a civil one, although the 
status of the designation would, at the very least, be a relevant factor in 
sentencing. 
However, notwithstanding the fact that a challenge to the validity of a 
designation could not act as a defence to a criminal charge, such a 
challenge could act to suspend the criminal proceedings. Taking the same 
104 See, for example, submissions by the New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties 
(submission number 22), the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Society 
(submission number 28), the Indonesia Human Rights Committee (submission 
number 36), the Canterbury Council for Civil Liberties (submission number 45), 
the Latina America Committee of New Zealand (submission number 88), and the 
Auckland Council for Civil Liberties (submission number 95). See also Smith JE, 
New Zealand's Anti-Terrorism Campaign: Balancing Civil Liberties, National 
Security, and International Responsibilities, Ian Axford New Zealand Fellowship 
in Public Policy, December 2003, 61. 
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example: A [the donor], as a person with an interest in ascertaining the 
validity of the designation of B [the associated entity], could initiate 
proceedings under section 33 of the Terrorism Suppression Act: 
33 Judicial review of designations 
Nothing in this Act prevents any person from bringing any judicial 
review (whether under Part r of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 or 
otherwise) or other proceedings before a court arising out of, or relating 
to, the making of a designation under this Act. 
In doing so, A [the donor] would seek to have the Prime Minister's 
decision concerning B [the associated entity] reviewed. Specifically, 
section 22(3)(b)(i) (which is the basis of B's designation in this scenario) 
provides that the Prime Minister can designate as an associated entity a 
group that s/he believes on reasonable grounds: 
(b) is acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, -
(i) the terrorist entity, knowing that the terrorist entity has done 
what is referred to in sub-section (1) [emphasis added] 
In that regard, sub-section (1) of section 23 refers to the designation of an 
entity as a terrorist one if it has knowingly carried out or participated in a 
terrorist act. In the example given, A [the donor] would seek to argue (on 
judicial review of the Prime Minister's decision) that although B [the 
associated entity] was denouncing the US military role in Afghanistan at 
the direction of C [the terrorist entity], B did not know that C had carried 
out or participated in a terrorist act, and that the test under section 
22(3)(b)(i) was therefore not satisfied. In more simple words, A would 
argue that the Prime Minister had improperly concluded that B was an 
entity within the definition of section 
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A point made earlier was that A would be unable to make direct use of 
such an argument as a defence to criminal proceedings. By challenging the 
validity of the designation under section 33, however, A would no doubt be 
able to obtain an adjournment of the criminal proceedings to await the 
outcome of the civil (judicial review) proceedings. lOS The issue of natural 
justice comes into play with regard to those civil proceedings, since section 
39 of the Terrorism Suppression Act could require the High Court to hear 
the classified security information in the absence of A [the donor] or B [the 
associated entity]. If the classified security information was the only basis 
on which the designation of B was made, how is A or B to respond to the 
Crown's argument before the High Court that the Prime Minister's 
decision was proper? Thus, the issue of natural justice can also arise for a 
person accused of offences under sections 9, 10 or 12 of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002. 
7.2.2 Sources and Content of the Right to Natural Justice 
If natural justice is an issue for the situations identified, then a number of 
enquiries must be made. The first, to be dealt with under this part of the 
chapter, is to determine what the various sources of the right to natural 
justice are. In doing so, it will be necessary to consider and examine the 
content of the right. Those two enquiries will be shown to lead to a 
preliminary conclusion that the situations identified conflict with the right 
to natural justice. Having arrived at that position, this chapter will then 
105 Where a defendant is proceeded against summarily, for example, the Court has 
an unfettered power to adjourn the hearing of any charge: Summary Proceedings 
Act 1957, section 45(1), 
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consider whether the Act's designation process can be a valid limitation 
upon the right to natura] justice. 
Addressing the frrst enquiry, there are three relevant "sources" of the 
right to natural justice (or its equivalent) for the purpose of this chapter: (1) 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); (2) the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA); and (3) the Terrorism 
Suppression Act itself. 106 Each is considered in further detail. 
7.2.2(a) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Using 
the language of the ICCPR, the International Covenant guarantees to all 
persons the right to a fair hearing: 107 
Article 14 
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the 
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all 
or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or 
national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the 
private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary 
in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in 
a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the 
interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings 
concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children. 
As can be seen, the provision contains exceptions to the right, which will 
be considered later in this chapter.108 At this stage, this examination is 
concerned with determining the broad content of the right to a fair hearing, 
106 The right, it should be acknowledged, is also a cornmon law one (see Drew v 
Attorney-General [2002] I NZLR 58). For consideration of the interaction 
between the cornmon law and statute law, see Chapter Nine concerning the 
privilege against self-incrimination (at 9.1.3 Self-Incrimination and the Common 
Law). 
107 Note that the balance of article 14 is limited in its application to criminal 
rrroceedings. 
08 See 7.3 The Designation Process as a Limitation upon Natural Justice. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 337 
Chapter 7: Terrorist Designations and Rights to Justice 
which has been recognised by the Human Rights Committee as including 
the various rules of natural justice. The jurisprudence of the Committee 
has accepted that article 14( 1) encompasses the principles of equality 
before courts and tribunals, the need for tribunals to be competent, 
independent and impartial and to promptly dispose of proceedings.109 
Specifically pertaining to the right to a fair and public hearing, the 
Committee has considered this to include the notion of equality of arms, 
the right to attend a hearing, the right to respond to a case, and the idea of 
open justice.1lO The Committee has also taken the view that the right to 
natural justice is not dependent on the status of one of the parties (whether 
governmental, parastatal or an autonomous statutory entity).lll 
Presumably, then, this includes decisions of a Prime Minister. 
To the extent possible, an 'equality of arms' 112 will be an important 
factor in the guarantee of a fair hearing. Having said this, the Committee 
has been reluctant to find breach of this aspect of a fair hearing, so long as 
the person has been afforded an opportunity to be present, examine 
witnesses and be represented if that is the person's wish. In Aguda v Spain, 
for example, the author claimed that there was no verbatim record of the 
statements of witnesses, experts, parties and counsel but only a summary 
109 For a more detailed discussion of the jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
Committee on these points, see Conte A, Davidson S and Burchill R, Defining 
Civil and Political Rights. The Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2004), 117-125. 
110 Ibid, 122-124. 
111 YL v Canada, Human Rights Committee Communication 547/1993, para 9.1 L 
See also Conte, Davidson and Burchill, ibid, 118-119. 
112 This is a term used by both the United Nations Human Rights Committee and 
the European Court of Human Rights to represent the idea of the procedural 
equality of parties. See, for example, Wasek-Wiaderek M, Principle of "Equality 
of Arms" in Criminal Procedure Under Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights & its Function in Criminal Justice of Selected European Countries 
(Leuven University Press, 2000). 
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drawn up by the clerk of the court, so that the proceedings lacked essential 
guarantees. The Committee failed to see how those facts alone constituted 
a breach of article 14(1).113 In Jansen-Oielen v The Netherlands, however, 
the Committee found that there had been an inequality of arms. The 
Netherlands Central Appeals Tribunal had failed to append a psychological 
report (submitted by the author's counsel) to the case file two days before 
the hearing, in violation of her right to a fair hearing. The Netherlands 
argued that the Court had considered that the admission of the report two 
days before the hearing would have unreasonably obstructed the other 
party in the conduct of the case. The applicable procedural law did not, 
however, provide for a time limit for the submission of documents. The 
Committee found that it was the duty of the Court of Appeal, which was 
not constrained by any prescribed time limit, to ensure that each party 
could challenge the documentary evidence which the other filed or wished 
to file and, if need be, to adjourn proceedings. 114 
The right to a fair trial in a suit at law, by being present at the hearing, 
is less clear than in the conduct of criminal proceedings. 115 The Committee 
has commented that article 14(1) 'may' require that an individual be able to 
participate in person in civil proceedings. In such circumstances the State 
party is under an obligation to allow that individual to be present at the 
hearing, even if the person is a non-resident alien. In assessing whether the 
requirements of article 14(1) were met in Said v Norway, the Committee 
113 Agudo v Spain Human Rights Committee Communication 864/1999, para 9.4. 
114 lansen-Gielen v The Netherlands Human Rights Committee Communication 
84611999, para 8.2. 
115 In the case of criminal proceedings, the Committee has been clear about the 
need to ensure that an accusedis tried in person and the limited restrictions to this 
rights that are permissible: see Conte, Davidson and Burchill, above n 109, 122-
123. 
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noted that the author's lawyer did not request a postponement of the 
hearing for the purpose of enabling the author to participate in person; nor 
did instructions to that effect appear in the signed authorisation given to the 
lawyer by the author and subsequently presented by the lawyer to the judge 
at the hearing of a child custody case. In those circumstances, the 
Committee adopted the view that there was no violation by the state 
through any failure by the Oslo City Court to postpone the hearing, on its 
own initiative, until the author could be present in person.116 The 
Committee went no further to clarify when civil proceedings 'may' require 
that an individual be able to participate in person in civil proceedings. 
Interesting, also, is the fact that the party in Said v Norway was at least 
represented by counsel and, thereby, allowed to respond in some for to the 
case against him. 
The case of Hermoza v Peru is also highly relevant to the question of 
the content of the right to a fair hearing. 117 Hermoza was an ex -sergeant of 
the Peruvian police, Guarda Civil, and claimed to have been temporarily 
suspended from the force on false accusations of insulting a superior 
officer. When brought before a judge on the charge, he was released for 
lack of evidence. Notwithstanding that fact, Hermoza was discharged from 
service by an administrative decision in respect of which he was not 
permitted to make representations. The Human Rights Committee 
concluded that those circumstances entailed a breach of article 14(1) of the 
116 Said v Norway Human Rights Committee Communication 767/1997, para 
11.3. 
117 Hermoza v Peru, Human Rights Committee Communication 203/1986. 
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Covenant. 118 In the individual opinion of Committee members Cooray, 
Dimitrjevic and Lallah, the Committee members specifically expressed that 
the principle of audi alteram partem (literally meaning "hear the other 
side") 119 was part of the right to a fair hearing under the Covenant. l2O 
In summary, article 14(1) guarantees the right to a fair hearing in civil 
proceedings, which has been equated with various principles of the right to 
natural justice. Relevant to the enquiry in this chapter, it has been 
expressed to include the principle of equality of arms, the right to be 
present, or at least represented, at a hearing, and the ability to state one's 
case in response to the case of an opposing party. 
7.2.2(b) The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002. Section 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
protects three rights: the right to natural justice, the right to seek judicial 
review, and the right to bring and defend civil proceedings against the 
Crown on an equal basis. 121 As already seen through the expository review 
of the designation process under the Terrorism Suppression Act, the right 
to judicial review is specifically guaranteed.122 Thus there are only two 
provisions of the Bill of Rights to be considered: 
27. Right to Justice-
(1) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of 
natural justice by any tribunal or other public authority which has 
the power to make a determination in respect of that person's 
rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law. 
118 Ibid, para 12. 
119 Joseph PA, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, (2nd ed, 
Brookers, 2001), 860. 
120 Above n 116, para 4. 
121 As summarised in Rishworth P, Huscroft G, Optican S and Mahoney R, The 
New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford Univeristy Press, 2003), 753. 
122 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 33: discussed above at 7.1.3(b) 
Judicial review or other proceedings relating to designations. 
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(3) Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and 
to defend civil proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to have 
those proceedings heard, according to law, in the same way as 
civil proceedings between individuals. 
Before considering the content of these provisions, it is important to note 
that, in the Solicitor-General's review of the first draft of the Terrorism 
(Bombings and Financing) Bill, he advised the Attorney-General that: 123 
In my view, the process of designation is consistent with BORA and, in 
particular, s 27(1) thereof. 
Regrettably, the Solicitor-General gave no reasons for arriving at that 
conclusion within his letter of advice. While that advice seems out of step 
with the discussion that follows, it should be noted that the Solicitor-
General was advising on the first redraft of the Bill, which included the 
Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence being involved in the 
designation and review process. 124 
The right to natural justice (subsection (1)) contains two main 
components: audi alteram partem, the duty to hear both sides of a matter 
before making a decision; and nemo judex in sua causa, the notion that no 
one should be a judge in his or her own cause. 125 It is the first component 
that is of relevance to this chapter. Of particular relevance, the duty to hear 
both sides can include the giving of prior notice, the disclosure of relevant 
123 Letter from the Solicitor-General to the Attorney-General. "re Terrorism 
Suppression Bill: Slip Amendments - PCO 3814B/ll Our Ref: ATT114/1048 
(15)",9 November 2001, para 20. 
124 As will be discussed later, that role is seen by the author as central to achieving 
a justifiable balance between the needs of the designation process and the right to 
natural justice: see below at 7.4.2 Reinstatement of the Inspector-General's 
Review. 
125 Rishworth. Huscroft, Optic an and Mahoney, above n 121, 754. 
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material, the receipt of (written or oral) submissions, representation by 
counsel, and the giving of reasons for the decision-maker's finding. 126 
The first point to note is that the right to natural justice differs in its 
content as between administrative versus judicial decision-makers. 
Professor Joseph summarises the point that natural justice does not include 
a right to a hearing before an administrative decision-maker, but merely a 
right to tender written submissions, whereas parties have an unqualified 
right to be heard orally before the courtS. 127 Where a hearing is granted, 
prior notice of the hearing is seen as inherent to the right to be heard. 128 In 
being heard, however, natural justice does not recognise any general right 
to be represented by legal counse1. 129 What it does recognise, however, is 
that an administrative tribunal has the discretion to permit representation, 
which must be exercised fairly, and be based on a number of factors 
identified in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte 
Tarrant: the serious of the allegation and of any potential penalty, whether 
points of law are to arise, the ability of the person to present the case, the 
potential for procedural difficulties, the desirability for the prompt disposal 
of proceedings and the need for an equality of arms. 130 
Two features of the right to natural justice are particularly important to 
this chapter: the disclosure of relevant material; and the giving of reasons 
for a decision-maker's finding. Central to the audi alteram partem rule is 
the right to hear the nature and basis of the case, thereby allowing 
126 Joseph, above n 119, 860-874. 
127 Ibid, 864. 
128 Ibid, 860-861. 
129 Ibid, 864-866. 
130 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ex parte Tarrant [1985] 1 QB 
251. 
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interested parties to respond to the case and, if appropriate, contest or seek 
to correct the information in issue. In Daganayasi v Minister of 
Immigration, the New Zealand Court of Appeal quashed the Minister's 
refusal to revoke a deportation order, since the Minister's decision had 
been based upon a medical report that had not been disclosed to the 
applicant. 131 Where disclosure is made, it must be in a way that affords a 
person a proper opportunity to consider the material and be thus put in a 
position to respond. The production of a detailed report at the time of 
hearing has been held, for example, to be a breach of natural justice by 
failing to give a person an opportunity to assess the report and make 
submissions on it. 132 Where disclosure is made by way of a summary of 
information, the summary must disclose what Professor Joseph refers to as 
a "sufficient account" of the information to make the right to respond a 
. f I 133 meamng u one. 
The second important aspect of the right to natural justice is the 
desirability that a decision-maker will give reasons for its decision. 
Ultimately, however, there is no obligation at law to give reasons, which 
"places the law out of step with public expectations of transparency and 
accountability in decision-making" .134 Notwithstanding this, Chief Justice 
Davison, in Potter v New Zealand Milk Board, described it as a public 
131 Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130. 
132 Mockford v New Zealand Milk Board unreported, 14110/81, Roper J, He 
Dunedin. 
133 Joseph, above n 119, 862. 
134 Ibid, 871. 
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responsibility of both courts and administrative authorities to provide 
reasons: 135 
The giving of reasons helps to concentrate the mind of the tribunal 
upon the issues for determination: it enables litigants to see that their 
cases have been carefully considered and the arguments understood and 
appreciated; it enables a litigant dissatisfied with a decision to more 
readily consider whether there are grounds of appeal; and it enables an 
appellate Court or tribunal to ascertain the determinations of the 
tribunal on questions of fact, to which the appellate Courts pay 
deference on the hearing of an appeal and [it] also enables the appellate 
Court... to know what principles of law have been applied and to 
consider whether such were correct. 
The right to bring and defend proceedings against the Crown (section 27(3) 
of the NZBORA) is described as being grounded in Dicey's idea of 
equality and as comprising two components: the right to bring and defend 
proceedings; and the right that those proceedings be dealt with on the same 
basis as if the Crown was not a party. 136 In principle, the first component is 
not affected by the designation process since the Terrorism Suppression 
Act envisages in its terms that proceedings concerning designations can be 
both defended and brought against the Crown.137 The latter component is 
of particular relevance, and mirrors the concept of equality of arms 
discussed above.138 As noted in the White Paper on the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights: 139 
The individual should be able to bring legal proceedings against the 
Government, and more generally to engage in civil litigation with it, 
without the Government enjoying any procedural or jurisdictional 
privileges. 
135 Potter v New Zealand Milk Board [1983] NZLR 620, 624. 
136 Rishworth, Huscroft, Optic an and Mahoney, above n 121, 767. 
137 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 33, 35, 39 and 41. 
138 Discussed at 7.2.2( a) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
139 New Zealand Department of Justice, A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (1985) 
AJHR A6, para 10.177. 
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7.2.3 Preliminary Conclusion 
The above analysis can easily lead to the preliminary conclusion that there 
is an apparent, or prima facie, conflict between the various components of 
the right to natural justice and the Terrorism Suppression Act, sections 20 
and 22 (the making of designations), 26 (notice), 34 (reconsideration by the 
Prime Minister on application of the entity), 38 and 41 (treatment of 
classified information in proceedings concerning designation extensions), 
and 39 (treatment of classified information in proceedings arising out of the 
making of a designation). In each of the five situations identified above, 140 
these provisions have the potential effect of excluding all or most of the 
reasons for the making of a designation. This will be the case where the 
Prime Minister's decision to designate is based entirely, or largely, upon 
classified security information, or where the notice of designation fails to 
give reasons for the designation. 
In such circumstances (which clearly impact upon the rights, 
obligations or interests of a designated or accused person), a person IS 
being denied access to the reasons for the designation and is thereby denied 
the opportunity to "answer the case". In the situation of reconsiderations 
by the Prime Minister under section 34, the person has no right to be heard 
at alL 
The question now becomes whether there is an actual conflict or 
inconsistency. To determine this, one needs to give careful consideration 
to a number of further issues. Are the rights concerned able to be limited 
within the framework of the ICCPR, and do the limitations imposed by the 
14() Discussed at 7.2.1 The Issue of Natural Justice. 
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Terrorism Suppression Act fit within any such permissible limitations? 
Similarly, are the limitations justifiable within the framework of section 5 
of the Bill of Rights, and how do sections 4 and 6 affect the relationship 
between the limitations and the expression of the right to natural justice 
within the NZBORA? Next, what implications are there if the limitations 
are justifiable under one instrument (e.g. the Bill of Rights) but not under 
the other (e.g. the International Covenant)? 
The Designation Process as a Limitation upon Natural Justice 
7.3.1 Limiting Natural Justice under the lCCPR 
The first of the questions just posed was this: are the rights concerned able 
to be limited within the framework of the ICCPR, and do the limitations 
imposed by the Terrorism Suppression Act fit within any such permissible 
limitations? As seen in the discussion above,141 article 14 of the ICCPR 
only permits a limitation upon the right to a fair and open trial by 
permitting the press and public to be excluded "from all or part of a trial for 
reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a 
democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so 
requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law 
shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons 
otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the 
guardianship of children". The jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
141 Discussed further above at 7.2.2( a) The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
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Committee has not extended this exception to the right. Neither the words 
of article 14, nor the jurisprudence of the Committee, suggest that the right 
to a fair hearing can be limited in the way it is under the designation 
process within the Terrorism Suppression Act. 
As such, the earlier preliminary conclusion that the designation process 
is in breach of the principle of natural justice, enshrined in the ICCPR 
through the right to a fair hearing in article 14, must stand as a final 
conclusion. Although article 14(1) is not listed within article 4(2) of the 
Covenant setting out rights that may not be derogated from in times of 
emergency - the position remains that New Zealand has not lodged a 
declaration of emergency under article 4. As such, it cannot claim to be 
derogating from the right to a fair hearing as a result of any state of terrorist 
emergency. 
7.3.2 Limiting Natural Justice under the NZBORA 
In considering the question of whether natural justice can be properly 
limited under the Terrorism Suppression Act within the framework of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the answer does not lie in simply applying 
the section 5 justified limitation provision of the latter Act. Application of 
the Bill of Rights brings into play what has been described as the "unholy 
trinity" of sections 4, 5 and 6. 142 Much of that is an exercise in statutory 
[42 That phrase having been coined by Dr James Allen in his article "The 
Operative Provisions - An Unholy Trinity" [1995] Bill of Rights Bulletin 79: as 
discussed in Chapter Four at 4.3. 2( a) The 'unholy trinity' of sections 4, 5 and 6. 
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interpretation and, as such, it is important to identify the precise language 
of each provision that is to be examined. 143 
7.3.2(a) The making of designations. The making of designations is done 
by the Prime Minister under section 20 (interim designations) or 22 (final 
designations). The authority of the Prime Minister is contained within 
subsections (1) to (3) of those sections (what has earlier in this chapter 
been described as the "tests" for designation): 
(1) The Prime Minister may designate an entity as a terrorist entity 
under this section if the Prime Minister [has good cause to suspect 
- section 20(1)] [believes on reasonable grounds - section 22(1)] 
that the entity has knowingly carried out, or has knowingly 
participated in the carrying out of, 1 or more terrorist acts. 
(2) On or after designating an entity as a terrorist entity under this 
Act, the Prime Minister may designate 1 or more other entities as 
an associated entity under this section. 
(3) The Prime Minister may exercise the power given by subsection 
(2) only if the Prime Minister [has good cause to suspect section 
20(3)] [believes on reasonable grounds - section 22(3)] that the 
other entity-
(a) is knowingly facilitating the carrying out of 1 or more 
terrorist acts by, or with the participation of, the terrorist 
entity (for example, by financing those acts, in full or in 
part); or 
(b) is acting on behalf of, or at the direction of,-
(i) the terrorist entity, knowing that the terrorist entity has 
done what is referred to in subsection (1); or 
(ii) an entity designated as an associated entity under 
subsection (2) and paragraph (a), knowing that the 
associated entity is doing what is referred to in 
paragraph (a); or 
(c) is an entity (other than an individual) that is wholly owned 
or effectively controlled, directly or indirectly, by the 
terrorist entity, or by an entity designated under subsection 
(2) and paragraph (a) or paragraph (b). 
143 These have been earlier identified as raising six situations that are inconsistent 
with the principles of natural justice: discussed above at 7.2.1 The Issue of 
Natural Justice. 
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The provision does not exclude the ability to hear from an alleged terrorist 
or associated entity, although the drafters of the Act clearly anticipated that 
there would be no such hearing, section 29 providing that: 
No designation under section 20 or section 22 is invalid just because-
(a) the entity concerned was not, before the designation was made, 
given notice that it may be made, or a chance to comment on 
whether it should be made, or both: 
Adopting the approach advocated by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Moonen, the fIrst step to be taken is to identify the different interpretations 
of the words contained in the provision being examined, with a view to 
determining the application of section 4 and 6 of the NZBORA. 144 One 
might thereby argue that, since sections 20 and 22 do not exclude the right 
to be heard by the Prime Minister or the right to be informed of the basis 
upon which the designation is being considered, then one interpretation that 
is open (and one most consistent with the NZBORA right to natural justice) 
is that the Prime Minister is obliged to hear the alleged entity and provide it 
with a copy of the information being considered. 
However, such an interpretation would in the author's view - produce 
an absurd result. Firstly, not all entities being designated will be resident in 
New Zealand, or even have representatives in New Zealand. Secondly, 
such an interpretation would not cater for the special status of classified 
security information, which must surely be protected (and is able to be 
protected, by proportionate means, in the view of the author).145 The 
additional problem concerns the role of the Prime Minister and is one of 
144 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 17: 
discussed in Chapter Four at 4.3.2( a) The 'unholy trinity' of sections 4, 5 and 6. 
145 See discussion below at 7.3.2( d) Status of class~fied security information. 
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common sense and reality. As head of State, and ultimately the effective 
head of security intelligence services and of the military, it is suggested 
that the Prime Minister cannot be .• pected to him/herself hear alleged 
terrorist or associated entities. In any event, that would not establish an 
independent and impartial process. In saying this, it is not suggested that 
the Prime Minister would fail to act in an impartial manner, but the reality 
is that the office of the Prime Minister is an executive rather than a judicial 
one. In contrast, the office of the Inspector-General of Security and 
Intelligence is one (in the view of the author) that does guarantee 
impartiality and independence. 146 It is suggested that, in order to achieve a 
proper balance between the exercise of the right to be heard and the 
protection of the integrity of the designation review process, reform is 
again necessary. The reforms advocated below seek to introduce a process 
by which designations are automatically reviewed by the Inspector-General 
of Security and Intelligence, with certain rights to be heard and be advised 
of the reasons for the designation. 147 In effect, the proposal is to re-
establish the Inspector-General's review as had been proposed within the 
first redraft of the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill. It will be 
submitted, in the discussion of those reforms, that such a process, while 
still limiting the right to natural justice, would nevertheless be 
proportionate and thereby justifiable in a free and democratic society. 
146 While it has to be acknowledged that there have been criticisms of the 
Inspector-General in this regard (see Small D, "A Critique of the Terrorism 
Suppression Bill", available online at the ARENA website, URL 
<http://www.arena.org.nz> at 2 November 2002), the author posits that the 
structure of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996 does 
guarantee (to the extent possible) the impartiality and independence of the office. 
147 Discussed below at 7A.2(a) Review of designations. 
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7.3.2(b) Notice of designations. As to notice, section 26 of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act provides: 
A notice under section 21(d)(i) or section 23 (f)(i) (to notify the 
designated entity of the making of the designation under section 20 or 
section 22) 
(a) must state the section under which the designation is made, and 
whether the entity concerned is designated as a terrorist entity or 
as an associated entity: 
(b) may describe the entity concerned by reference to any name or 
names or associates or other details by which the entity may be 
identified: 
(c) must state the maximum period for which the designation may 
have effect or, if it is made under section 22, the maximum period 
for which it may have effect without being extended: 
(d) must include general information about how it may be reviewed 
and revoked: 
(e) must include any other information specified for the purposes of 
this paragraph by regulations made under this Act 
The provision does not exclude the ability to inform the entity of the 
information upon which a designation was based, nor does it require it. In 
attempting to identify the different interpretations of the words contained in 
the provision, one might argue that, since section 26 does not exclude the 
provision in such a notice of information upon which a designation is 
based, then an open interpretation of section 26 (and one most consistent 
with the NZBORA right to natural justice) is that notice under section must 
inform the entity of the information upon which the designation was based. 
That is certainly an attractive argument and one that, in the author's 
view, is correct. There are, however, two practical problems that remain. 
The first is the simple fact that section 26 does not state that such 
information is required and that, as such, an innocent application 0 f the 
section could cause notice to be given without the provision of such 
information. The more important problem is that, although section 26 
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should be interpreted as requiring information to be given, such an 
interpretation provides no guidance on how classified security information 
should be dealt with. As will be seen in the discussion that follows, the 
protection of classified security information is seen by the author as an 
important objective and an interpretation of section 26 should not, it is 
proposed, be such that it would require disclosure of all classified 
information. 148 The protection of classified information in the provision of 
information could, as argued later, be justifiable in a free and democratic 
society (section 5). As such, this is something that calls for reform. 149 
7.3.2(c) Review of designations by the Prime Minister. Requests by an 
entity to have a designation reconsidered by the Prime Minister are 
provided for under section 34(1) of the Terrorism Suppression Act: 
The Prime Minister may at any time revoke a designation made under 
section 20 or section 22, either on the Prime Minister's own initiative 
or on an application in writing for the purpose-
(a) by the entity who is the subject of the designation; or 
(b) by a third party with an interest in the designation that, in the 
Prime Minister's opinion, is an interest apart from any interest in 
common with the pUblic. 
Again, the provision does not exclude rights (in this case, any 
accompanying right to be heard by the Prime Minister or to receive 
information about the basis upon which the designation was made), nor 
does it require or allow it. Again, one might therefore conclude that 
application of section 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act requires this 
provision to be interpreted in a manner that is most consistent with the right 
148 Discussed below at Status of classified security information. 
149 Proposals for reform of the designation process are set out later within this 
chapter. In the context of reforming the provision of notice of designations, see 
7.4.1 Notice of Designations. 
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to natural justice, thereby requiring the Prime Minister to hear an applicant 
and first provide the applicant with information about the basis upon which 
the designation was made. 
Here, there are three perceived problems with this position. As before, 
the first practical problem is that any right to be heard or provided with 
information is not expressed and might therefore lead to an inconsistent 
application. The second again relates to the problem of protecting 
classified security information, as earlier discussed. 
The additional problem in the context of reviews by the Prime Minister 
is one of common sense and reality. As head of State, and ultimately the 
effective head of security intelligence services and of the military, it is 
suggested that the Prime Minister cannot be expected to him/herself hear a 
designated entity. A practical answer may lie in the delegation of this 
authority by the Prime Minister. In any event, and under either option, this 
would not establish an independent and impartial process. In saying this, it 
is not suggested that the Prime Minister would fail to act in an impartial 
manner, but the reality is that the office of the Prime Minister is an 
executive rather than a judicial one. In contrast, the office of the Inspector-
General of Security and Intelligence is one (in the view of the author) that 
does guarantee impartiality and independence. 15o It is suggested that, in 
order to achieve a proper balance between the exercise of the right to be 
heard and the protection of the integrity of the designation review process, 
reform is again necessary. The reforms advocated below seek to introduce 
150 While it has to be acknowledged that there have been criticisms of the 
Inspector-General in this regard (see Small D, above n 145), the author posits that 
the structure of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1996 does 
guarantee (to the extent possible) the impartiality and independence of the office. 
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a process by which entities can be heard when requesting a review by the 
Prime Minister, but that such hearing be conducted by the Inspector-
General for Security and Intelligence. 1Sl 
7.3.2( d) Status of classified security infonnation. The protection of 
classified security information is something that is addressed several times 
within the Terrorism Suppression Act. Three sets of statutory provisions 
are relevant in this regard. 
.. On the issue of the status of classified security information in 
proceedings to extend a designation (or any appeal against such 
proceedings), the relevant parts of sections 38 and 41 provide: 
38. Procedure on applications (and on appeals from decisions) 
under section 35 or section 
(3) If information presented or proposed to be presented in support of 
the application includes classified security information,-
(a) the proceedings must be heard and determined by the Chief 
Justice, or by 1 or more Judges nominated by the Chief 
Justice, or both; and 
(b) the Court must, on a request for the purpose by the 
Attorney-General and if satisfied that it is desirable to do so 
for the protection of (either all or part of) the classified 
security information, receive or hear (the part or all of) the 
classified security information in the absence of-
0) the designated entity concerned; and 
(ii) all barristers or solicitors (if any) representing that 
entity; and 
(iii) members of the public. 
(4) Without limiting subsection (3), if the designated entity 
concerned participates in proceedings relating to an application 
under section 35 or section 55,-
(a) the Court must approve a summary of the information of the 
kind referred to in section 32(2) that is presented by the 
Attorney-General except to the extent that a summary of any 
particular part of the information would itself involve 
disclosure that would be likely to prejudice the interests 
referred to in section 32(3); and 
151 Discussed below at 7.4.2(c) Hearing of entities seeking reconsideration of 
designations. 
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(b) on being approved by the Court (with or without 
amendments directed by the Court in accordance with 
paragraph (a)), a copy of the statement must be given to the 
entity concerned. 
41. Appeal against decision on application under section 35-
(2) Subject to sections 38 to 40, the procedure for the appeal must be 
in accordance with rules of Court. 
.. The status of classified security information in any other proceedings 
(and appeals against decisions in such proceedings) is governed by 
section 39, as follows: 
39. Procedure in other cases involving classified security 
infonnation-
(3) If information presented or proposed to be presented by the 
Crown includes classified security information, then section 38(3) 
(but not also section 38( 4)) applies with all necessary 
modifications to the proceedings as if the proceedings were an 
application to the High Court under section 35 or section 
However, if the proceedings are before the Court of Appeal, 
section 38(3)(a) does not apply. 
.. Finally, it is very significant that the above mechanisms by which 
classified information is protected are provided with what the author 
has described as a "trump card" in section 38(7): 
Subsection (2) to (6) and section 39(3) and (4) apply despite any 
enactment or rule of law to the contrary. 
The effect of the latter trump card is that, notwithstanding any finding that 
the provisions in sections 38, 39 and 41 are inconsistent with the right to 
natural justice, those provisions are nevertheless to be applied. 152 Section 4 
of the NZBORA provides the trump card with that effect. Still, two issues 
152 The use and effect of classified security information in the designation process 
has been expressed by the responsible select committee chair, Graham Kelly MP, 
as "a necessary evil": see Smith IE, New Zealand's Anti-Terrorism Campaign: 
Balancing Civil Liberties, National Security, and International Responsibilities, 
Ian Axford New Zealand Fellowship in Public Policy, December 2003, 62. 
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remam. The first is whether the provisions can be provided with more than 
one meaning, since section 6 will require the meaning most consistent with 
the NZBORA to be adopted. Next, although section 4 requires the trump 
card to prevail, the question in principle is whether the limitations upon 
natural justice imposed by these provisions are justifiable in a free and 
democratic society. 
On the question of potential interpretations of the provisions, the author 
takes the view that the provisions have been drafted with sufficient 
precision that only one meaning is open in each case. Firstly, if the 
Attorney-General requests, and the Court is satisfied that "it is desirable to 
do so for the protection of (either all of part of) the classified security 
information", then the Court must hear that information in the absence of 
the designated entity, its counsel and the public (section 38(3)(b)). The 
question of "desirability" is linked only to the protection of classified 
information. Having said this, the question of the 'desirability' of 
excluding information from one party to proceedings for the purpose of 
protecting classified security information may (depending on the approach 
taken by the Chief High Court Judge or his or her delegates) be applied in a 
robust manner to give effect to natural justice. At least in theory, the Judge 
could determine that is it never desirable to exclude the enjoyment of the 
right to natural justice for the protection of classified security information. 
It has to be acknowledged, however, that this is an assessment of what the 
Court might do and cannot therefore be relied upon with any certainty. 
Secondly, where the Attorney-General is required to provide a 
summary of information "except to the extent that a summary of any 
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particular part of the information would itself involvc disclosure that would 
likely prejudice the interests referred to in section 32(3)", this is again a 
proviso precise in its language. Thirdly, in the context of judicial review 
proceedings, the terms of section 39(3) clearly exclude the requirement for 
the Attorney-General to provide a summary of information. 
In the application of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, it is firstly 
notable that the provisions at hand do not exclude the rights to be informed 
of the case and to present the other side, but they limit the rights. This, as 
discussed in Chapter Four, is something that the Supreme Court of Canada 
has seen as important to determining whether provisions of an enactment 
are capable of justification. 153 This feature L'i preserved by virtue of the 
fact that the provisions call for their application on the particular facts of 
each case. The hearing of evidence in the absence of the entity or counsel 
will only occur "if it is desirable to do so" for the protection of classified 
security information. Likewise, the exclusion of classified security 
information from a summary will only occur "to the extent that a summary 
of any particular part of the information would itself involve disclosure that 
would be likely to prejudice the interests referred to in section 32(3)". 
Those factors would also go towards an argument that the limitations at 
hand are reasonable and proportionate. In some cases, that may be true. 
However, the author posits that a large number of designations are likely to 
be based upon high-level classified information, and solely upon such 
information. In those circumstances (even if they are rare), a designated 
entity (and its counsel) will be excluded from hearing information 
153 Chapter Four at 4.4.2( c) Reasonable "limitation n. 
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presented to the court and may thereby learn nothing of the reasons for the 
designation and be in a position where it cannot answer the case against it. 
Such situations would entirely oust the observance of natural justice, as 
enshrined in the audi alteram partem principle. Such situations would not, 
it is concluded by the author, be proportionate and justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
Before closing on this discussion, there are two matters to be addressed. 
The first is that there are some parallels in New Zealand legislation to the 
TSA's treatment of classified security information. The Crown 
Proceedings Act 1950 provides the Crown with exemption from disclosing 
in civil proceedings documentation that would be like1 y to prejudice the 
security or defence of New Zealand or the international relations of the 
Government of New Zealand. 154 This exemption, however, pertains only 
to such prejudicial documentation and rclates to 'normal' civil proceedings 
in which the Crown is involved and in respect of which classified 
information is unlikely to form the substance of the case. The Immigration 
Act 1987 also provides for the special treatment of classified security 
information (which is given an identical definition to that under the 
TSA).155 As a safeguard, the process is combined with rights of review and 
the inclusion in the process of legal counsel and the Inspector-General of 
Security and Intelligence. 156 The provision of full disclosure is also a 
matter restricted in the case of information relating to the application for 
and making of warrants to intercept communications under the Misuse of 
154 Crown Proceedings Act 1950, section 27 
155 Immigration Act 1987, section 114B 
156 Immigration Act 1987, sections 114A - 114R. 
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Drugs Act 1976 and the Crimes Act 1961.157 That process, however, does 
not deny an accused access to evidence that will be tendered against him or 
her and therefore does not impact upon the ability for an accused to answer 
the prosecution case. IS8 Finally, a process very similar to that under the 
Terrorism Suppression Act is being proposed under the Identity 
(Citizenship and Travel Documents) Bill 2004. 159 
The second matter to be addressed is that the Solicitor-General did, in 
his advice to the Attorney-General, give some brief attention to the 
treatment of classified security information under the Terrorism (Bombings 
and Financing) BilL 160 His main emphasis, however, was on the definition 
to be given to classified security information. The only point concerning 
the justifiability of the consequent limitations upon natural justice were 
contained in a footnote, in which he said: 161 
In addition, I draw comfort from the decision of the Canadian Supreme 
Court in Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and 
bnmigration) (1992) 90 DLR (4th) 289 in which that Court upheld 
against Charter attack a scheme under which, where security and 
intelligence issues were at stake classified security information need 
not be revealed to a deportee at a hearing before the Security 
Intelligence Review Committee. 
With all due respect to the Solicitor-General, the latter summary of the 
Court's decision is misleading. The Supreme Court of Canada concluded, 
on the particular facts, that fundamental justice had been observed by the 
157 Misuse of Drugs Act 1976, sections 14-29, and Crimes Act 1961, sections 
312A-312Q. 
158 This was held to be the case by the Court of Appeal in R v Saifiti [1994] 2 
NZLR 403, 408. 
159 For a brief overview of the Bill, see New Zealand Law Society, 'Delay changes 
to citizenship criteria, NZLS says', LawTalk, 14 February 2005, 5. 
160 Letter from the Solicitor-General to the Attorney-General, above n 123, paras 
21-22. 
161 Ibid, footnote 2. 
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Security Intelligence Review Committee through the provision by the 
Committee to the respondent of documents summarising information and 
giving (in the view of the Court) sufficient information to know the 
substance of the allegations against him and to be able to respond. 162 The 
provisions of the Terrorism Suppression Act, in contrast, has the potential 
to result in no substantive information being provided to an interested 
party. The Solicitor-General does not appear to have turned his mind to 
that point in his advice to the Attorney-General. 
7.3.2(e) The Ahmed Zaoui case. A matter of clarification needs to be 
addressed before proceeding any further. Many have wrongly assumed 
that the case involving Mr Ahmed Zaoui, an Algerian national who entered 
New Zealand in December 2002 and was detained by authorities until 
December 2004, was a matter involving his designation and/or detention 
under the Terrorism Suppression ACt.163 Mr Zaoui's matter in fact 
involved his claim for refugee status, the application of the Immigration 
Act 1987 and processes outside the Terrorism Suppression Act instigated 
by the Director of Security. Mr Zaoui had been granted refugee status by 
the Refugee Status Appeals Authority, but the New Zealand Government 
sought his removal based upon section 129X of the Immigration Act 1987 
and article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, the latter providing that the 
principle of nonrefoulment (literally non-return) does not apply to a person 
162 Chiarelli v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992) 90 DLR 
(4th) 289,291. 
163 This is a question that has commonly been presented to the author during the 
conduct of various seminars and discussions on the subject of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 361 
Chapter 7: Terrorist Designations and Rights to Justice 
in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger 
to the security of the country. 
Having said this, there are some useful statements made by the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal and High Court concerning the use of classified 
security information in the issuing by the Director of Intelligence of a 
security risk certificate against Mr Zaoui. In an appeal against judicial 
review proceeding in the High Court, President Anderson of the Court of 
Appeal identified the relevant issue as follows: 164 
As a general proposition, for a system to be fair, it would have to 
recognise and apply the ordinary principles of natural justice which in 
New Zealand are affirmed by s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 ('BORA'). A fundamental aspect of natural justice is the 
right to know, and to be accorded the opportunity of being heard in 
respect of matters which might be considered in the course of a 
decision affecting a person's rights or interests. But it may sometimes 
be the case that the Contracting State's grounds for regarding a refugee 
as a danger to the security of that country are based on classified 
information, the disclosure of which, to others including the refugee 
facing refoulement, may compromise the source of the information or 
State security operations. This can produce a conflict between the 
refugee's rights to natural justice and the State's interest in its own 
security. 
Notwithstanding that conflict, the High Court had held that the Director of 
Intelligence was required to provide Mr Zaoui with a summary of the 
allegations against him, provided that the information did not disclose 
classified security information which could not be divulged under the 
relevant provisions of the Immigrations Act. 165 The High Court's finding 
164 Attorney-General v Zaoui (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 690, para 4. 
165 Zaoui v Attorney-General [2004] 2 NZLR 339,383. 
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on that account was not the subject of appeal. Useful reference to Justice 
Williams' judgment in the High Court can therefore be made: 166 
[I]n struggling to reconcile their obligations under the international 
human rights covenants with national security concerns in a world 
plagued by more prevalent terrorism, other countries - including 
countries which have actually been subjected to terrorist attacks - have 
nonetheless found ways and adopted procedures which do not exclude 
those thought to be threats to security from procedural safeguards 
designed to ensure that, in a limited way, they can meet and challenge 
what is alleged against them through procedures which comply in as 
full a measure as possible with natural justice. For the most part, 
overseas experience such as that reviewed in the authorities and the 
affidavits filed on Mr Zaoui's behalf provides for: 
(a) Review by an independent functionary of unquestioned 
integrity; 
(b) The provision of summaries of classified information to the 
person concerned shorn of matter likely to identify source or 
proscribed from disclosure; and 
(c) Procedural fairness in the sense of the right to call evidence 
and present a case in opposition. 
These seem consistent themes in countries comparable with 
New Zealand. Two of the three already apply in this country. There 
seems no reason why the third should not apply. Certainly, Part IVA 
and s 1141 [of the Immigration Act] do not forbid it. 
That position, it is posited by the author, is entirely consistent with the 
conclusion made earlier that the mechanisms under the Terrorism 
Suppression Act are currently inconsistent, in principle, with the 
. fl" 167 requIrements 0 natura Justice. 
7.3.3 The Clash Between the ICCPR and the NZBORA 
Against the background of this analysis, a mixed and somewhat peculiar 
situation is exposed. Firstly, it appears that sections 20, 22, 26 and 34(1) -
relating to the making of a designation, the provision of notice of a 
designation and the review of designations by the Prime Minister - can be 
166 Ibid, paras 162-163. 
167 See 7. 3. 2 (d) Status of classified security information. 
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given interpretations that are consistent with the right to natural justice. 
The outcome of doing so, however, is problematic for a number of reasons, 
most importantly that a "NZBORA-consistent" interpretation neither caters 
for the special requirements of classified security information, nor the 
special nature of the Prime Minister's office. The conclusion drawn has 
been that reform is necessary. 
More significantly, it has been concluded that although the provisions 
of the Terrorism Suppression Act concerning classified security 
information cannot be invalidated or held to be ineffective through 
application of the Bill of Rights, these provisions are nevertheless in breach 
of article 14(1) ofthe ICCPR. New Zealand is thus in a position where the 
application and effect of its domestic law (the Terrorism Suppression Act 
and the Bill of Rights Act) renders it in breach of its international 
obligations (under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights). What are, or might be, the consequences of this? 
As already established earlier in this thesis, the internal law of a nation 
cannot be relied upon as a justifiable reason for beach of that nation's 
international obligations. 168 As also seen, the Human Rights Committee 
has expressly directed that New Zealand must, when implementing its 
counter-terrorist obligations under Security Council Resolution 1373, 
ensure that this is done in full conformity with the ICCPR. 169 The failure 
of New Zealand to do so will likely result in adverse comments being made 
168 Discussed in Chapter Five at 5.5.2(a) The 'normal course' infinding a conflict. 
169 Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: New Zealand, 17 July 2002, CCPR/C0I75/NZL, para 11. Discussed 
in Chapter Four at 4.2 Why Consider Human Rights in the Examination of 
Counter-Terrorist Legislation? 
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by the Human Rights Committee in the next periodic report under article 
40 of the Covenant. If the matter is made the subject of a communication 
under the ICCPR Optional Protocol, its could again see the Committee 
render adverse comments and direct New Zealand to amend its lawsYo 
Thus, this chapter comes to the final issue to be considered: that of reform. 
7.4 Reform 
Given the different outcomes in the application of New Zealand's domestic 
versus international human rights instruments, and the resulting tension 
between the two, it now falls to be considered whether the relevant 
restrictions under the Terrorism Suppression Act should be abandoned or 
modified. They should not, it is posited, be abandoned. The protection of 
classified security information, and the terrorist designation process, are 
clearly both important matters. l7l Abandoning the mechanisms by which 
classified security information can be protected would not only prejudice 
New Zealand's ability to use, gain and exchange such information, but it 
would also prejudice its work in countering terrorism. 
However, if New Zealand wants to comply with its international 
obligations, reform is clearly necessary. To that end, three levels of reform 
are advocated. All three reforms are suggested to be necessary for New 
Zealand to implement its counter-terrorist designation process in a manner 
170 A communication can only be lodged by a person that is a victim of a breach of 
a right under the ICCPR: see article 5 of the First Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966,999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). The effect 
of decisions of the Human Rights Committee ("views") is discussed in Chapter 
Four at 4.3.1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Ri.ghts. 
171 This has already been the subject of discussion within this chapter: see above at 
7.3.2 Limiting Natural Justice under the NZBORA. 
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that is at least proportionate with the ohjectives sought to be achieved. It 
should be noted that, strictly, speaking, the reforms would still not fall 
within any expressed permissible limitation upon the right to a fair hearing 
under the ICCPR. As discussed, article 14(1) only permits restriction upon 
the "open justice" nature of the right. Notwithstanding that fact, it is 
suggested that the following reforms would balance the restriction upon 
rights so in a manner that is proportionate (and, as such, compliant with 
section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act). As a consequence, it is 
proposed that the Human Rights Committee would be loathe to make 
overly adverse comments or directions against New Zealand in situations 
where it could be shown that New Zealand had taken aU reasonable steps to 
ensure that the right has only been limited to the extent strictly necessary 
and in a manner that seeks to limit the right to the least possible extent and 
with safeguards preventing an abuse of the process. 
7.4.1 Notice of Designations 
As already seen, section 26 of the Terrorism Suppression Act requires 
notice of a designation to be made to an entity within New Zealand (or its 
representative in New Zealand) that has been designated as a terrorist or 
associated entity, on either an interim or final basis. ln Despite the various 
requirements for a notice, nothing requires such notice to include 
information about the information upon which the designation has been 
made. The first recommendation for reform is to amend section 26 of the 
Act, requiring information to be given of the reason(s) for the designation, 
172 Discussed above at 7.1.1 (f) Notice of designations. 
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subject to the need to protect classified security information. The 
following amendment to section 26 is recommended (new subsection (e»: 
A notice under section 21(d)(i) or section 23(f)(i) (to notify the 
designated entity of the making of the designation under section 20 or 
section 22) -
(a) must state the section under which the designation is made, and 
whether the entity concerned is designated as a terrorist entity or 
as an associated entity: 
(b) may describe the entity concerned by reference to any name or 
names or associates or other details by which the entity may be 
identified: 
(c) must state the maximum period for which the designation may 
have effect or, if it is made under section 22, the maximum period 
for which it may have effect without being extended: 
(d) must include general information about how it may be reviewed 
and revoked: 
(e) [must include a summary of the information upon which the 
designation was based, to the extent that this does not prejudice 
the interests referred to in section 32(3):] 
[(f)] must include any other information specified for the purposes of 
this paragraph by regulations made under this Act. 
The aim of the new subsection (e) is to guarantee the right to be informed 
of the basis upon which a designated entity's interests have been affected, 
while at the same time protecting (to the extent necessary) the special 
status of classified security information. The limitation, in that regard, has 
been drawn from the wording of section 38(3)(b) of the Act. 
7.4.2 Reinstatement of the Inspector-General's Review 
The second reform recommended is the reinstatement of a modified form 
of the review of designations by the Inspector-General of Security and 
Intelligence. 173 There are a number of anticipated objectives and benefits 
in such a review process. 
173 As had been contained within the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill 
(see the select committee's interim report, above n 60), but then removed in the 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 367 
Chapter 7: Terrorist Designations and Rights fa Justice 
7.4.2(a) Review of designations. The first proposed role of the Inspector-
General would be to exercise the function envisaged within the first redraft 
of the Terrorism Suppression Bill: to undertake a mandatory review of all 
designations and consider, in that review, whether the tests for designation 
were properly applied and satisfied, when weighed against the information 
received by the Prime Minister. In doing so, the Inspector-General would 
act as an internal check upon the exercise of the significant decision-
making power of designation. Not only is this important to the integrity of 
the designation process itself, but also to the criminal responsibility 
implications of such designations. 174 By introducing an immediate and 
mandatory checking mechanism, this also addresses the lack of notice and 
hearing prior to the making of a designation. 175 It is posited that the 
addition of this checking mechanism transforms the latter limitation upon 
natural justice into a proportionate and justifiable one. 
Naturally, the power of review should corne with the ability on the part 
of the Inspector-General to act upon his or her findings. Under the 
proposed regime in the Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill, the 
Inspector-General was to have the power to revoke designations upon 
review 176 and it is proposed that any reinstatement of the Inspector-
General's role under the TSA include the same authority to revoke. In 
essence, as summarised by the Solicitor-General in his review of the Bill 
when giving advice to the Attorney-General, the Inspector-General's 
later Terrorism Suppression <Bombings and Financing> Bill (see the committee's 
final report, above n 65). 
174 Since the Terrorism Suppression Act prohibits certain dealings with designated 
entities: as discussed above at 7.2.1 The Issue of Natural Justice. 
175 Discussed above at 7.3.2(a) The making of designations. 
176 Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill [first redraft], clause 17T(1). 
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review would amount to a de novo determination. 177 The decision of the 
Inspector-General should, it is proposed, be accompanied with notice of the 
decision being given to the designated entity. By doing so, the entity will 
be in a better position to assess whether to seek judicial review of the 
decision. 
As was provided for in the Bill, it is proposed that the Inspector-
General's review function be able to be triggered by the designated entity. 
The Bill had provided, in that regard, that if a designated entity had 
unsuccessfully applied to the Prime Minister to have a designation revoked 
(current section 34(1) of the TSA), then it could apply for review by the 
Inspector-General. 178 
7.4.2(b) Review of notifications. The second role for the Inspector-General 
would be additional to that originally proposed by the Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee in its interim report on the BilL It is again 
proposed that this be mandatory and undertaken at the same time as the 
latter review of any designation. The question for the Inspector-General to 
consider here, though, would be whether the notice under section 26 has 
been properly made, having specific regard to the proposed new subsection 
(e): 
(e) [must include a summary of the information upon which the 
designation was based, except in the case of classified security 
information to the extent that this might prejudice the interests 
referred to in section 32(3):] 
177 Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill [first redraft], clause 17P(I): see 
letter from the Solicitor-General to the Attorney-General, above n 123, para 16. 
178 Terrorism (Bombings and Financing) Bill [first redraft], clause 17N(2). 
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This second role would require the Inspector-General to determine two 
things. First, whether the summary of information provided under the 
notice was a proper and fair reflection of the information upon which the 
designation was based. Next, it would require him or her to determine 
whether any exclusion of classified security information was necessary to 
the extent required to protect the interests referred to in section 32(3). 
This power of review should again be accompanied with the ability on 
the part of the Inspector-General to take any necessary action. In this case, 
s/he should be able to direct that the notice be amended to include any 
additional information s/he deems necessary that is, information upon 
which the designation was based, except classified security information (to 
the extent that this might prejudice the interests referred to in section 
32(3». 
7.4.2(c) Hearing of entities seeking reconsideration of designations. The 
next proposed role for the Inspector-General addresses the specific concern 
of the manner in which requests to the Prime Minister to reconsider a 
designation are dealt with under section 34. The point has been made that 
there is currently no right, in such circumstances, to be heard or to receive 
information about the basis upon which the designation was made. 179 The 
latter aspect has been addressed, it is suggested, by recommending the new 
section 26(e) concerning the provision of information in the notice of 
designation and the associated power of review of the notice by the 
Inspector -GeneraL 
179 Discussed above at 7.1.2( a) Reviews initiated by a designated entity or 
interested party. 
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What is recommended here is that the Inspector-General be empowered 
to receive submissions from an entity that requests review of their 
designation by the Prime Minister. However, it is posited that a careful 
balancing act must be achieved. The author has earlier criticised the fact 
that any reconsideration by the Prime Minister of a designation does not 
provide for the designated person to be heard. As already indicated, that is 
not to suggest that the Prime Minister should him/herself be required to 
hear a designated entity.180 Likewise, the Inspector-General should also 
not be expected to hear any frivolous evidence or submissions. It is posited 
that in seeking to maintain the integrity of any process, the checks upon 
that process should themselves be reasonable and prudent. Thus the 
following process is recommended: 
Where an entity, or a third party with "an interest in the designation", 181 
requests reconsideration of a designation by the Prime Minister under 
section 34( 1) of the Act, the written notice requesting reconsideration 
should first be referred to the Inspector-General of Security and 
Intelligence. 
.. If the written notice does not disclose any iniormation which, in the 
view of the Inspector-General, challenges the basis upon which the 
designation was made, then the Inspector-General should: (1) consider 
whether the information upon which the designation was based satisfies 
180 Discussed above at 7.3.2(c) Review of designations by the Prime Minister. 
181 As currently permitted under section 34(1) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 371 
Chapter 7: Terrorist Designations and Rights to Justice 
the tests for designation under the Act; 182 and (2) advise the Prime 
Minister accordingly. He or she should not, however, be required to 
hear from the applicant if the application does nothing to chal1enge the 
basis of the designation. To do so, it is suggested, would be pointless. 
Notwithstanding this, the Inspector-General should inform the 
applicant that the applicant's written notice does not disclose any 
information which challenges the basis upon which the designation was 
made and that, in the absence of such further information, slhe has 
reached the conclusion that the designation should stand (or be 
revoked) and has made a recommendation to the Prime Minister 
accordingly. By doing so, the applicant is thereby advised of the 
Inspector-General's recommendation and the reasons for it. 
.. If, in contrast, the written notice does disclose information which 
challenges the basis upon which the designation was made, then the 
Inspector-General should be required to advise the applicant that they 
can (a) file with the Inspector-General written submissions; andlor (b) 
attend at a specified time and place to be heard in person. After hearing 
from the applicant in this way, the Inspector-General should: (1) 
consider whether the information upon which the designation was 
based, together with any further information received, satisfies the tests 
for designation under the Act; and (2) advise the Prime Minister 
accordingly. Again, it is recommended that the Inspector-General 
should advise the applicant that slhe has reached the conclusion that the 
182 In other words, s/he should confirm that the designation is valid. 
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designation should stand (or be revoked) and has made a 
recommendation to the Prime Minister accordingly. 
.. The latter process should, to ensure both fairness and efficiency, 
include appropriate time limits. 
Such a process, in the view of the author, would both guarantee the right to 
be heard (where there is something to be heard about) and at the same time 
limit the Prime Minister's involvement in that process and restrict frivolous 
applications from taking the time of both the Prime Minister and Inspector-
General. What must be remembered, as discussed earlier,183 is that there is 
no right to be heard in person by an administrative tribunal. There is only a 
right to make representations. By instituting a system where 
representations can be made to the Inspector-General (with the ability for 
him or her to hear submissions in person), that right is preserved. 
Furthermore, by notifying an applicant of the Inspector-General's 
recommendations, the applicant is in a better position (it is suggested) to 
assess whether to seek judicial review of the recommendation, or of the 
Prime Minister's later decision to designate or refuse to revoke a 
designation. 
7.4.3 Panel of Security-Cleared Counsel 
The recommendations thus far have addressed the early stages of the 
designation process, not all dependent on action by a designated entity or 
interested third party. The final recommendation considered now concerns 
183 Above at 7.2.2(b) The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002. 
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the representation of an entity or interested third party in judicial 
proceedings under the Terrorism Suppression Act. Specifically, those 
proceedings relating to the extension of a designation (sections 35 and 41), 
or arising out of the making of a designation (section 33). In the case of 
such proceedings, the current position is as follows: 
.. Where the Attorney-General applies to extend a final designation 
(section 35), the High Court is required to receive any classified 
security information relating to the application without the presence of 
the designated entity (or its counsel) if that is desirable for the 
protection of the information (section 38(3)(b)).184 The Attorney-
General is however obliged to provide a summary of the information to 
the designated entity, except to the extent that this would involve 
disclosure of information that would prejudice those interests listed in 
section 32(3) of the ACt. IS5 Any appeal against a decision of the High 
Court to extend a designation restricts (in the way just mentioned) the 
appeal court's dealings with classified security information. 186 
.. Next, although the Act does not prevent a person from bringing judicial 
review proceedings arising out of the making of a designation (section 
33), the High Court is again required to receive any classified security 
information relating to the application without the presence of the 
designated entity (or its counsel) if that is desirable for the protection of 
184 Discussed above at 7.1.3(a) Proceedings for extension of designations. 
185 Discussed above at 7.1.3 Classified Security Information. 
186 Terrorism Suppression Act 2002, section 41: discussed above at 7.1.3(a) 
Proceedings for extension of designations. 
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the information. 187 This time the Attorney-General is not required to 
d f h 'nf . 188 pro uce a summary 0 t e 1 ormation. 
These restrictions are clearly imposed for the purpose of protecting 
classified security information and are, to that extent, important ones. It 
has been concluded, however, that they are not proportional. 189 The 
recommendation made here is to address these restrictions by permitting an 
entity (that is the subject of extension proceedings) and/or interested person 
(the subject of review proceedings) to be represented by counsel and 
thereby ensure that those persons' interests are represented and put forward 
to the Court. 
The principal objection to representation by counsel is likely to be that 
representation by counsel does not avoid the need to protect certain 
classified security information. What is proposed here, though, is the 
establishment of a special panel of legal counsel that have an appropriate 
level of security clearance so that they may be present during the otherwise 
"closed hearing" of classified information when section 38(3)(b) of the 
TSA is applicable. Such counsel, it is proposed, should also be entitled to 
make submissions to the Court on the content of any summary of 
information to be presented by the Attorney-General under section 38(4) of 
the Act. Doing so, it is posited, transforms what can otherwise be a blanket 
exclusion of disclosure into a justifiable and proportionate limitation upon 
the duty of disclosure. At least by having counsel present during the 
187 Discussed above at 7.1.2(a) Reviews initiated by a designated entity or 
interested party. 
188 Discussed above at 7.1.3(b) Judicial review or other proceedings relating to 
designations. 
189 Discussed above at 7.3.2( d) Status of classified security information. 
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hearing and consideration of all information before the Court, respondents 
or applicants in proceedings under sections 33, 35, 39, and 55 of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act can be sure that they have a level of capacity to 
respond to the case against them. The proposed reform would at the same 
time preserve the important need to protect classified security information. 
For the sake of completeness, two further matters should be addressed. 
Firstly, it must be recognised that there is no direct equivalent to this 
proposal in any established procedures in New Zealand law. There are, 
however, some analogies. Panels of specialised counsel are not a new 
phenomenon. New Zealand retains panels of military counsel for the 
purpose of proceedings under the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971; 
panels and categories of criminal legal aid counsel for ordinary criminal 
proceedings in New Zealand courts (administered under the Legal Services 
Act 2000); and specialised counsel for the child under the Care of Children 
Act 2004. Although these panels do not have (as the central requirement 
for being on the panels) the need for special security clearance,190 they do 
have their own special requirements for relevant expertise. 
The second issue that should be touched upon is that of choice. Given 
that any panel of security-cleared counsel is likely to be limited, could a 
non-Crown party to proceedings under the Terrorism Suppression Act 
complain that they have little or no choice in who is to represent them? 
This, however, is not seen as problematic and there are, again, analogies to 
be seen. Those charged within criminal offences who are granted legal aid 
190 Members of military defence panel must have a certain level of security 
clearance, but by virtue of the fact that they are members of the armed forces 
rather than as a specialised feature of their status as counsel. 
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have for a significant time had no choice at all in what counsel is to be 
assigned to represent them. It has been only a recent initiative of the Legal 
Services Agency to introduce a system of "preferred counsel", whereby an 
applicant for criminal legal aid can nominate counsel to be represented. 
Although, in practise, preferred counsel is usually appointed, there is no 
obligation upon the Legal Services Agency to do so. Likewise, in family 
proceedings, it is the Family Court that appoints counsel for the child under 
section 7 of the Care of Children Act 2004, or section 30 of the 
Guardianship Act 1968. Appointment of counsel is at the sole discretion of 
the Family Court and the New Zealand High Court has recently 
pronounced that the child to be represented has no right to determine what 
counsel is to act. 191 
7.5 Conclusion 
The process by which designations are made, reviewed, extended, and 
capable of being challenged is a complex one. It is central to the operation 
of the Terrorism Suppression Act anti-financing regime, and to New 
Zealand's compliance with the Security Council's identification of terrorist 
organisations. The process is important to New Zealand's contribution to 
the international regime towards the suppression of the financing of 
terrorism. Designations are also important to the way in which others are 
able to deal with designated entities, and to the interests of the entity 
concerned. Entities are, by reason of their designation, restricted in their 
property and financial dealings and may be subject (upon extension of a 
191 In the matter of R, unreported, 30/07/04, Kean J (HC), Auckland, para 61. 
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final designation) to forfeiture of their property to the Crown. Third parties 
are prohibited from financing, supporting, recruiting into, or providing 
financial or other property-related services to terrorist or associate entities. 
Financial institutions are bound to report financial transactions. In short, 
terrorist designations impact, in significant terms, upon both designated 
entities and those that might interact with them. 
Identified within this chapter are a number of features of the 
designation process that give rise to serious concerns about the compliance 
of the process with various aspects of the right to natural justice. Most 
significant is the principle of hearing the other side, audi alteram partem, 
featuring within that the notions of equality of arms, the disclosure of 
information, the ability to make submissions and the receipt of reasons for 
the making of decisions. It has been concluded that the current regime 
under the Terrorism Suppression Act does not comply with New Zealand's 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(article 14(1)). Likewise, it has been concluded that although aspects of 
the regime cannot be invalidated by domestic courts in the application of 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, features of the regime are otherwise 
incompatible with the normal standards of justifiable limitations upon 
rights in a free and democratic society. 
number of reforms have therefore been recommended within this 
chapter. Their aim is to produce a designation process that is workable, 
achieves compliance with New Zealand's international counter-terrorist 
obligations, and protects the special status of classified security 
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information. At the same time, the reforms aim to achieve a proportional 
balance between those objectives and the enjoyment of rights to justice. 
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Democratic and Civil Rights 
Democratic and civil rights include two freedoms of relevance to this 
chapter held to be important to western notions of democracy - namely, the 
freedoms of expression and association. The first matter to be examined in 
this chapter concerns the ability of the Prime Minister, under the 
International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987, to prohibit the 
publication or broadcasting of certain matters relating to an international 
terrorist emergency. Freedom of expression, in the context of media 
control, is therefore at issue. The freedom of association is also to be 
considered. These are freedoms impacted upon by provisions of both the 
United Nations Sanctions (Terrorism Suppression and Afghanistan 
Measures) Regulations 2001, and amending regulations (the Terrorism 
Regulations), and the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002. 
S.l Media Control 
Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the advent of the 'War on 
Terror', these experiences have been cited as the cause of a decline in the 
freedom of the press. 1 Interestingly, in the case of New Zealand, there 
1 See, for example, the accounts of the organisation Reporters Without Borders, 
pointing to the physical violence and enforced disappearance suffered by 
journalists, the arrest and detention of media workers, censorship, and the 
surveillance of the internet: '2003 Round-Up', Reporters Without Borders, 6 
January 2004, URL <http://www.charter97.orgleng/news/2004/01l06Iborders> at 
11 March 2005; and 'United States', Reporters Without Borders, June 2004, 
URL <http://www.rsf.orglartic1e.php3?id_artic1e=10612> at 11 March 2005. See 
also United Nations Foundation, 'Report Shows Decline of Press Freedom with 
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have been no legislative changes smce September 11 impacting upon 
media control. Rather, media control was something legislated for under 
the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 (ITEPA) 
following the Rainbow Warrior bombing in 1985. Although an 
"international terrorist emergency,,2 under the Act has never been invoked, 
Assistant Commissioner of Police Jon White has reported that this was 
contemplated in 2003 when cyanide was mailed in threatening letters to the 
embassies of the United States and United Kingdom? 
Section 14 of the ITEP A provides the Prime Minister with certain 
rights to prohibit publication or broadcasting of certain matters relating to 
an international terrorist emergency:4 
14. Prime Minister may prohibit publication or broadcasting of 
matters relating to terrorist emergency-
(1) Where, in respect of any emergency in respect of which authority 
to exercise emergency powers has been given under this Act, the Prime 
Minister believes, on reasonable grounds, that the publication or 
broadcasting of-
(a) The identity of any person involved in dealing with that 
emergency; or 
(b) Any other information or material (including a photograph) which 
would be likely to identify any person as a person involved in 
dealing with that emergency-
would be likely to endanger the safety of any person involved in 
dealing with that emergency, or of any other person, the Prime Minister 
may, by notice in writing, prohibit or restrict-
(c) The publication, in any newspaper or other document; and 
(d) The broadcasting, by radio or television or otherwise,-
War on Terror', UN Wire, 8 January 2004, URL <http://www.unwire.org/ 
UNWire> at 12 January 2004. 
2 The definition of the term, and the activation of a state of emergency under the 
Act, are considered in Chapter Three at 3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency 
Powers) Act 1987. 
3 Smith JE, New Zealand's Anti-Terrorism Campaign: Balancing Civil Liberties, 
National Security, and International Responsibilities, Ian Axford New Zealand 
Fellowship in Public Policy, December 2003, 11, note 57. 
4 Subsections (4) and (5) of section 14 (concerning the pUblication of section 14 
notices in the Gazette and proceedings of the House of Representatives) have not 
been reproduced. 
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of the identity of any person involved in dealing with that emergency, 
and any other information or material (including a photograph) which 
would be likely to identify any person as a person involved in dealing 
with that emergency. 
(2) Where, in respect of any emergency in respect of which authority 
to exercise emergency powers has been given under this Act, the Prime 
Minister believes, on reasonable grounds, that the publication or 
broadcasting of any information or material (including a photograph) 
relating to any equipment or technique lawfully used to deal with that 
emergency would be likely to prejudice measures designed to deal with 
international terrorist emergencies, the Prime Minister may, by notice 
in writing, prohibit or restrict-
(a) The publication, in any newspaper or other document; and 
(b) The broadcasting, by radio or television or otherwise,-
of any information or material (including a photograph) of any such 
equipment or technique. 
(3) The Prime Minister may issue a notice under subsection (1) or 
subsection (2) of this section notwithstanding that the emergency in 
respect of which the notice is issued has ended. 
Section 15 of the Act deals with the expiry, revocation and renewal of 
section 14 notices. Subsection (3) provides that, unless earlier revoked or 
extended (or unless the notice specifies the life of the notice), a section 14 
notice will expire months after the date on which it was issued. This 
provision is unaffected by whether the terrorist emergency continues to 
exist. Section 15(4) allows further extensions for periods of five years at a 
time, if renewal of the notice is necessary: 
(a) To protect the safety of any person; or 
(b) To avoid prejudice to measures designed to deal with 
international terrorist emergencies. 
This part of the chapter considers the freedom of expression and the 
reasons underlying the desire to control the media when dealing with 
terrorism. The compatibility of section 14 of the !TEPA with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) will then be examined. In 
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doing so, the justiciability of decisions of the Prime Minister concerning 
'media gags' will also be considered. 
8.1.1 Freedom of the Press 
The freedom of expression is a matter dealt with under article 19(2) and (3) 
of the International Covenant. Paragraph (3) sets out the permissible 
limitations upon the freedom (to be discussed),5 while paragraph (2) 
expresses the substantive right: 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas 
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
In very similar terms, section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
guarantees "the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to 
seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any 
form", The question to briefly consider within this part of the discussion 
is whether article 19 and section 14 afford protection to the media, since 
neither document expresses a 'freedom of the press'. In the case of section 
14 of the NZBORA, the approach of New Zealand courts has been to treat 
freedom of the press as an integral feature of the right of al1 members of the 
public to seek, receive and impart information and opinions.6 
5 Discussed below at 8.1.3 Media control and the lCCPR. 
6 See Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 48, 61, where 
the court stated that "the right of freedom of the press is no more and no less than 
the right of all and any member of the public to make comment", See also 
Television New Zealand Ltd v Attomey-General [1995] 2 NZLR 641, 646, where 
Cooke P stated for the Court of Appeal: 
The freedom of the press is not separately specified in the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights, our Bill differing in that respect from s 2 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and the First Amendment in the United States, but it is 
an important adjunct of the rights concerning freedom of expression affirmed 
in s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. They include "the freedom to 
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The situation under the International Covenant is slightly more 
complicated, however. The words of the Covenant again do not expressly 
include the freedom of the press, but the same argument as that adopted by 
New Zealand courts is applicable in the view of the author. The difficulty 
lies in the fact that there is no jurisprudence in this area since complaints to 
the Human Rights Committee under the First Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR are limited to complaints by individuals.7 It was on that basis that 
communications 36011989 and 36111989 were dismissed by the Committee 
as being inadmissible under the Optional Protocol. 8 The communications 
involved claims by printing companies, whose main purpose was to 
purchase and supply material to a publication company for the production, 
printing and publishing of weekly newspapers. Both communications were 
submitted on behalf of companies incorporated under the laws of Trinidad 
and Tobago. Under article 1 of the Optional Protocol, only individuals are 
able to submit a communication to the Human Rights Committee. As such, 
the particular communications were found to be inadmissible.9 
Importantly, however, this does not invalidate the application of article 
19 to the freedom of the press. The effect of what has just been discussed 
seek, receive, and impart information ... Decisions of this Court have reflected 
the importance of media freedom, quite apart from the Bill of Rights. 
Attorney-General for the United Kingdom v Wellington Newspapers Ltd 
[1988] 1 NZLR 129, 176 and Auckland Area Health Board v Television New 
Zealand Ltd [1992] 3 NZLR 406 are two of the numerous examples which 
could be cited. 
7 See Conte A, Davidson S and Burchill R, Defining Civil and Political Rights. 
The Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd, 2004), 18-21. 
8 A Newspaper Publishing Company v Trinidad and Tobago, Human Rights 
Committee Communication 360/1989; and A Publication and a Printing 
Company v Trinidad and Tobago, Human Rights Committee Communication 
36111989, para 12.2. 
9 Ibid. 
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simply means that only individuals, as opposed to media groups or 
corporations, may complain to the Human Rights Committee about 
interference with their freedom of expression. The freedom is still a right 
guaranteed under the Covenant and an obligation in respect of which New 
Zealand must, as a State party, comply. 
8.1.2 Limiting the Freedom of Expression when Responding to Terrorism 
Control upon the media and its ability to publish or broadcast any matter is 
something that impacts upon the freedom of expression. In the language of 
the Rishworth steps, the right being invoked (the freedom of expression) 
applies to the circumstances being complained of (the Prime Minister's 
authority under sections 14 and 15 of the ITEPA).lO Because these 
provisions effect limitations upon the freedom of expression, the issue to 
then consider is whether the limitations are consistent with section 5 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the expression of the right within 
article 19 of the ICCPR. It is useful to firstly consider the reasons behind a 
desire to restrict the media when responding to terrorism. 
In its report on emergencies, the New Zealand Law Commission spoke 
of the generally accepted notion that only in the most exceptional 
circumstances is it desirable or necessary to control the media in its 
coverage of events. ll In doing so, the report identified various factors that 
might call for media control, from the perspective of both dealing with an 
instant terrorist emergency anq the longer-term implications of 
10 See Chapter Four at 4.3. 2 (a). The 'unholy trinity' of sections 4, 5 and 6. 
11 Keith K, Final Report on Emergencies (New Zealand Law Commission Report 
22, 1991), para 7.140. 
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broadcasting and publication. On the subject of dealing with an actual 
terrorist incident, the report noted:12 
Media coverage of terrorist events can compromise the efforts of the 
authorities to resolve those events and may also prejudice further 
responses to terrorist action. The primary concern is that the terrorist, 
by following the coverage of the incident, may be alerted to 
counteractive measures taken by the police and by the armed forces 
where they are involved. This forewarning may result in the failure of 
the operation and could place lives, of both anti-terrorist personnel and 
hostages (if any) at risk. 
Other factors were also identified as having a potential impact upon the 
ability of authorities to deal with particular instances of terrorist activity. 13 
First to be identified was the obstruction of authorities by the physical 
presence of the media, although this is a matter that could apply to the 
physical presence of any person and is dealt with under section 10 of the 
ITEPA.14 Secondly was the fact that media representatives may become 
participants in the event by communicating directly with the terrorists and 
thereby potentially undermining the conduct of authorities. Again, 
however, it appears to the author that this is a matter capable of being dealt 
with under the police powers to restrict entry and require evacuation of 
emergency areas under section 10 of the Act. 
The report also makes the point that media coverage may have an 
impact outside the operation of a particular terrorist emergency. 15 This 
might occur through terrorist organisations gaining tactical information and 
technical knowledge from the media coverage of counter-terrorist 
12 Ibid, para 7.142-7.143. The report pointed to the siege of the Iranian Embassy 
in London in 1980 as a situation in which this almost arose. The police and SAS 
assault on the Embassy was filmed, although this was not broadcast live. 
13 Ibid, para 7,144. 
14 See Chapter Nine at 9.2.4 Intemational Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 
1987. 
15 Above n 11, para 7.144. 
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operations. Such coverage might also expose the identity of members of 
counter-terrorist forces and thereby expose them to the risk of attack by 
terrorists. These are clearly undesirable consequences. 
Bearing these issues in mind, consideration will next be had of the 
relationship between media control and the ICCPR, and the NZBORA 
justified limitations provision. 
8.1.3 Media Control and the ICCPR 
The freedom of expression, as guaranteed under the International 
Covenant, has already been identified briefly. The question here is whether 
sections 14 and 15 of the ITEPA fall within the permissible limitations in 
the Covenant. Article 19(3) sets out these limitations as follows: 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this 
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may 
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such 
as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals. 
Recognised within paragraph 3, then, is the fact that the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and 
responsibilities permitting the imposition of restrictions upon the right, 
which may relate either to the interests of other persons or to those of the 
community as a whole. Within the terms of paragraph 3, any restriction 
must cumulatively meet the following conditions: it must be provided for 
by law, it must address one of the aims enumerated in paragraph 3(a) and 
(b) of article 19, and it must be necessary to achieve those legitimate 
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purposes.16 Any limitation must also be proportional and not implemented 
in a manner that nullifies the substance of the right to expression.17 Where 
a State seeks to justify a limitation as falling within the ambit of paragraph 
3, the Human Rights Committee will require the State party to specify the 
precise nature of the threat allegedly posed by a person's exercise of 
freedom of expression and how the limitation achieves dissipation of that 
threat. 18 
Limiting the freedom of expression on the basis of national security 
was considered in Park v Republic of Korea. 19 Korea stated that the 
restrictions in question20 were justified in order to protect national security 
and that they were provided for by law, under article 7 of the National 
Security Law 1980 (Korea). Despite the potentially sensitive nature of 
security issues, however, the Committee took the view that it must still 
determine whether any measures taken are in fact necessary for the purpose 
stated. On the facts of the communication, the State party invoked national 
security by reference to the general situation in the country and the threat 
posed by "North Korean communists". The Committee considered that the 
State had failed to specify the precise nature of the threat posed by the 
author's exercise of freedom of expression and therefore found that there 
16 Mukong v Cameroon, Human Rights Committee Communication 458/1991, 
para 9.7. 
17 Freedom of Expression (Art, 19), CCPR General Comment 10 (1983), para 4. 
18 See, for example, Kim v Republic of Korea, Human Rights Committee 
Communication 574/1994, para 12.5; Laptsevic v Belarus, Human Rights 
Committee Communication 780/1997, para 8.5; and Pietrataroia v Uruguay, 
Human Rights Committee Communication r 1 0.44/1979, para 17. 
19 Park v Republic of Korea, Human Rights Committee Communication 
62811995. See also Kim v Republic of Korea, Human Rights Committee 
Communication 574/1994. 
20 Prohibiting the "praising, encouraging, or siding with or through other means 
the activities of an anti-State organization" (article 7(1) of the National Security 
Law 1980). 
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was no basis upon which the restriction could be considered compatible 
with article 19(3).21 
In contrast to this communication, however, the ITEPA deals with 
specific emergencies (declared by no fewer than three Ministers upon 
advice from the Commissioner of Police, on the particular facts, to 
constitute an "international terrorist emergencY").22 Applying the various 
requirements of paragraph 3 identified above, the first requirement is 
clearly met, sections 14 and 15 being restrictions imposed by law. Next, to 
satisfy paragraph 3, the provisions must be in pursuit of the aims expressed 
in subparagraphs 3(a) and (b). Sections 14 and 15 appear to fit well within 
the aim of protecting national security and, equally, protecting public order 
or public health. The Prime Minister's authority to restrict the media only 
arises where the information in question: 
.. "would be likely to endanger the safety of any person involved in 
dealing with that emergency, or of any other person,,;23 or 
.. "would be likely to prejudice measures designed to deal with 
international terrorist emergencies". 24 
The final requirement of paragraph 3 is that any limitation upon the 
freedom of expression be proportional and in response to specific 
identifiable threats caused by a continuance of the freedom. 25 In the main, 
the author considers that proportionality is met, and it is clear that these 
21 Ibid, para 10.3. 
22 See Chapter Three at 3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 
1987. 
23 Section 14(1) of the Act. See also section 15(4)(a). 
24 Section 14(2) of the Act. See also section 15(4)(b). 
25 Above n 17. 
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measures can only apply to identified, and expressly declared, states of 
international terrorist emergencies. The only matter of concern relates to 
section 14(3) of the ITEP A, which permits the continuance of restrictions 
or prohibitions under subsections (1) or (2) notwithstanding that the 
emergency has ended. A notice under section 14 automatically lasts for 
one year, unless earlier revoked by the Prime Minister.26 The restrictions 
can then be extended for five year periods under section 15(4) if renewal of 
the notice is necessary for the protection of any person or to avoid 
prejudice to measures designed to deal with terrorism. 27 As identified 
earlier, the continued suppression of information may be necessary for the 
purpose of preventing to identification of counter-terrorist agents or to 
prevent terrorist organisations from gaining tactical or technical 
information on counter-terrorist operations and, to that extent, the ability 
for restrictions to apply after a state of emergency seems reasonable.28 At 
face value, then, this seems appropriate. 
The author's concern is that the Prime Minister's authority, in its 
current form, is absent any checking mechanism and could therefore be 
used to suppress the publication of information that does not pertain to the 
aims identified in subsections (1) and (2). During an actual state of 
terrorist emergency, the lack of a checking mechanism and the need for the 
Prime Minister to act decisively seems perfectly reasonable. Checking the 
continuance of 'media gags' after a terrorist emergency has ended, 
however, presents different considerations. The Act does not expressly 
26 Section 15(2) and (3) of the Act. 
27 Section 15(4) of the Act. 
28 Discussed above at 8.1.2 Limiting the Freedom of Expression when Responding 
to Terrorism. 
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permit the media to challenge the continuance of a prohibition in the 
domestic courts. Yet, should an individual complain to the Human Rights 
Committee, the Committee would require New Zealand to give reasons for 
the continued need of the prohibition or restriction.29 The New Zealand 
Law Commission identified that the gravity of the circumstances giving 
rise to an emergency under the ITEPA will vary, as will the threat posed by 
the publication or broadcasting of information. 30 Questions should 
therefore be able to be asked as to whether those circumstances or threats 
justify prolonged media gags. 
As noted by the Law Commission, the Human Rights Committee has 
levelled criticism at the media provisions of the ITEPA in its consideration 
of New Zealand's reports under the ICCPR.3I In its comments to New 
Zealand's second periodic report, the Committee noted that concerns raised 
by it during the examination of New Zealand's report concerning the scope 
of the ITEP A had not been alleviated. 32 The Committee expressed 
particular concern about the 'closure provisions' of the ITEPA media gags. 
8.1.4 Media Control and Judicial Review 
Picking up on the concerns raised about the continuance of media gags, the 
perceived problem is that the continuance cannot be challenged under the 
ITEP A and, as such, there is no guarantee that continuance notices are 
connected with the stated objectives ill sections 14 and 15. Thus, the 
potential effect of the provisions, III the absence of some reVIew 
29 See General Comment 10, above n 17, and Park v Republic of North Korea, 
above n 19. 
30 Above n 11, para 7.15l. 
31 Ibid, para 7.152. 
32 Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand, 
CCPRI Al44/40 (1989), paras 393 and 402. 
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mechanism, is to permit the unfettered abuse of media gags under the 
ITEPA. The issue thus arises: are notices under sections 14 and 15 
reviewable? The starting point is to recognise that the ITEPA does not 
prohibit judicial review and, as such, the media could prima facie challenge 
the continuance of media gags through judicial review proceedings. The 
next point to consider, however, is whether decisions of the Prime Minister 
under sections 14 or 15 of the ITEPA are justiciable. 
The most recent word on the justiciability of ministerial decisions in 
New Zealand is the case of Curtis v Minister of Defence.33 Citing its 
earlier decision in CREEDNZ v Governor GeneraP4 and decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada and House of Lords, the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal concluded that:35 
A non-justiciable issue is one in respect of which there is no 
satisfactory legal yardstick by which the issue can be resolved. That 
situation will often arise in cases into which it is also constitutionally 
inappropriate for the Courts to embark. 
In the making of decisions under sections 14 and 15, the author is of the 
view that such decisions are justiciable, applying the test identified by the 
Court of Appeal. Rephrasing the Court's test in the context of the ITEPA 
provisions, there are two questions to ask: (1) are decisions under sections 
14 and 15 ones in respect of which it would be constitutionally 
inappropriate for the courts to embark: and (2) is there a satisfactory legal 
33 Curtis v Minister of Defence [2002] 2 NZLR 744. 
34 CREEDNZ v Governor General [1981] 1 NZLR 359. 
35 Above n 33, (para 27). 
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yardstick by which to determine whether the Prime Minister's decisions 
under sections 14 and 15 have been properly made?36 
Considering the first question, the author posits that the determinations 
at hand are not ones of a constitutionally sensitive nature calling for 
judicial deference. The decisions concern the safety of persons and the 
potential prejudice of information to future counter-terrorist operations. 
Unlike Curtis, they are not decisions concerning the disposition of armed 
forces or other policy-based matters. This goes to answer the second 
question in the affirmative. In exercising judicial review of decisions 
under sections 14 and 15, the courts would be considering the application 
of facts to the statutory tests under those provisions to determine whether 
the continuance of notices is proper. The question to be considered by the 
courts would be this: would the publication or broadcasting of the identity 
of any person involved in the emergency (or other infonnation or material 
that would lead to the identify of such a person) be likely to either (1) 
endanger the safety of that or any other person (sections 14(1) and 
15(4)(a)), or (2) prejudice measures designed to deal with international 
terrorist emergencies (section 14(2) and 15(4)(b))? The question is, in the 
author's view, a justiciable one. 
Against that background, the author concludes that judicial review is 
available as a safeguard against the improper use of sections 14 and 15 of 
the ITEP A. As will be seen in the discussion that follows, the consequence 
36 This also appears to be consistent with the Court of Appeal's approach in the 
Zaoui case, where the decision to issue a "security certificate" was held to be 
subject to judicial review in the absence of an express exclusion of judicial 
review: Attomey-General v Zaoui (No 2) [2005] 1 NZLR 690. 
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of this conclusion is significant to the question of the provisions' 
compatibility with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
8.1.5 Media Control and section 5 of the NZBORA 
Turning to the question of whether sections 14 and 15 of the ITEPA are 
justifiable under section 5 of the NZBORA, the first consideration (the 
existence of an important objective) seems easy to answer. To the extent 
that media gags are issued for the purposes identified under sections 14(1) 
and (2) and 15(4), those objectives are clearly pressing and substantial not 
only to deal with instant emergencies but also to preserve the integrity of 
counter-terrorist operations, and the safety of persons. Those objectives, in 
the author's view, satisfy the first limb of the Oakes and Radio New 
Zealand limitations test.37 
In applying the second, proportionality, limb of the section 5 test one 
must first be satisfied that the legislative provision is rationally connected 
to the achievement of the objective. Again, this seems easy to answer in 
the affIrmative. The structure of sections 14 and 15 is such as to restrict or 
prohibit the publication or broadcasting of information likely to prejudice 
the safety or a person or the integrity of future counter-terrorist operations. 
The second proportionality factor requires the legislative provision to 
impair the right as little as reasonably possible. This goes to the question 
of whether sections 14 and 15 are the least intrusive means by which their 
objectives might be achieved. So long as safeguards exist against the 
improper use of these provisions, the author takes the view that sections 14 
and 15 satisfy the minimal impairment test. The current statutory 
37 See Chapter Four at 4.4.2(e) The substantive test under section 5. 
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framework does not exclude judicial review of section 14 and 15 decisions 
and, as concluded above, these decisions are justiciable so that adequate 
safeguards are present. In the view of the author, this conclusion also goes 
to the final factor of the proportionality test, rendering the effect of the 
provisions upon the freedom of the press proportional to the objectives of 
protecting the safety of persons and the ability to deal with future counter-
terrorist operations. As such, sections 14 and 15 are 'consistent' with the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights and no further enquiry under the Rishworth 
steps is required. 
8.1.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, sections 14 and 15 of the International Terrorism 
(Emergency Powers) Act 1987 are compliant with both the ICCPR and 
NZBORA. In a disappointingly brief and cursory examination of the 
ICCPR and NZBORA, the Law Commission concluded that media control 
under the ITEP A was ineffective38 and that their encroachment upon the 
ICCPR and NZBORA were not justified?9 It therefore recommended the 
repeal of sections 14 and 15, preferring a model by which voluntary 
guidelines be adopted by the media40 
With due respect to the Commission, the author disagrees. Certainly, 
the provisions do limit the freedom of the press, a freedom guaranteed by 
article 19 of the ICCPR and section 14 of the NZBORA. However, the 
restricted purposes in respect of which media gags may be issued, 
38 No reasons for this conclusion are given, other than the fact that the Act is 
'cumbersome' in determining whether a terrorist emergency exists: above nIl, 
paras 7.160 and 7.161. This does not, however, go to the question of whether the 
media control provisions are themselves ineffective. 
39 Ibid, 7.162. 
40 Ibid. 
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combined with the availability of judicial review as a safeguard against 
abuse of the powers under the provision, mean that the ITEPA provisions 
comply with the limitations provisions of article 19(3) of the ICCPR and 
section 5 of the NZBORA. 
8.2 Association with Terrorist Entities 
Chapter Three identified provisions of both the Terrorism Regulations and 
the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 as impacting upon the freedom of 
association. Because the Terrorism Regulations have now expired,41 
however, this Chapter will only consider the provisions of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act. Sections 8 and 10 of the Act prohibit the provision of 
funds to, or collection of funds for, a designated entity,42 or the provision 
of property or financial services to such entities. Sections 12 and 13 make 
it an offence to recruit another person into an organisation or group, 
knowing that the organisation or group is either a terrorist entity or 
participates in "terrorist acts", or to participate in such an organisation or 
group.43 Section 13A criminalises the harbouring or concealing of a 
person, where it is known (or ought to be known) that the person has 
carried out, or intends to commit, a terrorist act. Broadly speaking, then, 
these provisions prohibit various means of associating with terrorist 
entities. 
41 The regulations expired on 31 December 2002, by which time the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002 had come into force. 
42 For a full discussion of the process by which persons or groups are designated 
either "terrorist" entities or "associated terrorist" entities, se Chapter Seven. 
43 The latter term is defined and discussed in Chapter Three at 3.11.2(b) Offences. 
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8.2.1 Freedom of Association 
The freedom of association is a right protected by both the ICCPR and 
NZBORA. Section 17 of the Bill of Rights expresses the freedom in very 
simple terms, describing it as "the right to freedom of association". Article 
22(1) of the Covenant is not much more helpful in its definition of the 
right: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests. 
Regrettably, the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee does not 
help define this right within the context of the current examination, since 
complaints before the Committee have concerned the membership of 
individuals in political parties or trade unions, and strike actions. 44 In the 
context of the Bill of Rights, there has likewise been little academic and 
judicial scrutiny of the freedom of association. The point made by 
Professor Paul Rishworth, however, is that the freedom of association is 
often viewed as a right linked with other rights.45 The freedom of 
association may permit, in turn, the exercise of the freedoms of expression 
(section 14) and peaceful assembly (section 16). Likewise, an interference 
with the freedom of association may involve discrimination against a 
person based upon that person's political opinion (section 19)46, or it may 
interfere with the manifestation of a person's religious beliefs (section 15). 
44 Conte, Davidson and Burchill, above n 7,61 and 65-67. 
45 Rishworth P, Huscroft G, Optican S and Mahoney R, The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights (Oxford Univeristy Press, 2003), 354. 
46 See also section 21(1)(j) ofthe Human Rights Act 1993. 
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8.2.2 Association with Terrorist Entities and the ICCPR 
The general freedom of association is qualified under article 22 of the 
International Covenant by paragraph 2: 
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than 
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not 
prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed 
forces and of the police in their exercise of this right. 
Considering article 22(2) step by step, the first point is that the restrictions 
in question are provided for under the Terrorism Suppression Act and are 
therefore "prescribed by law".47 The second requirement is that the 
restrictions are necessary in a democratic society for the furtherance of 
certain interests. In the case at hand, it seems easily arguable that the 
identified provisions of the Terrorism Suppression Act are in pursuit of 
almost all of those interests by contributing to the international suppression 
of terrorism and by putting into place means by which terrorist threats or 
acts within New Zealand can be suppressed and responded to: national 
security; public safety; the protection of public health; and the protection of 
rights and freedoms of others (including, for example, the right to life). 
The author therefore concludes that the non-association provisions of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act are, in and of themselves, consistent with the 
ICCPR. However, in saying that the provisions are "in and of themselves" 
consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
author takes the view that this is dependent on the proper and just 
47 For a discussion of the meaning of that term, see Chapter Four at 4.4.2(d) The 
limitation must be "prescribed by law". 
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designation of terrorist entities.48 An abuse of that process might, for 
example, be used to prevent membership of all Islamic organisations rather 
than properly proscribing membership of organisations that fall within the 
strict terms of the designation process. 
It should be mentioned that membership of proscribed organisations is 
not something new. In considering regulations made by the relevant 
Minister in Ireland for the "preservation of the peace and the maintenance 
of public order", the House of Lords had to determine in McEldowney v 
Forde whether it was proper for the Minister to have proscribed 
membership in a "republican club".49 By three judges to two, the House of 
Lords held that Forde's conviction for being a member of such a club was 
proper. While the division in opinion might seem problematic, the 
dissenting judgments were on the question of whether there was sufficient 
evidence that "republican clubs" caused any prejudice to peace or good 
order.5o There was no dispute as to whether membership can be proscribed 
for the purposes of preserving the peace and maintaining public order. 
Earlier still, the Nuremberg Tribunal held that proscribing membership of a 
criminal organisation was proper.51 
8.2.3 Association with Terrorist Entities and the NZBORA 
By reason of the plain expression of the freedom of association under the 
NZBORA, the provisions at hand do impact upon the freedom. 
48 See Chapter Seven. 
49 McEldowney v Forde [1971] AC 632. 
50 Ibid, Lord Pearce (651-654) and Lord Diplock (658-665). 
51 International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, judgment of 30 September 1946. 
For a discussion of this, see Keith K, 'Terrorism, Civil Liberties and Human 
Rights', a paper presented at the 13th Commonwealth Law Conference 2003, 
(CR4) Terrorism: Meeting the Challenges I Finding the Balances, 13-17 April 
2003, 32-33. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 399 
Chapter 8: Democratic and Civil Rights 
expression of the right does not qualify itself in any way that could render 
those provisions consistent with its definition. The issue of consistency 
must therefore be determined by reference to the section 5 justified 
limitations provision. 
The author takes the view that, of all the provisions examined within 
this thesis, the ones at hand present the most clear-cut case of justified 
limitations upon a right or freedom. The objectives of the various 
provisions are all directed, and rationally connected to, the suppression of 
the financing of terrorism, the participation in terrorist groups and the 
bringing to justice of the perpetrators of terrorist acts. Bearing in mind the 
consequences of terrorism, 52 these prohibitions are manifestly proportional 
to the limitations upon the freedom of association. It is therefore 
concluded that the provisions are 'consistent' with the Bi11 of Rights Act, 
within the meaning of Rishworth's Step Two. No breach of the NZBORA 
occurs. 
Again, however, the author qualifies this conclusion on the proviso that 
this is dependent on the proper and just administration of the process by 
which a person or group may be designated a "terrorist" or "associated" 
entity. some extent, this concern is alleviated through the express 
qualifications within sections 8(2) and 10(2) of the Terrorism Suppression 
Act, which make it clear that these provisions do not make it an offence to 
provide or collect funds with the intention that they be used, or knowing 
that they are to be used, for the purposes of advocating democratic 
52 See Chapter Five at 5.1 The Impact of Terrorism on Security and Human 
Rights. 
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government or the protection of human rights, so long as such an 
organisation is not involved in carrying out terrorist acts. 
8.3 Conclusion 
The freedom of expression, a right incorporating the freedom of the press, 
is impacted upon by the media control provisions of the International 
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. Section 14 of the Act allows the 
Prime Minister to issue media gags concerning any information or material 
relating to an international terrorist emergency which would be likely to 
prejudice the safety of a person or the integrity of counter-terrorist 
operations. That, in itself, raises no particular problems and constitutes a 
justified limitation upon the freedom of expression, under both the ICCPR 
and NZBORA. More problematic is the fact that a media gag can operate 
for a period well after the state of emergency. Again, in principle, this is 
justifiable if the extension occurs for the purpose of protecting a person or 
the integrity of future operations. The author's concern with the provision 
is with achieving checking mechanisms to ensure that the authority under 
sections 14 and 15 is not abused. It has been concluded, in that regard, that 
decisions made under these provisions are justiciable, thereby facilitating 
the means by which abuse of the power to issue media gags can be 
checked. In those circumstances, the media control provisions of the 
ITEP A are lawful and justified. 
A number of provisions of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 
prohibit various means of associating with entities designated under the 
Act as terrorist or associated entities. This is the least problematic 
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interference with rights considered in this thesis, easily justifiable under 
both the ICCPR and NZBORA. That conclusion relies, however, on the 
proper use and administration of the designation process under the 
Terrorism Suppression Act. 
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Chapter Three of this thesis identified various aspects of New Zealand's 
counter-terrorist legislation impacting upon the criminal process. Rights 
and freedoms relevant to the criminal process are set out within both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), and it is therefore proper that 
these matters be examined more closely. The statutory provisions 
concerned are not limited to the most recent items of New Zealand's 
counter-terrorist legislative regime, but are to be found in four of the seven 
items of legislation identified within Chapter Three: the Aviation Crimes 
Act 1972; the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987; the 
Maritime Crimes Act 1999; and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. The 
principal item of the counter-terrorist legislative framework in New 
Zealand (the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002) does not concern itself with 
criminal process matters, other than the creation of criminal offences. Four 
sub-groups of rights will be examined in this chapter: the privilege against 
self-incrimination; search and seizure; arrest and detention; and privacy 
and surveillance. 
9.1 The Privilege against SelfaIncrimination 
The first matter to be considered within this chapter is the amendment of 
the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (SPA), effected through the Counter-
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Terrorism Act 2002. A new section 198B was inserted into the SPA, 
allowing police to demand assistance to access computer data by providing 
police with any data protection codes or other information necessary to 
access that data. 
In giving evidence before the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee, the author submitted to the Select Committee that the proposed 
provision (under clause 33 of the Counter-Terrorism Bill) offended the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 1 Clause 33, as it then read, provided: 
198B Person with knowledge of computer or computer network to 
assist access 
(1) A constable executing a search warrant may require a specified 
person to provide information or assistance that is reasonable and 
necessary to allow the constable to access data held in, or accessible 
from, a computer that is on premises named in the warrant. 
(2) A specified person is a person who-
(a) is the owner or lessee of the computer, or is in the possession or 
control of the computer, or is an employee of any of the above; 
and 
(b) has relevant knowledge of-
(i) the computer or a computer network of which the computer 
forms a part; or 
(ii) measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, 
the computer. 
(3) Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary 
conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 3 months or a fine 
not exceeding $2,000 who fails to assist a constable when requested to 
do so under subsection (1). 
In brief term'i, the author submitted that this clause would offend the 
privilege against self-incrimination by compelling a person to provide 
assistance to police (under clause 33(1) above) who may be investigating 
an offence against that person or who might, as a result of gaining access to 
the computer data, be provided with information that would incriminate 
I Conte A, Submissions to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on 
the Counter-Terrorism Bill (27-1, 2003). 12 May 2003, paras 29-58. 
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that person. In apparent response to this submission, clause 33 was 
amended, with the Select Committee reporting to the House that this was to 
explicitly preserve the right against self-incrimination, continuing by 
stating:2 
Whether a broadly worded statutory provision requiring the supply of 
information, and making no reference to the privilege against self-
incrimination, overrides this privilege is a question of its construction. 
A Court must be satisfied that a statutory power of questioning was 
meant to exclude the privilege. We are advised that this conclusion is 
unlikely to be reached unless it is either explicitly provided for, or is a 
necessary implication of the provision. Our recommended amendments 
make it clear that a person is required to provide information that is 
reasonable and necessary to allow the police to access data held in, or 
accessible from., a computer in particular circumstances, but that does 
not itself tend to incriminate the person. We note that there are several 
other instances of statutory obligations on citizens to assist police or 
other agents. 
Section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act retains the original form of 
subsections (1) and (2), which set out the rule requiring the provision of 
assistance and to whom that rule applies. The final form of the section now 
includes new subsections (3), (4) and (5), with subsection (6) retaining the 
penalty for failure to comply (as had been provided for in the first draft of 
the Bill): 
(3) A person may not be required under subsection (1) to give any 
information tending to incriminate the person. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not prevent a constable from requiring a 
person to provide information that-
(a) is reasonable and necessary to allow the constable to access data 
held in, or accessible from, a computer that-
(i) is on premises named in the warrant concerned; and 
(ii) contains or may contain information tending to incriminate 
the person; but 
(b) does not itself tend to incriminate the person. 
2 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, Report on the Counter-
Terrorism Bill, A Government Bill, 27-2, Commentary, presented to the House 8 
August 2003, 10. 
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(5) Subsection (3) does not prevent a constable from requmng a 
person to provide assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow 
the constable to access data held in, or accessible from, a computer 
that-
(a) 
(b) 
is on premises named in the warrant concerned; and 
contains or may contain information tending to incriminate the 
person. 
An issue that becomes apparent at the outset is that of interpretation, that is, 
exactly what do subsections (3), (4) and (5) mean and how do they inter-
relate? Once that issue is resolved, if it can be, the question of the 
consistency of section 198B with human rights falls for consideration. 
Discussion of the potential application of the provision to both counter-
terrorism and other law enforcement investigations will also be had. 
9.1.1 The Meaning of section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 
In its original form, the meaning of the proposed provision was quite clear. 
Clause 33 was to enable a police constable executing a search warrant to 
require assistance or information to be given in order to access data in a 
computer within the premises being searched. Subclause (1) - which 
remains identical to section 198B(l) - set out the authority by which a 
constable could make such a request. Subclause (2) again remaining the 
same specified who may be the subject of such a request Subclause (3) -
which became section 198B(6) of the Summary Proceedings Act created 
an offence where a person refuses to comply with the constable's request, 
punishable by a maximum of three months' imprisonment or a fine of up to 
$2,000. 
The new subsections (3), (4) and (5), however, require a close reading. 
Subsection (3) appears to protect the privilege against self-incrimination, 
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stating that "a person may not be required under subsection (1) to give any 
information tending to incriminate the person". Certainly, the Select 
Committee reported that the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination was the intention of this added provision. 3 However, the 
author doubts that this is the effect of subsection (3) when read in the 
entirety of section 198B. 
The first point to note is that subsection (3) only prevents a constable 
(acting under subsection (1 )) from requiring a person to give information 
that might incriminate them. The reality, however, is that subsection (1) 
only authorises a constable to require information to be provided for the 
purpose of allowing the constable to access data within a computer. That 
information will take the form of either a password, or information about 
the location within a computer of certain data. That in itself cannot, posits 
the writer, be incriminating information, since it only informs a constable 
on how to access data. In other words, subsection (3) does nothing. Even 
without the additional subsection (3), section 198B(1) can only ever permit 
a constable to request information on how to access data. It does not 
authorise a constable to require any further information and the purported 
restriction upon section 198B(1) created by subsection (3) is therefore 
redundant. 
Next, it appears that subsections (4) and (5) in fact expressly override 
the privilege against self-incrimination. The two provisions are almost 
identical in nature, except that subsection (4) relates to the provision of 
information necessary to access data (e.g., a password), and subsection (5) 
3 Ibid, 10. 
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relates to the provision of assistance necessary to access such data (e.g., the 
physical operation of a computer). However, the two provisions 
specifically envisage that data accessed as a result of such information or 
assistance "contains or may contain information tending to incriminate the 
person".4 They envisage (and do not prohibit) the provision of information 
and assistance which will result in the person incriminating him or herself. 
For those reasons, it is not envisaged that a liberal, rights-based, 
interpretation of section 198B could be argued in favour of reading the 
provision consistently with the privilege against self-incrimination. 
It is therefore concluded that although subsection (3) - when fIrst read 
appears to preserve the privilege against self-incrimination, the overal1 
amendment of section 198B does the opposite. 
9.1.2 Section 198B and Human Rights 
According to the latter analysis, section 198B provides the police with 
authority to require information which may lead to the discovery of 
incriminating information. In the writer's view, this represents a 
significant extension to existing police powers and a departure from 
common law and statutory rights. The provision raises questions about the 
following rights: 5 
.. The common law right of every person to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty, with the resultant burden on the State to prove guilt from 
4 Summary Proceedings Act 1957, section 198B(4)(a)(ii) and (5)(b). 
5 It should be noted, of course, that the rights expressed within the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 are limited in their application to situations where a person is either arrest or 
detained, or charged with an offence. The significance of this is a matter for later 
analysis at 9.1.4 Self-Incrimination, the NZBORA and the ICCPR. 
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investigation to conviction (and the relationship this might have with 
section 25( c) and (d) of the NZBORA and article 14(2) of the ICCPR). 
25. Minimum standards of criminal procedure 
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the 
determination of the charge, the following minimum rights: 
(c) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according 
to law: 
(d) The right not to be compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt: 
[New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990] 
Article 14 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to 
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] 
• The right to silence (codified within the NZBORA, section 23(4), in the 
context of a person being arrested or detained under an enactment).6 
23. Rights of persons arrested or detained 
(4) Everyone who is-
(a) Arrested; or 
(b) Detained under any enactment-
for any offence or suspected offence shall have the right to refrain 
from making any statement and to be informed of that right. 
The right to legal advice (codified within the NZBORA, section 
23(l)(b), in the context of a person being arrested or detained under an 
enactment).7 
Rights of persons arrested or detained 
(1) Everyone who is arrested or who is detained under any 
enactment-
(b) Shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without 
delay and to be informed of that right; 
6 There is no equivalent right within the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
7 Again, there is no equivalent within the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Article 14(3)(b) only guarantees the right to counsel in the 
preparation of a defence: see Conte A, Davidson S and Burchill R, Defining Civil 
and Political Rights. The Jurispmdence of the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2004), 128-129. 
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Two questions arise: 
1. What is the extent, and effect, of the common law privilege against 
self-incrimination and right to be presumed innocent? 
2. How does section 198B interact with the codified rights to silence 
and legal advice, and the presumption of innocence, under the 
NZBORA and ICCPR? 
9.1.3 Self-Incrimination and the Common Law 
Existing quite independently of New Zealand's human rights legislation 
and corresponding international obligations is the long-held common law 
privilege against self-incrimination and the right to be presumed innocent. 
The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is exercised through 
the burden upon the State throughout all stages of the criminal process, 
from investigation to conviction. For example, an accused person has no 
obligation to give evidence at trial, nor to disprove any allegation against 
him or her. This has been held to be so even where the only person in 
possession of information relevant to the elements of an offence is the 
accused. 8 The common law privilege against self-incrimination is 
intimately linked with the presumption of innocence, exercisable through 
the right to silence. No person may be compelled to say or do anything 
8 See Attygale v R [1936] 2 All ER 116 (Privy Council). Here, the accused was 
charged in respect of an megal operation performed on a woman while she was 
under chloroform. The defence case was that no operation took place. The trial 
judge directed the jury that, the facts being specifically within the knowledge of 
the accused, the burden of proving the absence of any operation was upon the 
accused. On appeal, the Privy Council held that the direction was an incorrect 
statement of the law, and that the onus of proof to establish that there had been an 
operation remained with the prosecution. 
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that might incriminate him or her.9 The New Zealand Court of Appeal has 
held that the privilege against self-determination is not limited to testimony 
and discovery in judicial proceedings. The Court held, in Taylor v New 
Zealand Poultry Board, that this privilege was capable of applying outside 
Court proceedings when the obligation to answer questions, or give 
information, or to provide or disclose documents, was imposed by statute. lO 
The combined affect of the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
presumption of innocence is that a person cannot be compelled to assist in 
the investigation and prosecution of any offence against him or her by 
being required to make any statement or provide any information 
(documentary or otherwise). The question, then, is what affect this has 
upon the operation of section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act. 
Since Parliament is Sovereign, the normal interaction between common 
law and statute is that Acts of Parliament prevail over the common law. As 
summarised by Professor Joseph "Parliament's words can be neither 
judicially invalidated nor controlled by earlier enactment".l1 Prima facie, 
then, the common law privilege against self-incrimination and the 
presumption of innocence have no impact upon section 198B. As Joseph 
himself discusses, however, the courts have taken a guarded approach 
when Parliament has attempted to restrict the role of the judiciary or take 
h . h f' . 12 away t e ng ts 0 CItIZens. In the case of New Zealand Drivers' 
9 See Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 All ER 649 (Queen's Bench Division), applied in 
Waaka v Police [1987] 1 NZLR 754 (New Zealand Court of Appeal). 
10 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394, 40l. 
11 Joseph PA, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand, (2nd ed, 
Brookers, 2001), 461. 
12 Ibid, 485-495. 
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Association v New Zealand Road Carriers, Justices Cooke, McMullin and 
Ongley noted: 13 
We have reservations as to the extent to which in New Zealand even an 
Act of Parliament can take away the rights of citizens to resort to the 
ordinary courts of law for the determination of their rights. 
More strongly worded, Cooke J later questioned whether "some common 
law rights may go so deep that even Parliament cannot be accepted by the 
Courts to have destroyed them".14 Despite the apparent strength of those 
statements, however, no New Zealand court has invalidated or refused to 
apply a statutory provision on the basis that it encroaches upon common 
law rights. 
It is at this point that further discussion of Taylor v New Zealand 
Poultry Board is called for, the case having similarities with the issue at 
hand. IS The case concerned the operation of regulation 57(3) of the Poultry 
Board Regulations which, like section 198B of the Summary Proceedings 
Act, required a person to provide information to prescribed officers. 16 
Taylor was a poultry farmer who refused to answer questions properly 
asked under regulation 57(3) and he was subsequently convicted on three 
charges under regulation 57(4).17 Notwithstanding the fact that the Court 
of Appeal held that the privilege against self-incrimination was capable of 
applying outside court proceedings, it qualified this decision by stating that 
13 New Zealand Drivers' Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] 1 
NZLR 374, 390. 
14 Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116, 121. See also Taylor 
v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] I NZLR 394,398. 
15 Above n 10. 
16 The Poultry Board Regulations 1980 were made pursuant to an empowering 
provision in the Poultry Board Act 1980 (section 24(1». 
17 Regulation 57(4) of the Poultry Board Regulations 1980 made it an offence to 
refuse to answer any enquiries made under regulation 57(3). 
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the scope of the privilege must be determined in the context of the 
particular statute being examined. Adopting the words of the Select 
Committee when reporting on the Counter-Terrorism Bi1l, the privilege 
against self-incrimination "is a question of its construction"Y For the 
Court of Appeal, Cooke J stated:19 
The common law favours the liberty of the citizen, and, if a Court is not 
satisfied that a statutory power of questioning was meant to exclude the 
~~=:::.' it is in accordance with the spirit of the common to allow the 
privilege. [emphasis added] 
In a recent case concerning legal professional privilege in New Zealand, 
the Privy Council considered the question of statutory provisions 
overriding or excluding the privilege. The question before it was whether 
the Law Practitioners Act 1982 excluded legal professional privilege either 
expressly or "by necessary implication"?O The Privy Council held that a 
necessary implication was one which the express language of the statute 
clearly showed must have been included.21 In con..<;idering the issue, 
reference was made to Lord Hobhouse's explanation in R (Morgan 
Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax: 22 
A necessary implication is not the same as a reasonable implication ... 
A necessary implication is one which necessarily follows from the 
express provisions of the statute construed in their context. It 
distinguishes between what it would have been sensible or reasonable 
for Parliament to have included or what Parliament would, if it had 
thought about it, probably have included and what it is clear that the 
express language of the statute shows that the statute must have 
included. A necessary implication is a matter of express language and 
logic not interpretation. [original emphasis] 
18 Above n 2, to: discussed above at 9.1 The Privilege against Self-Incrimination. 
19 Above n to, 402. 
20 B v Auckland District Law Society [2004] 1 NZLR 326. 
21 Ibid, 349 (para 58). 
22 Ibid. R (Morgan Grenfell & Co Ltd) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax 
[2002] WLR 1299, para 45. 
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In the context of section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act, it is 
concluded that the necessary implication of the structure of the provision is 
to exclude the privilege against self-incrirnination?3 The common law 
must therefore give way. The wording of subsections (4) and (5) clearly 
preserve the power of questioning under subsection (1). The courts must, it 
is therefore posited, take the statutory power as meaning to exclude the 
privilege and could not interpret the provision as allowing the common law 
privilege to operate. 
9.1.4 Self-Incrimination, the NZBORA and the ICCPR 
The first point to note in the examination of the interaction between section 
198B of the SPA and both the NZBORA and ICCPR is that neither human 
rights instrument expressly codifies a privilege against self-incrimination. 
The question is whether the provisions of the NZBORA andlor ICCPR 
might be taken to incorporate this privilege. 
In the context of the common law rights discussed, it was concluded 
that the privilege against self-incrimination, linked with the presumption of 
innocence and the right to silence, combined to prevent a person from 
being compelled to assist in any investigation or prosecution against him or 
her. The question is whether this notion extends to the combination of 
rights under the ICCPR and NZBORA 24 
9.1.4(a) Article 14(2) of the ICCPR. Article 14(2) of the International 
Covenant sets out the presumption of innocence (until proved guilty 
23 Discussed above at 9.1.1 The Meaning of section 198B of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957. 
24 Those rights identified earlier at 9.1.2 Section 198B and Human Rights. 
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according to law). It is the only provision within the ICCPR dealing, 
expressly or impliedly, with the rights identified as being relevant to the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Its limitation, however, is that the 
right only applies to persons "charged with a criminal offence". Thus, the 
starting point is to acknowledge that - where a person has not been charged 
with any offence then article 14(2) does not apply (even in principle). 
More importantly, even where a person is charged with an offence and 
- in the investigation of that offence - the person is asked for information 
by a police officer under section 198B(1) of the SPA, it is highly doubtful 
that article 14(2) lends any 'protection' to the person charged. It would be 
implausible to suggest that the presumption of innocence, by itself, implies 
a privilege against self-incrimination. Certainly, the jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Committee has not sought to infer such a privilege in its 
application or consideration of article 14(2)?5 It is therefore concluded 
that section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 does not breach 
article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
9.1.4(b) Section 25 of the NZBORA. The first point made about article 
14(2) of the ICCPR is equally applicable to section 25 of the NZBORA. 
The rights set out within section apply only to those that are "charged 
with an offence". The second point that was made (that the privilege 
cannot be inferred from the presumption of innocence) is equally 
applicable when looking at section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights. 
The only remaining provision that has been identified as having 
potential relevance is section 25(d). This codifies the right not to be 
25 Conte, Davidson and Burchill, above n 7, 125-126. 
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compelled to be a witness or to confess guilt. Again, however, the author 
concludes that the section does not apply to circumstances in which section 
198B operates. Subsection (1) only authorises an officer to require 
information or assistance to be given to facilitate access to data on a 
computer within the premises being searched. It does not require a person 
to be a witness, nor to confess gUilt. Section 25 of the NZBORA does not, 
therefore, 'pass' or move beyond Rishworth's first step in the application 
of the operative provisions of the Bill of Rights.26 
9.1.4(c) Section 23 of the NZBORA. The rights to silence and to a lawyer 
are similarly limited in the potential scope of their application, this time to 
situations where a person is "arrested" or "detained under any enactment". 
Only then are the rights triggered. The right to silence does more directly 
reflect the privilege against self-incrimination and the guarantee of a right 
to consult with counsel strengthens that privilege by ensuring that a person 
is advised of the application of the privilege to the process of investigation. 
In other words, in the limited situation of a request under section 198B(l) 
being made while a person is arrested or detained, section 23(l)(b) and (4) 
of the Bill of Rights can operate. Step 1 of the Rishworth application 
process is satisfied (limited to the specific situation identified). An 
observation to make at this point is that it is only section 23(4) - the right to 
silence - that is directly relevant and the subject of further examination. 
The right to counsel is seen by the author as simply a supporting 
mechanism which may at times facilitate the exercise of the right to 
silence. 
26 Discussed in Chapter Four at 4.3.2(a) The unholy trinity of sections 4, 5 and 6. 
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Proceeding with the next step, one then has to consider whether the 
operation of section 198B(1) is 'inconsistent' with section 23(4) of the 
NZBORA where a person is arrested or detained. In doing so, the first 
question to consider is whether section 198B(1) effects a limitation upon 
the right to silence. In other words, how far does the right to silence 
stretch? Consider the following situation:27 
A (a New Zealand citizen) has made a donation to B (a Muslim 
organisation in Auckland, which has been made the subject of a final 
designation as an associated terrorist entity). Police arrive at A's 
property and formally arrest him, charging A with an offence under 
section 10(1) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (making money 
available to B, knowing that B was designated under the Act as an 
associated terrorist entity). A is properly cautioned under section 
23(1)(b) and (4) of the NZBORA. 
Police have a warrant to search A's premises, suspecting that he may 
have funded other proscribed entities. They locate a computer in A's 
study and request A to provide the password to the computer (under 
section 198B(1) of the SPA). Having been told upon arrest that he has 
the right to silence, A refuses to provide the police with the computer 
password. 
The author concludes that the right to silence extends at least in principle 
- to this situation. Section 198B(1) limits the right to silence by requiring 
A to provide information to the police enabling themto access data on his 
computer. That being the case, the next question within Rishworth's Step 
2 is whether this limitation is 'consistent' with the Bill of Rights by 
application of section 5 of the NZBORA. Addressing the preliminary 
issues in the application of section 5: the onus would be upon the Crown to 
establish that section 198B is a justified limitation in any challenge against 
its validity or operation; section 198B, it is posited, only effects a 
'limitation' upon the right to silence (limited in its operation to the 
27 As an extension of the factual situation identified in Chapter Seven at 7.2.1 The 
Issue of Natural Justice. 
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situations identified in subsections (1) and (2»; and it is 'prescribed by 
law' (being a statutory provision)?8 
The difficulty in applying the substantive test under section 5 of the 
NZBORA is that section 198B of the SPA has no clear, or single, objective 
other to assist general law enforcement through the investigation of 
offences. Although this provision was enacted under the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2003, it forms part of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 
and is not restricted in its application to the pursuit of counter-terrorism. 
Section 198B has the potential to apply to situation in which the police 
are executing a search warrant. Taking this general objective, the ftrst 
question in the application of section 5 is whether the objective (assisting 
law enforcement through the investigation of offences) relates to concerns 
which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society. Law 
enforcement is certainly an important societal concern and, for the sake of 
continuing with this enquiry, it is assumed that a court will take this limb of 
the section 5 test as being satisfied. 
Turning to the second limb of section 5, three questions must be 
considered. 29 First, is the legislative provision (section 198B) rationally 
connected to the achievement of its objective? As discussed in Chapter 
Five, it is sufficient to show that the provision logically furthers the 
objective and this question is a normally answered in the affirmative 
without too much trouble.3o Section 198B provides police with the means 
28 See Chapter Four at 4.4.2 Limiting Rights under the Bill of Rights Act and 
Human Rights Act. 
29 See Chapter Five at 5.4.3( e) A summary on proportionality. 
30 See Chapter Four at 5.4.3(b) Factor 1: Measures rationally connected to the 
achievement of the objective. 
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to access computer data, which easily furthers the objective of assisting law 
enforcement through the investigation of offences. The second question 
asks whether the legislative provision impairs the right to a minimal extent 
(as little as reasonably possible). Again, this part of the overall test has 
been applied in a flexible manner by the Supreme Court of Canada, 
focussing upon whether the provision is an appropriate means of giving 
effect to the objective, rather than whether the provision is proportional. It 
is very difficult to consider this second factor separately from the third, 
proportionality, factor. Combined, there is considerable difficulty III 
satisfying the justified limitations test, because of the broad nature of 
section 198B (applying to the execution of any search warrant). In 
considering the third factor, then, this will require the Crown to establish 
that the effects of the legislative provision are proportional to the 
importance of its objective. In examining the case law on proportionality, 
it has been concluded that consideration of four factors are relevant to this 
final step in the application of section 5:31 
(a) What are the effects of the limiting provision upon the right invoked? 
The answer is that section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act has 
the effect of negating the right to silence, requiring a person to provide 
access to computer data that may incriminate him or her. 
31 See Chapter Five at S.4.3(d) Factor 3: Proportionality between the effects of the 
measures and the importance of the legislative objective. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 419 
Chapter 9: Criminal Procedure Rights and 
Search, Arrest and Detention Rights 
(b) What is the level of importance of the objective of the provision? 
The difficulty in answering this question lies in the fact that section 
198B applies to the execution of any search warrant. It might therefore 
be argued that the importance of the objective depends upon the 
particular circumstances surrounding the issuing of the warrant (that is, 
the reasons for the warrant being issued, and the type of criminal 
conduct to which the evidence sought to be obtained through the 
warrant relates). In the factual scenario set out above, for example, the 
warrant to search A's premises is based upon the suspicion that A has 
funded terrorist entities, contrary to section 10(1) of the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002. This is an important objective. However, it 
should be noted that a search warrant can be issued for the purpose of 
finding evidence relating to any offence punishable by imprisonmene2 
including, for example, indecent exposure under the Summary 
Offences Act 1981 (making a person liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding three months).33 The relevance of this to section 198B is 
that computer data might, for example, include electronic photographs 
of such an event. While the exposure of one's genitals in public is not 
something that the public should be expected to tolerate, the objective 
of countering such activity is clearly not as important as countering the 
financing of terrorist organisations. That conclusion is supported by 
the fact that an offence against section 10(1) of the Terrorism 
32 Summary Proceedings Act 1957, section 198. 
33 Section 27(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981 provides that "Every person 
is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not 
exceeding $2,000 who, in or within view of any public place, intentionally and 
obscenely exposes any part of his or her genitals". 
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Suppression Act makes a person liable to imprisonment for a term of 
up to seven years (as opposed to a maximum of three months for 
indecent exposure). Thus, the currently broad scope of section 198B 
has the very undesirable effect that the importance of its objective relies 
upon the particular context in which the provision is applied. 
(c) What is the importance of (or degree of protection provided by) the 
right invoked? 
The right to silence when charged with an offence, and the underlying 
privilege against self-incrimination, are two of the most important 
rights in the criminal process. The European Court of Human Rights 
has described the right to silence and the accompanying privilege as 
"generally recognised in international standards which lie at the heart 
of the notion of a fair [criminal] procedure,,?4 Professor Rishworth 
describes the rights as "fundamental in New Zealand's criminal 
procedure". 35 As already discussed, they are rights that the common 
law has long-recognised also.36 
(d) Are the effects (identified at (a) above) proportional to the objective 
(identified at (b) above), having regard to the importance of the right 
(identified at (c) above)? 
It is here that the broad scope of the potential application of section 
198B is felt and provides material1y different outcomes. Consider 
34 Murray v United Kingdom (1996) 22 EHRR 29, para 45: as quoted in 
Rishworth P, Huscroft 0, Optican S and Mahoney R, The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights (Oxford Univeristy Press, 2003), 646. 
35 Rishworth P, Huscroft 0, Optican S and Mahoney R, The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights (Oxford Univeristy Press, 2003), 646. 
36 Discussed above at 9.1.3 Self-Incrimination and the Common Law. 
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agam the two examples above (execution of a warrant in the 
investigation of charges of (1) the financing of terrorism versus (2) 
indecent exposure). In the first case, the author takes the view that 
although the right to silence is indeed of very high import, the 
limitation upon the right effected by section 198B is proportional to the 
objective of suppressing the financing of terrorism. 37 In the second 
case, however, the author concludes that limiting the right to silence in 
the pursuit of evidence relating to an indecent exposure is not 
proportional. The latter objective is, relatively speaking, nowhere near 
as important as the right to silence and the underlying privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
Returning to the application of Rishworth's Steps in the application of the 
NZBORA, Step 2 cannot therefore be answered outside the specific 
application of section 198B. The most that can be said is that section 198B 
might be consistent with the Bill of Rights (by application of section 5), 
depending on the nature, and circumstances surrounding the issuing, of the 
search warrant. Where this results in a finding that the operation of section 
198B is justified under section 5 of the NZBORA, then this means that its 
operation is 'consistent' with the Bill of Rights, bringing consideration of 
the Bill of Rights to an end. Where the operation of section 198B fails the 
proportionality test, however, one must proceed to Step 3. These differing 
37 Note that the New Zealand courts have been clear on the permissible limits of 
warrants issued under section 198 of the Summary Proceedings Act concerning 
the type of evidence that may be seized during the execution of a warrant. The 
New Zealand Court of Appeal pronounced at an early stage that any item seized 
must be referable to the offence in respect of which the warrant was issued: 
McFarlane v Sharp [1972] NZLR 838, 84. The case was cited with approval, 
although distinguished in its application to the facts, in the more recent Court of 
Appeal decision in R v Burns [2002] 1 NZLR 203,211 (para 28). 
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results prompt the author to advocate reform, which will be discussed 
later.38 
The third step advocated by Rishworth is to determine whether an 
alternative interpretation of the enactment (section 198B) is possible and 
whether this is consistent with the right invoked. If it is, then section 6 of 
the NZBORA will demand that the courts apply this alternative 
interpretation. The writer takes the view that such an alternative 
interpretation of section 198B is not open, having regard to subsections (4) 
and (5) of that provision. As concluded above, these subsections envisage 
(and do not prohibit) the provision of information and assistance which will 
result in the person incriminating him or herself. 39 As such, application of 
Step 4 results in a finding that section 198B will (in the absence of 
satisfying the proportionality test) be in an 'irreconcilable conflict' with the 
Bill of Rights. As such, section 4 of the NZBORA will demand that 
section 198B must prevail of the right to silence. 
9.1.4(d) Summmy on section 198B of the SPA and section 23(4) of the 
NZBORA. Because the latter analysis of the interaction between section 
198B of the SPA and section 23(4) of the NZBORA has been somewhat 
38 Discussed below at 9.1.5 Reform of section 198B of the Summary Proceedings 
Act. 
39 Discussed above at 9.1.1 The Meaning of section 198B of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957. 
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lengthy and involves a number of different considerations, it is useful to 
summarise the various conclusions made: 
.. The relevance of the section 23(4) right to silence to the operation of 
section 198B is limited to circumstances where a person is ftrst arrested 
or detained and then made subject to a request under section 198B. 
.. In the situation where a person is first arrested or detained and then 
requested to provide information under section 198B, the right to 
silence should - in principle - operate, but is limited by section 198B. 
.. The general objective of assisting law enforcement through the 
investigation of offences will probably satisfy the first limb of the 
section 5 justified limitations test. 
'" Section 198B is rationally connected to the objective of assisting law 
enforcement through the investigation of offences. 
.. Section 198B probably impairs the right to silence as little as 
reasonably possible, although the broad scope of the section's potential 
application may result in a court concluding otherwise. 
.. Determining whether the effects of section 198B are proportional to its 
objective, depends upon the nature, and circumstances surrounding the 
issuing, of the search warrant. 
.. In the case of a warrant to search premises in the pursuit of evidence 
relating to the financing of terrorist entities, it has been concluded that 
this objective is proportional to the limitation imposed upon the right to 
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silence. In that case, the operation of section 198B is 'consistent' with 
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
" In the case of warrants to search premises in the pursuit of evidence 
relating to much more minor offences (carrying low penalties upon 
conviction) it has been concluded that proportionality is not achieved. 
The operation of section 198B in these circumstances is 'inconsistent' 
with the Bill of Rights. 
• In the latter cases, it has been concluded that there is no alternative 
'consistent' interpretation of section 198B relevant to the application of 
section 6 of the NZBORA. Section 4 of the latter Act will therefore 
operate to 'save' section 198B from invalidation by the courts. 
9.1.5 Refonn of section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act 
The analysis of section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act has thus far 
revealed various matters. The report of the Select Committee to the House 
of Representatives, advised that its proposed amendment to clause 33 of 
the Counter-Terrorism Bill would explicitly preserve the privilege against 
self-incrimination. In actual fact, however, the words of the provision (as 
enacted) show that the provision envisages and does not prohibit the 
compelling of a person to give information and assistance which might 
result in the police gaining access to incriminating evidence. This is 
contrary to the long-held common law right to silence and privilege against 
self-incrimination. However, due to the express terms of section 198B and 
the primacy of legislation over the common law, the courts could not 
interpret section 198B as allowing these common law rights to operate. 
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It has been concluded that section 198B does not conflict with the 
ICCPR, nor does it conflict with section 25 of the NZBORA. The 
relationship of the provision with section 23 of the Bill of Rights is, 
however, more complex. The immediately preceding discussion has 
revealed that - where section 198B is activated following an arrest or 
detention - there are numerous weaknesses in justifying the limitation 
imposed by section 198B upon the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Although section 4 of the NZBORA ultimately acts to save section 198B 
from invalidation, the weaknesses in finding the provision to be a justified 
limitation mean that New Zealand may be acting outside the international 
guidelines on the limitation of rights.4o It has been concluded that this 
would be the case, for example, where section 198B operated in respect of 
minor offences. 
This being the case, it is proposed that section 198B should be amended 
to restrict its operation to the investigation of serious offences, the 
suppression of which can be justified as a pressing and substantial concern 
proportional to the important status of the right to silence. In giving 
evidence before the Counter-Terrorism Bill the author submitted that 
clause 33 should have been amended to restrict its application to counter-
terrorism by adopting the following amendment to the original form of the 
clause (amendments are shown in square brackets): 
198B Person with knowledge of computer or computer network to 
assist access 
(1) [Subject to subsection (3), al A-constable executing a search 
warrant may require a specified person to provide information or 
4Q See Chapter Five, in particular 5.2.3 Commission on Human Rights, 5.2.4(b) 
Council of Europe, and 5.4.3(a) Does the section 5 proportionality test fit with the 
external guidelines on counter-terrorism and human rights? 
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assistance that is reasonable and necessary to allow the constable to 
access data held in, or accessible from, a computer that is on premises 
named in the warrant. 
(2) A specified person is a person who-
(a) is the owner or lessee of the computer, or is in the possession or 
control of the computer, or is an employee of any of the above; 
and 
(b) has relevant know ledge of-
(i) the computer or a computer network of which the computer 
forms a part; or 
(ii) measures applied to protect data held in, or accessible from, 
the computer. 
(3) [A constable may require assistance under subsection (1) if -
(a) the premises named in the warrant are owned, leased or occupied 
by an entity for the time being designated under the Terrorism 
Suppression Act 2002 as a terrorist entity or as an associated 
entity; or 
(b) the computer at the premises named in the warrant is owned, 
leased or used by an entity for the time being designated under the 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 as a terrorist entity or as an 
associated entity; or 
(c) the constable believes, on reasonable grounds, that the computer 
holds data relating to the preparation of a terrorist act, as defined 
by section 5 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002.] 
[(4)] Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary 
conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 3 months or a fine 
not exceeding $2,000 who fails to assist a constable when requested to 
do so under subsection (1). 
It is proposed that the restrictions upon the operation of section 198B, 
contained within subsection (3), would render the provision justifiable 
under section 5 of the Bill of Rights. Three weaknesses had been 
previously identified in the justifiability of the provision: 41 
• The general objective of assisting law enforcement through the 
investigation of offences will probably satisfy the first limb of the 
section 5 justified limitations test. 
41 As summarised above at 9.1.4(d) Summary on section 198B of the SPA and 
23(4) of the NZBORA. 
Terror versus Tyranny - PhD Thesis by Alex Conte 427 
Chapter 9: Crimillal Procedure Rights and 
Search, Arrest and Detemioll Rights 
.. Section 198B probably impairs the right to silence as little as 
reasonably possible, ==-== the broad scope of the section's potential 
application may result in a court concluding otherwise. 
.. Determining whether the effects of section 198B are proportional to its 
objective, depends upon the nature, and circumstances surrounding the 
issuing, of the search warrant. 
The author posits that the proposed restrictions address those weaknesses 
and thus would make section 198B 'consistent' with the Bill of Rights 
(even with its limitation upon the right to silence). As an aside, the 
restrictions within the proposed subsection (3) might also be expanded to 
include other pressing and substantial concerns, such as the suppression of 
child pornography for example.42 
9.1.6 The Application of section 198B Beyond Counter-Terrorism 
One final matter requiring discussion is the issue of counter-terrorism and 
the potential manipulation by States of this important objective as a means 
of legitimising the extension of State powers. In introducing the Counter-
Terrorism Bill on 1 April 2003, Minister of Justice Phil Goff said that the 
Bill "reflects the need for New Zealand to ensure we have a comprehensive 
legislative framework in place that reflects the new, more dangerous era of 
international terrorism that we live in".43 Apparent from the foregoing 
42 Since this is outside the scope of this thesis, however, such further matters are 
not considered. 
43 Phil Goff MP, "Counter-Terrorism Bill- Introduction", Parliamentary Speech, 
1 April 2003, summarised at URL <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ 
ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentlD=16392> at 4 March 2005. 
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discussion, however, is the fact that section 198B of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 has the potential to apply beyond counter-terrorism. 
It applies to the exercise of any search warrant issued under section 198 of 
the Act. 
The establishment of broad legislative provisions like section 198B 
within the umbrella of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 was a matter of 
consistent criticism in submissions to, and evidence before, the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee. 44 It was also a criticism from 
within the Select Committee, Keith Locke MP describing the Bill as 
"fraudulent" due to the fact that a number of its legislative amendments 
had nothing to do with terrorism.45 Similar concerns were expressed 
during the Select Committee hearing process by Committee Member 
Wayne Mapp MP.46 In the view of the author, those criticisms were quite 
valid. In attempting to justify the inclusion of non-terrorism specific 
provisions within the Counter-Terrorism Bill, the Select Committee 
reported to the House that, after consulting with the Minister of Justice, the 
majority of the Committee agreed that the non-terrorism specific provisions 
should remain within the Bil1. The report stated that:47 
The Minister told us that it is accepted that there are strong links 
between terrorist activity and other organised crime, such as arms 
smuggling and drug importation. However, these activities are not 
44 Including submissions and evidence by the author, the Privacy Commission and 
the New Zealand Law Society: see Submissions to the Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade Committee on the Counter-Terrorism Bill 2003, Parliamentary Library, 
Wellington. 
45 Keith Locke MP, "Counter-Terrorism Bill - First Reading", Parliamentary 
Speech, 2 April 2003, copy at URL <http://www.greens.org.ll7}searchdocs! 
speech6173.html> at 1 July 2003. See also the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee report on the Counter-Terrorism Bill, above n 2, 13. 
46 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee Hearing on the Counter-
Terrorism Bill, Old Parliament House (Room 0.003), Wellington, 15 May 2003. 
47 Above n 2,3. 
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always associated with terrorism and terrorist acts are essentially the 
same as ordinary criminal offences committed with a different motive. 
The investigative powers contained in the bill are critical to allowing 
police to identify terrorist activity effectively. Therefore, we do not 
believe it is possible to make this distinction in legislating for 
investigation of these activities. 
With all due respect to the majority of the Committee and the Minister of 
Justice, the analysis within this chapter of section 198B of the Summary 
Proceedings Act does not support that position. The provision applies to 
the investigation of any offences punishable by imprisonment, the greater 
majority of which will fall outside any link between terrorism and 
organised crime. Furthermore, it has been shown (in the preceding 
discussion advocating reform) that section 198B could, in fact, have been 
enacted in a way that restricts its application to counter-terrorism. 
Significantly, the upshot of this concern is not limited to matters of 
domestic politics and internal wranglings to extend State powers. New 
Zealand's enactment of generally applicable provisions under the specific 
vehicle of the Counter-Terrorism Act is also contrary, in the author's view, 
to the international guidelines on counter-terrorism discussed in Chapter 
Five. Although these guidelines have been characterised by the author as 
"soft law", it has been posited that they are highly influential given the 
consistency between the various sources of the guidelines. They represent, 
in the view of the author, the standards generally accepted by international 
society as being applicable to the countering of terrorism in democratic 
States. 
The Guidelines advocated by the Committee of Ministers to the 
Council of Europe in July 2002 provide that where measures taken by 
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States to combat terrorism restrict human rights, those restrictions must be 
defined as precisely as possible and be necessary to the objective of 
countering terrorism.48 The Guidelines of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, presented in February 2002, provide that (to be lawful) 
limitations imposed by counter-terrorist legislation must be necessary for 
public safety and public order, and for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.49 Finally, the Draft Principles and Guidelines within 
the 2004 report of the Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights provided that:50 
Counter-terrorism measures should directly relate to terrorism and 
terrorist acts, not actions undertaken in armed conflict situations or acts 
that are ordinary crimes. 
By extending beyond counter-terrorism in its potential application, the 
author concludes that section 198B does not comply with any of these 
guidelines. New Zealand has therefore acted improperly in the passing of 
section] 98B under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. This strengthens the 
need, it is posited, for the reform proposed earlier. 
48 Council of Europe, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight Against 
Terrorism, (Council of Europe Publishing, 2002), article III(2): discussed in 
Chapter Five at 5.2.4(b) Council of Europe. 
49 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-up to the World. Conference on 
Human Rights, Report of the High Commissioner submitted pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 48/81,27 February 2002, ElCN.4/20018, Annex. Proposals 
for "further guidance" for the submission of reports pursuant to paragraph 6 of 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). Compliance with international human 
rights standards, I General Guidance: Criteria for the Balancing of Human Rights 
Protection and the Combating of Terrorism, para 4(b). 
50 Koufa KK (as Special Rapporteur), A Preliminary Framework Draft of 
Principles and Guidelines Concerning Human Rights and Terrorism, 11 August 
2004, E/CN.4/Sub.212004/47, para 9. 
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9.2 Search and Seizure, and Arrest and Detention 
Security of the person from unreasonable search and seizure IS again 
something guaranteed by both the ICCPR (article 17) and the NZBORA 
(section 21). Identified as having the potential to impact upon these rights 
are sections 12 and 13 of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972 (ACA), which set 
out powers of search of passengers, baggage and cargo. Section 17 of the 
Act also confers certain powers, upon an aircraft commander, to search 
persons on an aircraft. In the context of international terrorist emergencies, 
section 1O(2)(b), (d) and (e) of the lnternational Terrorism (Emergency 
Powers) Act 1987 (ITEPA) confers upon police (and mi1itary acting as an 
aid to the police) various powers of entry into, or seizure of, or destruction 
of, property. Similar to the ACA, section 12 of the Maritime Crimes Act 
1999 (MCA), confers upon a ship master and crew certain powers of search 
of a person or baggage on a ship. 
Arrest and detention are matters that strike at the heart of personal 
security and are impacted upon by various provisions of the ICCPR 
(articles 9 and 10) and the Bill of Rights (sections 22 to 24 inclusive). 
Authorisations to arrest and detain are included within the ACA, ITEP A 
and the MCA. Section 15 of the Aviation Crimes Act confers upon an 
aircraft commander certain powers of restraint and forced disembarkation. 
Similarly, section 11 of the Maritime Crimes Act authorises a ship captain 
to detain and surrender a person who commits an offence relating to ships 
(offences under section 4 of that Act). Section 1O(2)(a), (c) and (g) of the 
International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act conferring powers upon 
police (and military acting as an aid to the police) to restrict entry and 
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require the evacuation of premises. Although the latter provisions may not 
be the same as 'detention', they do otherwise impact upon personal 
security and freedom of movement and will therefore be considered. 
9.2.1 Defining the Rights and Freedoms 
Rishworth's four-step application of the New Zealand Bill of Rights first 
asks whether the provisions identified establish a limit(s) upon rights. It is 
necessary, in doing so, to define the rights involved and demonstrate that 
they operate in the circumstances to which the identified provisions apply. 
In plain terms, the questions to ask are (1) what is the scope ofthe freedom 
from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) what is the scope of the 
freedom from arbitrary detention and the rights that flow from one's arrest 
or detention? 
9.2.1(a) Freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. In very simple 
terms, this freedom does not prohibit the search and seizure of a person or 
of premises or other item';; within the possession or control of a person 
(e.g., vehicles, lockers, bags, correspondence, and the like). The freedom 
prohibits the unreasonable search and seizure of the person or those things. 
Thus, reflecting Butler's analysis of rights, the human right in question 
involves a 'definitional balancing' (whereby a right by its very expression 
- envisages and permits a limitation upon its content and effect).51 
The right under section 21 of the NZBORA incorporates two important 
developments from the traditional common law notions of 
'unreasonableness' and 'search'. Section 21 is broader in its application 
51 Butler A, "Limiting Rights", (2002) 33 Victoria University of Wellington Law 
Review 537,541-544. 
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than the common law protection of property rights, instead including the 
protection of "those values or interests which make up the concept of 
privacy".52 Thus, in general terms, section 21 will be triggered by the 
invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 53 The second distinction 
to be made between the common law and Bill of Rights protection is in the 
detennination, and consequences of, whether a search and seizure is 
'unreasonable'. Like the common law, this question is ultimately 
dependent upon the actual exerCise of a search and/or seIzure. 
Reasonableness, as concluded by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v 
Jeffries, can only be assessed in light of the facts and circumstances of a 
particular case. 54 Unlike the common law, however, illegality is not the 
touchstone of unreasonableness. In plain words, an illegal search will not 
necessarily invalidate that search, if it is exercised reasonably. 55 
Albeit brief, this definition of the freedom from unreasonable search 
and seizure exposes an important limit upon the ability of this thesis to 
examine the provisions of New Zealand's counter-terrorist legislation 
identified. Determining whether a search is unreasonable will ultimately 
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The most 
that can be considered here, it is posited, is whether the legislative 
provisions are framed in such a way that they exclude the exercise of a 
reasonable search. The position is almost identical in the case of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits the 
52 R v Jeffries [1994] 1 NZLR 290,319. 
53 Rishworth, above n 35, 421. 
54 Above n 52, 306. See also Rishworth, ibid, 434. 
55 Rishworth, ibid, 434-435. See also R v Jeffries, above n 52, and R v Grayson 
and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399, 405. 
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"arbitrary" or unlawful interference with a person's privacy, their family, 
home or correspondence.56 This thesis restricting itself to the analysis of 
legislative provisions, rather than the various and potentially unlimited 
manner in which they might be applied, all that can be said is that 
legislative authorisations to search must not be framed in a way that they 
require an arbitrary interference with privacy. 
Formulating the latter points into a useful question for the analysis of 
New Zealand's counter-terrorist legislation: do the counter-terrorist 
provisions authorise search and seizure in such a way that they either 
exclude the exercise of a reasonable (and non-arbitrary) search? If the 
answer is yes, then the provisions prima facie offend the ICCPR and 
NZBORA and will require further consideration. If, however, the 
provisions are not framed in such a way if they permit a reasonable and 
non-arbitrary exercise of search - then that is all that can be expected of a 
legislative authority to search. 
9.2.1 (b) Freedom from arbitrary detention, and rights flowing frOln arrest 
or detention. The rights and freedoms associated with arrest and detention 
fall within two categories. First, there is the freedom from arbitrary arrest 
or detention guaranteed under section 22 of the NZBORA57 and article 9(1) 
of the ICCPR.58 Next are the specific rights triggered upon a person's 
56 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 17(1). See also 
Conte, Davidson and Burchill, above n 7, chapter 7. 
57 Section 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides that "Everyone 
has the right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained". 
58 Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
guarantees that "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are 
established by law". 
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arrest or detention, codified under section 23 of the NZBORA59 and the 
balance of article 9 of the ICCPR. 60 The rights triggered include the right 
to be informed of the reasons for one's arrest, and the prompt 
determination of bail. 61 
The most that can be done within this part of the chapter is to consider 
whether the counter-terrorist provisions in question either (1) exclude a 
non-arbitrary arrest or detention; and/or (2) exclude the exercise of any 
59 Section 23 of the New Zealand Bm of Rights Act 1990 provides: 
23. Rights of persons arrested or detained 
(1) Everyone who is arrested or who is detained under any enactment-
(a) Shall be informed at the time of the arrest or detention of the reason for it; and 
(b) Shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and to be 
informed of that right; and 
(c) Shall have the right to have the validity of the arrest or detention determined 
without delay by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the arrest or 
detention is not lawful. 
(2) Everyone who is arrested for an offence has the right to be charged promptly 
or to be released. 
(3) Everyone who is arrested for an offence and is not released shall be brought as 
soon as possible before a court or competent tribunal. 
(4) Everyone who is-
(a) Arrested; or 
(b) Detained under any enactment-
for any offence or suspected offence shall have the right to refrain from making any 
statement and to be informed of that right. 
(5) Everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect 
for the inherent dignity of the person. 
60 Paragraphs 2 to 5 of article 9 to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provide: 
2. Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for 
his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. 
3. Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before 
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be 
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule 
that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to 
guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial proceedings, and, 
should occasion arise, for execution of the judgement. 
4. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 
5. Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have an 
enforceable right to compensation. 
61 A comparison between the provisions of section 23 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights discloses that the rights triggered upon arrest and detention are not 
identical between documents. Ultimately, however, this is not a matter of import 
for the purpose of this chapter, since the examination limits itself to whether the 
provisions being examined exclude any of the rights. 
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rights triggered following arrest or detention. 62 If they do not then, again, 
this is the most that can be expected of a statutory authorisation to detain or 
arrest. 
9.2.2 Aviation Crimes Act 1972 
Section 12(1) of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972 (ACA) authorises the 
search of a passenger or their baggage prior to boarding any aircraft in New 
Zealand,63 but only with the passenger's consent.64 Given that the search 
can only be undertaken by consent, it is concluded that the authority under 
section 12(1) of the ACA does not exclude the exercise of a reasonable and 
non-arbitrary search and is therefore compliant with the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act. Furthermore, subsection (4) sets out limitations on the 
power of search which promote a reasonable search. In the search of a 
person, the person cannot be required to remove anything more than a coat 
or similar item.65 Female passengers must be searched by a female, unless 
the search is conducted by means of any mechanical or electronic device.66 
Section 12(5) also contains an authority to search, this time in respect of 
any cargo to be loaded onto any aircraft in New Zealand. Again, there is 
nothing in that authority preventing a reasonable and non-arbitrary search 
of the cargo. 
62 As was done in the context of the freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure, discussed above at 9.2.1(a) Freedom j1'om unreasonable search and 
seizure. 
63 Such a search may be conducted by the New Zealand police, any aviation 
security officer (as defined by the Act), any customs officer, or any employee of 
thc can'ier or person authorised by the carrier: section 12(1). 
64 Failure to give consent allows the carrier to refuse to carry the person and/or 
their baggage: section 12(2). 
65 Section 12(4)(a). 
66 Section 12(4)(b). 
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Where a person refuses to consent to a search, this has the potential to 
permit a search without consent by a member of the New Zealand police 
under section 13 of the ACA. Section 13(1) authorises a police officer to 
conduct a search without warrant if the officer has reasonable grounds67 to 
suspect that a crime against the ACA has been, is being, or is likely to be 
committed (hijacking, crimes in connection with hijacking, crimes relating 
to aircraft, or crimes relating to international airports).68 The officer can 
detain the passenger for the purpose of that search and may take possession 
of any item listed in section lIed) of the Act (firearms, explosives, 
dangerous weapons, and the like).69 Section 13 does not demand arbitrary 
or unreasonable searches, nor does it demand arbitrary detention or purport 
to exclude rights upon arrest or detention. 
Once passengers are onboard an aircraft, certain rights of search and 
detention are vested in the aircraft commander under section 15 of the 
ACA, who may request any member of the crew or any person onboard the 
aircraft to execute the search or detention.70 Where an aircraft commander 
has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has, or is about to, carry 
out certain acts,71 then he or she can take "such reasonable measures, 
67 Section 13(2) makes it clear that the fact of refusal to be searched cannot, by 
itself, constitute reasonable grounds for suspecting that a crime against the Act 
has been, is being, or is likely to be committed. 
68 See discussion on crimes against the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, Chapter Three 
at 3.6 Aviation Crimes Act 1972. 
69 Section 13(I)(b). 
70 This 'delegation' of the authority vested in the aircraft commander is contained 
in sections 15(2) and 17 of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972. 
71 Those acts being (section 15(1) of the Act: 
(a) Anything which is an offence under the law of the country in which the aircraft 
is registered (not being a law of a political nature or a law based on racial or 
religious discrimination); or 
(b) Anything (whether an offence or not) which jeopardises or may jeopardise-
(i) The safety of the aircraft or of persons or property all board the aircraft; 
or 
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including restraint" as may be necessary to achieve certain prescribed 
ends.72 Any restraint must be discontinued once the aircraft ceases to be in 
flight, unless the aircraft commander has obtained the consent of the 
appropriate domestic authorities to continue the restraint and deliver the 
person to those authorities.73 It is concluded that section 15 does not 
demand an arbitrary detention, not seek to exclude the triggering of rights 
upon detention, although the exercise of those rights is likely to be delayed 
due to the exigencies of air traveL Indeed, the provision contains 
mechanisms seeking to ensure that any restraint is proper, triggering the 
authority only where there are reasonable grounds to suspect certain 
activity and even then only permitting reasonable measures to be taken. 
Finally, section 17 of the Act authorises the search of any person or 
baggage where the aircraft commander has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that a crime against the ACA has been, is being, or is likely to be 
committed. Section 17 also allows the seizure of any article found which 
could be used to effect or facilitate the commission of such a crime. 
Section 17, it is concluded, also complies with the and ICCPR. 
9.2.3 Maritime Crimes Act 1999 
The Maritime Crimes Act 1999 confers upon the master of a New Zealand 
ship rights of search and delivery, similar to those conferred upon an 
(ii) Good order and discipline on board the aircraft, 
72 The measures taken by the aircraft commander must be reasonable and 
necessary for the following purposes (section 15(1) of the Act): 
(c) To protect the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property on board the 
aircraft; or 
(d) To maintain good order and discipline on board the aircraft; or 
(e) To enable the commander to disembark or deliver that person in accordance 
with subsection (4) or subsection (5) of this section. 
73 Section 15(3). 
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aircraft commander, although the powers of a ship master are much less 
than those of an aircraft commander. The first such distinction is that a 
ship master is only authorised to deliver a person to authorities where he or 
she suspects that a crime relating to ships 74 has occurred. The Act is 
otherwise devoid of any express authority to detain or restrain a person, 
whether following the commission of such a crimes, or upon suspicion that 
an offence is being, or is likely to be, committed. Consideration of the 
NZBORA and ICCPR is therefore not necessary. 
A limited right of search and seizure does, however, exist. Where the 
master of a ship believes on reasonable grounds that a crime against the 
MCA has been, is being or is likely to be committed on board the ship, 
section 12 of the Act allows the master or crew to search a person (and 
their baggage) where there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she 
is involved in the offending.75 Search of any baggage which is believed, on 
reasonable grounds, to contain any article that has been used or could be 
used to effect of facilitate the commission of a crime under the Act is also 
authorised. 76 Section 12 clearly imports the need for searches to be based 
upon reasonable grounds and does not purport to require arbitrary or 
unreasonable searches. It is concluded that the Maritime Crimes Act does 
not offend human rights. 
74 As set out in section 4 of the Act: see discussion in Chapter Three at 3.9 
Maritime Crimes Act 1999. 
75 Section 12(2)(a) and (b). 
76 Section 12 (2)( c). 
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9.2.4 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 
Section 10(2) of the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 
confers upon police (and military acting as an aid to police) various powers 
where an international terrorist emergency is declared. 77 Although the 
powers conferred are not expressly those of detention or seizure, they are 
worth considering in brief. The powers under section 10(2) loosely fall 
within four categories. The first is the power to enter, and if necessary 
break into, any premises or place or vehicle which is within the area in 
which the terrorist emergency is occurring. Although this is a right of 
entry, and one that clearly impacts upon property rights, the power is not 
one that authorises investigatory search and seizure and does not, it is 
posited, impact upon human rights.78 The power is presumably meant to 
allow counter-terrorist agents to enter and occupy premises or vehicles for 
the purpose of observation or to facilitate other aspects of a counter-
terrorist operation. 
The next category of authorisations concerns the ability of the police or 
military to direct and restrict the movement of persons. Although 
associated with security of the person, these powers do not appear to 
77 The declaration of an international terrorist emergency is discussed in Chapter 
Three at 3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. 
78 The distinction needs to be made between property rights versus human rights 
(the former not a matter within the scope of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
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impact upon arrest and detention rights, but instead upon the freedom of 
movement. The relevant parts of section 10 provide: 
Subject to this Act, any member of the Police may, for the purpose of 
dealing with any emergency to which this section applies, or of 
preserving life or property threatened by that emergency,-
(a) Require the evacuation of any premises or place (including any 
public place), or the exclusion of persons or vehicles from any 
premises or place (including any public place), within the area in 
which the emergency is occurring: 
(c) Totally or partially prohibit or restrict public access, with or 
without vehicles, on any road or public place within the area in 
which the emergency is occurring: 
(g) Totally or partially prohibit or restrict land, air, or water traffic 
within the area in which the emergency is occurring. 
These provisions clearly restrict the freedom of movement of persons made 
subject to directions issued under the provisions. In contrast, section 18( 1) 
of the NZBORA and article 12(1) of the ICCPR guarantee that every 
person shall enjoy the freedom of movement. One must therefore consider, 
by application of Rishworth's Step 2, whether these limitations upon the 
freedom of movement are 'consistent' with the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 by application of section 5 of that Act. The author takes the view 
that this is a clear situation in which statutory limitations are justified under 
section 5. The objective of the provisions is a pressing and substantial one 
(dealing with an international terrorist emergency and preserving life or 
property threatened by that emergency). The provisions rationally pursue 
that objective, by reasonable means, that are proportionate to the objective. 
Proportionality is achieved by expressly limiting the powers for the 
purpose of dealing with any emergency under the Act, or of preserving life 
or property threatened by that emergency. Proportionality is also met 
through the strict time limitations applicable to the 'life' of a terrorist 
emergency (sections 6 to 8) and the consequent availability of the 
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powers?9 It is posited that the powers are also III accord with the 
permissible limitations upon the freedom of movement expressed within 
article 12(3) of the ICCPR, allowing restrictions "which are provided by 
law, [and] are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre 
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others". 
The third category of powers relates to property rights, authorising 
police or the military to remove any type of vehicle80 that is within the area 
in which an emergency is occurring or is impeding measures to deal with 
the emergency.81 Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that any 
property within the emergency area constitutes a danger to any person, that 
property may be destroyed.82 Again, these affect property rights, which are 
outside the scope of consideration within this thesis. It is likely, however, 
that those limitations upon property rights are justifiable by application of 
principles of necessity and proportionality. 
The final power is one of requisition of property, somewhat akin to 
seizure, but outside the parameters of criminal procedure. The power of 
requisition relates to any property within an emergency area and, by virtue 
of the first sentence of subsection (2), is limited to achieving the purpose of 
dealing with the emergency or of preserving life or property threatened by 
the emergency. 83 As for the restrictions upon the freedom of movement, 
the author again concludes that the objective is sufficiently important and 
the means proportional to justify the limitation upon the freedom from 
79 Discussed in Chapter Three at 3.8 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) 
Act 1987. 
80 Whether aircraft, hovercraft, ship, ferry, train or vehicle (section 1O(2)(d) of the 
Act). 
81 Section 10(2)( d). 
82 Section IO(2)(e). 
83 Section 1O(2)f). 
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unreasonable search and seizure. It is even open to conclude that the 
provision does not 'limit' the freedom as such but merely authorises the 
'reasonable' seizure of property (permissible within the expression of the 
freedom itself). 
9.2.5 Summmy 
Although the three items of legislation examined contain provisions 
authorising (or relating to) search and seizure, and arrest and detention, it 
has been concluded that these provisions are not in breach of either the Bill 
of Rights or the International Covenant. The Aviation Crimes Act and 
Maritime Crimes Act include a number of authorisations to search and 
detain, none of which demand an arbitrary or unreasonable search or 
detention, nor exclude the operation of rights that are triggered when a 
person is arrested or detained. It has been concluded that this is the most 
that can be expected of authorising legislation. Notwithstanding this, there 
are mechanisms within the provisions directing that search and detention 
are to be conducted in a reasonable way and based upon reasonable 
grounds. 
The International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act provides the 
police and military with emergency powers during an "international 
terrorist emergency". Most of those powers impact upon property rights, 
rather than civil and political rights. Section lO(2)(a), (c) and (g) impact 
upon and limit the freedom of movement, although it has been concluded 
that this is consistent with both section 5 of the Bill of Rights and article 
12(3) of the International Covenant. The authority to requisition property 
within an emergency area has likewise been concluded to be justified. 
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9.3 Privacy and Surveillance 
Authorisations to intercept communications and attach tracking devices to 
people or property are to be found within the International Terrorism 
(Emergency Powers) Act 1987 (ITEPA) and amendments to other 
legislation effected through the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 (CTA). As 
summarised in Chapter Three, section 10(3) of the ITEPA authorises the 
police to intercept private communications within an area in which an 
international terrorist emergency is occurring, with qualifying provisions 
concerning the use of such communications (sections 18 to 20 inclusive). 
Sections 7B, 8 and 26 of the CTA extend the ability of police to obtain 
warrants to intercept private communications relating to terrorist offences 
(by amending section 312 of the Crimes Act 1961). Section 27 of the CTA 
also amended the definition of "security" within the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969, having implications upon the issuing of 
interception and seizure warrants. It will be relevant, in the examination of 
the latter interception capabilities, to consider the principles set out in the 
Telecommunications (Interception Capability) Act 2004. Finally, section 
34 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 authorises police or customs officers 
to obtain a warrant to attach a tracking device to any property or person 
where it is suspected that an offence has been, is being, or will be 
committed (by adding new sections 200A to 2000 of the Summary 
Proceedings Act). 
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9.3.1 International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 
The International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act (ITEPA) authorises 
the police84 to intercept private communications85 under section 10(3) of 
the Act. This authority is restricted by various qualifications. Firstly, 
private communications that may be subject to interception are only those 
communications in the area in which an emergency is occurring, with that 
authority only existing during the 'life' of the emergency. 86 Next, the 
interception must be for the purpose of preserving life that is threatened by 
an international terrorist emergency. Where a communication is 
intercepted, section 18 prohibits the subsequent disclosure of the contents 
of the communication (except in the performance of the police officer's 
duty under the Act). Private communications may be produced in evidence 
in court, so long as prior notice and disclosure is given,87 and only in 
respect of proceedings concerning any offence related to the terrorist 
emergency. 88 
In the author's view, these qualifications render the interference with 
privacy both reasonable and proportional. By application of the principle 
generalia specialibus non derogant, the authority is not limited by the 
provisions of the Privacy Act, other than in the storage or subsequent 
84 This authority does not extend to members of the armed forces acting as an aid 
to the civil power: section 10(4) of the Act. 
85 Section 2 of the Act defines "private communications": 
(a) means a communication (whether in oral or written form or otherwise) made 
under circumstances that may reasonably be taken to indicate that any party to 
the communication desires it to be confined to the parties to the 
communication; but 
(b) does not include such a communication occurring in circumstances in which 
any party ought reasonably to expect that the communication may be 
intercepted by some other person not having the express or implied consent of 
any party to do so. 
86 Section 10(3) of the Act. 
87 Section 19 of the Act. 
88 Section 20 of the Act. 
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disclosure of the information. 89 Likewise, the authority appears to be 
entirely compatible with article 17 of the International Covenant and the 
international guidelines on reasonableness and proportionality. 
9.3.2 Crimes Act 1961 
Under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003, section 312N of the Crimes Act 
1961 was amended to make interception warrants available for the 
investigation of terrorism-related offences,90 or conspiracy to commit such 
offences.91 By implied repeal, the issuing of such warrants is unaffected by 
the Privacy Act. Again, article 17 of the ICCPR is satisfied by the fact that 
section 312N is a statutory authority which does not itself authorise 
arbitrary interception. 
On the question of reasonableness and proportionality, the author takes 
the view that this extension is both reasonable and proportional. In its 
report to Parliament, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee 
pointed to the fact that there is no express international requirement to 
intercept communications pertaining to terrorist offences, but argued that 
such a power is necessary to provide for the effective investigation of such 
offences. 92 The interception of private communications, it explained, 
might be necessary "to prove certain elements of terrorist offences, such as 
89 See Chapter Five at 5.6 Counter-Terrorism and Privacy. 
90 "Terrorist offence" is defined under section 312A of the Crimes Act as any 
offence against sections 7 to 13 (including 13A) of the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002. Interestingly, this does not include the bioterrorism offences enacted under 
the Counter-Terrorism Act, resulting in new sections 298A, 298B and 307 A of the 
Crimes Act, which make it an offence to cause disease or sickness in animals; 
contaminate food, crops, water or other products. 
91 Sections 8 and 26 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003: see the report of the 
select committee, above n 2, 7. The amendment inserted subsections (c) ("a 
terrorist offence") and (d) ("a conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence") into 
section 312N of the Crimes Act 1961. 
92 Above n 2,8. 
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knowledge that an entity was designated".93 The author agrees entirely 
with this position. Counter-terrorism (including New Zealand's 
contribution to achieving an effective international framework on counter-
terrorism) is a pressing and substantial objective justifying proportional 
limitations upon rights in furtherance of that objective. 94 
9.3.3 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 
The next statutory amendment effected under the Counter-Terrorism Act 
2003 is the definition of "security" within the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969 (NZSIS Act). The definition, under section 
2 of the latter Act, now includes "the prevention of any terrorist act and of 
any activity relating to the carrying out or facilitating of any terrorist act".95 
Section 4A of the NZSIS Act authorises the issuing of interception and 
seizure warrants for the purpose of detecting activities prejudicial to 
"security". The grounds upon which the Minister in charge of the Security 
Intelligence Service and the Commissioner of Security Warrants96 can 
issue interception warrants is thereby broadened to include the detection of 
activities, or the gathering of information, for the prevention of terrorist 
acts.97 
93 Ibid. 
94 Chapter Five at 5.4.2 Application of the Substantive Test under section 5. 
95 Definition (d) of "security" under section 2 of the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Act 1969. 
96 The Commissioner of Security Warrants is a former High Court Judge, 
appointed under section SA of the Act by the Governor-General on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister (following consultation with the Leader of 
the Opposition). 
97 This is through the combined affect of the section 2 definition of "security" and 
the first-stated grounds for the issuing of an interception warrant under section 
4A(3) of the Act. 
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The first comment to make about this authority is conceptual, or moral, 
rather than legal. Professor Gross talks of national security as a pursuit 
which is both a duty and right of the State and in respect of which privacy 
can be validly interfered with. 98 Although not in the same terms, the 
Human Rights Committee has also spoken of individual privacy as being a 
relative matter - relative, that is, to the individual's membership of society 
and societal needs.99 Both those positions are correct in the view of the 
author. Importantly, however, it is implicit in the view of the Human 
Rights Committee that this is a balancing Act. The national interest should 
not justify the imposition of an unchecked power of the State to spy on its 
people. 100 
Applying these ideas to the legislative structure by which the Security 
Intelligence Service is able to obtain an interception warrant, the author 
concludes that there are proper checks and balances upon the issuing of 
such warrants. An interception warrant can only by issued by the Minister 
in charge of the Service jointly with the Commissioner of Security 
Warrants for a domestic interception warrant or by the Minister alone for a 
fi .. . 101 . oreign mterceptIon warrant. Once satIsfied that an interception warrant 
is necessary for the detection of, or gathering information relating to, 
activities prejudicial to security, the Director of Security must satisfy other 
factors: (1) the value of the information sought must justify the 
98 Gross E, "The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism. Protection of 
Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest - the Proper 
Balance" (2004) 37(1) Cornell International Law Journal 27, 31: discussed in 
Chapter Five at 5.6 Counter-Terrorism and Privacy. 
99 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 6, Article 17, 
HRIIGEN/I/Rev.l (1988), para 7. 
100 The concept of a "big brother" society. See Orwell G, 1984 (Harcourt Brace 
and Company, 1949). 
101 Section 4A(1) and (2). 
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interception; (2) the information is not likely to be obtained by other 
means; and (3) the information is not privileged in proceedings in a court 
of law. These various restrictions make the legislation both reasonable and 
proportional. 
9.3.4 Telecommunications (Interception Capabilities) Act 2004 
A small point to note in the context of the interception of communications 
is that the Telecommunications (Interception Capabilities) Act 2004 
requires telecommunications providers to be capable to intercept 
communications when required to do so under an interception warrant. 
Notably, the actual interception must be carried out "without unduly 
interfering with any telecommunications", adding a further, practical, 
safeguard. 102 
9.3.5 Tracking devices 
The final statutory amendment under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003 
concerns the introduction of tracking devices, through the creation of new 
sections 200A to 2000 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. Despite the 
number of provisions involved, their effect is relatively simple. What 
follows is an overview of the regime by which warrants to use tracking 
devices 103 may be made, as weB as the special power to use a device 
without a warrant. Consideration will then be given to the question of 
102 Telecommunications (Interception Capabilities) Act 2004, section 6(b). 
103 A tracking device is defined under section 200A of the Act as a device that, 
when installed in or on anything, can be used to ascertain the location of a thing or 
person, or whether something has been opened, tampered with or in some way 
dealt with. 
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checks and balances and the broad, rather than counter-terrorism-specific, 
nature of the authorising provisions. 
9.3.5(a) The general regime authorising the use of tracking devices. 
Section 200B of the Summary Proceedings Act allows an authorised 
officer to apply to the District or High Court for a tracking device warrant. 
The Counter-Terrorism Bill was initially to allow any "authorised public 
officer" to do so, allowing any officer of a government agency to apply for 
a warrant to enforce any law.104 Agreeing with submitters that this would 
give an important power to too wide a scope of government officers, the 
Select Committee successfully recommended that the authority be limited 
to "authorised officers", defining that term to include only the police and 
customs. 105 
To issue a tracking device warrant, the Judge hearing the application 
must be satisfied: 106 
(a) that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence has 
been, is being, or will be committed; and 
(b) that information that is relevant to the commission of the offence 
(whether or not including the whereabouts of any person) can be 
obtained through the use of a tracking device; and 
(c) that it is in the public interest to issue a warrant, taking into 
account the seriousness of the offence, the degree to which 
privacy or property rights are likely to be intruded upon, the 
usefulness of the information likely to be obtained, and whether it 
is reasonably practicable for the information to be obtained in 
another way. 
104 Counter-Terrorism Bill 2003, clause 34. 
105 Section 200A of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. See the report of the 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, above n 2, II. 
106 The matters specified are those required to be within the belief of the officer 
making the application (section 200B(2)), with the presiding judge needing to be 
satisfied that those matters have been met (section 200C«(l)). 
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Once a warrant is issued (upon terms directed by the COurt),107 the 
authorised officer can install, remove, maintain and monitor the tracking 
device and is permitted to take certain steps, including entry into premises, 
to do SO.108 
9.3.5(b) The use oftracldng devices without a warrant. More controversial 
is the ability for a police or customs officer to use a tracking device without 
a warrant. This authority exists where the officer believes on reasonable 
grounds that a court would issue a warrant (that is, that a Judge would be 
satisfied of the grounds identified above) and that, in all the circumstances, 
it is not reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant. The officer concerned, 
within 72 hours of installing a tracking device, must either remove it, cease 
monitoring it, or apply for a warrant to continue use of it-109 
number of public submissions proposed that this authority was 
excessive and unnecessary, although the Select Committee disagreed, 
pointing to the occasional and inevitable need to react to ernergenciesYo 
In what may have been an attempt to placate criticisms of the power, the 
Committee succeeded in introducing a requirement, whenever a tracking 
device is used without an accompanying warrant, for the officer to lodge a 
written report with the District or High Court on matters concerning the 
107 See section 200C of the Act. This includes the need for the court to direct the 
period for which a tracking device warrant is valid, which cannot be more than 60 
days, without renewaL See section 200F on renewal of warrants. 
108 Section 200D of the Act. 
109 Section 2000 of the Act. 
110 See the report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, above n 
2, 11-12. 
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installation of the device and the circumstances in which it came to be 
installed. III 
9.3.5(c) Checks and balances. The issue of checks and balances in the use 
of tracking devices was a matter of particular concern to the New Zealand 
Privacy Commissioner. 112 In the process of the issuing of warrants to use 
tracking devices, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee has 
pointed to the involvement of the courts (determining whether or not a 
warrant should be issued) as an adequate safeguard against abuse of the 
process. ll3 In the case of tracking devices used without a warrant, the 
checking mechanisms exist through sections 200G and 200R. Firstly, 
section 200G(S) provides civil and criminal immunity to an officer acting 
under the authority of section 200G, unless the officer "acts in bad faith or 
without reasonable care". Secondly, the requirement to report to the court 
was pointed to by the Committee as a further judicial safeguard. 114 Reports 
under section 200R are to be considered by a judge of the District or High 
Court, with that judge having the ability to refer a copy of the report, with 
any comments or recommendations, to the chief executive of the New 
Zealand Police or Customs, or to the responsible Minister. ll5 
Concerning the use of tracking devices, both with and without a 
warrant, the Privacy Commissioner submitted to the Select Committee that 
an offence provision was an essential component of the scheme if it was to 
111 Section 200H(2) of the Act. 
112 See the Report by the Privacy Commissioner to the Minister of Justice in 
relation to the Counter-Terrorism Bill, 7 February 2003, available online at URL 
<http://www.privacy.org.nz/people/countter.html> at 10 March 2005. 
113 Above n 2, 12. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Section 200H(4) and (5) of the Act. 
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fully protect privacy. In his report to the Minister of Justice, the 
Commissioner said: 116 
I support the scheme proposed in this bill for the authorisation of the 
use of tracking devices for law enforcement purposes. However, that 
scheme is incomplete without the accompaniment of an offence 
provision. Without an offence provision the law is silent in respect of 
the covert use of tracking devices by citizens against other citizens, 
notwithstanding the effect on privacy. The law does not explain what 
happens if an official fails to obtain a warrant or otherwise disregards 
or breaches the statutory. scheme... An offence provision would also 
mean that public officials, whether authorised or not, could not use 
tracking devices for purposes not contemplated by this scheme (such as 
investigating behaviour which does not constitute an offence). 
The majority of the Committee disagreed that such a provision was 
necessary, commenting (in what the author sees as an unjustifiably 
dismissive way) that "at this time, there is no evidence that the illegitimate 
use of tracking devices is a problem in New Zealand" .117 That view seems 
rather short-sighted and does not respond to the concerns of the Privacy 
Commissioner, although the Select Committee did urge the Government to 
consider the recommendation of the Privacy Commissioner in the near 
futureYs Although an offence provision in the nature of that 
recommended by the Commissioner was not enacted, it is notable that the 
Committee did recommend limiting an officer's immunity from civil or 
criminal liability where acting in bad faith or without reasonable care. 119 
Still, the question remains as to whether the use of tracking devices is 
adequately balanced. Are the safeguards under the Summary Proceedings 
116 Above n 112, part 3.8. 
117 Above n 2, 12. 
118 Ibid. There is currently no public indication that the Commissioner's 
recommendation is under consideration. 
119 Ibid, 35, 
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Act sufficient? The author posits that they are not, in cases of the use of 
tracking devices both pursuant to a warrant and without a warrant. 
9.3.5( d) Checks on the use of tracking devices under a warrant. The role 
of a judge in issuing a warrant certainly provides a check on whether a 
warrant should be issued in the first place, and it permits the issuing judge 
to make directions on the terms upon which a tracking device may be used. 
In doing so, a judge is required to determine whether the statutory criteria 
are met to allow for the use of tracking devices. The judge is also in a 
position to make whatever directions slhe deems appropriate for the proper 
use of the device, including the administration of justice and the 
maintenance of the right to privacy. At face value, then, the regime 
appears to be satisfactory. 
However, the concern of the author is with what may occur cifter the 
issuing of the warrant. The terms of sections 200A to 200P of the Act do 
not guarantee that the use of a tracking device under a warrant will be 
undertaken in compliance with any directions accompanying the warrant. 
There is no mechanism within the Act to either censure or otherwise deal 
with an officer using a tracking device outside the terms directed, or to 
provide any redress to a person SUbjected to the use of a tracking device in 
breach of directed terms, 120 Ultimately, the courts may be able to provide a 
remedy by excluding evidence obtained in breach of directions under a 
120 Since criminal and civil liability under section 200G is restricted to liability 
following conduct in the use of tracking devices without a warrant. Although it 
has to be said that a police officer acting outside the directions of a court warrant 
may, instead, be subject to disciplinary proceedings under the Police Regulations 
1992. One might also query whether a remedy for a victim of such interference 
might be able to claim remedies under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
for an unreasonable search. The author views this as highly doubtful, since the 
use of a tracking device is neither a "search", nor a "seizure", 
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warrant. The courts appear powerless, however, to grant any remedy for 
the interference with a person's privacy (outside directed terms) where 
there are no subsequent proceedings relying upon evidence obtained as a 
result of the use of a tracking device. In an extreme case, for example, an 
officer could obtain a warrant for one purpose, use the tracking device for 
an entirely different purpose, with no consequences upon the officer or the 
State. 
This is considerably problematic, since article 17 of the ICCPR requires 
States parties to ensure that the law protects individuals against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with their privacy.121 The author concludes, in the 
absence of mechanisms to enforce compliance and authorise remedial 
action, that the tracking device regime is in breach of the International 
Covenant. 
9.3.5( e) Checks on the use of tracking devices without a warrant. Arguing 
in favour of adequate checks in the use of tracking devices without a 
warrant (under section 200G), one would point to the fact that a police 
office must if the warrant is not extended beyond 72 hours by a judicial 
warrant - file a written report with the District or High Court giving reasons 
for using the device without warrant and outlining its installation and 
use.
122 One could also contend that the ability to use devices without 
warrant is a necessary reflection of the exigencies of law enforcement 
operations where there is no adequate opportunity to obtain a warrant, and 
point to the fact that a judge reviewing an officer's report can make 
l21 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 17(2). 
122 Section 200H(2) of the Act. 
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recommendations (including any adverse comments if appropriate) to the 
chief executive of the police or customs, or to the responsible Minister. 
The author agrees that these do act as checks upon the use of devices 
without warrant. The problem, in the view of the writer, is that these 
checks have little weight behind them. 
Section 200G(8) permits civil and criminal liability to follow where the 
use of tracking devices by an officer has been undertaken in bad faith or 
without reasonable care. However, this is a limited level of liability. Of 
particular concern to the author is the fact that the Crown is not required to 
act upon any recommendations made by a judge following a review of an 
officer's report. Again, this does not appear to provide adequate protection 
of individuals' freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with their 
privacy. 
9.3.5(j) Crown Law Office advice to the Attorney-General. In her role 
under section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Attorney-
General sought advice from the Crown Law Office concerning any 
potential inconsistency between the Counter-Terrorism Bill and the Bill of 
Rights ACt. 123 In the two letters of advice from the Solicitor-General's 
office to the Attorney-General, the use of tracking devices was the only 
matter identified as having an impact upon the NZBORA 124 The advice of 
123 For further explanation of this function, see Chapter Four at 4.1.5(de) Role of 
the Attorney-General. 
124 Letters from Crown Counsel to the Attorney-General, "Counter-Terrorism Bill 
PC04663/14 Our Ref: nATT11411124(l5)", 10 December 2002 and 11 February 
2003. 
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the office was that the tracking device scheme to be created under the 
Bill: 125 
... establishes a reasonable accommodation of law enforcement needs 
and reasonable expectations of privacy. The warrant regime is tightly 
circumscribed and while s 200G creates a warrantless tracking device 
power, that too is limited in scope and clearly available only in exigent-
type situations. 
That conclusion was arrived at by undertaking a similar analysis to that 
above. The critical difference, however, is that Crown Counsel did not 
give consideration to the question of checks and balances upon the 
potential abuse of the provisions by an officer. This, as suggested, is where 
the tracking device regime fails to satisfy section 5 of the NZBORA. 
9.3.5(g) The use of tracking devices beyond counter-terrorism. A criticism 
made earlier in this chapter concerned the use of the Counter-Terrorism 
Act as the vehicle through which to enact generally applicable powers.126 
Without revisiting those criticisms, the author posits that the earlier points 
made are also applicable to the use of the Counter-Terrorism Act to 
provide police and customs with the authority to use tracking devices for 
h f c· d' . 127 t e purpose 0 enLorcmg or mary cnmes. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This final chapter in the analysis of particular provisions of New Zealand's 
counter-terrorist legislation has considered a number of different rights and 
125 Ibid (11 February 2003), para 7. 
126 Discussed above at 9.1.6 The Application of section 198B Beyond Counter-
Terrorism. 
127 A specific concern of the Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, above n 50. 
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resulted in varying conclusions. In all cases, it has been concluded that the 
legislative provisions are valid at domestic law. The question of 
compatibility of the provisions with the International Covenant and 
international guidelines on counter-terrorism gives rise to different answers 
however. 
The regime by which police may require information of a person under 
section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 has been concluded to 
be 'valid' at domestic law by virtue of its statutory status and by 
application of section 4 of the Bill of Rights Act. The regime is, however, 
a step away from the long-held common law privilege against self-
incrimination. Where section 198B operates in respect of a person that is 
arrested or detained, it is also 'inconsistent' with the NZBORA (to the 
extent that it does not meet the section 5 justified limitations test). It is 
thereby also inconsistent with the international guidelines on counter-
terrorism and human rights. 
The search, arrest and detention authorisations under the Aviation 
Crimes Act 1972, the Maritime Crimes Act 1999 and the International 
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 have all been concluded to be 
both reasonable and proportional. It has been noted that because only the 
actual use of those authorisations will determine compliance with human 
rights, all that can be expected of authorising legislation is that it is framed 
in a way that does not demand arbitrary or disproportionate conduct. 
The provisions of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, by which use 
can be made of tracking devices, are in the main reasonable and 
proportionate. The legislative regime does not, however, adequately cater 
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for the event in which directions under warrants to use devices are 
breached, or where the use of a device without a warrant has been arbitrary 
or unreasonable. The current lack of compliance and remedial provisions 
renders the tracking device scheme in breach of both the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the international guidelines on 
counter-terrorism and human rights. 
Finally, this chapter has addressed and criticised the use of the Counter-
Terrorism Act 2003 as a vehicle through which to enact generally 
applicable law enforcement mechanisms. The amendment of the Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957 to include sections 198B (provision of information 
to access computer data) and 200A to 200P (tracking devices) are 
applicable to the investigation of any criminal offending punishable by 
imprisonment, rather than terrorist-related offending. It has been 
concluded that this is both politically unsound and in breach of the 
international guidelines on counter-terrorism. 
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The question posed in this thesis was whether the legislative means by 
which New Zealand has implemented its international counter-terrorism 
obligations comply with its domestic human rights legislation and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The answer is a 
mixed one although, broadly speaking, New Zealand's counter-terrorist 
legislation is compliant with domestic and international human rights, with 
occasional but important breaches of international human rights law and 
international guidelines on counter-terrorism. 
Counter-Terrorism 
New Zealand is a party to all twelve of the principal international 
conventions on anti-terrorism and, as a member of the United Nations, it is 
also bound by the obligations and directions of the Security Council on the 
issue of countering terrorism. It is similarly guided by the principles and 
recommendations enumerated within resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights. As a responsible 
international actor, whose domestic national interests rely upon the 
maintenance of a peaceful, secure, and free-functioning international 
society, New Zealand's implementation of its international counter-terrorist 
obligations is important not only to its compliance with those obligations 
but also to the promotion of its own interests. 
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The international counter-terrorist obligations upon New Zealand have, 
over time, prompted it to enact six items of legislation, including 
regulations made under the United Nations Act 1946. Also considered 
within this thesis has been the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) 
Act 1987. While the latter legislation was not enacted for the purpose of 
implementing New Zealand's international obligations, it nevertheless 
forms an integral part of New Zealand's legislative counter-terrorist 
framework. The New Zealand Parliament is about to consider further 
reform to this framework, under the Terrorism Suppression Amendment 
Bill (No 2) 2004, seeking to extend current designations of terrorist entities 
until a review of the principal Act has been undertaken, and making 
consequential changes to the principal Act. Terms of reference are 
currently being drawn up for the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee to undertake this review - which is to consider those provisions 
of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 that implement New Zealand's 
obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). 
The Select Committee is to undertake its review during the course of 2005 
and present a report to the House by 31 December 2005. 
General Principles on the Interface between Counter-Terrorism and 
Human Rights 
Five basic principles set the stage for the subsequent examination of New 
Zealand's counter-terrorist legislation. Firstly, terrorism adversely impacts 
upon international peace and security, international relations, States' 
territorial integrity and the enjoyment and development of rights. These 
features are integral to the functioning of a democratic society and, as such, 
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the establishment of a legislative regime to combat and suppress terrorism 
is prima facie a substantial and pressing objective in a free and democratic 
society (whether for the purpose of combating specific threats to New 
Zealand or contributing to the international anti-terrorist framework). 
Secondly, and notwithstanding the importance of counter-terrorism, it 
is clear that counter-terrorist legislation must comply with human rights. 
This is a requirement of domestic law (to a qualified extent), and also 
necessary for New Zealand to remain compliant with its obligations under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its 
membership of the United Nations. Compliance with human rights has 
been advocated by both the United Nations General Assembly and 
Commission on Human Rights. Significantly, the Security Council has 
directed under Resolution 1456 (2003) that States must ensure that 
measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under 
international law, including international human rights in particular. 
The third principle is that when talking of the need to 'comply with 
human rights' it must be remembered that human rights instruments 
themselves cater for the limitation of rights in certain circumstances. In the 
case of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) and the 
Human Rights Act 1993, this is through section 5 of the NZBORA, or 
through the particular expression of the right (the freedom from 
unreasonable search and seizure, for example). Section 5 of the NZBORA 
sets out a 'justified limitations' test, although it is subject to section 4 of the 
Act which protects an 'unjustified' limitation from invalidation by the 
courts. In the case of the Privacy Act 1993, interference with privacy is 
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only permissible to the extent that such interference either complies with 
the information privacy principles (section 6 of the Privacy Act), or is 
expressly authorised under an enactment which prevails by application of 
the principles of implied repeal or generalia specialihus non derogant. In 
the case of the ICCPR, there is no general limitations clause. In the 
absence of invoking article 4 of the Covenant to claim that a state of 
emergency exists (which New Zealand has not done), the limitation of 
rights is provided for within the particular expression of rights. 
The next matter to bear in mind concerns the different treatment within 
the ICCPR of derogable and non-derogable rights. The author has posited 
that this represents a false dichotomy and that great care should be taken in 
asserting that any right is absolute. While some rights are more significant 
than others, no right is absolute (other than, perhaps, the prohibition against 
torture). Even with what is regarded as the most fundamental human right, 
the right to life, permissible limitations are commonly recognised to exist -
for example, the taking of someone' s life is justified if that occurs in the 
defence of one's self or another and is a proportional response in the 
circumstances. 
Finally, the section 5 justified limitations test within the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act has been concluded to be consistent with international 
guidelines on meeting the challenges of counter-terrorism in compliance 
with human rights. The various international guidelines' advocacy of 
necessity, proportionality, legality, unfettered discretion, rational 
connection, and minimal impairment find favour with the section 5 test. 
Each of those factors are reflected within the justified limitations test set 
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out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Oakes and adopted by the New 
Zealand High Court in Solicitor-General v Radio New Zealand Ltd and 
subsequent relevant case-law. Thus, if a statutory provision is justifiable 
under section 5, it is also consistent with international guidelines on 
counter-terrorism and human rights. Although the international guidelines 
are in the form of 'soft law' recommendations and principles, rather than 
binding norms, the high degree of consistency between the various sources 
of the guidelines makes them highly influential. They represent the 
standards generally accepted by international society as being applicable to 
countering terrorism in democratic States. 
Limiting Rights in the Pursuit of Counter-Terrorist Objectives: 
Domestic Human Rights and International Law Implications 
Reflecting upon the application of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the 
starting point is that - in the abstract - counter-terrorist legislation that 
imposes limitations upon rights and freedoms is capable of being 'not 
invalid' under the NZBORA and therefore 'good law' from the perspective 
of a domestic court. This will arise in two situations. The first is where the 
legislation is found to be 'consistent' with the Bill of Rights by application 
of section 5 of the Act. As discussed, this will also render the legislation 
consistent with the international guidelines on counter-terrorism and 
human rights. The second situation in which legislation will be 'not 
invalid' under the Act is where the legislation is 'inconsistent' with the Bill 
of Rights (by application of section 5), but otherwise 'not invalid' by 
application of section 4. In this event, the legislation is not consistent with 
the international guidelines on counter-terrorism and human rights. 
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Various examples exist of limiting provisions within New Zealand's 
counter-terrorist legislative framework that are 'consistent' with the Bill of 
Rights under section five. The power to restrict public access within an 
area in which an "international terrorist emergency" is occurring (under 
section 10(2)(c) of the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 
1987) has been concluded to represent a justified limitation upon the 
freedom of movement. Section 1O(2)(f) of the latter Act, which authorises 
the requisitioning of property within an emergency area, is likewise a 
justified limitation upon the freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. 
The Prime Minister's power under the Act to issue media gags on 
information or material concerning an international terrorist emergency has 
also been concluded to be a justified limitation upon the freedom of 
expression, when viewed against the anticipated justiciability of such 
decisions to judicial review. Next, the operation of section 198B of the 
Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (inserted under the Counter-Terrorism Act 
2003) to the investigation of offences under the Terrorism Suppression Act 
2002, is viewed as a justified limitation upon the right to silence - although 
section 198B is broader in its authority than the investigation of terrorist-
related offending. Finally, the prohibitions, and corresponding offences, 
against the participation in, recruiting for, and financing of terrorist entities 
(sections 8, 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002) is seen as a 
justified limitation upon the freedom of association. 
At the other end of the scale, two statutory counter-terrorist provisions 
have been concluded to be 'not invalid' under the Bill of Rights, but by 
virtue only of the operation of section 4 of that Act. Firstly, it has been 
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concluded that it is not a justifiable limitation upon the right to silence for 
section 198B of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 to be capable of 
operating in the investigation of any offences punishable by imprisonment. 
Next, and significantly in the author's view, sections 38 and 39 of the 
Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 (preventing the disclosure of classified 
information upon which a terrorist designation is made) is seen as an 
unjustifiable limitation upon natural justice (audi alteram partem) but 
nevertheless 'not invalid' by application of section 4. The significance of 
these findings is that, although the provisions remain 'good law' as far as 
the New Zealand courts are concerned, they violate the international 
standards on counter-terrorism and human rights since they do not satisfy 
section 5 of the Bill of Rights. 
The final point to note concerning the application of the NZBORA is 
that, where counter-terrorist legislation is found to be 'not invalid' under 
the Act, it might nevertheless be contrary to the ICCPR (depending upon 
the expression of rights in the latter document). This occurs in one 
instance only, concerning the 'protection' of classified security information 
in the designation process under the Terrorism Suppression Act. The 
relevant provisions are considered to be 'not invalid' by application of 
section 4 of the Bill of Rights, but otherwise inconsistent with the rights to 
natural justice. They conflict, however, with article 14(1) of the 
International Covenant and find no saving provision under that instrument. 
On the subject of privacy, this thesis has proposed that counter-terrorist 
provisions to comply with the ICCPR and the international guidelines on 
counter-terrorism and human rights - must not permit arbitrary interference 
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with privacy, they must protect the individual against arbitrary or unlawful 
interference, and any interference must be reasonable and proportional. In 
all but once instance, the relevant statutory provisions examined have been 
concluded to be in compliance with those requirements. The authorisation 
to intercept communications under section 10(3) of the International 
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987 is reasonable and adequately 
restricted. The authorisation to obtain interception warrants under sections 
312N of the Crimes Act 1961 for the investigation of terrorist-related 
offences is also reasonable and adequately restricted. Finally, the ability of 
the Security Intelligence Service to obtain interception warrants under 
section 4A of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 (for 
the detection of activities, or gathering of information, for the prevention of 
terrorist acts) has been concluded to be reasonable and adequately 
restricted. In contrast, the regime under sections 200A to 200P of the 
Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (by which tracking devices may be used) 
does not adequately safeguard the individual against arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with privacy. 
Turning to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
there are two propositions made by the author concerning the manner in 
which any breach of the ICCPR might be dealt with. Applicable to both 
propositions is the idea that, notwithstanding a breach of the ICCPR, such a 
breach might in exceptional circumstances be rendered 'otherwise 
acceptable' - either at international law or from a policy perspective. The 
first proposition is that this may be the case where the legislative provision 
(or, more usually, a specific act or omission) can be justified by operation 
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of other international law principles. For example, the application of the 
defence of distress (under the principles of State responsibility) can act to 
legitimise the taking of a terrorist's life in defence of one's self or another 
in reliance upon the right to self-defence under section 48 of the Crimes 
Act 1961. 
The second, more controversial, proposition is that a violation of the 
International Covenant might be rendered 'acceptable' if the statutory 
provision limits rights in a manner justifiable under section 5 of the 
NZBORA (and, as such, in a manner consistent with the international 
guidelines on counter-terrorism and human rights). The latter proposition 
is more controversial than the first because of the 'soft law' nature of the 
international guidelines. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see the Human 
Rights Committee making an adverse comment upon a limitation on rights 
that - notwithstanding a conflict with the ICCPR - is framed in such a way 
that it is in pursuit of a pressing counter-terrorist objective, necessary to 
that end, is proportional, in legal terms, providing a discretion with 
adequate safeguards, is rationally connected to the achievement of the 
objective, and impairs the right to the most reasonably limited extent. Such 
an approach may well be deemed acceptable by the Human Rights 
Committee applying a concept akin to the 'margin of appreciation', albeit 
that the Committee does not formally recognise the notion of a margin of 
appreciation. At worst, such a limitation would stand as one grounded 
upon a justifiable policy reflecting international standards. The advocated 
reform of the terrorist designation process under the Terrorism Suppression 
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Act would, while still technically breaching the ICCPR, be a candidate for 
justification on this basis. 
Conclusions on New Zealand's Counter-Terrorist Legislation 
Returning to the thesis question, are the legislative means by which New 
Zealand has implemented its international counter-terrorism obligations 
compliant with its domestic human rights legislation and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights? In the main, they are. Of the six 
extant counter-terrorism statutes (in other words, excluding the now 
expired terrorism regulations), tensions between terrorism and human 
rights are only felt under the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) 
Act 1987, the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and the statutory reforms 
enacted under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2003. In a number of cases, the 
other items of legislation either do not effect a limitation upon rights and 
freedoms contained within the NZBORA and ICCPR, or only effect 
limitations consistent with a qualified expression of the right. In the case 
of the Aviation Crimes Act 1972, for example, the authority to search a 
passenger and his or her baggage under sections 12 and 13 of the Act a 
restricted in such a way that they only authorise reasonable search and 
seIzure. 
Furthermore, in most of the instances where a conflict between counter-
terrorist provisions and the NZBORA have been perceived to exist, these 
perceived tensions are resolved by the ability to justify the limitations 
under section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. These instances have been 
identified above, relating to: sections 1O(2)(c), 10(2)(f), 14 and 15 of the 
International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act; sections 8, 12, 13 and 
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13A of the Terrorism Suppression Act; and section 198B of the Summary 
Proceedings Act (in its operation to counter-terrorist investigations). 
Likewise, most strains between counter-terrorism and the right to freedom 
from interference with one's privacy (in the context of both the Privacy Act 
1993 and the ICCPR) are resolved through the legislative provisions 
imposing reasonable limitations upon the right and adequately protecting 
against the arbitrary, unreasonable or disproportionate interference with 
privacy. This has been found to be the case under section 10(3) of the 
International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act, section 312N of the 
Crimes Act 1961 and section 4 of the New Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service Act. 
There are, however, three specific and two general concerns about New 
Zealand's counter-terrorist legislation that see New Zealand acting in 
breach of international law and the international guidelines on counter-
terrorism and human rights, and therefore call for legislative reform. The 
first two specific concerns relate to provisions that limit rights under the 
NZBORA and are saved only by operation of section 4 of the Act. Of 
those, the first is the protection afforded to classified security information 
under the Terrorism Suppression Act designation process. This is neither 
justifiable under section 5 of the NZBO~A, nor within the expression of 
rights under article 14 of the ICCPR, so that the relevant provisions 
constitute a breach of the ICCPR that cannot be justified at law or in 
policy. In the case of requests for information made under section 198B of 
the Summary Proceedings Act (where made subsequent to a person's 
arrest), the application of this provision outside the scope of an identified 
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and pressing objective fails to satisfy the section 5 test as a justified limit 
upon section 23(4) of the NZBORA, but is 'not invalid' by operation of 
section 4. While this does not breach the ICCPR, since there is no 
comparable provision in the Covenant to section 23(4) of the NZBORA, it 
fails to comply with the international guidelines on counter-terrorism and 
human rights. The final specific concern relates to the use of tracking 
devices under sections 200A to 200P of the Summary Proceedings Act. In 
this case, the lack of safeguards against the arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with privacy by use of tracking devices renders the regime 
both in breach of article 17 of the ICCPR and the international standards on 
counter-terrorism and human rights. 
Finally, the general concerns mentioned relate to New Zealand's use of 
its international counter-terrorist obligations as an excuse to extend State 
powers beyond counter-terrorism. The enactment of sections 198B and 
200A to 200P of the Summary Proceedings Act (requests for information 
and tracking devices) was said, in the introduction to the Counter-
Terrorism Bill, to reflect "the need for New Zealand to ensure we have a 
comprehensive legislative framework in place that reflects the new, more 
dangerous era of international terrorism". However, those provisions are 
not limited to countering terrorism but instead have the potential to apply 
to the investigation of any offence punishable by imprisonment. These two 
features are thus contrary to the international guidelines on counter-
terrorism and human rights, which express that counter-terrorism measures 
should directly relate to terrorism and terrorist acts, not to acts that are 
ordinary crimes. 
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The balance between the terror capable of being induced through 
terrorist acts and the tyranny of the State over its people is one that is 
generally well-struck within New Zealand's counter-terrorist legislative 
framework. There remain, however, instances of unjustified and 
potentially excessive State powers that call for reform if New Zealand 
wishes to comply with the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and with international guidelines on counter-terrorism. 
One final question remains: where to from here? The foregoing 
discussion has suggested that legislative reform should be undertaken 
where there are breaches of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, or of the international guidelines on counter-terrorism and 
human rights. To that end, this thesis has proposed some of the more 
technical legislative amendments that could be made to achieve 
compliance. Is the Government likely to make such changes? What if it 
doesn't amend the law for the sake of compliance with human rights? 
What should the State do if legislating in the future on the subject of 
counter-terrorism? 
It is impossible to say with any certainty whether the New Zealand 
Government will adopt the reforms advocated in this thesis. To attempt to 
do so would be highly speculative and beyond the aim of this thesis. Some 
comments can be made, however, on the potential consequences of not 
reforming the identified areas of concern. Potential consequences can be 
addressed at four levels: internal judicial responses; individual complaints 
to the Human Rights Committee; periodic reporting to the Committee; and 
diplomatic relations and credibility. 
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Internal judicial responses and individual complaints to the Human 
Rights Committee are consequences that will arise through the 
consideration of the particular application of counter-terrorist provisions, 
where an individual or designated entity complains of this. Although it has 
been concluded that all legislative provisions are either 'consistent' with 
section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act or 'saved' under section 4 of the Act, the 
latter event does not preclude action by the New Zealand judiciary. In the 
case of requests for information under section 198B of the Summary 
Proceedings Act (where such requests are made outside the scope of 
counter-terrorist investigations or other pressmg and substantial 
objectives), the New Zealand courts would be entitled to make a judicial 
indication of incompatibility. The same is true of the operation of sections 
38 and 39 of the Terrorism Suppression Act in their protection of classified 
security information. In the latter instance, since this also involves a 
breach of the ICCPR, an individual could complain directly to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (after having exhausted local remedies). 
It is anticipated that the Committee would find these provisions in breach 
of article 14(1) of the Covenant and therefore demand New Zealand to 
provide effective remedies for the breach and consider legislative 
amendment to prevent further breaches. 
Independent of individual complaints, the monitoring function of the 
Human Rights Committee under the Covenant wi1l require New Zealand to 
lodge further periodic reports on the status of the enjoyment of Covenant 
rights in New Zealand. As a matter specifically mentioned by the 
Committee in its comments to New Zealand's most recent report, the 
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Committee will no doubt look to examine the question of the compliance 
of counter-terrorist legislation with the ICCPR. New Zealand will need to 
account for any violations of the Covenant and any adverse observations 
made by the Committee will be published and thereby made available in 
the public arena. As such, this also triggers the issue of diplomatic 
relations and credibility. As a State that has repeatedly advocated 
compliance with human rights at the diplomatic level, adverse comments 
and decisions against New Zealand are likely to reflect badly upon the 
State. It will certainly impact upon the credibility of the State to advocate 
human rights compliance by others. 
Finally, some comment should be made about the prospect of the New 
Zealand State enacting further counter-terrorist legislation. Regrettably, 
this thesis has argued more than once that the advice provided to the 
Attorney-General on the question of compliance of proposed counter-
terrorist legislation with the NZBORA has been inadequate. This is of 
concern not just to the question of legislating on the subject of terrorism, 
but it calls into question the efficacy of section 7 of the Bill of Rights and 
the wisdom of retaining Parliamentary sovereignty under section 4 of the 
Act. As for any other examination of Bills, the author advocates a careful 
application of section 5 when advising the Attorney-General on the 
'consistency' of potential statutory provisions with the Bill of Rights. By 
doing so, the State can be confident that it will also comply with the 
international guidelines on counter-terrorism and human rights. The State 
should also further consider whether the legislation might be in breach of 
the ICCPR, although it has been suggested in this thesis that non-
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compliance could be justified on a policy basis so long as section 5 and the 
international guidelines are complied with. 
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